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Game Theory: A Simple Strategy That Will Change Your Life Forever

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You’re twenty-three years old. You just moved into a modest two-bedroom apartment

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with a roommate—a neutral acquaintance you’re  splitting costs and responsibilities with. To

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ensure everything is fair and cordial, you both  establish who does what in the apartment—when and

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who takes out the trash, cleans the floors  and counters, does the dishes, and so on.

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You determine you’ll each do the dishes once  a week. You take Sunday. They take Wednesday.

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Soon, the first Sunday comes around, and, as  planned, you do the dishes. Then the first

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Wednesday comes, and your roommate does them.  This continues for a couple of weeks. Then,

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on one Wednesday, after coming home late from  work, you find the dishes piled up in the sink.

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You don’t say anything. In your generous  nature, you assume it’s a one-off thing,

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and your roommate will just do them the next day. When that Sunday comes, however, the pile of

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dishes is twice as high, spilling out of the  sink and onto the surrounding countertop. They

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never did them. You want to tell your roommate  that they should do the dishes today, but they

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aren’t home—and haven’t been all day. And so, you  do them. This keeps things on schedule anyway.

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When the following Wednesday comes, your  roommate does the dishes. All is well and

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back to normal. That is until the following  Wednesday, when again, late into the evening,

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you find the sink filled with dishes. You go to  your roommate and ask them what’s going on. They

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assure they will do them. You accept this. The  next day, however, the dishes are still there,

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pilled even higher. And then the next day. And  the next day. You realize there’s a problem.

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When that Sunday comes, you wonder what you  should do. Do the dishes or leave the already

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giant pile to grow bigger? What precedent  have you set? What precedent will you set?

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Can you reset things? What if you don’t do the  dishes, and then your roommate still doesn’t

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do them? The kitchen will remain a constant  mess. Alternatively, what if you do do them,

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and soon you’re always doing them every time?  Who are you dealing with here, and how can you

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deal with them most effectively? You wonder what  decision—based on what strategy—you should make.

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*** This is a version of a famous thought experiment

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in game theory known as the prisoner’s dilemma—a  situation where two people would be better off

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cooperating, but each person has some incentive  to go against the other. In both not cooperating,

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however, both end up worse off. In this case, the  individual incentive is not spending time doing

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the dishes. The outcome is either a messy kitchen  and messy roommate situation or a clean one.

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Broadly, game theory is the mathematical study  of decision making and strategies in situations

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where outcomes depend on others’ choices. More  specifically, it examines the nature and effects

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of how conflict and cooperation among rational  decision-makers can lead to optimal or suboptimal

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payoffs. In essence, it is a science of strategy. In social situations, in business, in economics,

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and in politics—in every interaction—whether  between as little as two people or as many as

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nations, decisions are constantly being made  that affect everyone involved. As individuals

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and collectives, we each possess the power to  not only change our own circumstances but also

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the circumstances of others—of the world. These  decisions and their outcomes can be as benign as

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who does the dishes in an apartment to as critical  as whether a country and its citizens survive.

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Game theory suggests that every decision made with  a particular aim can, in principle, be represented

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and understood as a mathematical model. In other  words, with a clear goal and defined constraints,

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a rationally right choice can always be  determined. More yet, an optimal strategy

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can be determined across multiple choices. And  through various computer programs and simulations,

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researchers in the field of game theory have  actually found a strategy (or an approach and

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temperament) that, under many conditions in  society and nature, has proven to consistently

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be extremely effective. And surprising to many in  the field, the strategy is profoundly simple. Even

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more compelling, it is hopeful. It is something  that each of us can apply to our own lives.

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Before going any further, it’s important to note  that in the context of game theory, a “game” is

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not how we conventionally think of one—though  it can also include traditional games. Rather,

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“game” simply refers to any interaction that  occurs between multiple decision-makers,

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where the outcome and payoff of the interaction  for each individual depends on the choices made

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by the others. This can include games like chess  and poker, but it also includes nearly everything

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else. Of course, not literally everything—but  all direct interactions that occur between

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individuals or groups that involve competition or  cooperation, where there is a mutually affected

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outcome. And this is almost everything. Importantly, however, game theory does

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delineate two types of interactions (or games):  cooperative and non-cooperative. Cooperative

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game theory includes dynamics like players on  the same sports team, roommates (in theory),

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business partnerships, as well as international  alliances and trade agreements. In these cases,

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goals are shared, resources and information are  often freely exchanged, and fairness and mutual

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benefit is both implied and actively pursued. Non-cooperative game theory, however,

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is far more prevalent in the world—and arguably  much more interesting. In non-cooperative games,

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there are typically winners and losers, as players  act independently in their own interests, making

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choices intentionally to benefit themselves,  potentially at the expense of their opponents.

