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Elon Reveals SpaceX Explosion **Why SpaceX 36 Exploded** COPV Failure

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0:00

If you haven't seen it yet, yesterday a

0:02

uh SpaceX Starship 36 during conducting

0:06

a single engine static fire test, which

0:08

is a static fire generally means you

0:10

stay uh seated in a position, so you're

0:13

not planning to take off. We actually

0:15

call the a static takeoff as a pilot

0:18

since obviously I'm a jet pilot. uh a a

0:21

takeoff where we will hold the brakes

0:23

and we will advance the thrust fully

0:26

forward to the toga position takeoff uh

0:29

or goaround position and and we'll just

0:31

hold uh the plane in position to static

0:35

fire up the engines. Uh so this this is

0:38

a common phrase in aviation but

0:40

yesterday a single engine static fire uh

0:42

test at the Massie outpost uh resulted

0:45

in a rapid uh unscheduled disassembly.

0:49

You can see that here in this footage

0:51

and you'll find that um Elon Musk hasn't

0:55

given us a sort of perspective on this

0:58

yet. Obviously, this it does carry a

1:00

little bit of um you know, egg on face

1:03

POV. I I am also I want to be clear like

1:05

a SpaceX investor, so I'm not like you

1:08

know trying to bag on SpaceX or

1:09

whatever, but it just it's just

1:10

something that they gives the media

1:13

classic ammunition again to kind of

1:14

complain. This is generally normal

1:17

though. Usually the reason we do these

1:20

tests is to see are we doing anything

1:24

wrong and what can we do to prevent

1:26

these in the future when we have manned

1:28

missions. Right? This is obviously an

1:30

unmanned static fire uh mission. Uh

1:33

SpaceX's official statement was that on

1:36

Wednesday, June 18th, at approximately

1:37

11 p.m. Central time, the Starship was

1:40

preparing for its 10th flight test and

1:43

experienced a major anomaly while on the

1:45

test stand at Starbase. A safety clear

1:48

area around the site was maintained

1:50

throughout the operation and personnel

1:52

are safe and accounted for. Starbase

1:53

team is actively working to basically

1:56

secure the test site and immediate

1:58

surrounding area. there is no hazard to

2:00

residents in the community and we ask

2:02

individuals not to approach the site uh

2:04

while they are conducting their safing

2:06

operations which is a bizarre um uh sort

2:10

of phrasiology they use but that's what

2:12

they use uh Grock somebody writes here

2:14

Grock simply reframed this post in short

2:17

but do it as an old man with wisdom son

2:20

when SpaceX Starships met its fiery end

2:22

on Texas night on that Texas night it

2:25

wasn't just a mental loss mental loss it

2:27

wasn't just mental loss Each burst of

2:30

flames teaches us like the scars on an

2:33

old man's hands. Progress ain't smooth.

2:36

It's forged in trials where failure

2:38

whispers wisdom.

2:41

No soul was harmed. Thank the stars, but

2:44

the path to the heavens demands

2:46

patience. I actually love this. Like I I

2:48

think it's it's totally true. It's like

2:50

you can't only have success in life,

2:52

right? So Elon writes just a scratch,

2:55

which is pretty classic. I love this.

2:57

Uh, I also think it's funny like Elon is

3:00

really like tripling down on this like

3:02

drug test that he has, which you know

3:04

plenty of people who are doctors online

3:06

are like, "Bro, this was not a

3:07

supervised test." Like a woman took the

3:09

sample, which is not who would supervise

3:13

a test. It's also a a sample that you

3:17

knew was coming and you could dilute

3:19

your sample by drinking a lot of water

3:22

or by knowing that it's coming and then

3:24

just being clean for some. this I don't

3:26

think honestly any investor like as a VC

3:28

investor in SpaceX I don't really care

3:30

this like Elon is Elon and it doesn't

3:33

matter to me so whatever people will

3:35

make a big deal about the drug use but I

3:37

figure I may as well at least mention it

3:39

but I want to jump into Scott's channel

3:41

here because he posted uh his thoughts

3:43

on this and so I want to give some time

3:44

to listen in uh so we're going to go

3:46

about 420ish into the vid and let's

3:48

listen in here see from this angle is is

3:52

that the initially this starts out as

3:55

spray of like cryogens, condensets

3:58

coming out of the nose cone area, right?

