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179 Died in Jeju Air Flight 2216 in Shocking Pilot MISTAKE

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Pilots are now being blamed in the

0:02

aircraft accident in South Korea that

0:04

ran into a barrier killing 179

0:08

passengers. As a jet pilot, I'm going to

0:11

break down what we now know from the

0:13

just released interimm report on this

0:16

accident that killed 179 individuals.

0:18

Here you can see the aircraft belly

0:21

landing uh emergency landing the

0:24

opposite direction of what the runway

0:25

was being used for suggesting possibly

0:28

there was a tailwind pushing the

0:30

aircraft in addition to the fact that

0:32

the aircraft is landing without its gear

0:34

down limiting any actual wheelbreaking

0:37

application hoping to skid to a stop but

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unfortunately not making it to a stop

0:43

after a bird strike killed one of the

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engines. Mind you, aircraft engines are

0:48

designed for bird strikes. But when you

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get through a flock of birds or you hit

0:54

large enough birds, you could end up

0:56

with a situation like a miracle on the

0:59

Hudson where you end up losing both

1:01

engines in a very rare circumstance or

1:04

in a case like this one where birds a

1:07

bird strike ends up leading to the loss

1:09

of engine power on one of your engines

1:12

and then pilots unfortunately make a

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fatal mistake that leads to the belly

1:18

landing of the aircraft. an unfortunate

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overrun into the ILS concrete foundation

1:24

at the end of the runway leading to the

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death again of 179

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people. Absolutely devastating crash.

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And now we have details into what

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actually happened and it's very

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disappointing. Take a look at this. A

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close source to the South Korea

1:43

investigation told Reuters there is now

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clear evidence that the pilots

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mistakenly shut down the wrong engine.

1:52

two people survived this crash, but

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apparently per the interim report that

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we're hearing uh along with, you know,

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uh well, according to the now released

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interim report, the Aviation and Railway

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Accident Investigation Board presented

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its latest report to victim's families,

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which concluded the pilot mistakenly

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turned off the left engine, your number

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one engine, not the engine on the right

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side, the number two engine, which was

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severely damaged by a bird strike.

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minutes before the plane made an

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emergency landing. This apparently after

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investigators found no defects in the

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engines and unfortunately contributing

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to the lack of that landing gear

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deployment. Now, something that's

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important to remember is when we look at

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an accident like this, we see, okay, no

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gear down. Why could there potentially

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be no gear down? Well, if you don't have

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your engine driven hydraulics, you'd

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have to go through a manual process to

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extend the gear. And unfortunately, that

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could take 10 to 15 minutes in an

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aircraft of this size. Whereas, this

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aircraft went from mayday call to

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landing in under 4 minutes. Not enough

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time to manually lower the gear. And

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without either of the engines operating

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because of mistakenly shutting down the

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wrong engine, the aircraft essentially

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had no choice but to make a belly

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landing. Unfortunately, now we know due

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to pilot error. Now, usually the last

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thing anybody wants to blame is pilot

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error, but at this point it looks more

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clear that what ended up happening was

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you had a bird strike that disabled the

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right engine. After you have a disabled

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right engine, there's a likelihood that

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if you continue to feed fuel to the uh

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engine, you're going to end up leading

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to some form of an engine fire, which

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obviously calls for a shutdown procedure

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of that engine. Something that I always

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say, when you fly a jet engine, here's

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actually me in short shorts and a don't

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sue me brochure uh taking off this

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weekend going to uh Disneyland with the

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family. But anyway, uh what what you'll

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see is after we take off and we rotate

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here uh through the clouds, I'll show

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you where our engine switches are. So,

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if we just move the mouse out of the way

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over here, our engine switches might uh

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goes away in just a moment. Our engine

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switches are below that throttle there

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on the left side all the way down here.

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Uh, and what's really important in an

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engine failure in a jet engine, well,

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and frankly a piston engine, is making

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sure you identify and verify that you're

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shutting down the correct engine. Pilots

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are trained not only in simulators, but

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uh, check rides when you get licensed

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with the FAA to prove that you can

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handle an engine failure and you shut

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down the correct engine. Uh, shutting

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off the wrong engine is obviously a

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fatal mistake. you would lose all thrust

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and you have essentially no choice but

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to land. They were fortunate they made

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it to the runway after shutting down the

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wrong engine. Unfortunately uh when uh

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you know what happens often when you get

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pilots and it's unclear if this is sort

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of what they fell to. When you get

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pilots who are used to flying pistons

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that maybe don't have a lot of hours yet

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in jet, they're rushing to turn off that

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failed engine. Because in propellers we

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think about feathering the prop to

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reduce the drag on the aircraft. in a

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jet engine. It doesn't make a

