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Air India 171 Crash Cause | Fuel Sensor Problem - Captain Steeeve

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0:00

That is a really critical minute where I

0:02

mean if you lose dual engine power at

0:06

this critical phase of flight, you're

0:08

screwed. There's nothing. You do not

0:11

have the altitude to glide back to your

0:13

destination. Kevin is very talented, but

0:16

I don't know it's going to be him, but

0:17

he's a very talented guy. Hey, it's

0:19

Kevin. So, I've been watching this

0:21

Captain Steve video on fuel filter

0:24

failures and contaminated fuel, and he

0:27

talks a lot about Air India 171,

0:30

potentially borrowing off of the crisis

0:32

of Air India 171, suggesting that maybe

0:35

a fuel filter contamination was the

0:37

problem in the crash that caused the Air

0:40

India 171 crash shortly after takeoff.

0:42

There have been a lot of theories

0:43

circulating around this, but I want to

0:45

talk a little bit about fuel filters and

0:48

fuel contamination and some issues that

0:51

might there might be with Captain

0:53

Steve's video. But first, I want to also

0:55

shout out here Gary B. pilot who talks

1:00

about how there we we go into sort of

1:02

some casework documentation into how

1:06

previous engine thrust failures have

1:08

been suspected by the NTSB in 787

1:13

aircraft where the thrust control

1:17

malfunction accommodation can instruct

1:20

the FADC to potentially revert thrust in

1:24

engines to go to an idle setting. I

1:28

would argue that at the moment this

1:30

software glitch is potentially the

1:33

highest likelihood though probably still

1:36

only 20 30% because there's so many

1:38

different things that could have

1:39

happened uh with the area 171 crash. Uh

1:43

it it seems to be that some form of

1:45

software fedc dual fadec issue which is

1:48

remarkable since each engine has its own

1:51

but some kind of central electronic

1:54

computing system failure that sent the

1:57

thrust for both engines to idle that led

2:00

to that tragic 171 Air India crash. Now,

2:05

regarding Air India 315, which I made a

2:08

video about a week or so ago, we have

2:11

Captain Steve just now breaking down Air

2:14

India uh 315. And what he does is he

2:18

sets up the scene as, hey, here's a case

2:20

where we had uh pilots on Air India 315

2:24

make what he calls the right decision to

2:27

divert back to Hong Kong on their way to

2:29

Delhi given a potential fuel filter

2:31

error. You can listen to that here.

2:33

Okay. Okay.

2:35

Technical reasons, sir. We would like to

2:38

stay closer to Hong Kong. Uh maybe we

2:41

will uh come back and land back into

2:43

Hong Kong once we sort out the problem.

2:45

We don't want to continue further. Okay.

2:47

air in. And so there's some speculation

2:50

now that much like that Air India 315

2:53

crash complaining about a fuel filter

2:55

issue or some form of uh engine related

2:59

uh fuel flow issue that's coming up on

3:02

their screens. Uh this is an aircraft or

3:06

that that basically didn't end up in the

3:09

disaster that Arandia 171 ended in

3:12

because they diverted. Now is that

3:14

possible on an immediate takeoff? No, of

3:16

course. But what you end up having is

3:18

Captain Steve suggests that hey, you

3:21

know, here are the checklists. If you

3:22

have one engine fuel filter message,

3:25

you'll just monitor the performance,

3:27

although you could end up getting a

3:29

flame out if you end up having a dual

3:32

engine fuel filter error, then land at

3:35

the nearest suitable airport. So, he

3:38

provides the checklist uh for what would

3:40

normally be done in uh an uh in a Boeing

3:44

787. Now, what I notice, and this is

3:48

what my impression was when I first

3:50

watched the Captain Steve video, is very

3:53

often when we get failure notifications

3:56

on either fuel pumps or fuel filter

3:58

lines, not always, but they tend to be

4:01

sensor issues. Now, the reason I

4:03

mentioned sensor issues, and here's a

4:05

comment that brings this up, is because

4:07

I don't believe that one of these fuel

4:10

issues is a high likelihood, unless

4:13

there was some bizarre combination of

4:16

sudden fuel flow shut off along with

4:19

vapor lock and some kind of cascading

4:21

electrical problem that would have

4:22

contributed to the Air India 171 crash.

