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Why: Philadelphia Medevac Learjet Crash [w/ ATC Audio]

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FULL TRANSCRIPT

0:00

a devastating accident just occurred in

0:02

Philadelphia where a flight was destined

0:05

to pick up a young girl under 18 years

0:09

old who just received life-saving

0:12

treatment in Philadelphia unfortunately

0:15

as her plane went to take off to take

0:18

her back to her home in Tijana Mexico

0:21

the plane crashed in this video and just

0:24

a few hours after the accident we're

0:26

going to try to piece together how it's

0:29

possible that a Learjet 55 was able to

0:33

crash out of the sky almost like a

0:37

missile and kill everyone on board and

0:40

potentially even some on the ground this

0:44

is a

0:45

devastating occurrence it is terrible to

0:48

see this event happen and I feel so

0:50

terrible for everybody whose lost loved

0:52

ones involved I want to say I'm meet

0:55

Kevin I'm a pilot while I'm a newer

0:58

pilot I want to be clear my goal every

1:01

single day is to learn from any incident

1:03

that occurs and share my experiences in

1:05

my pilot Journey you could see more on

1:08

my Channel about that but for now we've

1:10

got to look at ATC Communications and

1:13

what trajectory this plane was supposed

1:15

to be on and what may have actually

1:18

happened because what the plane was told

1:20

to do is not what the plane did or

1:24

should I say the pilots so let's try to

1:27

piece together what happened here what

1:30

I'd like to do first is start with the

1:32

air traffic control instructions and

1:35

then I'm going to compare those

1:36

instructions to what actually happened

1:39

take a look here this is the air traffic

1:41

control uh communication recording now

1:45

you only it sounds like you only get the

1:48

tower frequency here so you're not

1:50

actually going to hear the pilots until

1:52

they switch to the tower frequency I'll

1:54

explain that in a moment but let's start

1:57

with what the initial instructions were

1:59

and then look at what they actually

2:01

did medac Med service 056 on departure

2:06

turn right hitting 2 ner0 Runway 24 for

2:09

takeoff win 250 1

2:11

0 first things first the wins are 250 at

2:15

10 knots this means they have almost a

2:18

perfect headwind and for a Learjet 10

2:21

knots of winds at a 10° offset is

2:26

essentially a

2:27

nonissue there was no mention of gusting

2:30

winds so I don't think winds were an

2:32

issue here is a rainy night this is

2:35

night time with low cloud coverage and I

2:37

think that may end up making a factor

2:40

here or playing a factor here now keep

2:42

in mind they were just cleared for

2:44

takeoff from Runway 24 and they were

2:47

instructed on takeoff uh after they've

2:50

reached the end of the runway typically

2:52

this is when the FAA expects you to

2:54

initiate your term they were asked to

2:56

turn right heading 2 ner Z is that what

2:59

the plane did well you're going to see

3:02

first this is forf flight and it'll show

3:05

you an overview of Runway 24 here is

3:08

Runway 24 at the Northeast Philadelphia

3:12

Airport if we draw an extending ruler

3:15

from the center line of the runway you

3:18

could see it lines up perfectly with

3:20

240° now why does that matter because if

3:24

I extend straight down the runway

3:28

heading and I hold that 240 look at

3:31

where this ruler intersects the freeway

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it intersects right about where these

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trees are at a straight heading notice

3:40

this right here in this area where the

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bend is of the freeway and approximately

3:46

where those trees sit this will be very

3:49

important so keep this in mind but first

3:52

I want you to see what a 29 or0 heading

3:55

actually looks like 29 or0 off of

3:59

takeoff would have looked something like

4:03

this this heading is set for 290 so if

4:07

you took off we'll go ahead and use a

4:10

different color here just so we could

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see this potentially a little bit more

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clearly we'll go with a green thicker

4:15

line here if you made it to the end of

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the runway you would have been expected

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to start your turn at the end of the

4:23

runway in a heading of 2 N or Z but

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that's not what happened here remember

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if they ended up going straight you

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would expect that the plane would

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intersect right about here where this

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green circle is right let's go ahead and

