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The Fed *JUST* Held **EMERGENCY** Meeting

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FULL TRANSCRIPT

0:00

Holy smokes. The Federal Reserve just

0:01

convened an emergency meeting with Wall

0:04

Street bankers because of liquidity

0:08

issues. I'm going to break all of this

0:10

down and what the details are in this

0:12

because there are a lot of folks that

0:13

are now saying, Kevin, this is not a

0:16

liquidity issue anymore. This is now a

0:18

solveny issue. The difference, mind you,

0:21

is liquidity is, yo, you got the cash,

0:24

so you can do some more lending. Solveny

0:26

is, hey, we got some cash, but we got

0:29

way more debt and this don't balance out

0:32

anymore. This is a big problem, folks.

0:35

We got to talk about this because this

0:36

has happened in history before. So,

0:38

we're going to talk about what's going

0:40

on now and then what history tells us in

0:44

terms of which direction we go next.

0:47

We'll talk about it. First, let's

0:49

understand what just happened. So, the

0:51

Financial Times reported this that New

0:53

York Fed President John Williams

0:55

convened a meeting uh this week with

0:58

Wall Street dealers over a short-term

1:00

lending offic uh facility underscoring

1:03

officials concerns about strains in US

1:06

money markets. This was a hastily

1:09

arranged meeting that was arranged under

1:12

the cover of another Treasury market

1:14

conference that was going on. So, they

1:16

kind of did it under the guise of

1:18

another meeting. They didn't really want

1:20

people to know that this was going on

1:21

because now the stress in the repo

1:23

markets is starting to show up. Uh and

1:26

so they did end up confirming that the

1:29

meeting took place. So the Fed has

1:31

verified that yes, we did have a rapidly

1:34

arranged meeting that took place and

1:36

yeah, it was an emergency meeting. And

1:38

what this is is this all about trying to

1:41

make sure that our repo facility at the

1:43

Federal Reserve functions. Now, that

1:46

doesn't mean much for us as individual

1:49

investors until it does. And that's

1:52

really what we're going to spend time

1:53

talking about because when you look at

1:55

this chart of usage of the repo

1:58

facility, you might think, eh, this

2:00

isn't really a problem, is it? But when

2:03

you actually zoom out for four years,

2:05

you realize that it's actually rare that

2:06

we have blue over here at all. Sure,

2:10

it's not near some of the peak levels

2:12

that we saw like at the end of last

2:13

month, which could have been end of

2:15

month rebalancing uh or or normal sort

2:18

of end of the month of funding. But then

2:19

again, you know, you don't see that in

2:22

any of these other end of months. So, it

2:25

suggests that maybe this last end of

2:28

month was worse than some of the prior.

2:31

Now, why could that be? Well, it could

2:33

potentially be because we've seen a lot

2:36

of credit stress in just the last 60

2:39

days. Let me just remind you really

2:41

quick as a summary of what's happened in

2:43

literally the last 65ish days. Now,

2:47

September 10th, goes bankrupt after JP

2:50

Morgan rugpulls them on a $700 million

2:52

line of credit. Now, obviously, the

2:54

immigration situation didn't help. Maybe

2:56

that company was just fraudulent. Maybe

2:58

it was just that company that sucked.

3:00

you know, they didn't do they did no

3:01

credit loans for autos, right? But JP

3:03

Morgan took $170 million haircut on

3:05

this. Then on September 28th, First

3:08

Brands collapsed after receivables

3:11

fraud, which is really interesting

3:13

because the company that was auditing

3:15

First Brands was fined for failing to

3:18

identify similar receivables issues. But

3:21

the auditor's lender, so the person

3:24

lending the auditor money, ended up

3:27

having a short against the very company

3:29

that defaulted. And it kind of makes you

3:32

scratch your head like how diabolical

3:34

that if you're trying to like raise

3:36

money, [laughter] you're putting your

3:38

financials out there to privately raise

3:39

money. Imagine your bank shorting you

3:42

after you showed them your tax returns,

3:44

right? Who knows? Maybe that's just an

3:47

individual issue. But then of course on

3:49

November 1st, UBS closes two private

3:52

credit funds because people are

3:53

demanding their money back. On November

3:56

3rd, Black Rockck's Renovo Homes

3:58

literally goes from, "Oh, we value these

4:01

assets at 100%." to 3 days later,

4:04

they're actually worth zero. It was

4:06

literally like straight out of South

4:08

Park. Yeah. Oh, we'll take all your

4:09

money and it's gone. [laughter]