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This sort of non-cooperative dynamic and  tension is often used and simplistically

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reproduced in game shows. For example, in the  late-2000s British game show Golden Balls,

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two strangers would sit across from each other  and decide whether they wanted to split or steal

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a large sum of money with the other person. Each  persons’ choice directly affected whether either

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individual got any money and how much, but  neither would know the other’s final choice

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until it was revealed and locked in. If both chose  to split, they shared the money equally. If one

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chose to split, and the other chose to steal,  the one who chose to steal got all the money,

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and the other person got nothing. If both  chose to steal, neither person got anything.

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In these sorts of one-off situations, where one  can either split or steal–cooperate or defect—game

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theory shows us that there is a clear rational  choice. What is known as the dominant strategy

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refers to a choice that provides a player with the  best results no matter what the other player does.

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And this is always the most rational choice  to make. The choice is not about what could

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lead to the best possible outcome, but about  choosing for the best outcome no matter what

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the other person decides to do—since you have  no control over that. And so, in Golden Balls,

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the most rational thing to do would be to always  steal. This is because if one person splits,

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then the other person does better by stealing.  If one person steals, again, the other person,

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in a sense, does better by stealing, because  they get the same amount as splitting (zero),

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but are not manipulated or exploited by the  other person. Technically, this is what game

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theorists would call a weakly dominant strategy,  since the literal payoff in this later situation

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would be equal to splitting, rather than better. Of course, however, life is not a gameshow.

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Interactions are almost never one-offs without  lingering, continued effects. Decisions are rarely

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as simple as splitting or stealing, and outcomes  are rarely as simple as half, all, or zero. In

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real life, there is almost always a much greater  interplay with time, repeated interactions,

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uncertainty, leverage, and resources. If  someone does or doesn’t do the dishes once,

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that game is not over. The relationship and space  are and can be either benefited or strained,

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moving forward. When a business smears or partners  with another business, that game is not over.

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Retaliation or a growth in resources can and will  likely follow. When a country attacks, retaliates,

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or allies with another, that game is not over.  Wars can begin or end. Nations can begin or end.

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With all this in mind, what is the most effective  decision-making strategy (or approach and

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temperament) in life in general. Is there one? In 1980, political scientist Robert Axelrod set

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out to test and answer this very question.  Using computer programs to model different

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decision-making strategies, Axelrod orchestrated  an experiment. He had leading theorists from

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various disciplines and places around the  world create and submit programs that would

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compete in a tournament of an iterated  version of the prisoner’s dilemma. The

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goal was to submit the best strategy and win. The rules of the tournament were simple. Each

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player (or program) played a single game against  every other player—as well as a copy of itself.

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In each game, each player had the option to either  cooperate with or defect against their opponent.

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If both players cooperated, they both received  three points. If one cooperated and the other

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defected, the player who defected received  five points, and the player who cooperated

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received zero. If both defected, both received  one point. Each individual game contained 200

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rounds. The player with the most points by the  end of all the matchups in the tournament won.

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In total, fourteen programs were submitted—and  then Axelrod added one that defected or cooperated

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at random, with a 50% probability each round.  Most of the submitted strategies began with

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cooperation, while others began with early  defections. Some players were complex and

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calculating, probing for weakness and then  exploiting it—like a program called Graaskamp.

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Some mixed in random moves to utilize confusion  and surprise–like a program called Joss. Others

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were far more straightforward. Together, the  programs spanned from what Axelrod referred

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to as simple and nice to cunning and nasty. After the tournament concluded, Axelrod, along

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with many other game theorists, found the results  profoundly surprising. He ran the whole tournament

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again, five times over, to ensure the results were  dependable and repeatable. Each time, the results

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were consistent, and the same winner emerged: a  program called tit-for-tat, which was one of the

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simplest and most cooperative programs of all. To further elevate the complexity and better

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mirror real-world circumstances, Axelrod conducted  a second tournament. This time, there was no

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defined number of total rounds per game. With it  now being a random, unknown number, players could

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no longer track and calibrate their decisions  against a defined endgame. Just like reality.