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take a look at the publicly available

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tracking data for tail number x-ray

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alpha- uniform charlie India keep in

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mind when a tail number starts with

4:47

November it's usually a Us registration

4:50

and when it starts with x-ray Alpha it's

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generally a Mexican registration which

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this indeed was in fact all the

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passengers on board of this sponsored

4:58

flight with a medical Transport company

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were sponsored now in other words the

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life-saving treatment was sponsored so

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this was sort of like a make a wish or a

5:07

charity right the FAA has also confirmed

5:11

that six people were on board a mother

5:13

the daughter who received the treatment

5:15

two uh pilots and two crew members it's

5:19

expected that all of them lost their

5:21

lives as this crash impacted near a mall

5:25

in Philadelphia but let's take a look at

5:27

that publicly available flight data so

5:30

what do we have on flight data here well

5:32

you can see here is the runway where my

5:35

mouse is and when we extend from this

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Runway what do you notice the plane is

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right there where the trees are at the

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bend in the highway and it's actually on

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a track of

5:47

240° now this doesn't tell us the

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direction of the nose at the time but it

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does tell us that the plane itself was

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moving at a direction of about 240°

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which is roughly Runway heading it means

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they have not started started their

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right turn yet and they're already at

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1,300 ft now at this point you could see

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that the aircraft has climbed about

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1,200 ft we know this because the

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airport elevation here on foreflight is

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listed at

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120 ft so after climbing about 12200 ft

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the plane is still not even to about 5°

6:25

started its turn now that's odd and and

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given that in the air traffic controller

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comms we hear an air traffic controller

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say turn right hitting 29 or Z and then

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a firm turn right hitting 29er Z and

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it's the controller saying it twice it

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makes me wonder are the pilots

6:43

distracted in the cockpit now it doesn't

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sound like there's a lot of stress when

6:48

we go through more of the data so let's

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go ahead and play the rest of what we

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have here which is an edited together

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version of what the tower frequency

6:57

hears I'll play it again from the

6:58

beginning and interrupt just to say when

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I think there are pieces cut out medac

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Med service 056 on departure turn right

7:06

hitting 2 ner0 Runway 24 for takeoff wi

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250 1 0 ini service 056 affirmative on

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departure turn right hitting 290 Runway

7:17

24 clear for takeoff now you might

7:19

wonder why didn't you hear the pilots

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there well in my opinion you didn't hear

7:24

the pilots because they were likely

7:26

transmitting on the ground frequency and

7:28

I believe that this recording is only of

7:30

the tower frequency not also of ground

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so you could hear Tower talking to both

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sides but you can't hear what they're

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saying on ground so we don't get their

7:39

voices until they're actually airborne

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and they're asked to switch from the

7:44

tower frequency to the departure

7:45

frequency which we'll hear in just a

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moment medac Med service 056 contact

7:53

departure

7:54

23.8

7:57

3.8 5 thank you good

8:00

day medac mid service

8:03

056 Northeast Tower contact Philly

8:08

23.8

8:09

23.8 they're saying this because they're

8:12

asking that the pilots transfer over to

8:15

the contact the other frequency now

8:18

initially when we heard the pilot it

8:20

didn't sound like there was any

8:22

particular cockpit distress in my

8:25

opinion the pilots may not have yet been

8:29

distressed at the time that they've

8:31

switched frequencies in fact I think

8:34

this happened very suddenly to them well

8:38

what's about to happen and I'll explain

8:40

what my impression is but we'll keep

8:42

listening medac mid service Northeast

8:46

Tower medac Med service 056 Northeast

8:49

Tower you on frequency medac M Ang here

8:51

056 Northeast Tower how do you hear this

8:53

transmission medac Med service 056

8:56

Northeast

8:57

Tower at this point it's likely that

9:00

they've already switched frequencies

9:02

they're on with the other comms they're

9:04

not on with Tower anymore and

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unfortunately the accident takes place

