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Air India 171 *URGENT New Data* FADEC ECC Failure - Captain Steeeve RESPONDS

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FULL TRANSCRIPT

0:00

Just moments ago, we received an

0:01

official update from Air India on some

0:04

of the information that the corporation

0:06

Air India knows about Air India Flight

0:10

171. In addition, after my video on

0:13

VaporLock posted about 2 and 1/2 days

0:16

ago that got over 400,000 views, we've

0:20

seen multiple other YouTube channels

0:22

start talking about the theory of vapor

0:25

lock. In this video, we're going to give

0:27

an update on that, but I'm actually

0:29

going to give you some insight into what

0:31

may be even more of a probable cause for

0:35

the Air India 171 accident based on new

0:39

information that's since come out. Now,

0:42

in case you're not familiar, I'm Meet

0:43

Kevin. I'm the owner, operator, and uh

0:46

pilot in command of this Phenom 300E, a

0:50

dual engine jet. In this video, we're

0:53

going to touch on first the latest

0:55

updates from Air India. Air India just

0:58

provided in an inter interview interview

1:00

with the Times of India information on

1:02

the engines. The right engine was new

1:05

and installed as of March of 2025.

1:09

So, in other words, less than 2 months

1:11

old at the time of the Axim. And the

1:13

left engine was quote last serviced in

1:16

2023. Typically, an engine is going to

1:19

get overhauled every 5 to 10,000 hours.

1:22

So, this may not be unusual. Though,

1:25

using the word service might be a bad

1:27

translation since engines are serviced

1:29

with oil. I think they might be

1:32

referring to overall here, but that

1:33

translation might be lost. Uh, the CEO

1:36

of Air India indicates, quote, "No

1:39

safety concerns that were raised on this

1:41

7878

1:43

prior to the crash. There were no known

1:46

maintenance issues or red flags, which

1:48

stands in contrast with some of the

1:50

rumors we've heard online that this

1:52

plane has had maintenance issues in the

1:54

past. We've seen video of the air

1:56

conditioning not working in the cabin on

1:59

the ground. people suggesting these

2:01

planes specifically. This aircraft has

2:03

had issues with sort of the uh cabin

2:06

pooling or cabin electrical systems for

2:09

the little computer uh you know computer

2:11

screens that you see in front of your

2:13

seat and glitching out or not

2:14

functioning. But the CEO at least at the

2:16

moment suggests no known maintenance

2:18

issues or red flags that Air India has

2:20

been coordinating with Boeing at the

2:22

quote highest levels and has also

2:24

coordinated with GE regarding the GE NX

2:27

engines regarding any potential known

2:29

issues. Now this is entirely possible

2:32

here that the CEO is just sort of

2:33

washing their hands of hey we didn't

2:35

know anything. This is a terrible

2:36

tragedy. We've got both black boxes

2:38

recovered. So TBD what information is

2:41

revealed and released from this? But

2:43

what we should do right now is catch you

2:46

up to speed on why Air India 171 could

2:49

have crashed and what we know about this

2:51

accident. First, we know that the RAM

2:53

air turbine was deployed. We can audibly

2:56

hear the deployment of the RAM air

2:57

turbine. Uh and uh we can see it. Now,

3:01

this at this point, we're going to

3:02

assume we're already accepting of this

3:05

information, and this information

3:07

suggests that an electrical failure or a

3:10

dual engine failure is heavily likely.

