this could DESTROY us.
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Right now, we're analyzing Carvana, and
somebody suggested I go check out this
video and react to it and add some color
to what's going on because there might
be some unsustainable circular financing
going on at Carvana. That may at first
glance not necessarily be illegal, but
it could be the first thing that
collapses in this whole private credit
disaster we're in. So, we're going to
react to this video by Upper Echelon,
the Carvana scam, a predatory bubble.
And it's interesting because it comes at
a time where we've seen the collapse of
first brands and tririccolor which we've
covered significantly on the channel
leading to Jaime Diamond suggests that
there are cockroaches in the economy
that as they show up there's usually not
just one cockroach there tend to be
more. And then as that warning is being
made, remember what I said? I mentioned
that companies are going to start
analyzing their books really closely and
people are going to start getting more
sus about private credit. Well, what's
starting to happen? Carvana technically
beats on adjusted earnings, on uh GAP
EPS, on revenue, but the stock dumps 9
to 13%. Interesting. Now, at the same
time, BlackRock just announced that they
are quote ens snared by loans tied to
firms accused of fraud. This is another
private credit issue. Take a look at
this. Black Rockck and two and and other
creditors are grappling with the fallout
from loans made to two teleco firms and
companies that are now they are now
accusing of fraud. Lenders uh lenders
like Black Rockck are suing Broadcom
Telecom and Bridge accusing the firms of
fabricating accounts receivable fraud
that collateral agent lawyers call
breathtaking in scope. So in other
words, more cockroaches, more accounts
receivable fraud, which is exactly the
kind of fraud that we saw at First
Brands, which is exactly the kind of
fraud that the auditor for First Brands
failed to uncover and had previously
gotten sanctioned for by the PCAOB,
saying, "You guys failed. We're finding
you millions of dollars for in the past
in like 2017 failing to find accounts
receivable fraud. They fail again with
first brands and now we're seeing even
BlackRock is losing billions of dollars
due to accounts receivable fraud. Uh as
as you know we could go through this but
we can see here listing liabilities as
much as $1 billion with creditors
including BlackRock and other companies.
These are big deals and nobody's really
reading these articles because they
don't actually make it to the top yet.
But the cockroaches are starting to come
out of the rugs. It's it's kind of like
somebody stepped on the rug and and they
they killed one cockroach and they're
like, "Ew, gross." You know, first
brands and tricolor, but now a bunch
more are starting to scurry out the
other end of the rug. It's really nasty
and it makes you wonder how can a
company like Carvana
have 100% gross profit on other sales
and revenues, a lot of which are going
to related party entities. Take a look
at this. Carvana on their annual report
for 2024 shows us that other sales and
revenues brought in $1.1 billion of
revenues. Their gross profit on the
other segment, $1.15 billion.
In other words, zero expenses. So,
they're making 100% gross profit on the
other side of their business, which is
the only thing that's really keeping the
entire business profitable. Because, you
know, if it weren't for that $1.1
billion of total profit that somehow
came in, the company in 2024 would have
lost money because their net income was
only $44 million. So, if they're getting
this random $1.1 billion injection from
somewhere at no expenses and their net
income was 404, if you didn't have that
injection, you'd be upside down by 600
700 67 uh $100 million. Same thing for
2023, you'd be upside down. Now, they
burned their bond holders a few years
ago and they managed to go straight up
since then in the stock market. But what
if their move up in the stock market
driven by momentum is exactly what's
exacerbated this cycle? So they burn
their bond holders that leads the stock
to go up which allows who? The GarcAs to
dump shares because they've been dumping
shares forever.
Then what if the GarcAs who own or are
related to Drive Time and uh uh you know
Bridgerest, the financing companies are
using their liquidations of stock to
funnel money into Drive Time and
Bridgerest to buy out Carvana loans at
this 100% profit uh uh margin for
Carvana.
And the cycle works as long as Carvana
stock goes up. What it actually means is
the private credit cycle might not just
affect private companies. It could
affect Carvana. They might think, well,
is Garcia actually selling shares every
single month? Uh, yeah. If you go to
NASDAQ market activity and you look at
uh the last 12 months of shares traded,
over 75% of the time you're getting
shares sold. And look at Garcia almost
every single month. 10,000 shares,
10,000 shares, 10,000 shares. This is
just these are just multiple days here
in October of what's already disclosed.