4:26

mostly because I agree with this poster

4:28

here that a lot of fuel filter errors

4:31

seem to be related to crappy sensors.

4:34

Now, that doesn't mean don't land or

4:36

don't pay attention to the issue, and

4:38

I'll give you a personal experience with

4:39

this, but take a look at this comment.

4:41

I'm an AM mechanic. I work on commercial

4:43

jetliners. We get calls on fuel filter

4:46

bypass lights, and most of the time it's

4:49

an indication issue, not an actually

4:53

clogged filter. Now, keep in mind there

4:56

were no other reports of aircraft

4:58

receiving fuel filter issues or having

5:02

engine issues because of contaminated

5:05

fuel coming out of the AirIndia 171

5:08

airport or 315 airport. So, in neither

5:12

of those cases have there been reports

5:13

of other aircraft having issues of fuel

5:15

contamination because fuel contamination

5:17

is relatively a rare occurrence. Now, it

5:21

has happened before. Take a look at

5:23

Cathway Pacific. This was a this was a

5:26

remarkable case where nobody actually

5:28

died despite the aircraft landing at

5:30

twice its normal speed back in 2010,

5:34

popping I think it was seven out of uh

5:36

almost almost all of their tires. Uh but

5:39

uh nobody died despite landing at twice

5:41

its normal speed, blowing a lot of

5:43

tires, and remarkably surviving uh the

5:46

this contaminated fuel incident that

5:49

damaged both of the aircraft's engines.

5:53

This was 2010.

5:55

If we go back to the Dominican Airlines

5:57

flight 603, this is 1970.

6:00

So 40 years earlier, we get a water

6:03

contamination issue in the fuel lines.

6:06

1960,

6:08

we get uh the Munich C130 crash because

6:12

of water freezing at the bottom of the

6:16

fuel inlet tanks. And then we have a

6:18

2012 short hall uh flight where about

6:22

three of the four yeah three of the four

6:24

occupants were killed uh also

6:27

potentially due to fuel contamination

6:30

caused by rain that led to

6:31

contamination.