4:00

Yeah. It's not the propellant tanks now

4:03

on the Starship. Yeah, this could be a

4:06

sealant issue, too. Honestly, you get

4:08

such variations of temperature and I I

4:11

don't know. This is just speculation,

4:13

but let's see what the Texas um weather

4:16

is really quick. I'm just going to look.

4:18

Yeah, you're you're running between I

4:20

mean today looks like it might be a

4:21

little rainy in parts of Texas. you're

4:23

you're typically running in the 90s to

4:24

hundreds and you can cool down pretty

4:26

rapidly at night and sometimes just like

4:28

we've had with NASA explosions before uh

4:31

like the I think it was the Discovery

4:33

you really had like just like one O-ring

4:36

failure could lead to a catastrophic

4:38

explosion like this. It is terrible. V2

4:41

you have the liquid oxygen tank at the

4:43

bottom. Then you have the liquid methane

4:45

tank in front of that and then above

4:47

that you have the space where you've got

4:49

the uh you know the PEZ dispenser. But

4:52

more importantly, as we go up the side,

4:54

we also have the two header tanks. Now,

4:56

in the V2 Starships, we believe we have

4:59

uh a methane and an oxygen tank in the

5:03

nose. And then there is a down comer

5:05

which runs along the windward side. Now,

5:08

that windward side that is where the

5:10

heat shield is and it we see that the

5:14

spacecraft is splitting along that area.

5:17

So I'm really feeling that this failure

5:21

is related to the header tanks or at

5:25

least that is how we're manifesting now.

5:27

How it's this is an interesting point.

5:29

It's basically saying like the seal uh

5:32

under the the seal like think about like

5:34

a tin can. tin can may not be the

5:37

perfect example because it's rolled, but

5:39

it it you know it's likely that the way

5:42

these starships are assembled are sort

5:44

of almost like two like a half of a tin

5:46

can and then put together and then under

5:48

that heat shielding you have a seam and

5:50

it seems like there may have been some

5:52

kind of uh abnormal pressurization upon

5:56

ignition inside of the actual canister

5:58

that then led to that sort of rupturing

6:01

uh of the canister or or the fuel tanks

6:03

itself then leading to the rupturing of

6:05

the outside. Unclear obviously what came

6:07

first. We'll find out over time, but

6:09

let's keep listening because I think

6:10

he's got a good perspective. Actually

6:12

get this particular failure. I'm not

6:14

sure. Uh this could well be a kind of

6:17

like the seam right here. It's a perfect

6:20

example. design deficiency in the

6:23

spacecraft or it could be there was a

6:25

design deficiency in their testing

6:28

procedures which led to something going

6:31

wrong led to a line being say over

6:33

pressured rupturing and then failing we

6:36

will find out more in coming days but

6:39

anyway I believe this failure starts in

6:41

the forward section with the header

6:43

tanks and initially what we're seeing is

6:46

this sort of collapsing downwards and I

6:49

think probably what happens s is we have

6:52

the oxygen tank spilling hardware down

6:54

and something falls down, ruptures the

6:56

methane tank. You get mixing and that's

6:58

when the ignition starts.

7:01

Now, as this starts to fail, we also do

7:03

see what looks like a sort of a wave

7:06

shock wave or whatever some sort of Oh,

7:07

Elon did, it looks like, make a mention

7:10

that it looks like there may have been a

7:13

CPOV failure

7:15

uh at below rated pressure. Let's take a

7:18

look at this. Here's a SpaceX lounge

7:21

right here. Preliminary data suggests

7:23

that a nitrogen C uh COPV uh in the

7:27

payload bay failed below its proof

7:30

pressure. It further if further

7:32

investigation confirms that is what

7:34

happened. It is the first time ever for

7:37

this design. Uh let's just see what what

7:39

for some what some folks are um talking

7:42

about here. Here are some folks who say

7:44

hey who manufactures these? Is it SpaceX

7:47

here? Uh, let's see here. Uh, debris

7:51

washes it. Some have washed up in

7:53

beaches. Okay, let's take a look at some

7:56

of these. And SpaceX debris washed up.

7:59

How interesting.

8:01

Debris washes up on shore. Okay. Yeah.