4:12

Then on November 10th, Sonder Hotel

4:15

Group, think they ended up blaming

4:16

Marriott, but when you actually look at

4:18

the bankruptcy filings, what you find is

4:20

Saunder Hotel Group got rugpulled by

4:22

their construction lender who said,

4:24

"Yeah, no, we ain't giving you any more

4:25

money." And Saunders's like, "Yo, the

4:27

construction of our Ritz Carlton resort

4:29

isn't done yet." And the letter's like,

4:31

"Peace."

4:33

Uh oh, okay. You know, that's all that's

4:36

all just in the last 65 days. Let's not

4:38

even get to the fact that Open AI just

4:43

hinted that they might need back stops

4:46

to keep getting loans and the IMF told

4:49

us that 90% of this private credit

4:52

funding where people are like, "Oh, you

4:54

know, that's just private credit. Who

4:56

cares? Let that all fall." Well, 90% of

4:58

that private credit comes from big banks

5:01

like JP Morgan, which means the entire

5:04

financial system is built up on stuff

5:06

like this. Now, hopefully it's not an

5:09

issue, but when you combine those credit

5:12

issues, you can understand why there's

5:15

some money stress that the Federal

5:17

Reserve is starting to panic about. Now,

5:20

we've seen this in the past. We're going

5:22

to go through some of these historical

5:23

examples, but quickly on how this repo

5:26

situation works. Basically, when banks

5:28

have little excess cash, which tends to

5:31

get worse towards the end of the year,

5:34

banks start running out of reserves and

5:37

they stop lending. If you stop lending

5:40

in the American economy, it collapses.

5:43

Now, that's not what I'm calling for

5:45

here, but I want you to think about what

5:46

they did in 2020. They literally did the

5:49

opposite for banks. They went to banks,

5:51

the Fed went to banks and said, "Hey,

5:53

um, instead of you having to keep 10% in

5:57

cash, in other words, if you go lend out

5:59

$100, we want you to have $10 in the

6:01

bank to sort of back stop at least with

6:04

something." Uh, why don't we just say

6:06

you don't need to keep anything in the

6:07

bank at all? You could go lend a h 100%

6:09

out. Yeah, that's the new fractional

6:12

reserve banking situation that we have.

6:15

That probably helped us boom for the

6:17

last 5 years. Like, it's been great.

6:20

Banks have been able to lend lots of

6:21

money. The economy has been booming. But

6:24

now we're at that point where

6:26

quantitative tightening at the Fed has

6:29

brought us to oh crap, banks are now at

6:32

the point where we're starting to have

6:34

these liquidity issues, not enough cash.

6:37

At the same time as we have credit

6:38

issues and high debt and OpenAI is

6:41

making people nervous.

6:43

It's all not good. Now, when people hear

6:46

these liquidity issues, the first thing

6:48

they usually do is they think that the

6:50

Federal Reserve is now going to print

6:52

money and bail everyone out just like

6:55

they did during CO. I mean, I hate to

6:57

say it, but there are literally people

6:59

on YouTube like this guy who's like,

7:01

"Guys, remember what happened last time?

7:04

We got stim checks. We got PPP loans. We

7:08

got unemployment benefits. And we pumped

7:10

trillions into the economy. It's got to

7:12

happen again. Therefore, we're going to

7:13

go to the moon. Yet, when you listen to

7:16

this kind of content, they either glaze

7:19

or gloss over it very briefly. Uh or

7:22

they just completely ignore the fact

7:24

that the last time we got that, we had

7:26

40 years of essentially disinflation

7:29

going on. 40 years of a trend of

7:32

inflation going down. And everybody is

7:35

like, we won't have inflation if we

7:36

print money. Let's just print as much as

7:39

we can. How much should we print? Yes.