9:11

now what else can we glean from the

9:13

publicly available data well when we

9:15

look at the rest of the public data we

9:17

could see that the plane never enters

9:20

Its Right Turn ever all we could see is

9:25

that at 11:06 UTC we have a plane that

9:29

is still heading Runway Direction 12200

9:32

ft after Runway elevation they haven't

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even begun their right turn now the

9:37

Metar we have at this moment a couple

9:40

hours afterwards indicates broken clouds

9:43

at 700 ft it's possible that right as

9:46

they entered this 1300 ft height they

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started to get disoriented in the clouds

9:52

and this can happen even to experienced

9:55

instrument rated Pilots especially if

9:57

they're not familiar with the airport

9:59

they're not not familiar with the area

10:00

or the weather and clearly at this point

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they've forgotten already to turn right

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they might be overwhelmed with what's

10:08

going on especially if a passenger is

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potentially having issues in the back or

10:13

somebody is talking to them and they

10:15

don't actually have a sterile cockpit

10:17

unfortunately we're unlikely to know

10:19

what happened on the inside because

10:21

there's unlikely to be a voice data

10:23

recorder or cockpit recorder on this

10:25

small of a jet however I can tell you

10:28

that when you you enter clouds even as

10:31

an instrument rated pilot it can be a

10:34

moment of adjustment or call for a

10:36

moment of AD adjustment I was just

10:39

flying a multi-engine plane yesterday

10:41

and the feeling of transitioning from I

10:44

can see the Horizon to wow I'm looking

10:48

at a wall of clouds and the clouds are

10:50

the same color as the water under me

10:52

that's flying at around 400 p.m. and we

10:54

had such an overcast day that everything

10:56

looked like I was looking into a

10:58

seamless on a studio set as in there was

11:00

no Horizon anymore it can take a moment

11:03

to adjust and look okay let's get into

11:07

instrument mode look down how's my

11:10

altitude how is my air speed and how is

11:12

my headache we already know that they've

11:14

lost sight of their heading because they

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never initiated their turn the only

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thing that's next to make a big oopsy

11:22

when you start getting into the clouds

11:25

is you accidentally pitch the nose up

11:27

too high especially if you're loaded to

11:30

the rear now when people hear Jets we

11:33

regularly think that jets are extremely

11:35

powerful but as a jet owner myself

11:39

somebody who owns uh a slightly smaller

11:42

than the uh Learjet 55 but a Phenom

11:46

300E I can tell you the loading weight

11:50

of these Jets isn't as much as you think

11:52

especially if you have F full fuel

11:54

because you're trying to get from

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Philadelphia all the way to Tijana

11:58

Mexico and and you're going to be

11:59

against the jet stream you're probably

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trying to make it without stops so

12:04

you've probably filled this to the brim

12:06

if you filled this plane to the brim

12:08

you're going to have a useful load of

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about 1,800 to 2200 lb that's not a lot

12:15

if you have six people on board let's

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put an average weight for each person

12:20

yes the person under 18 was presumably

12:22

under 200 lb but we don't know the

12:24

weight of the pilots so let's use an

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average weight per person of 200 lb now

12:29

we already have 12200 lb gone but now we

12:33

have to add medical equipment possible

12:36

IV equipment we saw oxygen tanks in the

12:39

debris field there is a lot more weight

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on this plane than is probably typical

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in addition to any kind of baggage that

12:47

the mother and daughter potentially

12:49

brought or souvenirs or gifts that they

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got for for succeeding in their

12:53

treatment I hate to say it but I think

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there's a high likelihood that as the

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Pilots entered the clouds they

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unfortunately had a plane that was fully

13:03

loaded afed heavy and they before they

13:07

could even realize it had pitched the

13:10

plane up slightly too high and the plane

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entered a right spin

13:17

stall that's my opinion as somebody

13:20

who's still advancing in their flight

13:23

training and I'm a newer pilot so I want

13:25

to be clear about that but looking at

13:27

this data this is ex exactly what we're

13:30

trained for to try to avoid the best

13:33

stall is no stall and let's look at this

13:36

data here together to see if this would

13:38

make logical sense we're at, 1300 ft at

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a ground speed of 187 knots now if we