6:33

So in the last you know what do we have

6:36

here 65 years we've had four incidents

6:41

of fuel contamination. This is really

6:44

really low. This is very very rare to

6:46

have a fuel contamination related crash

6:49

let alone then a fatal crash. So for the

6:52

fatalities associated with fuel

6:54

contamination very very low. In fact, if

6:56

you look at some of the FAA's

7:00

documentation

7:01

or or their advisory circulars on uh

7:05

fuel failures, most of the fuel failures

7:08

issues that they will talk about will

7:10

only have to do with piston engines or

7:12

reciprocating uh you know engine

7:14

aircraft. The reason they do is because

7:16

this is where fuel contamination becomes

7:19

even more important. Uh, and what I find

7:21

remarkable is they pin the biggest cause

7:24

of fuel problems on piston aircraft

7:28

on fuel starvation. In other words,

7:31

pilots not properly monitoring how much

7:33

fuel they have in each tank, especially

7:35

since a lot of older planes or even

7:37

Pipers still today will require that you

7:40

manually change from the left tank to

7:42

the right tank every about 10 to 15

7:44

minutes depending on uh what power

7:45

setting you're flying on. I had to do

7:47

this in my training as well. It's

7:49

exhausting and it's really important to

7:51

pay attention to, but the FAA suggests

7:53

that 51% of all engine power loss

7:56

accidents are related to fuel

7:58

exhaustion. So, a lot of cases where you

8:01

have aircraft failing or or you know,

8:03

crashing because of an engine failure is

8:06

often more than half the time related to

8:09

the pilot's failure to pay attention to

8:11

how much fuel they actually have or

8:13

should have. potentially loading too

8:16

little fuel, not properly calculating an

8:18

alternate uh airport if they're entering

8:20

IMC conditions, or potentially uh need

8:23

to, you know, fly to a different airport

8:25

for whatever reason. They also talk

8:26

about the potential for a lack of

8:29

training around sumping fuel out of

8:31

piston aircraft where generally you'll

8:33

take these little sump cups and on

8:35

Cessnas, I don't know, you've got like

8:37

seven or eight different spots you have

8:38

to check. on a Cirrus, you might have

8:41

three different spots that you check,

8:42

usually one under each wing and one

8:44

center tank. What I found that was very

8:46

fascinating when I went to jet training

8:49

school and started flying a jet uh was

8:52

that it's actually not recommended to

8:55

sump the fuel on these. Now, they

8:57

actually do have fuel sumps under uh,

9:00

you know, under the aircraft, under the

9:01

fuselage, and under the wings, uh, the

9:03

low points of the tanks, but they

9:05

actually don't recommend you sump them

9:07

because they're such larger sumps. There

9:09

have been plenty of cases, is what I'm

9:11

told from, you know, every single pilot

9:14

I've ever flown with, they're like, "No,

9:16

no, no. We we don't touch those."

9:17

Apparently, the sumps get stuck. So, if

9:20

you go sump the fuel to see if there's

9:21

water contamination or debris or

9:24

whatever uh in the fuel on a jet,

9:27

there's a high likelihood of that sump

9:30

uh staying in the stuck open position

9:32

and then dumping thousands of pounds of

9:34

fuel onto the tarmac before you can stop

9:36

the flow. And now you're talking about

9:38

thousands of dollars of fuel on the

9:39

ground, but also a fire safety hazard

9:40

issue.

9:41

kind of odd because the manuals for jet

9:44

aircraft do call for sumping the fuel,

9:47

but nobody in practice seems to do it.

9:49

And I've never seen any jet pilot

9:52

actually sump fuel. But then again,

9:54

maybe maybe that is something that

9:56

should be done unless there isn't an

9:58

actual fuel contamination issue in

10:01

aircraft, especially modern aircraft

10:03

where maybe what we actually have is

10:05

just a sensing issue. So, I kind of

10:07

agree with this comment here that it's

10:09

possible we might just be looking at

10:11

sensing issues in terms of why the 315

10:13

pilots decided to turn back in an

10:15

abundance of caution. And this is where

10:17

I'd actually like to point out my own

10:19

fuel sensor issues that I've had on my

10:22

very own plane. So, on uh on our Phenom

10:25

300E, we have had a fuel valve uh fail

10:29

on uh our left engine uh show up. This

10:33

basically means we're now operating

10:34

without the powered uh fuel pump and

10:37

we're just operating on essentially the

10:38

sump. Uh and then of course the other

10:41

engine uh has its active DC powered fuel

10:44

pump plus the sump. Uh and so we've seen

10:47

this before where we would actually then

10:50

switch, you know, follow our checklist

10:52

and switch our uh pump from auto to on.

10:55

We'd see the failure, we turn it, you

10:57

know, to off and the failure light goes

10:59

away, but then again our pump is off.

11:01

And so we'd go through our

11:02

troubleshooting steps. Never lost any

11:05

engine thrust, never any issues with the

11:07

engine. Uh all engine vitals, so to

11:09

speak, completely normal. And so, of

11:12

course, we immediately we stopped

11:13

flying. Uh called in service. Service

11:16

ended up ordering from Ember Air a fuel

11:19

uh pump replacement for the left side.