7:42

Donald Trump printed under the first

7:44

CARES Act with bipart with a bipartisan

7:47

Congress. Donald Trump printed again

7:49

with $600 stimulus checks. Joe Biden

7:52

printed again with $1,400 stimulus

7:54

checks. And we did get PPP, EIDL, every

7:57

kind of emergency facility under the sun

8:00

to backs stop uh corporate stock, to

8:03

backs stop corporate bonds. The Fed was

8:05

directly backstopping corporate bonds.

8:07

Every liquidity aspect under the sun was

8:09

brought out. And people think, "Oh,

8:11

okay. Well, if the Fed has liquidity

8:13

cris crisis today, they'll just start

8:14

immediately doing all that again. And

8:17

unfortunately, this is where they're

8:18

entirely wrong. No, unfortunately, I

8:22

don't think that charts like this posted

8:24

by uh Leo apparently follows me. What's

8:27

up, Leo? Uh Leo posts this chart mostly

8:30

because he has a price target on

8:31

Ethereum of like $30 to $80,000.

8:35

But anyway, he's like, "See, the last

8:36

time the Fed had to end QT because all

8:39

of a sudden we had liquidity stress and

8:40

we had these emergency meetings. Look

8:42

how much they printed after that." But

8:44

again, completely ignoring that we had

8:47

COVID in 40 years of disinflation to

8:49

say, "Oh, let's print. There won't be

8:51

inflation problem. Inflation will be

8:53

transitory." Now, you have a totally

8:55

different situation. First of all, a

8:59

liquidity support or temporary backs

9:02

stop by the Fed for this repo facility

9:04

like what we saw in 2018 to 2019 during

9:07

that liquidity crisis. Really what the

9:09

Fed just does is they issue very

9:12

short-term overnight lending to help

9:16

stabilize the banking system. That's

9:18

really all they do. This is not

9:20

long-term liquidity. This is not

9:21

stimulus. This is not pumping money into

9:24

the economy. So this idea that the Fed's

9:26

going to end QT is going to all of a

9:28

sudden be massively stimulative is

9:30

misplaced. Now if there's some kind of

9:34

shock, the big thing that most people

9:37

miss is that the Federal Reserve and

9:39

Congress, remember in 2020 they worked

9:42

in concert together. Congress is like,

9:44

"We'll spend it if you print it." And

9:45

the Fed's like, "Yep, we got we got the

9:48

message loud and clear." The uh the

9:50

problem is people forget of how humanity

9:55

works. If right now we have any kind of

9:58

issue where we actually have to provide

10:00

quantitative easing with the Federal

10:02

Reserve, we will have the Federal

10:05

Reserve and Congress extremely gunshy

10:09

about inflation, which is totally

10:11

reasonable. They're not going to want to

10:13

issue as much QE. they're going to be

10:15

much slower to do so because of the

10:17

deep-seated disdain for inflation that

10:20

grew over the last four to 5 years. And

10:22

therefore, the true risk is that we

10:25

don't have a COVID Larry Cuddlo V-shaped

10:28

recovery, but that if we do end up

10:30

having a problem or crisis in the

10:31

economy that the Fed has to solve. The

10:34

real risk is that they will be much

10:36

slower this time, which is really bad.

10:39

Historically, they do tend to be too

10:41

slow. In 2008, they were way too slow.

10:44

It took until February of 2009 for them

10:47

to bail out markets. During the dotcom

10:49

bubble, it took until March of 2003 for

10:52

them to bail out markets. They're

10:55

usually at the end of the cycle, not at

10:58

the beginning of the cycle. Co was so

11:00

weird and unique where they were

11:02

actually at the beginning of the cycle

11:04

and started printing basically before we

11:06

even locked down. And then of course

11:08

throughout all of that March which was

11:10

insane but it led to this inflation. So

11:13

therefore are we likely to see a Fed

11:16

that prints like they did in CO again? I

11:19

don't think immediately. I actually

11:20

think they'll be massively slow on it.