3:13

Catching you up, since this incident

3:15

occurred 6 days ago, now it's highly

3:18

believed that a dual engine failure is

3:20

the likely cause of the Air India 171

3:24

crash. But the question is, what would

3:26

cause a dual engine failure? We already

3:29

know the ram air turbine, a little

3:31

spinning turbine that gives you the

3:32

opportunity to potentially restart your

3:34

engines or operate some basic electrical

3:36

equipment at higher altitudes like

3:39

cruise altitudes could be useful but not

3:41

very useful at 400 to 600 ft which is

3:44

all this aircraft was able to climb to

3:46

unfortunately before crashing. We also

3:50

know that there are rumors around

3:52

potentially the uh pilots setting up the

3:55

flaps instead of the gear retracting the

3:58

wrong uh uh lever essentially. This

4:02

seems unlikely based on on the ground

4:05

footage of the wings of the aircraft

4:08

appearing like they're set to a flaps 5

4:11

setting suggesting the flaps were never

4:14

fully retracted. Despite this rumor, we

4:17

do see potential evidence that the gear

4:20

was indeed commanded up, but never

4:23

actually fully went up. Uh, in fact, a

4:26

Gary B pilot has a great video on this

4:28

where he shows what the typical gear

4:31

retraction mechanism looks like on a

4:33

Boeing 787. He's a first officer and he

4:36

plays a clip here of once that gear is

4:40

commanded up, the Boeing 787 actually

4:44

tilts the tires while opening the board

4:47

doors before retracting the actual gear

4:51

of the aircraft. And based on the

4:53

footage that we could see, the crash

4:55

footage, some of the higher resolution

4:57

crash footage, and the different angles,

4:59

it's currently believed that the gear

5:01

was indeed commanded up. So, it doesn't

5:06

seem like while it's still possible, it

5:08

doesn't seem like pilot error was one of

5:11

the large contributing factors here, at

5:13

least not regarding the gear or the

5:15

flaps based on the limited information

5:17

we can have at this moment. So, this is

5:18

where we get to the topic of vapor lock

5:20

and potential electrical issues. Now, a

5:23

lot of people have a lot of issues with

5:25

vapor lock, and we're going to talk

5:26

about vapor lock in just a moment. But

5:28

what I'd like to do is first talk about

5:30

the potential of a catastrophic engine

5:33

failure here. But you see, one of the

5:35

things that we know is that when we have

5:37

a dual engine failure or an electrical

5:39

failure, we're going to get that

5:41

deployed ram air turbine, which is

5:44

exactly what we saw and we heard. In

5:46

fact, we remember that Bronco Liri has a

5:48

fantastic uh uh uh video comparison

5:51

where he shows uh the ram air turbine

5:55

deployed or at least the sound of the

5:58

ram air turbine being deployed and this

6:00

being something that we can listen to

6:02

very closely to hear. Ah, okay. That's a

6:04

distinct sound of the ram air turbine

6:06

deployment. I'll save your time and not

6:08

rehash some of this older information by

6:10

showing video clips and that we can see

6:11

that in prior videos. What matters more

6:14

is now what would cause a dual engine

6:17

failure. And so there are a few things

6:18

that c could cause a dual engine

6:20

failure. Let's for a moment start with

6:23

an electrical and fadec issue. Now this

6:26

is potentially a very convincing

6:29

argument as to why the Boeing 787 could

6:34

have had a complete loss of thrust. that

6:37

we didn't necessarily lose our engines

6:39

since we didn't see smoke or flames

6:42

coming out of the end of the uh the you

6:44

know the the rear side of the engines.

6:46

Well, it's possible the engines simply

6:48

simultaneously flamed out because of a

6:50

fuel issue or vapor lock which we could

6:52

talk about. It seems possible that

6:55

thrust was simply lost as the fedc or

6:59

the full authority digital engine

7:01

control unit potentially reset to some

7:04

kind of failsafe reversion, which is in

7:07

English a way of saying this. Imagine

7:10

you're driving a car and you have your

7:12

foot halfway down. So, pedal halfway

7:15

down to the metal, right? And you're

7:17

like, "Cool, I should be accelerating."