13:46

expect an engine failure we would expect

13:49

that this ground speed would rapidly

13:53

decline before our vertical speed

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declines if our vertical speed rapidly

14:00

declines it potentially indicates a

14:02

stall now in case you've never been in a

14:05

stall when you get your private pilot

14:07

license you actually in order to pass

14:10

you have to go on a check ride with a

14:11

designated pilot examiner uh they're

14:13

authorized by the FAA to do this I you

14:15

know I had my check ride not that long

14:17

ago and uh I had to show her a full

14:20

stall break and Recovery in you know

14:23

single engine prop plane and in a single

14:25

engine prop plane essentially you get

14:27

into a this would be like a power on

14:30

stall we would call it where you're in a

14:32

takeoff configuration and in order to

14:35

show them a power on stall you have to

14:38

pitch the nose back uh you know pull it

14:40

towards you essentially so you're

14:41

pulling on the elevator you're pitching

14:43

up pitching up pitching up uh Until It

14:46

Breaks and in a single engine prop you

14:49

can recover from this so you'll actually

14:52

give the examiner a full brake on a

14:54

single engine plane and what that feels

14:57

like is you'll slowly up up up up stick

15:00

Shaker activates if you have one stall

15:03

stall warning warning warning when it

15:05

breaks it's not a slow break a break

15:08

like a stall would be something

15:11

like it's fast and it is really

15:15

difficult to recover from a stall if

15:17

your rear word

15:19

loaded and that is my assumption of what

15:22

happened here

15:23

baggage the staff and the patient the

15:27

mother anyway in a single engine plane

15:30

you can recover from this in a

15:32

multi-engine plane going through

15:34

multi-engine training and Jet training

15:37

it's almost impossible to recover from

15:39

these situations in fact when we train

15:42

them we never go into actual stalls in a

15:45

multi-engine situation because they're

15:47

so dangerous and deadly they're almost

15:51

unrecoverable and I think that's why in

15:53

footage when we see the plane come down

15:55

like a missile it's frankly because they

15:57

stalled and they was nothing to get them

16:00

to recover now let's look at the data to

16:02

see if the data corroborates this

16:05

thesis again we've got, 1300 ft of

16:08

elevation 187 knots of ground speed

16:10

vertical speed of 3,000 which is

16:13

actually acceptable for a Lear jet it

16:15

it's it's fast it's acceptable for a

16:17

Learjet though the very next ping that

16:20

we have uh let's go ahead and reset the

16:22

zoom there there we go the very next

16:24

data point that we have is actually a

16:27

vertical speed that has declined to 100

16:31

or 1472 ft per minute now this is really

16:36

interesting because you're going 187

16:39

knots and you did speed up by about 11

16:44

knots so you sped up 11 knots and your

16:48

vertical speed decelerated that would

16:50

actually indicate an initial sort of

16:53

pointing the nose down a little bit

16:56

unless this is the early portion of the

16:59

stall and unfortunately that's what I

17:01

think happened here this is the moment

17:04

of the stall we gain speed because all

17:07

of a sudden we're going from rising or

17:09

climbing at 3,000 ft per minute in the

17:12

very next snapshot which frankly is a

17:16

distance of less than 5 Seconds right

17:19

here 38 on the uh second uh counter here

17:24

to 35 so we're talking 7 seconds I

17:27

should say in 7 Seconds we go from

17:29

climbing at 3,000 ft to climbing half of

17:32

the rate and then just 2 seconds later

17:37

when we get the H 3 seconds later when

17:39

we get the next data point we go from

17:42

1,400 ft per minute to 400 ft per minute

17:46

and our ground speed is picking up and

17:48

the very next data point which is just 2

17:51

seconds later we're at roughly uh the

17:53

same feet per minute here picked up a

17:55

little bit on ground speed uh next data

17:58

point is is 4 seconds later same spot

18:03

and within the

18:05

next 5 Seconds thereafter we go from

18:08

climbing at 448 ft to now falling at

18:13

2,800 ft per minute so in other words in

18:17

the span of 20 seconds we went from

18:20

climbing 3,000 ft a minute which is

18:23