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difference. That jet engine isn't going

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anywhere. In fact, my son uh made me

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this for Father's Day. Uh well, I mean,

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he assembled it for Father's Day. Uh and

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uh you know, it's actually kind of a

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good little depiction here. These

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engines, what you can't feather the

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blades on these puppies, you know, so it

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doesn't really matter. You're not going

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to reduce the aerodynamic drag on one

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side of the aircraft. So in this case it

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appears that the aircraft had a bird

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strike on the right engine. They had

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positive thrust on the left engine which

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would have led to an asymmetric yaw. A

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lot of the aircraft are really good

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nowadays at actually providing that sort

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of counter yaw for you usually through

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just rubber rudder trim that's uh being

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imposed uh by the aircraft control

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systems or your foot for that matter. Uh

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but now the goal would be for a pilot to

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identify and verify, okay, we have an

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engine failure on the right thanks to

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bird strikes, fire risk, we're dumping

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fuel on it. We need to cut the fuel over

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here. Usually what we do to verify is we

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check the throttle. We move the throttle

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of the right engine to idle.

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Now, if you have a dead engine on the

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right and you move the throttle to idle

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and all of a sudden you hear

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what you you know you're killing

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throttle on the working engine. So, this

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is why we usually say throttle off on

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the dead engine first.

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Uh and then make sure that you still

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have thrust and then match your fuel

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shut off valve uh in your your now

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emergency checklist procedure. Make sure

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you're shutting off the fuel for that

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same side. Uh so in this case right

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here, you'd be pulling back the throttle

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on the lever right here and then

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shutting off our engine for this side.

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Now if you're shutting off the wrong

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engine 600 ft above the ground, much

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like what you saw in the Air India

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circumstance, there's really no way to

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recover from an accident like this. So

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not great. Uh that said, very

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disappointing to see this because this

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is something that is regularly trained.

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So I'm really surprised to see this.

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Here are some of the time frames that

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Wiki points out. As the plane was

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preparing to land, it was warned about a

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flock of birds and a potential for bird

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strike. About 2 minutes later, the

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pilots broadcast a Mayday alert advising

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they were going to go around. This was

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followed by a quest to land just 1

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minute later in the opposite direction.

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Reason we hear opposite direction being

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important here is because if you land

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with a tailwind, you're more likely to

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get pushed down that runway. Uh, which

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is not convenient. Tailwind landings can

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be practiced and I've done them before

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going into, for example, Monterey

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airport. Very common airport that you're

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going to see tailwind landings in.

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However, we're only rated to land with a

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certain speed of a tailwind. In my

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aircraft, that's only about 10 knots,

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which is very very low for for I mean,

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all aircraft have a relatively low

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tailwind land. Generally want to land

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into the wind. Uh but anyway, uh the

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landing gear was not deployed. The

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request was was authorized at 9:01. Uh

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and we could see here that the crash

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occurred at 9:03.

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Now, if we go through here, you could

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actually see here, even if a hydraulic

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system failed, there should be auxiliary

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equipment. This is in reference to

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lowering the gear. But activating that

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takes time, noting that less than 3 to 4

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minutes past for the accident to occur,

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and getting that auxiliary device to

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lower could take up to 15 minutes. Uh

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unfortunately

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this is an example here where uh pilot

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error appears to have shut down the

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wrong engine leading to the death of

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179. Very very sad and terrible. Here by

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the way is I have a Instagram story here

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of that 10 wind uh 10 knot tailwind ILS

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approach into Monteray. Uh I'll just

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kind of play that there. But it's um you

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can follow me on Instagram if you ever

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want to see more of these at uh meet

9:21

Kevin or real meet Kevin onx. But this

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is into Monterey which is actually a

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very unique airport because they have

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crushable concrete on each end. Right

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here under the rabbit the lights there

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you'll see crushable concrete. So if you

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ever run over the end of the runway,

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that crushable concrete will slow your

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plane down, which is something that you

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did not see in South Korea, which does

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also bring the, you know, bring up the

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question, you know, why were we in a

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place

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where you had a concrete barrier at the

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end of this runway and not

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some form of uh arresttor system in the

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event of an overrun? like who? In other

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words, who puts concrete like this at

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the end of the runway? We understand

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it's for an ILS,

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but there are ways to position this to

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where it's not the thing you run into if

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you slightly overrun the end of the

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runway. Uh, and this is what was very

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concerning about this in terms of

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airport design. You could see here is

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where the runway ends. And relatively

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soon after the end of that runway, you

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get this elevated uh concrete barrier

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here for the ILS localizer

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uh to keep you, you know, essentially

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centered as you're approaching the

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airport in the weather. Uh so this would

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be sort of your left and right alignment