7:19

But then all of a sudden, a computer

7:21

says, "Uh-oh, there's some kind of

7:24

sensor or data issue. We're resetting

7:26

your throttle to zero." So now your

7:29

foot's halfway on the pedal. And you're

7:30

like, "Where did all my engine power

7:33

just go? My foot's halfway down the

7:35

pedal." Now, of course, we might, you

7:37

know, let's push. The first reaction

7:38

might be to push down more or to push

7:41

the throttle forward on the plane. But

7:44

that could be where we have to get into

7:47

spontaneous emergency procedures for re

7:50

resetting fedc control that we don't

7:53

know if those procedures were properly

7:57

trained, properly followed or if it was

8:00

even possible in the limited time this

8:02

aircraft was airborne to reset the fedc

8:05

system that full authority digital

8:07

engine control system. So in other

8:09

words, as the gear was commanded up, it

8:13

is possible that there was a sudden

8:16

surge of power in the electrical system

8:19

leading to some form of sensor failure

8:21

or some form of ECC

8:24

failure. This would be uh uh your um

8:27

your engine control center failure where

8:30

you have some form of catastrophic

8:32

cascade of electrical failures. We're

8:34

not just talking about a breaker popping

8:36

here, but some kind of electrical

8:38

failure that happens at the same time as

8:39

you go command gear up. Some form of

8:42

bizarre electrical power surge that

8:45

resets the fadec basically resetting

8:48

your throttle to zero. So in other

8:51

words, the engines didn't fail

8:53

potentially in this theory, but the

8:56

control system, the computer that

8:58

controls the throttle may have failed.

9:00

In our phenom, for example, we also have

9:02

a fadec, which means when we move the

9:05

throttle, we're not moving a cable.

9:07

We're not moving any kind of fuel valve.

9:10

We're simply telling the computer we

9:13

want more throttle. Well, if there's a

9:15

catastrophic computer failure on takeoff

9:18

or some kind of electrical failure that

9:20

leads to that, we might command throttle

9:23

and get no throttle until that fadec is

9:25

reset, which would be a critical phase

9:27

of flight to have such a failure. In

9:29

addition, if it happened at the same

9:31

time as we commanded the gear up, but

9:33

the gear isn't fully retracting because

9:35

that electrical failure hits at roughly

9:37

that same time. Now, we have the drag of

9:41

our gear down and no thrust produced by

9:44

a full weight engine on a hot day when

9:47

we need all the performance we can get.

9:49

Fewer air molecules, slower climb rate.

9:52

And unfortunately, this is where we see

9:55

in the video, it looks like the

9:57

aircraft, it doesn't stall out, nose

10:00

down. It just simply looks like it loses

10:03

lift, which is almost why some people

10:05

are starting to suggest, could this

10:07

potentially have been some kind of uh

10:11

malicious action that maybe uh either a

10:14

pilot accidentally fell on the throttle

10:17

and pulled the throttle back. That's a

10:19

rumor that's going around. I find that

10:21

somewhat unlikely. Some people are

10:23

saying maybe this was malicious and they

10:25

just pulled the throttle back. But

10:26

frankly, if this was a malicious

10:28

intention of downing this plane, you

10:31

probably wouldn't be nose up. You'd

10:33

probably be nosed down or accelerating

10:36

into some form of malicious case. So, I

10:38

really find that to be an unlikely

10:40

theory. Though, let's be real,

10:41

everything gets a percentage chance. But

10:45

this new information about the gear

10:48

potentially being commanded up,

10:49

functioning, and then all of a sudden

10:51

freezing could potentially suggest that

10:54

an engine failure was caused by some

10:56

kind of catastrophic electrical failure

10:59

that led the gear not to complete its

11:01

gear up motion. Suddenly you get the uh

11:04

complete electrical failure that leads

11:07

to a failure or a a um reversionary mode

11:10

of the fedex basically resetting the

11:13

fedc. full authority digital engine

11:15

control resetting it to zero. Meanwhile,

11:18

the pilots are unaware of why all of a

11:21

sudden they lost all thrust. They are

11:23

likely pushed the the forward rather

11:25

than even having time or going through

11:27

the procedures to reset. Frankly, there

11:29

was not even enough time to pull out a

11:31

quick reference handbook to figure out

11:33

why did I just lose fedc control? How am

11:34

I going to reset this? And it's unlikely

11:37

that losing fadec control is a memory

11:40

item in the Boeing 787.

