*NEW* Air India 171 IGNORED FAA Warnings on Fuel Switches [MAJOR FAILURE]

According to that report, it appears

fuel from the plane, as you mentioned,

was cut off just moments before it

crashed, leaving many very confused

about how this could happen in the first

place. Now, taking a deeper look in that

15-page report released by India's

aircraft accident investigation bureau,

the flight lasted about 30 seconds

between takeoff and crash. And once it

reached its top recorded speed, fuel

control switches for the engines moved

from the run to the cutoff position,

starving both engines of fuel. The

report did not say how the switches

flipped, but says they were flipped back

to run, but the plane could not gain

power quickly enough as it was losing

altitude. The preliminary report says

both pilots were confused over the

change to the switch setting. Here's an

excerpt saying, quote, "In the cockpit

voice recording, one of the pilots is

heard asking the other why did he cut

off. The other pilot responded that he

did not do so." Experts say it's deeply

concerning.

>> This right here could be the exact

reason why Air India 171 crashed. We

already know that the fuel switches were

moved to the cutoff position with a

1second delay shortly after rotation.

But the question is why? And right here

at this moment, the Blanco Lero channel

points out a very critical piece of

fact. And I'm going to show you why it

is so unique to the way the Boeings are

designed compared to the way other

aircrafts are designed. and an FAA

bulletin that may have prevented this.

But unfortunately, that bulletin was a

recommendation for information only and

a non-mandatory

repair for these Boeing fuel switches.

Hey everyone, me Kevin here. I'm a jet

pilot. I fly a Phenom 300E, which we're

going to compare the inside of that

cockpit to this Boeing. So, you can see

the difference in the design and the

potential design flaw of what's going on

with this Boeing accident, which is

absolutely devastating, and we've been

covering it clearly. But, let's bring

you to the most important parts. We know

that these uh fuel switches were moved

with what says is a time gap of 01

seconds. Now, it's unclear if that's

rounding. Is that within 1 second? Was

it 0.51 millisec? You know, essentially

0.51 of 1 second that was rounded up.

Was it rounded down? It's unclear. And

future reports will probably give us

some more exact clarity on how much time

delay there was between these two

switches moving to the off position or

cutoff position in this case. Now, why

that's critical is because of this S AIB

uh notice, which is actually in the

preliminary report as well. This is a

special airworthiness information

bulletin, NM1833,

and they talk about the potential

disengagement of the fuel control switch

locking feature. Now this information

bulletin was issued because of reports

from 737 airplanes and this was a Boeing

7878.

However, if you go to the actual

bulletin, you'll see that the 7878 which

is the Dreamliner model in the Air India

171 accident is exactly mentioned in

this special airworthiness information

bulletin from 2018. So in other words,

for six and a half years, the FAA and

frankly aviation community of people

flying Boeings have been aware of the

potential that these fuel switches can

literally turn off inadvertently. And

that's because of the potential for the

disengagement of the fuel control

locking feature. This is basically that

little metal uh block that everybody's

been talking about where in order for

you to actually switch the switch off,

you have to lift it up and then rotate

it over to actually turn the fuel switch

to cut off. Which makes sense. Imagine

it's kind of like you're driving a car

and you have to reach over and rather

than just turn your key, you have to

like pull it a little bit and then you

can turn it. It's just that little extra

guard that limits mistakes from

happening.

But what's very odd here is these fuel

control switches are not like your car's

ignition key where it's way out of the

way of what you're doing. These fuel

control switches are actually right

where your arm would be resting,

especially in a turbulent environment,

which can typically happen on very hot

days, especially if you get ground

thermals that move your plane up and

down much more rapidly.

and we had an over 100 degree day in

India at the time of this accident. So

in other words, high likelihood of that

ground thermal activity leading to some

potential turbulence. So what does this

airworthiness bulletin actually say?