which is steep climb especially if

18:24

you're fully loaded to Falling 2,000 ft

18:27

per minute that that is not to me the

18:31

sign of an engine failure engines fail

18:33

at a rate of one every 240,000 flight

18:36

hours for a turbine it's very rare and

18:39

multi-engine Pilots are trained to

18:41

overcome an engine failure even on

18:44

takeoff it hurts your leg cuz it takes a

18:46

lot of Rudder work but this is a

18:49

solvable issue I think these Pilots were

18:52

so unfamiliar they got themselves into

18:55

the clouds they got confused Poss

18:58

possibly looked at each other for a

19:00

moment said hey what was the heading we

19:02

were supposed to fly again as they're in

19:04

the clouds they lost sight of the

19:06

Horizon they didn't look at their

19:08

instruments for the attitude or their

19:11

pitch angle and unfortunately they

19:14

exceeded the critical angle of attack

19:16

and left the plane no choice but to

19:20

stall now I want to be clear I don't

19:23

know if this is with certainty what

19:26

happened and it might be a very long

19:28

long time for any of us to get all of

19:31

the answers or all of the details of

19:33

what actually happened on screen you

19:36

could see some of the details or some of

19:38

the debris that we see on the floor here

19:40

this is a devastating situation to see a

19:43

medical plane with a pediatric patient

19:46

crash and some of the scenes are frankly

19:50

heartbreaking my purpose in going

19:53

through some of the data we have here is

19:55

really just to show you is [ __ ]

19:59

okay well I wasn't expecting the audio

20:01

to turn on that one but anyway it's

20:03

really to show you how quickly Aviation

20:07

can go from everything is fine to

20:11

everything is poopy doopy now I

20:13

personally really respect pilot debrief

20:16

and I look forward to his debrief on

20:18

what happened in the situation mostly

20:21

because I believe that he's the reason I

20:23

got into Aviation while I was looking

20:26

and watching his videos I got inspired

20:28

ired to see can I do what's necessary to

20:33

fly safely can I challenge myself and

20:37

become a safe pilot and I study Aviation

20:40

on almost a daily basis and seeing cases

20:43

like this

20:44

absolutely breaks my heart but I think

20:48

there's a learning experience in every

20:50

single accident that happens including

20:52

the helicopter crash that we talked

20:54

about the Blackhawk that crashed into

20:55

the American Airlines flight and my

20:57

experiences with trainers who are quite

21:00

frankly often still learning themselves

21:03

you can see my video on that there are

21:05

some recommendations I have for that as

21:07

well uh to looking at this and seeing in

21:11

bad weather going into the clouds what

21:13

happens when you're potentially

21:15

overloaded distracted not able to hold

21:19

the heading that you're instructed to do

21:21

or instructed to fly and before you know

21:24

it you exceed the critical angle of

21:27

attack for this plane now there are

21:29

other people who have indicated that

21:31

potentially this plane was on a go

21:33

around I've seen some uh posts of

21:36

individuals suggesting the plane had

21:38

actually potentially landed and then it

21:40

was on a go around that doesn't

21:42

corroborate or line up with the ATC data

21:44

and it doesn't line up with the adsb

21:47

data either mostly because we could see

21:49

here that the flight or the plane came

21:52

from Miami and landed in Philadelphia at

21:55

around 12:30 uh p.m. on a schedule uh a

21:59

slot but it actually ended up arriving

22:01

at 309 uh and then we have what looks

22:03

like a flight plan that is filed for a

22:06

5:00 p.m. departure but then we have the

22:09

actual flight which occurs right here

22:12

which is different from what's filed in

22:14

the flight plan it is the flight when

22:16

they take off uh and as we could see in

22:18

the data here this is not a continuation

22:21

or a goar around which would typically

22:23

be indicated by adsp data indicating

22:25

what looks like a fly over the airport

22:27

and a continuation

22:29

it's possible it doesn't seem like

22:31

that's what's happening here in the data

22:33

given the time difference uh between

22:35

this prior flight uh and uh what we see

22:38

uh in this data see this is 5:00 p.m.