Look at all these. Garcia, Garcia,
Garcia, Garcia, Garcia. Every single day
almost in uh September. We're selling
shares. Every single day almost. Every
single trading day almost in August.
We're selling shares. Selling shares.
Selling shares. Selling shares. Well,
maybe he's just wanting to finance his
lifestyle as a billionaire. You know,
hey, may as well, right? Sure. Maybe.
Unless they're using these share sales
to prop up the revenues at Carvana,
hoping that when they beat on earnings,
the stock goes up so they could keep
this circular financing going. It's a
little Ponzi. Now, we're not saying it's
illegal or wrong. We're just saying it
raises eyebrows that the income that's
coming in from financing receivables at
Carvana which is a public company which
is exactly the same place there's fraud
going on with Black Rockck there's fraud
going on atricolor and first brands it
is really interesting that Carvana gets
this 100% margin injection of financing
receivables see now people say oh well
it's because they have you know really
high interest rate subprime loans that's
true you So the the trick with Carvana
people say is you buy on Carvana, you
get your loan on Carvana and you
instantaneously refinance because the
rates are so high. This is what people
say in the rumor mill or you know if you
go on Reddit or whatever that's sort of
the word on the street. Uh and the sales
pitch there is well Carvana makes it
easy for you to get the loan directly
through the app. So maybe the loans are
just that much more profitable and
they're able to sell those in the
private markets for way more of a profit
than what you typically see. Well, I
haven't watched this video yet, but I'm
curious if they're going to dive into
any of this, but I wanted to start with
what I'm seeing going on and kind of
where I raise my eyebrows going, okay,
this is great in a bull market when
everything's going up, but this could be
a negative 99% play if private credit
starts boiling over and it's a public
stock that would be the recipient of
this private credit issue, which that's
always what you find is people are like,
"Oh, it's just, you know, private
credit's not going to affect stocks.
It's not going to affect banks. It's a
small portion of the market. Meanwhile,
when First Brands goes under, you see
Jeffre gets destroyed. Uh you see JP
Morgan take losses. You see massive
banks take losses. I mean, look at
Jeffre stock. Jeffre stock tanked uh
after the write down and loss that they
had from First Brands. Uh and you saw a
little bit of a recovery, but you're
already back on the downtrend. And so
obviously we mask a lot of this private
credit pain by you know what's going on
with mega caps and the mag 7 for example
this morning in the alpha report we were
really bullish on Netflix over here
because of the technicals of what
happened yesterday and then the
announcement of a stock split. It's been
it's now basically straight up on the
day. This has been a great trade. So
congratulations to everybody in the
alpha report. But with all that said
let's go into what this Carvana scam
predatory bubble is and we'll react to
it. We'll see. Maybe they'll say
something similar. Maybe they'll say
something different. But oftentimes
where there's smoke, there's fire. Where
there's one cockroach, there more. So,
let's see. Now, for this next one,
you're going to want to remember
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>> Currently, pretty much the entire global
economy feels like a propped up scam.
Trillions in corporate value, investor
musical chairs.
>> This is just going to be like an intro
monologue, huh? All right, let's I want
to get into Carvana. multiple similar
cycles with some of the most broken
underlying business practices I've ever
seen and some of the most vibrantly
waving red flags you can possibly
imagine.
>> Obviously, as per the video title, that
company is Carvana, which I believe is a
perfect example of what happens when
greedy people create a bad business with
nowhere to possibly end up other than
bankruptcy.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, so far based
on what I'm seeing, I agree with this.
Like keep in mind, like I said, if he's
going to talk about what I'm talking
about, you do not necessarily
say this is fraud, right? Like to to
take Carvana and to publicly disclose
that you're getting all this money from
a related party. If that related party
wants to overpay
for Carvana loans, technically that's
not fraud. It's just circular because it
means you're taking money from Carvana
stock by liquidating Carvana stock.
You're overpaying for Carvana
receivables, right? So, you dump Carvana
stock so you have the cash. You use that
cash to go buy those receivables at
Carvana at a premium, which makes
Carvana look more profitable, which
makes the stock go up, which gives you
the license to go sell more stock, have
more money to go keep buying more of
those loans. It's not illegal if it's
perfectly disclosed like that, which it
appears to be, right? It's hiding in
plain sight. The problem is the cycle
stops if you can't sell shares anymore.