11:23

And so this is where we can look at

11:25

history a little bit and understand what

11:27

has happened historically when we've had

11:30

these little repo crises before. In

11:34

1994, we've seen a failure like this

11:36

before. Orange County,

11:39

yes, literally the entire county went

11:42

bankrupt.

11:43

Allan Greenspan then immediately

11:46

pivoted, cut rates, and boom, we got a

11:48

soft landing. So, there is a precedent

11:51

for actually some kind of, oh my gosh,

11:53

there's been some collapse. Oh my gosh,

11:55

we've tightened too much. Let's cut

11:57

rates. The pressure on the Fed to cut

12:00

rates then was massive, and they did.

12:03

The problem today is the pressure on the

12:05

Fed to cut rates is massive. I mean,

12:07

look at Donald Trump. But inflation due

12:10

to tariffs or, you know, whatever is

12:12

keeping the Fed uncertain and we don't

12:15

have data to actually show that the

12:17

economy is deteriorating underneath the

12:18

hood because it's been delayed because

12:20

of the shutdown or whatever reason or

12:23

it's ragged. Who knows? We'll see what

12:25

we get. Uh so even that next 25 basis

12:28

point cut only has like a 43% chance of

12:32

happening right now. Well that's not

12:34

great. We really if we were really

12:36

nervous about plumbing here of the

12:38

financial stability of the economy we

12:40

would be seeing consistent cutting and

12:44

that would be the correct thing to do.

12:45

The problem is already you have the Fed

12:48

going ah but inflation. So all these

12:50

people that are like oh we're going to

12:52

see QE infinity again. Have you not

12:55

forgotten what how that ended up being a

12:57

massive mistake and the pain that put

13:00

people through?

13:02

But that's not the only time we've seen

13:04

the sort of U-turn on QT. In 2019, the

13:07

day of my interview with Jordan

13:08

Belelfford about Grant Cardone, the

13:10

overnight repo facility spiked from 2 to

13:12

10% and the Federal Reserve immediately

13:15

ended QT and set up emergency

13:17

operations. Of course, while that solved

13:19

issues for about the next 6 months, we

13:22

just walked right into co So the

13:24

question in 2019 was did we have that

13:28

repo crisis because people already knew

13:31

what was coming and they were already

13:33

sort of like hoarding cash. If you look

13:36

at the bond market, the bond market

13:38

actually inverted just about 2 months

13:40

before that liquidity crisis in 2019.

13:44

And so some people argue that in the

13:46

summer of 2019, people already knew what

13:49

was going on at Wuhan. the bond market

13:52

already knew and insiders who have

13:56

billions of dollars already started

13:58

positioning into safer assets hoarding

14:00

more cash leading to the very 2019 repo

14:05

crisis

14:06

and that's why people look and say okay

14:09

so are we more like 2019 today or we

14:11

more like 1995 well 1995 Alan Greenspan

14:14

just started cutting well today the

14:17

Fed's like we don't need to cut.

14:21

So that kind of makes people think that

14:23

oh crap this is more like a 2019 where

14:25

insiders already know what's coming that

14:28

the mag 7 is way too concentrated. What

14:32

40% of the flows into into markets right

14:35

now are like mag seven stocks. It's

14:37

wild. Uh insane concentration built up

14:40

on the peg leg of artificial

14:41

intelligence. I honestly think that a

14:43

lot of the data that we're getting for

14:44

the Atlanta Fed real GDP at 4% is just

14:47

AI. And if that peg leg of the economy

14:49

falls over, there's nothing left to

14:51

support it. But that that part is my

14:52

opinion. So we're not really like 1995.

14:56

We might be like 2019 liquidity stress.

15:00

And then is there any other example

15:02

where we had this sort of repo stress?