11:22

And the crazy thing, I didn't I didn't

11:25

know why they did this. I think it's

11:26

probably the safer way to do it. They

11:28

replaced the pump out of an abundance of

11:30

caution. And then just to test, they

11:32

moved the fuel sensor, the fuel pump

11:35

sensor from the left engine to the right

11:38

engine. The next time I go flying, I get

11:42

right fuel sensor fail. So fuel valve

11:44

fail. And we're like, "All right, it's

11:46

the sensor at this point. Engines are

11:48

operating normally. We've the the right

11:51

pump never had an issue. The left pump

11:53

is brand new. The sensor is obviously

11:56

gone. Very next flight, that sensor was

11:58

replaced. I'm not sure why they even

12:00

kept it in the first place, but that was

12:01

a maintenance decision. Uh, but it's

12:03

interesting because I've personally had

12:04

that experience uh on on a 2021 jet. So,

12:08

I don't think it's highly uncommon for

12:10

these sensors to go, and it sort of

12:11

aligns with what I'm seeing in the

12:13

comment here, though, there could be a

12:14

little bit of confirmation bias involved

12:16

in that. That said, there's also a note

12:19

where somebody leaves a comment here, a

12:22

clarification, which Steve rightfully

12:24

pins and says that fuel on the 787

12:29

is fed on takeoff by the lefthand engine

12:32

uh tank and the right-hand engine tank

12:35

independently during takeoff. There was

12:37

some commentary that maybe they're both

12:39

fuel fed from the center tank on the

12:41

787. This individual uh suggests and it

12:44

was pinned by Captain Steve that uh they

12:46

they would individually be fed from each

12:48

engine, which again suggests

12:50

contaminated fuel would not necessarily

12:53

cause Air India 171 to crash immediately

12:55

after takeoff. Because if you go to the

12:58

more recent Hathaway Air uh flight, and

13:01

you study this, there are plenty of

13:02

great YouTube videos on Cathway Pacific

13:04

Flight 780, you actually find that the

13:06

engines didn't both fail together at the

13:09

same time, which is very unusual. they

13:12

actually flamed out individually and the

13:15

second engine sputtered out over time.

13:18

Uh, and so this gave the uh, you know,

13:20

flight crew an opportunity to divert an

13:23

emergency land uh, at another airport,

13:26

which is great, but it indicates that

13:28

usually if you're starting to get fuel

13:30

contamination issues, the issues would

13:32

show up at the engines at different

13:34

times and not at exactly the same time.

13:37

Which brings us back to this idea much

13:40

like uh Gary B pilot over here suggests

13:43

that hey you know maybe there's some

13:46

kind of software glitch that ultimately

13:50

reset the fadeex on error India 171 to

13:54

some form of reversionary mode to an

13:57

idle thrust setting and there was not

13:58

enough time to go through a checklist to

14:01

essentially clear this issue before

14:04

crashing. Now I will say any pilot that

14:08

I have flown with uh has uh you know has

14:11

asked me they're like Kevin you know

14:12

what are your thoughts on on the Air

14:14

India 171 crash like everybody's talking

14:16

about Air India 171 in the aviation

14:19

community because frankly it's scary I

14:22

mean we I I love flying I try to go

14:25

flying uh almost every single week and

14:27

uh I I think uh you know pilots

14:29

regularly do you know I I don't fly for

14:32

anyone but myself uh so You know, some

14:35

people fly professionally three, four

14:37

times a week. I mean, sometimes I'm

14:38

flying for myself three or four times a

14:39

week. Uh, but more so the point is it's

14:43

scary and and pilots themselves are

14:45

wondering, you know, here's some sort of

14:46

footage in the background uh of us, for

14:49

example, going to take off and uh this

14:52

is such a scary moment when you're going

14:55

to take off that it's odd to think,

14:58

gosh, what if we lost both engines in

15:00

this moment? There's much not much you

15:02

can do other than basically hope that

15:05

you've got a field in front of you. Uh

15:07

which is really scary. Uh you can take a

15:09

look at my takeoff here. Tower 28 97

15:14

Mike holding runway 26 on alpha

15:17

26 heading good. Ready? Yes, sir. Let's

15:19

do it. Okay,

15:21

ATR is in the green. Yep. Disregard.

15:25

See that yellow popup right there?

15:27

That's the FMS disagree. That's what it

15:29

looks like when a cast message or an

15:31

error code shows up. That would be the

15:33

same thing as like fuel filter fault or

15:35

fuel valve fault or whatever. In this

15:37

case, it's FMS disagree. And we actually

15:39

prepare for this in our brief before we

15:42

go to take off. We're like, if we get an

15:44

FMS disagree because this plane does it

15:46

a lot, we will disregard it. So, we're

15:48

we're generally prepared for that. And

15:49

it's usually if there's a long line,

15:51

there were like four or five planes in

15:53

front of us to taxi out here and take

15:54

off. Usually if we're like on the ground

15:56

running for more than 10 minutes, the

15:58

fuel sync is slightly off. Uh and and we

16:01

get that error message. So it's very

16:02

common after the power is set. It's the

16:04

most annoying thing in this aircraft.