If Carvana starts tanking because people
get nervous about private credit shares,
it'll get those that tanking will be
accelerated by Garcia needing to
continue to dump shares and that's when
you'll hit escape velocity. The momentum
will go from up to down. anybody who's
in it for the trade, the meme trade from
when they b burned their bond holders,
you know, back at four bucks or
whatever, they're getting out and you go
to zero. So, I'm kind of curious to see
what they say in this video.
>> For anyone who isn't aware, Carvana is a
used car reseller, sort of with a near
$40 billion valuation. Initially founded
in 2012 by a man named Ernest Garcia III
as a subsidiary of another company
called Drive Time, Carvana has already
gone through a complete cycle of bubble
burst almost bankrupt and now an even
larger bubble,
>> right? And they would have guess who
they bailed out in that bankruptcy.
Well, the near bankruptcy, guess who got
bailed out, which was shocking, mind
you. People were blown away by this
because usually shareholders get burned
when you're about to go bankrupt. Guess
who got burned instead? the bond
holders. Guess who won? The
shareholders,
Mr. Garcia.
The cycle. It enabled the cycle.
>> Again, just as a brief overview, the
company IPOed at $15 a share. Business
model is
>> Obviously, we can see that the cycle is
now repeating itself. Carvana,
>> I know. Just tell me what's going on.
>> CEO of Carvana, Ernest Garcia III, as
well as pretty much every single other
internal executive. But the CEO by far
the most of those people.
>> I like how they used Fintel to show this
on one sheet because he just did a lot
of scrolling and you could see we're
still in October.
Like that's the thing. Like these
people, oh my gosh, he keeps going.
Dude, look at this.
>> Has been aggressively selling tens of
millions of dollars worth of the
company's stock, a multigenerational
trust almost every single calendar day
like clockwork.
>> Yes, that's the thing. is because they
need to to keep the cycle going.
>> The vacuum, it doesn't really mean all
that much. Never a good sign, but
certainly not always bad. Yet, what
should the takeaway be when the highest
ranking members of a company are only
ever selling hundreds of thousands of
shares in
>> Okay, it this is not uncommon. I mean,
in Jensen's Nvidia uh uh or Nvidia's
Jensen, I should say Jensen's Nvidia. I
mean, it may as well be Jensen's Nvidia.
You know, he sells shares, too. That's
not necessarily a red flag. Uh the red
flag is what's going on here that
they're probably selling to prop up the
books
>> their own business. Also the key term to
remember for late
>> except if you dig deeper even just a
tiny bit financing page you can see
quote 99% approval rate
>> right because like there was I was
reading on Reddit yesterday somebody
with $2,000 a month of income and like a
700 credit score. They're like I'm
pissed off I got approved for a loan but
it's 18%. Like, bro, how are you getting
a loan on a car with $24,000 of annual
income? Like, they're giving loans to
everyone because it doesn't matter.
Like, if you think about it, it doesn't
matter if the loan goes bad. All they
want is the stock to go up. That's all
they want. So, they literally move the
risk from Carvana to Drive Time or
Bridgeest, which they're all related, we
believe. Uh, and even if they have
losses over there, it doesn't matter
because the losses can be offset by all
the money they're making from dumping
the stock. And so it makes Carvana look
like it only goes up and it's the best
business model ever.
>> All credit situations welcome. End
quote. That's honestly fantastic from
>> that's like by the way
uh they had a thing where they're like,
"We don't check credit. You don't even
need anything but a passport and a pulse
and we'll give you a loan." and they
went bankrupt like overnight.
>> From a consumer perspective, if you need
a vehicle, Carvana is almost certainly
willing to sell you one. But now, let's
look at the details, right? Yeah. It
turns out that Carvana's only
requirements are that customers be 18
plus earning at least
>> earn $5,100
per year. I mean, that's like working
part-time at Jamba Juice. That's how
much I made when I worked part-time at
Jamba Juice.
>> $5,100
per year, not per month, per year with
no bankruptcies. That's it. Back in
2024, which isn't all that long ago
even, it was even lower, by the way. It
was just $4,000.
>> Requirements and pricing were the
absolute bare minimum.