Well, it says that based on an

assessment utilizing the limited data

currently available at this time, this

airworthiness concern is not an unsafe

condition that would warrant an

airworthiness directive. Now, why do you

think that this bulletin which is issued

for information only in a recommendation

would not end up being a mandatory

recall? That's basically what an

airworthiness directive is. It rises to

the level of a mandatory recall where

the planes are required to be inspected

and retrofitted. Can you think of one

reason why a special information

bulletin might not end up becoming a

recall?

How about lobbying because of money?

Politics. Basically, that's usually what

happens. I hate to say it, but it's

expensive to go and inspect a large uh

fleet of aircraft. And remember, this

was based on some reports from 737

airplanes, not from accidents, which

potentially led to less urgency on this

issue in the first place.

But here you can actually notice in the

preliminary report the uh as per the

information from error India the

suggested inspections on these fuel

control switches here it is critical

item were not carried out as this

information bulletin was advisory and

not mandatory. In other words the FAA

knew of a problem didn't issue a recall.

Air India said well since it's not a

mandatory recall we're not going to

inspect it. And even though people on

similar models of planes which have the

same fuel control switches as this

Dreamliner aircraft are having issues of

this fuel control uh locking feature

disengaging.

We're not going to worry about it. If

the locking feature is disengaged, the

switch can be moved between the two

positions without lifting the switch

during transition and the switch would

be exposed to a potential of inadvertent

operation

which would then move the fuel supply to

the fuel cutff position.

Now, why is this really important? Well,

take a look at the suspicion Blanco's

channel here.

ing the throttles up with their hand

behind the throttles while the other

pilot was pushing the throttles up or

thrust levers. That hand guarding the

thrust levers or throttles could

potentially hit those fuel control

switches to the cutff position. Not also

these two bars here. They're just fixed

there. So that's another

design attempt to prevent the accidental

inadvertent cutting off of those

switches by hitting them with some. So

basically there are two ways to think

about what is being said here.

One is that when one pilot advances the

throttle forward to the toga position,

this individual suggests, hey, maybe the

other pilot is guarding the throttle uh

and and by placing their hand behind it

or only one pilot, and this is another

potential option, one pilot is

potentially operating the throttle and

turbulence ends up moving their arm into

these switches. I believe this is where

he says that

>> by somebody guarding the throttles and

bumping around in the turbulence and the

of the aircraft bouncing down the runway

on takeoff.

We may never know the answer to this.

It's true. We may never know, but it

could also happen because of not just

bouncing on the runway, but because of

thermals in the air uh on takeoff or

after rotation. Now, what I want to show

you that I think is very interesting

here is I want you to think of when when

you put your hand on the throttle up

here, look at this rotated design right

here. When your hand pushes forward,

your arm is going to lower just by the

virtue of the fact that this rotates

down and forward, which means now your

forearm is lower and closer to the

switches. So I suppose it's possible

that these switches were actually

uh dis they had their locking feature

disengaged

and somebody who ended up

>> uh you know moving the advancing the

throttle which we now heard was the

first officer who was flying. So they

would have moved the throttle they would

have had their hand on the yolk. It's

possible that in a turbulent takeoff and

in thermals after takeoff, either their

forearm or a pilot guarding those

controls ended up accidentally switching

those switches to the off position. And

that's why I bring up how interesting it

would be to know exactly how much time

was between these two switches moving

because it would tell us, is it possible

that a turbulent event could have been

just that right amount of time? And is

there other data on the plane like an

accelerometer, a set of data that could

tell us, hey, did we experience thermals

or turbulence essentially at that same

time? I want you to see this in the

Phenom 300. So this is the Phenom 300

setup. Uh, and the reason I bring this

up as a comparison is because if you

look at the Phenom 300 versus the Boeing

control, you can see our ignition

switches which have which have the same

metal guards right here are actually

lower and then the thrust area is not on

a curve. So, in other words, as I move

my arm forward, my arm doesn't actually

get any closer to those switches. When

my arm goes forward, it's moving along a

straight plane, right? So, straight

plane. And I'm not actually really

getting closer to those switches. If I

could do a good example here of moving

my arm straight. There you go. We're not

really getting any closer because my

arm's going straight across. Whereas, if

my hand is on a curve and I'm pushing

the throttle forward, uh, technically my

hand's going up a little bit on that

curve, but then it's coming down

potentially to where that thicker part

of your forearm can rest in this area.