15:05

Oh, yeah. After Lehman Brothers in 2008,

15:09

but that SH9T show was so large, any of

15:13

the Fed's bailout facilities didn't work

15:16

until, well, we had to go through a

15:19

nasty recession that took about 8 months

15:21

to really bottom out on. And of course,

15:23

the stock market recession was even

15:25

longer than that because stocks started

15:27

falling well before Leman Brothers. You

15:30

just got a much more volatile shock

15:32

afterwards. So this now creates some

15:35

really big potential problems, but

15:38

hopefully they don't, right? The best

15:40

case scenario here is that jobs start

15:42

coming back. No more credit crisis. You

15:44

know, we don't have any more

15:45

bankruptcies and the Fed stabilizes the

15:49

repo operations through their emergency

15:51

meetings and inflation just keeps

15:53

cooling. That's the best case scenario.

15:56

That's the best case scenario that says,

15:57

"Okay, buy the dip. We're going up. Like

16:00

just load up." You know, who knows?

16:02

Maybe consumer stocks are cheap or

16:04

whatever. Great. Everything will be

16:06

fine. The problem with this is we're

16:09

seeing so much foreshadowing of real

16:11

private credit risk that likely trickles

16:14

over to the banking sector that we might

16:17

just be a hair trigger away from a true

16:20

shock. You all know I've mentioned many

16:22

times before that the 210 Treasury

16:25

spread is really your indicator for when

16:27

you were shock primed. It doesn't mean

16:30

that you're at the level of a shock, but

16:32

anytime you're above 50, you're shock

16:34

primed like we were in 1995, but we were

16:37

cutting rates and we were able to

16:38

engineer the soft landing. The labor

16:40

market wasn't rolling over and we

16:42

weren't propped up by, you know, one

16:44

industry like AI right now. These issues

16:48

are very, very different from 1995 where

16:50

our labor market is collapsing.

16:54

Hopefully, that turns around magically.

16:56

We do have an economy that's propped up

16:59

by one industry, artificial

17:00

intelligence, leading to massive

17:02

concentration and massive valuations in

17:04

the stock market. Things that we didn't

17:06

see in 1995. I mean, all you have to do

17:10

is look at the Cape uh Schiller or the

17:12

uh Warren Buffett indicator and see

17:15

where our valuations sit today relative

17:18

to where they sat then. So, here you go.

17:20

In 1995,

17:23

we sat right here. one standard

17:25

deviation below the trend line of

17:30

valuations. So we were cutting rates in

17:34

1995

17:36

actually setting the standard for the

17:38

dot bubble that really then started. We

17:41

were just setting the the the stage for

17:44

this sort of runup right here. And then

17:46

of course when we peaked in the dot

17:47

bubble we were up here at 2000. You

17:50

could actually argue that 1995 is

17:52

probably much more like 2020 and we just

17:55

set up for this big run where we are

17:59

finally now at the highest level ever on

18:02

the Buffett indicator for valuations.

18:04

Therefore, the situation we're facing

18:06

right now is very much the opposite of

18:09

what we saw in 95 with a discounted

18:12

environment. Now, how does this all boil

18:14

over? Well, there are two ways you could

18:17

fall into a recession. and we pray that

18:19

this doesn't happen. Uh, you know, we

18:21

strategize on this all the time in the

18:22

alpha report like, okay, here's, like I

18:26

was just sending alerts. Here's what I'm

18:28

selling. Here's the amount that I'm

18:29

selling. Here's what I'm buying and the

18:31

amount that I'm buying. You'll see that

18:32

what I'm buying is a fraction of what

18:34

I'm selling.

18:36

And that's because of where my sort of

18:38

concern sits about this loaded shotgun.

18:41

I really feel that we have this loaded

18:43

shotgun and you've got Donald Trump

18:46

with, you know, Jimmy arms almost like

18:49

don't talk bad about my tariffs and

18:51

we're literally just that hair trigger

18:53

away from some kind of collapse or shock

18:56

or whatever at a big bank or a big

18:58

company or a big institution or

19:00

somewhere. We don't know where it'll pop

19:01

up. That's why it's called a black swan.

19:03

And then what happens? We're already

19:05

foreshadowing that shock via the repo

19:07

stress, private credit issues, the IMF

19:09

warning, the Bank of England warning.