11:43

This also doesn't appear to be a single

11:45

engine failure because we don't see the

11:48

aircraft yaw to one side. Typically, in

11:52

an engine failure, you're going to

11:54

rapidly yaw to one side. This looks like

11:58

you simply lose dual thrust at the same

12:01

time. In fact, I have a video where I

12:04

can simulate an engine failure, a single

12:06

engine failure for you, just so you

12:08

could see this. Now, mind you, the video

12:10

that I'm going to show you is from uh

12:12

training when I was brand new at flying

12:15

jet. Uh, and so the instructor is going

12:17

to pull back where the little hand here

12:20

is. It's going to pull back on one of

12:22

the throttles to simulate an engine

12:24

failure. And you should see the front of

12:26

the plane. You see that yaw right there?

12:29

That's a substantial yaw on a takeoff

12:32

that I then have to counter with rudder.

12:35

And the reason is my right engine loses

12:38

thrust and in that loss of thrust

12:42

uh my left engine is now overpowering

12:45

the aircraft. So my aircraft flying

12:48

straight loses thrust than the right. I

12:50

get more push from the left engine and

12:53

we get that yaw which is not what you

12:55

see in the Air India crash suggesting

12:58

this was not a single engine failure.

13:01

This was a dual engine failure. And I

13:04

know there are a lot of rumors around,

13:06

oh well, perhaps the pilots uh made a

13:09

mistake and and simply pulled the wrong

13:12

lever.

13:14

I I suppose this is possible, but I

13:17

don't think it would lead to a

13:18

catastrophic failure of of complete

13:22

thrust here, even if I leave the gear

13:25

down. And I've I've done plenty of

13:27

emergency procedure takeoffs where we do

13:30

uh you know 50ft goarounds and we

13:33

purposefully leave the gear out to see

13:35

how the aircraft would handle with the

13:37

gear out in training and it just isn't

13:40

an issue. Even with misconfigured flaps,

13:43

it's really unlikely that it would lead

13:46

to such a catastrophic uh here's me

13:48

going for the gear handle right here.

13:50

it's really unlikely that we would get a

13:52

catastrophic result on this takeoff uh

13:56

for the Air India accident. So this is

13:59

why electrical failure seems to be a

14:01

little bit more likely leading to a fedc

14:05

reset or a computer control failure. So

14:08

this is where you know I've put together

14:09

a little bit of a menu of what I think

14:11

the odds of this dual engine failure

14:15

are. So I think the dual engine failure

14:17

is almost certain here. Not a single for

14:19

the lack of yaw. We saw theories causing

14:22

dual engine failure. We don't see birds,

14:24

so we're going to put that at less than

14:25

10%. Pilot error, the flap gear mistake,

14:29

the falling on the throttle, the thrust

14:32

issue, you know, some kind of uh, you

14:34

know, in intentional issue potentially

14:37

here, like malicious. I put that at

14:39

under, you know, a 13% chance, maybe

14:42

even lower. Uh, we'll talk about vapor

14:44

lock in just a moment. There's obviously

14:46

the potential for maintenance issues.

14:48

Give that maybe about a 15% chance. But

14:51

I actually believe a greater chance than

14:53

the vapor lock theory that I kind of

14:55

introduced to the scene. Nobody was

14:57

talking about vapor lock until I started

14:58

talking about it. Mind you, I'm not

15:00

trying to take credit for that. I'm just

15:01

trying to say like the idea here is to

15:03

walk through these ideas and as we get

15:05

more information revise. So

15:09

this fadec control failure

15:12

is very likely given the lack of flame

15:16

out that we see out of the end or the

15:20

failure to see any kind of movement in

15:22

yaw suggesting an uneven failure of the

15:25

engines and it reiterate is reiterated

15:28

by the deployment of the ram air turbine

15:31

and then of course the lack of engine

15:32

thrust. Now what about vapor lock?

15:36

Everybody started talking about vapor

15:38

lock uh after this video that I did

15:40

right here. Critical new data engine uh

15:43

you know vapor lock engine failure and

15:45

we talk about that as a potential,

15:46

right? Uh and so we've got a few videos

15:49

that came out. This is the first time I

15:51

saw Captain Steve talk about vapor lock.