>> I'm sorry. I have such little patience.
>> Just get to the point.
>> Change, but not like 500% or something.
But during the same period, on average,
almost every other type of default is
dramatically down. Home equity,
personal,
>> right? We know car loans are defaulting
more because we have a K-shaped
recovery. We know. We know that.
It sucks. It really sucks. People want
to just get to their damn job and
inflation has made everything so
freaking expensive and labor wages are
not going up at pace. People are getting
screwed.
>> Exactly what Carvana deliberately
targets. Now for the fun part. When you
use Carvana, taking out a loan for that
sweet new vehicle, well used vehicle in
this case, the loan itself is serviced
by a company called Bridgerest. Serve
just means they collect the payments.
You make the payments to them. That this
doesn't matter. That doesn't mean they
actually hold the loan
>> which is another subsidiary of drive
time just like Carvana.
>> Correct. Drive time is owned by the
GarcAs. There you go. Perfect
>> to be. But now we need to clarify
ownership. Carvana itself is a publicly
traded company. Yes. But at the very
same time, it also exists as something
called a controlled company because the
CEO, Ernest Garcia III, and the CEO's
father, Ernest Garcia II, who also owns
Drive Time, have majority voting power,
and thus they make all of the actual
decisions.
>> That's okay. Mark Zuckerberg has
majority voting power at Meta. Uh, you
know, that's not necessarily a bad
thing. uh that can sometimes be a good
thing because it it you know makes sure
a founders's vision can can can be uh
you know perpetually promoted through
the life of a company. So that's not
necessarily a bad thing.
>> It's a little bit complicated if you
break down the entire spiderweb, but the
general point is that Carvana initially
began as a subsidiary of drive time
until it was spun off and IPOed to the
public.
>> Correct. and and so I mean really
Carvana doesn't have much risk with
these loans which is a great thing for
Carvana because they're just dumping it
to the subsidiaries. The thing is that
cycle stops if the owners can't sell
Carvana stock anymore because the stock
is tanking. So it's all good until it's
not. The problem is if the tank begins
the then then all of a sudden people's
like here's the thing people buy stocks
because the chart is going up. Okay,
that's human psychology. The chart goes
up, people buy the stock. As soon as the
chart starts going down like what you
saw in Tesla in 2022,
and the insiders are dumping,
all of a sudden that dumping accelerates
the selling because you don't have new
people to buy. You don't have that
greater fool buying. That's the biggest
risk.
>> Meanwhile, Drive Time created Bridgerest
way back in 2003 to service their auto
loans. And now Bridgecrest also works
with Carvana. In essence, the son owns
Carvana. The dad owns the company that
offers the loans to Carvana customer.
>> This part doesn't matter. Let's go.
>> We drive time wasn't always called drive
time.
>> Back in the 1970s and even more notably
during the final years of its run.
>> This was the burning of the bond
holders. We get it.
>> 2025, one quarter later, Carvana had
over $2 billion of vehicle assets. If
you then go backwards in 2024, you
continue to see inventory growth and
yes, fluctuations, wild fluctuations in
their inventory.
>> Of course, inventory is going to grow
because you guys also have so much damn
money because the stock has done very
well. So, of course, the business is
going to grow. This is not a surprise.
>> Do certainly happen. But the last time
they experienced a glut of that size,
which continued to then grow, was right
about the same time they almost went
bankrupt.
>> Okay. making the argument that because
inventory is growing, uh, there's the
possibility of them going BK again
because it's getting harder to sell
cars. Uh, it look, I do think it's fair
to argue that you're you probably aren't
in the best time to try to sell cars to
people because it is a hard economic
time, especially for for folks who just
need to get by. But you could always
give you you you sell monthly payments.