Then thermals, you know, occur, some

form of turbulence, and you're bouncing

around right between those guards. And

if those guards are broken or the uh,

you know, mechanisms that lock those

pins into place are broken, is it

possible that you got a little click

click

and this is why potentially we have one

pilot saying, "Why did you turn off the

fuel switches?" And the other says, "I

didn't." Now, of course, it's entirely

possible that, you know, the person, you

know, one person's lying. It's entirely

possible that the other pilot uh is uh,

you know, was the one who did the like

the pilot who said, "Why did you turn

them off?" was actually the one who

turned them off themselves. Who knows? I

mean, there's so much speculation around

this. That's the very sad sort of murder

suicide I uh, you know, theory. But this

is very interesting because it actually

gives you a logical way to look uh at at

the way this aircraft is designed,

knowing that there was already an FAA uh

bulletin

flagging this issue

combined with this curved design that

could potentially lead your arm to sit

very close to those switches. And if

somebody's arm could fit between the

guards here, could be the uh worst case

and sort of Swiss cheese alignment that

just sadly led to disaster here. But I

I'll show you just so you could see it

what it looks like when we advance the

throttle le uh levers in uh the Phenom

for example. Uh so we'll give you a play

of this just so you could see it. And

you could see that those throttle levers

here, we don't have that bizarre bump.

And my switches. I'll leave my mouse

where the switches are. Right here. Uh,

actually, I'll hit play for

>> And that guy who's landing's not close

yet. So, we're good.

>> Yep. No factor.

>> Let's level out. Line up.

>> There it is. My

>> five to go. Okay, we're good. Here we

go,

>> sir. Let's do it.

>> Takeoff power set.

>> 80 yards in the green. You got a

symmetric spool up.

>> Speed alive three times,

>> right? Oh, a little slow today. Yep. Hot

and heavy.

>> Yeah,

>> it's not that heavy. It's just hot.

>> 70.

>> Check.

>> V1 rotate.

>> V2.

>> Now, that's the other thing that would

be interesting is whose hands were on

the throttle because usually after V1,

you're going to move your hands to the

yolk, which the Boeing aircraft have the

yolk. So, was it was was this person's

hand potentially and inadvertently still

on the throttles and the other and this

was the first officer flying apparently

and the other pilot moved the gear

although the gear lever was still found

in the off position. So maybe they never

even got to the point where uh they

ended up uh uh you know calling for

positive rate and uh and gear up because

maybe the fuel switches had already been

hit at this point and they started to

get uh cast messages or something

indicating that there was a cut off of

the fuel flow. Although the preliminary

report does not give us any intel on

what sort of cast messages were

displayed. Presumably, as soon as one of

those switches went to the off position,

we would have seen a cast message that

says fuel switch off very rapidly, I

would suspect. Uh or at least cut off.

Uh maybe even in that sort of motion of

going from throttle set to moving the

arm back, an elbow hit, who knows? But

again, the fact that there's a bulletin

about this and nothing was done is

probably the scariest part to me. Gear

up to the right. Flap up

16 papa.

>> That just gives you a a little example

of a takeoff here.

Yeah. So, uh and then mind you also that

the uh emergency procedure for a dual

engine failure in the 787 is very

specific. In the 787

Dreamliner, the emergency procedure for

a dual engine failure is to cut uh is to

move both of the fuel switches from uh

run to cut off and then back to run. So,

it is understandable that we would see

the switches move back to run as they

try to relight the engines, which as we

saw in the preliminary report, the

engines did relight.

They just didn't have enough altitude to

save this aircraft, which is really sad.

Anyway, uh, hey, if you want to get, uh,

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>> Why not advertise these things that you

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>> We'll we'll try a little advertising and

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>> Congratulations, man. You have done so

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you.

>> Kevin Praath there, financial analyst

and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great

to get your take.