15:55

Let's see here. So I you know I I

15:57

totally agree with that. What what's the

15:58

theory? Have you heard about this vapor

16:00

lock theory? So yeah. So let me throw

16:02

out another one to you. Okay. Okay. So,

16:04

it's 40. I saw I saw one mear line that

16:08

said it was 43 Celsius there. That's

16:11

like 110 or 112 degrees. That's really

16:13

hot. Right. Right. So, they're going to

16:16

have a much longer takeoff roll as a

16:17

result of that. And this is where they

16:19

kind of first initially start talking

16:20

about vapor lock. Talked about the gear

16:23

over here. Uh, and then this is actually

16:25

where Captain Steve really goes into

16:26

talking about vapor lock. Uh, and he has

16:29

a whole segment on it. Take a listen.

16:31

been asking me to explain to all of you

16:33

what vapor lock is. Okay. Uh again, you

16:37

can big P small P with vapor lock if you

16:39

want. There's going to be lots of strong

16:41

opinions about vapor lock, but we can't

16:43

exclude vapor lock completely. Now, a

16:46

lot of folks, let me answer the possible

16:48

objections about vapor lock before I get

16:49

into what it is. Some of the objections

16:51

are, oh, that only happens in piston

16:53

engines or that only happens in

16:54

carbureted engines. It doesn't make any

16:56

difference what type of engine we're

16:58

talking about. This is something that

17:00

happens to the fuel before it reaches

17:03

the engine. So, it can happen in a

17:05

turbine engine. It can happen in a reip.

17:07

It can happen in a piston engine,

17:09

carbureted or non-carbured. It can

17:11

happen in every type of engine because

17:13

it's something that happens to the fuel.

17:15

Now, I've got a great article here. I

17:17

want to read it to you and I got to put

17:18

my glasses on cuz I've been going for

17:20

about 20 hours straight.

17:22

This is basically where he gets into

17:24

talking about the potential for vapor

17:26

lock and how it can happen in jet

17:29

engines. Uh and I'll give a quick

17:31

explanation uh of this using actually uh

17:35

you know a liquid here. I've got a

17:37

colored vegetable oil here and this is

17:39

really just to give a visualization. So

17:42

um I don't actually believe and I want

17:44

to be clear about this. I don't actually

17:45

believe this is the primary likely cause

17:48

anymore of the Air India crash. Like I

17:51

said, as I've posted here, I think it's

17:53

less than a 20% chance that vapor lock

17:56

or this fuel issue contributed to a dual

17:58

flame out of both of the engines, but it

18:01

definitely is a chance. And Captain

18:02

Steve provides an update on exactly the

18:05

vapor lock that we introduced to the

18:06

scene. But let's explain it quickly.