That's what you do with cars, right? You
sell monthly payments. But I mean, look,
he's right. Inventory is rising. Uh,
you've got vehicle inventory sitting
right here at $2.3 billion versus 16
last year. So, this is not wrong. Uh,
but the balance sheet is not bad at
Carvana. You know, you've got long-term
debt of $4.8 billion. But current
liabilities, bills due within the next
12 months are 1.5. They've got more cash
than they have bills for the next 12
months. They've got accounts receivable
here. We've got inventory. We've got
enough money to pay our bills and our
debts at Carvana. They've done a very
good job actually at keeping the Carvana
balance sheet good and to some extent
you want a greater inventory because you
want those vehicle sales to grow. Look
at vehicle sales growth. This would not
be possible if it weren't for more
inventory. So that's not the smoking gun
here, sir. Upper echelon. Uh they grew
car sales by 57%. I don't actually
believe that them selling more cars is
fraudulent. You know, I think that
because they're giving everybody a loan,
they're enabling more of these car
sales. I have much more concern with
these related party transactions, which
hopefully this individual actually gets
to here at some point in this 14minute
video
>> worth because cars happen to be a
rapidly depreciating asset.
How far-fetched would it be if Carvana
was buying and selling as many cars as
they can to people who can't or likely
won't pay back these loans? A lot of
>> in fairness, that is how subprime works.
If you're a subprime lender, okay, let
me just pretend we're you and I. Okay,
you and I, we're subprime lenders. Okay,
here's how this works.
Hey, you know these guys are going to
default, right?
Yeah. Yeah, we know they're going to
default. All right, so here's what we
got to do. We got to make sure we get
all our money back on these loans after
they make just three payments. So, we're
going to sell them the car for 20 grand
that's worth 19. We're going to make
sure we get a $300 profit per month. So,
that way we've now made $21,200.
And the residual like you know the
residual value is 19K.
And so if worst case scenario we got to
go in there and repossess this car,
we've got margin after just three
payments. And then if they go BK, we'll
go repossess. We'll assume we're not
going to be able to get 10% of them back
because, you know, they're going to
fight us on the repos or whatever. And
so we'll factor that in and we'll make
money all the time as long as they make
three payments. That's roughly just so
you know how the subprime I'm, you know,
obviously making up some of the numbers
here, but that's roughly how the
subprime game is played. The goal is to
make as much money as possible within
the first 3 months because they assume
you are going to stop paying at some
point. Like if you make your payment for
more than 3 months, they're honestly
like sucker.
It's a brutal game
>> of them rapidly inflating their metrics
then offloading the debt or even excess
inventory perhaps on bridger crest and
drive time. The father and the son
continue to make billions of dollars by
just perpetually dumping their shares
every single day. And
>> okay, you've said that four damn times.
WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO TALK ABOUT THE
FINANCING RECEIVABLES?
>> Clear indications of this happening. By
the way, in their financial data, we can
see other sales and revenue as well as
wholesale sales and revenue for hundreds
of millions of dollars from
>> are you going to talk about the profit
margin
>> quote related third parties which
>> okay fine
>> would be something like drive time
presumably because the father of the CEO
as they jointly control the company owns
that too. Are we starting to see the
conflict of interest here? To be clear,
this isn't exactly an industry secret.
There's plenty of people getting wise to
what's happening right now, including a
300 being a pump and dump scheme for the
benefit of its owners. The first
iteration of that lawsuit was dismissed
because it was an impermissible puzzle
as it's called, which basically means it
didn't quite link all the parties
together well enough. But that really
just means rewrite it better and come
back to me from the judge, which they
did. And now that lawsuit, I believe, is
making its way through the system
actively. On page two, we
>> The thing about lawsuits is lawsuits
drag on for years.
And like you could kind of keep the
cycle going, right? It's actually
interesting. The scheme required Carvana
to enter into a sham pass through sales
arrangement with drive time to increase
its reported sales. Flout state motor
and title registration laws and
regulations. Abandon its purchase and
verification standards. Obscure critical
metrics related to uh retail gross
profits per unit. Implement an
unsustainable nationwide expansion.
conceal critical information related to
its average days to sale measure
misrepresent per vehicle profitability.
Yeah. Defendants Garcia Jr. CEO Garcia
Jun and Garcia Senior and Mark Jenkins,
all of them dump shares, by the way,
implemented a scheme to artificially
pump Carvana stock price. Oh, I totally
agree with that. Now, we don't know,
right? Like I want to be clear, the
things I'm talking about in my video,
they're just picking up on if this is
exactly what's happening, which is our
opinion that it's happening. It's fine
until the stock price goes down. That's
that's what matters.
>> Quote, this scheme required car
to violating state laws. I have no short
positions. No offer.
You want to sell your car? Definitely.
>> Okay. Listen. Okay.