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signaling system here, uh to keep you,

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you know, aligning with the center of

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the runway in the event that you're

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landing in the weather or clouds or

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whatever. Uh so little bit of an odd

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design here rather than having

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especially if you have a concrete

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barrier here to not have some form of

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crushable concrete

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here. Uh sorry that would be right here

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is a little odd. This would be a perfect

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place for that sort of product. Actually

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see uh if you Google it crushable

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concrete that's sort of the they call it

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the engineered material arresttor system

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EMA S. But uh what it looks like in use

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is something more like this. And you

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could see here, this is in an article,

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crushable concrete makes seventh save at

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Teterboro, snatching a Gulfream 5SP that

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overran

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at uh Teterboroough in a landing during

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rain and windy weather. None of the

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passengers or crew were injured. See,

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this is what we need more of is sort of

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like landings are the most dangerous

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phase of flight. And so, I think there's

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a lot of value in investing into

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technology that could save lives uh and

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avoid this. Uh here's just another angle

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of uh you know, your approach lighting

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system here. Uh your ILS system. You

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could see the uh what's left of it here.

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and the red uh red um radio signals

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right here, the little towers if you

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will, small towers, whatever you want to

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call them. Uh but uh very very terrible

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and this was quite a long airport as

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well. Although the aircraft did touch

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down quite a bit down the runway, which

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uh which was also unfortunate, although

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quite a lot of speed coming into that

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landing there. Just no more. If you have

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both engines shut down, there's no going

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around anymore. You're you're done. You

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can go around with one engine all day

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long. But you can see here they shut

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down probably about a third of the way

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down the runway or touchdown rather

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about a third of the way down runway

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maybe about 25%. Uh which certainly

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contributed to uh the leftover speed

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that they had when they impacted that uh

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ILS wall or concrete foundation.

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Terrible situation and really sad to

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hear about the uh shutting down of the

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wrong engine. I know a lot of people

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then say, "Oh, this is this is the

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industry saying it wasn't the pilot, you

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know, it was the pilot's fault. It it

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wasn't, you know, the manufacturer of

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the engines." Engines have quite a quite

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a substantial um substantially low fail

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rate on jets.

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And really, you don't even need two of

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them. Um, you really just need one of

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them. Somebody writes, "Ils are out of

13:22

date anyways. Let's move to RNAV 100%."

13:25

Yeah, random navigation. It's GPS based.

13:29

Uh Was great, very accurate. Uh I

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actually like using the ILS. Uh you

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know, I find it to be a very accurate

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system. Certainly anything over VR, but

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you know, I'll fly I'll fly an ILS into

13:43

Santa Barbara or actually I have an ILS

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approach uh into Santa Barbara. That

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would be

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I think that was in my pusher video. Is

13:53

it? No, it's not in my pusher video.

13:55

Stalls. Oh, it's in my stall video.

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Yeah, here's a uh an ILS approach into

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Santa Barbara after we do stalls. You

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could actually see green needles here.

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Really hard to see just because it's so

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blurry where this video is positioned,

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but I'm This is me taking an ILS and

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this is exactly what it's designed for.

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I'm in the clouds and I'm following that

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green needle into the runway. That's

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what those red, you know, beacons or

14:24

whatever you want to call them do. They

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allow me to follow and line up with that

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needle saying, "Okay, you're too far to

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the left, too far to the right, or

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whatever." And then, of course, we have

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a glide slope for the vertical purposes

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as well for those non-pilots wondering.

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Uh, but that's what an ILS will do.

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Sure, we could use a GPS approach into

14:41

here as well. Uh, see if you could get

14:44

another view of it there. You can't

14:45

really,

14:46

but uh, this is this was for a uh,

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practice mist approach over here. There

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are the green needles again. pract even

14:53

got my green little diamond over here.

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So, we're a little high. Uh but anyway,

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um doesn't end up being a problem

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because obviously we's going around.

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We's going missed. Uh there we go. And

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as soon as we go missed, we're hitting

15:09

our mist approach uh or nav. So, we go

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right back to the magenta needles.

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So

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anyway, this shows you a little bit of

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an example of uh actually using an ILS

15:20

approach. This is Santa Barbara for you.

15:24

Anyh who,

15:25

so that gives you a little bit of an

15:27

update on what happened with that

15:28

accident. Terrible situation.

15:30

>> Why not advertise these things that you

15:32

told us here? I feel like nobody else

15:33

knows about this.

15:34

>> We'll we'll try a little advertising and

15:36

see how it goes.

15:36

>> Congratulations, man. You have done so

15:38

much. People love you. People look up to

15:39

you.

15:40

>> Kevin Praath there, financial analyst

15:42

and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great

15:44

to get your take.

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