19:11

We're already foreshadowing the loaded

19:13

shotgun. We see the 210 spread. Like all

19:15

the foreshadowing is in place. The black

19:17

swan part is we just don't know who's it

19:20

going to be. This is like the potential

19:22

Leman light or maybe even Leman big

19:25

moment. And it's a solveny issue, not a

19:28

liquidity issue. So there's too much

19:30

debt in the system, which of course

19:32

we've been talking about in the last

19:33

videos with thinner margin debt, Robin

19:35

Hood debt, leveraged ETFs, uh leveraged

19:37

Bitcoin. I mean, there's there's no

19:39

shortage of this. You could almost argue

19:40

that Bitcoin is almost the harbinger of

19:44

this sort of near-term pain, uh that we

19:47

might be approaching. Uh who knows,

19:50

maybe it's short- termism, but look at

19:52

this. Bitcoin has returned 2.67

19:56

this year. 2.67% 67% this year. And

20:00

compare that to VO, like your most basic

20:04

ETF on a year-to- date basis, up 15%.

20:08

Bro, that's crazy. Okay, who knows? Some

20:11

people say it's an indicator. But how

20:13

does this potentially play out? Well,

20:15

here's the issue. Two ways this plays

20:17

out.

20:18

Well, I guess three ways. There's the

20:20

good way. The good way this plays out is

20:22

jobs come back. Jobs come back, the

20:24

credit stresses go away, the Fed

20:26

stability works out, and we're guched.

20:28

Gucci, gu. Okay, then there are two bad

20:31

ways this plays out. Bad way number one,

20:34

slow bleed. Okay, this could happen.

20:37

This is kind of like you're walking

20:38

through the desert, right? You got the

20:39

cuts in the legs, death by a thousand

20:41

cuts, jobs deteriorate over time,

20:43

eventually you hit corporate revenues,

20:45

eventually stocks bleed, and sort of the

20:47

cycle ensues, right? Because as jobs

20:50

deteriorate, revenues at corporations

20:52

come down and then companies miss

20:54

earnings and stocks bleed more and you

20:55

kind of get this back and forth cycle

20:57

that have more layoffs or whatever and

20:58

you get a slow bleed kind of recession.

21:02

That's scenario two out of three. So one

21:04

is good, two is bad uh and and then you

21:06

have the worst case scenario which is a

21:08

credit shock. Okay. Now a credit shock

21:10

is really interesting because a credit

21:12

shock hits markets really really hard

21:17

and fast. This is why and and and you

21:20

know people think like, "Oh, I'll always

21:22

have time to get out of margin." Not

21:23

necessarily. If you wake up and the

21:25

premarket's down 10% on the cues and

21:27

your favorite stocks are all down 40%.

21:29

You're not going to have time to get out

21:31

of margin. And I think people forget

21:33

that that can happen. If you actually

21:34

look at the CNN greed and fear index,

21:36

there's something very interesting here.

21:38

We are literally within 4.2% of all-time

21:41

highs and we are at extreme fear. This

21:43

is wild, mind you. Okay, so

21:46

look at the components. Market momentum,

21:48

fear. Stock price strength, extreme

21:51

fear. Stock price breath, so the number

21:53

of stocks going up versus down is that

21:55

extreme fear. Most stocks going down

21:57

basically. Uh put call ratio, extreme

21:59

fear. The only thing that and then a

22:01

safe haven demand, junk bond demand, all

22:03

this is extreme fear. The only thing

22:05

that hasn't actually gone to extreme

22:07

fear yet is market volatility. Well,

22:10

guess what pushes market volatility up?

22:13

A shock.

22:16

So, like the gun is loaded. The the

22:21

shotgun has a massive incendiary shell

22:24

in it and it's been racked back. Uh I if

22:29

you have the AR15 style shotguns, you

22:32

you rack them like this. Okay. If you

22:34

have a shotgun, like a pump. Okay.

22:35

[laughter] Anyway, I just want to

22:37

clarify that for the gun folks. There's

22:39

some really cool AR-15 frame shotguns.