I think he scratched the surface here.
Could have been a little bit more clear
about what the implications are to the
stock. Decent video, cool little
graphics. I don't have that kind of
stuff. Good for him. But I think what
you really ought to pay attention to are
those margins on those related party
transactions. Uh and so if we look at uh
you know just disclosures in their books
of related party transactions
uh we can also see that a lot of the
debts that Carvana has are to related
parties. So, uh, the $400 million in
leases,
uh, some of this are from some of these
are from related parties. Under these
other liabilities, the larger portion
over here, uh, you've got, uh, 98 and
$48 million to due to related parties.
So, basically almost all of it right
here due to related parties. Current
liabilities, you've also got uh, well, I
guess maybe not all of it because these
are the two different years, right? So
95 million out of 142 as an example.
That's how to read this. You've got 66%
of their other liabilities are just
debts to themselves, right? So there's
there's just a lot of this that it makes
sense how they're playing this game and
it's fine until it's not. Accounts
payable. $23 million payable to related
parties. Related party transactions
2014. uh the company and drivetime
automotive together with it with with
its affiliates drive time uh a related
party company due to Garcia and Garcia
uh controlling one or both uh entered
into a lease for different for you know
some locations whatever uh accounts
payable related transactions tax
receivable related transactions tax
payments on behalf of non-controlling
members the company made mandatory and
withholding tax payments on behalf of
the GarcAs. I mean, this is like a slush
fund for the GarcAs.
Uh, company recorded TRA $170 and $82
million respectively, of which 132 will
be paid to related parties again. So,
the vast majority going to related
parties, operating leases. I mean, the
whole thing is is basically you're not
investing in Carvana. You're investing
in the Garcia scheme, and it's fine for
now
until it's not until the GarcAs can't
afford to overpay uh for those loans.
Now, maybe they're not, but again,
that's the scary part. And I think
there's no surprise that when you look
at the quarterly reports, they're not
actually breaking down their costs of
sales right here, right? Uh they're not
breaking down their cost of sales. But
look at this. If you look at So what do
we have here? Retail sales. Uh so we've
got total net sales and operat.
In the quarter, our gross profit is
1.148. If I divide those into each
other, I've got a gross margin of about
20%. Which seems great. But again, if
you go to the annual report and you take
out those uh related party transactions,
where did we where we had the annual
report? I think I already closed it. We
go to that annual report and you see
there's no margin, no expense margin on
it, you start raising your eyebrows a
little bit and going, "Wait a second.
Let's go look at it again just because I
think it's so interesting. Let's go to
the annual report." And so you can pull
it up right here. I'll show you exactly
where it is. So, annual report PDF. And
you know what? Let's turn the
highlighter on for it for the giggles.
And
did I break it on the highlighter
extension? I think I did. [laughter]
That's all right. We'll go ahead and
pull it up again without uh the
highlighter tool. That's sad. I wanted
to use the highlighter. It's all right.
Here we go. So, jump on into
earnings. Earnings. Earnings. Earnings.
Earnings. Earnings.
H.
Okay, there we go.
Here we go.
Yeah, other gross profit. Let's see
their note on it.
So, other sales and revenues from
related parties. So, they're saying 200
from related parties here. Uh, so that's
interesting because let's see what notes
they have on other sales and revs
because they there should be a breakdown
here.
Other sales and revenues consist of 100%
gross margin products for which gross
profit equals revenue, which is a red
flag in itself. And they're blatantly
disclosing it here. So that's the thing.
This is where you can't really call it
fraud because they're so blatant about
it.
It's just circular. Let's see if we can
find anything else and then we'll be
done with it. Other liquidity resources.
I want to see who they're selling these
to.
Other investing financing.
Tax receivable arrangements. That's
fine.
They don't give much more of a
definition of this. They just say 100%
gross margin products. Other sales
primarily due to an increasing gain on
loan sales due to increased units sold
more loan sales and higher loan spreads.
Right?