16:06

Okay. Brakes off.

16:09

Your speed three ways.

16:14

70. Sure.

16:17

See that helicopter coming over? That's

16:18

what I was worried about.

16:22

Hey be rotate. The helicopter is no

16:24

factor. Copy two. Positive right.

16:27

Positive right. You're up.

16:32

I got that helicopter in sight. No

16:33

factor. I'm going to start turning left

16:34

though. Helicopter 6 05 north back the

16:36

option report on the go. Okay. Flap the

16:38

option. North 65. Check niner 7 Mike

16:42

right down approved. Runway 26. Clear

16:43

for takeoff. Caut.

16:47

[Music]

16:50

Okay. AP set on heading four. Papa

16:53

contacting your departure. Contact your

16:55

departure for Papa.

16:58

Oops.

17:00

Departure. All right. Departure Phenom 6

17:02

niner 4 Papa at 1600 climbing 3,000. 6

17:06

niner 4 Papa radar contact. CLL climb

17:08

maintain 4,000. Climb maintain 4,000. 6

17:11

niner 4 Papa. All right. Uh, landing

17:13

gear is Papa contact approach 128.

17:17

That's going to be 2865. Right.

17:20

128 65 6 niner 4 pop I think. Right. All

17:23

right. Here you go. So like your goal on

17:26

a takeoff, I mean we're at 2700 ft here,

17:28

right? Your goal on a takeoff is how

17:31

quickly can I get up. Uh and you know on

17:34

a jet, you know, we're we're moving

17:36

fast. We're going uh you know we're

17:38

already what what was that? 30 seconds

17:40

and we're already at 3,000 ft. I mean

17:42

let's let's calc.

17:44

Uh so there's our rotation. There we go.

17:47

We rotate at 148. And to get to 3,000

17:51

ft, I think we're about 50 seconds or

17:55

so.

17:56

H 2500 there. Yeah, it's about a minute.

17:59

It's about a minute. So, that is a

18:01

really critical minute where I mean, if

18:03

you lose dual engine power at this

18:07

critical phase of flight, you're

18:09

screwed. There's nothing. you do not

18:11

have the altitude to glide back to your

18:14

destination, let alone have the time to

18:16

go through uh uh you know checklist or

18:19

some sort of diagnosis uh on the issue.

18:21

So this is this is quite uh a

18:24

challenging moment uh for pilots and

18:26

that's why uh it's it's so alarming and

18:29

heartbreaking to see what happened with

18:30

the Air India 171 crash. But it also

18:33

makes us wonder like would it be fuel uh

18:36

contamination? Well, no other aircraft

18:38

seem to have the problem. Would it be uh

18:41

you know some kind of software glitch?

18:44

That would be very scary because even

18:45

our throttle is computer controlled.

18:49

Uh you know my uh uh I could steer up,

18:52

down, left, right like my ailerons, my

18:55

you know my pitch and my rudders. I

18:57

could steer steer this by hand. Uh in in

19:00

this particular aircraft in a Boeing you

19:02

would have a steer by wire system. This

19:04

one I'm actually like inputting uh the

19:08

controls myself but not on my throttle.

19:10

My throttle is a computer as well much

19:12

like the Air India 70 uh 7878 Boeing

19:17

where you're really just sending a

19:18

computer signal. So it's kind of like

19:20

imagine you get like a blue screen of

19:22

death. Uh I mean gosh quite literally

19:25

that's a little morbid but uh you get a

19:27

blue screen of death or whatever on

19:29

software. That's terrible. This was uh

19:33

this was more footage of sort of us

19:35

landing which we can talk about in a

19:36

different video but uh yeah you know

19:38

something to pay attention to and uh

19:40

hopefully we find out uh what else is

19:42

going on with the Air India 171 crash.

19:44

Why not advertise these things that you

19:46

told us here? I feel like nobody else

19:47

knows about this. We'll we'll try a

19:49

little advertising and see how it goes.

19:50

Congratulations man. You have done so

19:52

much. People love you. People look up to

19:53

you. Kevin Pra there, financial analyst

19:56

and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great

19:58

to get your take.

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