22:41

I've got them. Uh and they're pretty

22:44

cool. mostly super tangential, but you

22:48

know, you have an AR-15 in California,

22:50

you're limited to semi 10 shots. Well,

22:53

if you have an AR-15 shotgun, you're

22:56

semi duh, cuz you're not going to auto

22:59

that thing. It's so freaking powerful.

23:01

Uh, but you get 10 slugs, [laughter]

23:05

bro. 10 slugs. Uh, anyway, sorry. Okay,

23:10

so um or what some people do is they'll

23:12

mix them. Slug buck. Slug buck. This is

23:16

nasty stuff. Anyway, so getting back to

23:19

all of this insanity over here, cuz I I

23:22

don't know if it's like autism or just

23:23

like squirrel. Uh getting back to all

23:25

this insanity over here, it's bad. Now,

23:28

the good news so far is that banks ev

23:31

there's no evidence, at least broadly

23:33

yet, that banking standards are

23:35

tightening. Usually banking standards

23:39

tightening will lead credit shock. But

23:42

the problem is the charts tend to lag,

23:45

right? So reconcile what I just said

23:47

there. The charts give you the

23:49

information late, but usually credit

23:51

tightness leads. So in other words, like

23:54

wouldricolor have collapsed if JP Morgan

23:58

didn't call them and go, "Yo, we have a

24:00

$700 million line of credit with y'all

24:02

for your like warehouse line of credit

24:04

operations." Not to be confused with

24:06

like actually running a warehouse. It's

24:08

just sort of a larger business line of

24:10

credit that you could use because you

24:11

you pay for things then you wait for

24:13

your payments from your customers and

24:15

then you pay it off and then you pay for

24:16

things again, right? That's a warehouse

24:18

line of credit. Anyway, like would

24:21

Tricolor have collapsed if JP Morgan

24:23

didn't rug them? Maybe not. Would Sunder

24:28

have collapsed if their lender didn't

24:31

rug them? Maybe not.

24:34

And that's where you can kind of keep

24:36

the tides up where you don't really see

24:38

who's swimming naked because the lenders

24:40

are still like letting things pass. But

24:42

as soon as the lenders get nervous

24:44

because they're hoarding cash, that's

24:46

how the cycle begins. And we're at the

24:48

moment where where the lenders are

24:50

basically at that precipice of out of

24:52

money. That's scary. But again, not

24:56

showing up in the charts yet. domestic

24:58

banks tightening standards for credit

25:00

card loans, even though defaults are way

25:02

up. No tightening here yet. No

25:04

tightening right here yet on commercial

25:06

or industrial loans. Not seeing it here.

25:09

Not seeing the tightening yet over here

25:11

at commercial and industrial loans to

25:12

small firms. Not seeing the tightening

25:14

yet, right? These are all down. So,

25:16

we're seeing less tightening, which is

25:19

great. But again, think of how the cycle

25:21

is and how much faster the cycle can be

25:24

versus what actually ends up showing up

25:27

in the charts. And I think one way to

25:29

look at this is sort of the pattern that

25:32

you would expect. Okay? So, if you were

25:34

thinking like if you were a bank, how

25:36

would you operate? Okay, we're going

25:37

through quantitative tightening. That's

25:39

going to mean less cash. Higher rates,

25:42

that also means less cash. So, this puts

25:44

pressure on corporations, especially the

25:46

weakest of the corporations. They fail

25:48

first. Then banks start looking like

25:51

they've got egg on their face. UBS

25:52

closed their funds. Black Rockck people

25:54

like what the hell? How do you go from

25:56

100% value to zero? JP Morgan, how did

25:59

you end up losing $170 million

26:01

toricolor? Like what the hell? And then

26:03

people start going, who's next? And then

26:06

Jamie Diamond goes, "Yeah, cockroaches

26:08

check the balance sheets." Now all of a

26:10

sudden trust goes down in the economy.

26:13

credit default swaps start skyrocketing

26:16

at Coreweave and Oracle, which is

26:17

exactly what we're seeing, what we're

26:19

seeing. And it's literally people just

26:20

going, "All right,

26:23

who's next, homie? Have you found them

26:26

yet?" You know, they're getting on their

26:27

little company radios and they're like,

26:29

"Who is it? Who's it going to be?" And

26:31

this is where you see even more

26:33

tightness. And all that tightness the

26:36

Federal Reserve tries to respond to.