Other sales and revenue
wild. Yeah. So
let me see here. Cost of other gross
profit and any other disclaimer here. No
[clears throat] 200. Okay. At least
right here they're showcasing that maybe
only 200 or they're only disclosing that
200 million of these other sales and
revenues are from related parties. So,
it's unclear what the other entities are
that are involved in this. Are there
potentially undisclosed relations or
these other Wall Street private credit
firms coming in to buy out these loans
at a premium sort of propped up by
Garcia? Is, you know, the Garcia family
potentially buying, you know, the worst
of the loans and letting other Wall
Street companies take the others at 100%
profit to uh uh uh to Carvana to kind of
keep the cycle going. It's unclear. The
reason it's unclear is because we don't
get a lot of color. They just tell us
that other sales and revenue are a 100%
gross profit business and that it's
going up because they're doing more
business. That's it. That's all they
tell us. Other sales and revenues
consist of 100% gross margin products
for which gross profit equals revenue.
So, they're bluntly telling us that
private credit is coming in and
providing us massive amounts of money. a
chunk of it, we don't know which chunk,
probably the bad chunk, is going to the
GarcAs so they could absorb or hide
those losses. That's an opinion to keep
the cycle going. But again, if it
weren't for those loan sales, that's
where you look at their net income and
you say, "Okay, well, if it weren't for
the loan sales, we'd be losing money,"
which we talked about earlier. So, who
knows? Maybe the whole thing will keep
going. Maybe. Maybe all those loans are
so high quality and it's a really
sustainable business model, but I can't
help but feel that the private credit
stresses we're seeing could start
putting pressure on Carvana. And the
biggest concern is that once you get
pressure on Carvana stock, you limit
Garcia's ability to liquidate shares at
at strong prices to keep people buying
the stock in the face of the insiders
dumping.
Once the trend breaks down, I would
argue once we break 296 and these
private credit fears exacerbate, we will
probably relatively rapidly fall 50% if
not more on Carvana stock. Now, I too I
don't have a position for or against
this company. It doesn't matter to me.
I'm not short it. I just look at this as
this could be the biggest victim of the
private credit crisis
because of how the business is
structured. And I would just be very
cautious. Here's somebody else who has a
piece on Carvana that y'all just talked
about. Carvana filed its 10K two weeks
ago. I already highlighted numerous red
flags. Today, I'm going to present you
that ultimate proof that the company is
cheating on its accounting. Oh, okay.
Let's see the ultimate proof. Carvana
reported 155,000 cars sold. Fine. the
numbers continue to grow while the used
car market is essentially going in the
opposite direction. But that's okay
because their app-based product could be
uh you know gaining a lot of market
share. I think that the app is probably
a good product. People seem very happy
with it. So consider the competition
growing supply in Carvata's market. It's
fair to expect a impact on the margins.
Not necessarily. No, I I don't think
that's a smoking gun. I disagree with
that. And then at this point you might
ask yourself what's their secret? Total
gain related to financable receivables.
Financing receivables sold to financing
partners was 331 million during the 3
months ended in 2025.
8 uh 878 million during the 9 months
ended September 25. Right. Carvana is
telling us that 70% of its 1.2 billion
in sales are gains from selling his
loans. Oh, it's more than that. It's
more than that. They're doing these at
like 100% profit, but that's okay. Uh,
okay. So, overall, they sold 3.1 billion
of loans in 25 880 million profits.
Let's just go with it.
Uh, who bought these highly radioactive
subprime earning interests of, you know,
of of these loans? The only way Carvana
could make up so much money without this
blatant fraud, Carvana would never be
able to report. I don't think this is
fraud. I actually think this person is
is dancing on like uh a potential line
here of of like slandering the company
because I think they're fully disclosing
the circular financing they're doing
which technically isn't fraud. Is it
wrong because you're making like can you
make the argument of fraud? Sure. You're
kind of you're kind of like implying the
business is really profitable and
successful uh when it probably isn't.
But because of all the disclosure,
they're probably so legal up that they
could escape the fraud allegations.
That's my take on that. So, I think
Daario is going a little far here saying
it's blatant fraud given the amount of
disclosure that they put on this. Like,
somebody who reads it knows, okay, yeah,
this looks pretty circular. I'm going to
stay far away.
>> Why not advertise these things that you
told us here? I feel like nobody else
knows about this.
>> We'll we'll try a little advertising and
see how it goes.
>> Congratulations, man. You have [music]
done so much. People love you. People
look up to you.
>> Kevin Praath there, financial analyst
and YouTuber. Meet [music] Kevin. Always
great to get your take.
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