22:41

UTC when they landed in Philadelphia and

22:44

they were going to Philadelphia to pick

22:46

up a pediatric patient so while there

22:49

are some images circling around over oh

22:51

could this have been a go around I think

22:53

that's highly unlikely for example I see

22:56

this uh image or tweet right here oh was

22:58

this a go around uh I don't think so uh

23:01

in fact to me this is just a normal

23:03

takeoff pattern and this is an

23:04

interesting 3D visualization of the

23:06

direction of their flight as you can see

23:08

there's really at no point a right turn

23:11

here uh there's only a left turn stall

23:16

uh which is again extremely devastating

23:18

uh and it's it's just terrible uh to see

23:22

uh again the FAA has verified that there

23:23

were six people on

23:27

board see some more footage here of the

23:29

uh early scene of what this looked like

23:33

there are houses uh on fire there are uh

23:37

officers here responding clearly on the

23:39

phone actually one of those individuals

23:41

looks like a police explorer I used to

23:42

be a police explorer uh and um clearly a

23:47

devastating situation giv given that

23:49

this plane was uh expectedly full of

23:52

fuel to make the flight to uh Tijana uh

23:57

keep in mind also that

23:59

uh smaller Jets like for example a Sirus

24:01

single engine jet if you fill that jet

24:04

up with fuel all the way you could

24:06

barely put two people on it with full

24:09

Fuel and get anywhere the uh loading

24:12

capacity of smaller Jets isn't that

24:15

great so you have to be really really

24:17

careful especially when you're in the

24:19

elements and if you're an unfamiliar

24:21

terrain it's really scary and I highly

24:25

encourage that when Pilots are flying in

24:27

new areas they don't ever make flights

24:30

in new areas in situations where they

24:32

have passengers where they're likely to

24:35

be stressed or the very least pre-fly it

24:39

uh you know flight simulate uh the

24:41

flight first do whatever you can do to

24:43

become familiar with the area and brief

24:46

and brief and brief your takeoff

24:48

instructions one thing that I like to do

24:50

and this is what I'll leave it off at is

24:52

when I take off when I'm at the hold

24:54

Short Line I always triple check that I

24:58

have my heading set on my autopilot and

25:01

when I have my heading and my flight

25:02

level set I can't exceed the critical

25:06

angle of attack because I've set I've

25:08

set a climb rate that is well below the

25:11

critical angle of attack even fully

25:13

loaded beyond that I also have my

25:16

heading set that way not only do I have

25:18

the autopilot set which I don't turn on

25:20

yet until I've taken off and I'm usually

25:22

at about 4 to 600 ft but I mentally pre

25:26

turn right hitting 290 turn right right

25:28

Hing 290 got it now I have that in my

25:32

mind so when I get to the end of the

25:33

runway on my takeoff and I'm between 400

25:36

ft and 1,000 ft I can hit the autopilot

25:39

and the autopilot is going to take me

25:40

through those clouds at a safe clim rate

25:45

and in the heading and direction that

25:46

I'm supposed to be flying there's a lot

25:48

that's going on including frequency

25:50

changes you're going into the clouds

25:52

you're adjusting to your instruments

25:53

you're at night you're in an unfamiliar

25:55

territory anything you could do to

25:57

reduce your workload is a great choice

25:59

clearly in this case the autopilot was

26:01

not set otherwise they would have made

26:04

that right turn heading maybe they were

26:06

fidgeting and trying to set the

26:07

autopilot obviously this is speculation

26:10

at this point all we know is we've had a

26:12

tragic disaster here again just days

26:15

after the American Airlines crash into

26:17

the ptoi thank you so much for watching

26:20

and we'll see you in the next one why

26:21

not advertise these things that you told

26:23

us here I feel like nobody else knows

26:24

about this we'll we'll try a little

26:26

advertising and see how it goes

26:27

congratulations man you have done so

26:29

much people love you people look up to

26:30

you Kevin PA there financial analyst and

26:33

YouTuber meet Kevin always great to get

26:35

your take

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