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This time, sixty-two program strategies were  submitted—and again, Axelrod added one that

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was random. The results were very consistent to  the first tournament. Again, tit-for-tat won.

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Axelrod and many other game theorists found this  extremely surprising because the expectation was

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that the winning strategy would be either  highly complex, highly competitive, or both

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(i.e. cunning and nasty). And yet, tit-for-tat  was generally simple, nice, and forgiving.

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In terms of specific gameplay, tit-for-tat  always starts with cooperation. From there,

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it always copies its opponent’s last move. And  so, it continues to cooperate unless or until

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its opponent defects. At that point, tit-for-tat  immediately defects back and continues to do so

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unless or until its opponent cooperates again. As  soon as its opponent cooperates again, tit-for-tat

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then forgives (or no longer accounts for previous  moves) and returns to cooperating unless or until

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its opponent defects. So on and so forth. Interestingly, the results of this strategy

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equated to tit-for-tat never winning  any individual games, since one-on-one,

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it can only lose or draw. But across all  match ups and games, it cooperated with

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enough other players to consistently end up with  the highest score overall and win the tournament.

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Axelrod writes in The Evolution of Cooperation: What accounts for TIT FOR TAT’s robust success

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is its combination of being nice, retaliatory,  forgiving, and clear. Its niceness prevents it

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from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its  retaliation discourages the other side from

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persisting whenever defection is tried. Its  forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation.

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And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other  player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation.

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Moreover, almost all top performing players  in the tournaments shared in these similar

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qualities. And in later simulations with  even more realistic, chaotic conditions,

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a more generous version of tit-for-tat, that  occasionally forgave defections instead of

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reciprocating them, proved to be even more  effective. Nasty players, on the other hand,

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seemed to often find themselves in defecting wars  that lead to mutual destruction. Axelrod says:

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“What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge  is the fact that the players might meet again.”

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The takeaway from this is reasonable clear.  In continued non-cooperative, competitive

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interactions—like these tournaments—it is often  beneficial to, at the very least, try to be nice.

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To lead with niceness and cooperation. This  is not a weakness, but a strength. Conversely,

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an individual who often leads with or insights  defection is more likely to weaken itself

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and lose over time—even if it initially  appears as if they are winning. Moreover,

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holding grudges is a weakness; forgiveness is a  strength. Of course, however, weakness itself is

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a weakness. That is, letting someone do you  wrong without consequence will lead to being

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taken advantage of and losing. One’s approach to  exacting consequence, however, is also important:

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it must be relatively equal, consistent,  and clear, not opaque and manipulative.

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From a moral and historical perspective, the  winning tit-for-tat strategy essentially mirrors

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an eye-for-an-eye ethos. That is, justice and  punishment should be proportional to the harm

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caused by an offense, but after proportional  consequence, balance and cooperation can and

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should be restored. On a more individual level,  it essentially equates to being kind, forthright,

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and understanding, but never a push-over. Of course, there are problems and limitations

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both with Axelrod’s experiment as well as  game theory in general. Programs, simulations,

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and theories can arguably never truly reproduce,  model, or assess the true scale and complexity of

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real-world interactions. Real interactions  often involve many people and many issues;

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many perspectives, many goals; shifting ideas and  opportunities; asymmetric leverage and resources;

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known and unknown information; vast errors and  chaos; and, perhaps most importantly, they involve

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the very emotional, sentimental, spiteful, and  irrational nature of the human mind. As humans, we

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feel and hope and believe at least as much as if  not more than we assess, calculate, and execute.

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Ultimately, however, game theory teaches us  many important things. Perhaps one of the most

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important being is that every interaction  and game is not always about winning.

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A strategy always focused on winning can actually  be the least effective at winning overall—whereas

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one less focused on always winning can, over  the long term, win. If we want to truly be

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successful across various areas of life, there  are going to be—need to be—many instances of draws

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and losses. But so long as we continue forward  with each new moment and each new interaction,

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open and willing to try again, ensuring we stand  up for ourselves and hold true to our values,

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while striving to meet and unite with the  world around us, we can steadily and surely

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move toward bigger, more important wins—wins  of cooperation, kindness, and mutual benefit.

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We can never truly know or control if people will  cooperate or defect with us, but we can know and

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control if we will and why. And we can know that  each decision we make will likely influence the

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nature and outcome of all the games in which we  participate—present and future—potentially making

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or breaking relationships, goals, systems,  or even society and the planet. And so,

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at least for starters, for own sake, when our  day comes, let’s be sure we do the dishes.

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