26:38

Now, mind you, the Federal Reserve is

26:40

kind of like putting a bandage on this.

26:42

Imagine it's sort of like there's a

26:44

giant water cooler and inside the water

26:46

cooler is like really nasty poisonous

26:50

water, but nobody sees it because the

26:52

water cooler is one of those big blue

26:53

like emergency coolers and you don't

26:55

know that the inside water is all like

26:57

moldy. But you're like, "Oh, I got that

26:59

giant tank over there in case there's

27:00

ever like a, you know, an emergency like

27:03

a, you know, I don't know, Walking Dead

27:05

situation where we need water and

27:06

there's Armageddon or whatever." You

27:08

don't know the water's moldy until you

27:10

open it up.

27:12

Anyway, now it's starting to leak. And

27:14

what's leaking out is like, ew, that's

27:16

moldy. Oh, well, maybe that's just mold

27:18

at the bottom of the tank. Maybe the

27:20

rest of the 99% is totally fine. And the

27:23

Fed's just kind of like, all right,

27:25

boys. We're going to

27:29

[sighs] hold on everyone.

27:35

Here we go. We got this. We got this.

27:39

Just go ahead and place that. [sighs]

27:41

It's just a little leak.

27:44

Ah, all better. All better. I'm sure

27:46

it's fine.

27:48

Like their liquidity facility on their

27:51

emergency meeting here, folks. It is not

27:54

solving what's in the bucket. It is

27:57

hoping that the bucket don't burst and

28:00

all the poop comes out. That's all it

28:02

is. So now this like comes at the same

28:05

time as the Fed is getting headlines

28:06

again because of Cougler. So remember

28:08

Cougler left at the Fed to abruptly go

28:11

teach at Georgetown yet all of a sudden

28:13

was nowhere to be found on scheduled

28:14

classes. You know apparently just like

28:18

you know oh Georgetown with a bunch of

28:20

Trump alumni trying to align with the

28:22

Trump administration because Trump is

28:23

forcing you know universities to make

28:24

decisions as to whose side are you on

28:26

otherwise we're going to cut your

28:27

funding better be my side. Well,

28:30

apparently uh the US Office of

28:34

Government Ethics uh reports found out

28:37

that she was potentially involved in

28:39

multiple individual stock purchases,

28:41

including Apple, Southwest Airlines, and

28:43

Cava. Now, she disclosed in 2024 that

28:47

this happened, trades between a,000 to

28:49

$250,000,

28:51

and complained that her spouse did that,

28:53

her husband did that, and in 2024, she

28:56

reversed the trades. Nothing ever came

28:58

out of that. But that wasn't under

29:01

Trump. That was under Biden. So they

29:02

kind of let that slide. And in fairness,

29:04

it could happen. But the fact that it

29:07

happened again looked really bad because

29:09

right before the July 29th Fed meeting,

29:12

which she excused herself from, she

29:14

realized that her husband did it again.

29:16

She selfreported and said, "Yo, we effed

29:19

up again." And then she's like, "Yo,

29:22

Powell, can you give me permission to

29:24

undo this?" He says, "No." My assumption

29:27

now Trump administration hears about it,

29:29

hits up Georgetown,

29:31

make a make the phone calls, she resigns

29:34

August 1st, boom, my takes her place.

29:36

Myin is shilling for rate cuts, which is

29:38

probably the right move anyway. Catches

29:40

you up a little bit on all the stuff

29:42

going on, doesn't it?

29:43

>> Why not advertise these [music] things

29:44

that you told us here? I feel like

29:45

nobody else knows about this.

29:47

>> We'll we'll try a little advertising and

29:48

see how it goes.

29:49

>> Congratulations, man. You have done so

29:50

much. People love you. People look up to

29:52

you.

29:52

>> Kevin Pra there, financial analyst and

29:55

YouTuber. [music] Meet Kevin. Always

29:56

great to get your

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