18:09

Typically, you have a pressurized

18:11

system. Imagine I squeeze this bottle

18:14

really hard and I always basically have

18:17

this oil or fuel and you know in the

18:20

case of a jet engine it' be jet fuel

18:22

pressured the lines are always going to

18:24

be pressured right so imagine I'm

18:25

pushing at the back okay these are fuel

18:28

pumps fuel pumps are electrically driven

18:31

is it possible that we had a dual fuel

18:33

pump failure of course absolutely

18:36

possible that we had a dual fuel pump

18:37

failure because of some catastrophic

18:40

electrical issue but This seems like it

18:42

would be odd because we also have

18:44

battery backups, right? We switch to

18:47

batteries. I can while I'm flying, and I

18:49

don't do this while I'm flying. I do it

18:50

during my testing on the ground, but I

18:52

can push a button called electrical

18:54

emergency, and I will cut off every bit

18:57

of electricity to any non-essential

18:59

component of the plane, and I can run

19:01

off my batteries and my backup batteries

19:03

for 30 to 40 minutes. uh and and I can

19:06

still fly the plane and and have my

19:07

primary flight displays and and whatever

19:09

equipment that I need through a

19:11

simulated electrical emergency. My fuel

19:13

pumps are going to operate under this

19:15

situation. Again, this is why it's so

19:18

interesting that potentially could you

19:19

have had a fadec failsafe reversionary

19:22

mode where thrust goes to zero based on

19:26

the computer due to some electrical

19:28

failure or sensor failure seems much

19:30

more likely uh than a dual fuel pump

19:33

failure because fuel pumps are going to

19:35

provide pressure. When you lose your

19:37

fuel pumps though, you go to a

19:39

suctionbased system which is basically

19:41

the engine is sucking fuel and that

19:44

vacuum that it creates essentially pulls

19:48

uh fuel into the engine which basically

19:51

there are little sprayers inside of the

19:53

actual engine that atomize the fuel uh

19:56

and and and ignite uh to create thrust

19:59

inside of the turbine. Okay. Now, if the

20:02

suction system, which is, you know, all

20:06

no longer pressurized, you no longer

20:07

have somebody pushing at the end, you're

20:09

just operating now on, you know, a fuel

20:12

line that's operating off of suction,

20:14

which is fine. But what happens on very

20:17

high heat days where inside of the cabin

20:20

you're also not operating the air

20:23

conditioning which is what we had seen

20:25

during uh the pre-takeoff on tarmac

20:28

footage of the plane. Is it possible you

20:31

have vapor lock because the cooling is

20:35

not enabling fuel lines inside the

20:38

fuselage of the plane to be properly

20:40

cooled. Possible.

20:42

I still give it a smaller likelihood

20:45

because you know our wings are obviously

20:47

separate. Yes, we get heat from the

20:48

ground. Uh you know the the you know

20:51

unused fuel recirculates back into the

20:54

tanks which can warm this up. But these

20:55

are all normal procedures. So you'd

20:58

really on takeoff have to imagine that

21:01

the fuel lines became so hot that they

21:04

vaporized the jet fuel which can happen

21:06

less likely than obviously on on a

21:08

piston engine but can happen. You

21:10

vaporize. So you create water in the

21:12

fuel pump line. Now you lose your fuel

21:15

pump, your both engines fuel pumps and

21:18

you're left with suction. Now you go

21:21

take off with vapor in the line. And

21:23

then what happens when you're nose high?

21:26

See that you as your nose high only

21:30

operating off suction without pressure.

21:33

You potentially get a moment a momentary

21:36

loss of fuel. Right? As you're nose high

21:39

tilting on your climb, that vapor uh

21:42

leads to a temporary flame out. Uh

21:45

unfortunately, you're not going to have

21:46

enough time to relight the engines. So,

21:48

is it possible? Yeah. I don't think it's

21:51

as probable as a fade control issue

21:54

based on the deployment of the RAT. Uh

21:58

because we wouldn't necessarily have had

21:59

a RAT deployment uh until later in the

22:04

sequence where you actually lost

22:07

of fuel flow to both engines. It looked

22:10

like you had no yaw, which implies that

22:12

they shut down at exactly the same time,

22:15

which would also be weird that both

22:17

engines perfectly vapor locked at

22:19

exactly the same time with no yaw. And

22:22

that rat came out so quickly, which may

22:24

have taken longer had you had a flame

22:26

out versus an immediate electrical

22:28

failure. So, this is why I'm now

22:29

reducing the odds for some form of vapor

22:32

lock issue and am heavily focusing with,

22:35

in my opinion, and obviously we'll see

22:37

when the blackbox data comes out, but in

22:39

my opinion, some form of failsafe

22:42

reversion to zero thrust and an

22:44

inability to reset the fadec to get

22:46

thrust back. And it also aligns with

22:49

what we hear about uh a potential mayday

22:53

call that indicated no thrust, no power.

22:57

both of those align. So that's my latest

22:59

on what's going on with the Air India

23:02

crash, Air India crash update and

23:04

hopefully it puts together some of the

23:06

pieces of the puzzle. Obviously as more

23:08

data comes out, we'll keep providing

23:10

more updates. So follow for more. Why

23:12

not advertise these things that you told

23:13

us here? I feel like nobody else knows

23:15

about this. We'll we'll try a little

23:16

advertising and see how it goes.

23:18

Congratulations, man. You have done so

23:19

much. People love you. People look up to

23:21

you. Kevin Praath there, financial

23:23

analyst and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always

23:25

great to get your take.

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