8:05

You know, that's one of the things as

8:07

well that a lot of people talk about uh

8:09

is Elon's relationship uh with the

8:14

uh FAA and sort of the the allowance to

8:18

like go expectantly blow these things up

8:22

over the Gulf of Mexico is pretty dang

8:24

impressive. Uh but just so you know what

8:26

what you're looking at is these are uh

8:29

called composite overwrapped pressure

8:32

vessels. They're basically uh they're

8:36

almost like I feel like oxygen tanks

8:38

that you could go diving with or

8:39

whatever, but they're designed to hold

8:41

fluid under pressure. Usually some form

8:43

of fiber composite. Makes you wonder if

8:46

there's some like carbon fiber related

8:49

issue. Uh because you you can use carbon

8:51

and Kevlar on these and you know I

8:53

always get nervous now when I hear

8:54

carbon fiber after obviously the the

8:57

Titan though this is you know

8:59

potentially different. Uh but then

9:01

again, maybe not because sometimes these

9:02

carbon related tanks, they get damaged

9:04

and then people don't notice the damage,

9:06

right? Or like somebody drops one of

9:08

these. It's entirely possible one of

9:10

these was dropped uh in and and then

9:13

that's what ruptured uh leading to some

9:15

sort of internal then explosion uh and

9:17

then a tearing of obviously the outside

9:20

along a seam and then out of the heat

9:22

panels. So uh these

9:26

uh pressure vessels uh C O PV again

9:31

composite overwrapped pressure vessels.

9:35

Um

9:37

let's see here. I want to see who really

9:38

manufactures these. They're manufactured

9:41

by winding resin impregnated hightensil

9:43

strength fiber tape directly onto

9:45

cylindrical metallic liner. Fine. Mind

9:48

you, by the way, the uh Cirrus aircraft

9:52

are made out of carbon fiber, which is

9:54

very makes them very light. Pressure

9:56

containing vessels. Yeah, we know that.

10:00

And failures. Let's see here. A COPV can

10:04

be subject to complex modes of failure.

10:06

In 2016, a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket

10:09

exploded on the pad due to a failure of

10:11

a COPV inside the liquid oxygen tank.

10:15

inside of the liquid oxygen tank. You

10:17

had one of these smaller tanks fail in

10:18

2016 on a Falcon 9 rocket. The re the

10:22

failure resulted from the accumulation

10:24

of frozen solid oxygen between the

10:27

COPV's aluminum liner and composite

10:30

overwrap in a void or buckle. Yeah. So,

10:33

some kind of actual like fracture or

10:35

fissure in one of these tanks. these

10:37

tanks potentially seem to be a little

10:39

less reliable

10:41

uh given that this has happened in the

10:44

past.

10:45

Uh so that's interesting. It makes you

10:48

wonder what kind of,

10:52

you know, verifications or inspections

10:54

you can conduct on these because one of

10:55

the problems with carbon fibers you if

10:58

it's used in these tanks is it's really

10:59

hard to identify if if they're actually

11:02

damaged. Uh, so

11:05

and they're designed to hold, you know,

11:08

fluid or gas or whatever at at a high

11:10

pressure. So, so it's not uncommon for

11:12

these to fail. Let's keep listening

11:14

here. The displacement happening that

11:18

shows up at the common bulkhead between

11:21

the fuel and the oxidizer tank. Uh, and

11:24

that very quickly then fails and we get

11:26

more mixing. Now during the sort of

11:30

breakdown of everything, the whole

11:32

vehicle then begins to collapse. And as

11:35

it falls over, I think the methane tank,

11:38

the main methane tank remains largely

11:40

unmixed because at this point it didn't

11:42

have a huge amount of of liquid in it.

11:45

But as it falls over, eventually it hits

11:48

the ground, spills, we get a large

11:50

amount of mixing, and that's where you

11:51

get the secondary fireball, which then

11:53

propagates up into the mushroom cloud.

11:56

Now, if you step through these videos in

11:58

the original form, you can also see

12:00

various recognizable pieces of debris

12:03

flo flying around. You definitely see a

12:05

few COPVS flying away. We see Yeah, I'm

12:09

going to jump now for a moment since I

12:10

think we've got sort of an initial

12:12

impression from him. We've got some

12:14

initial impressions regarding the COPVS,

12:16

but I want you to take a look at this.

12:18

This is a 2021 article where they

12:20

actually talk about these pressure

12:22

vessels. uh and they remain a challenge

12:25

for engineers to unravel. Now, keep in

12:28

mind this is from 2021, but it is a NASA

12:31

blog piece, which I think is very

12:32

interesting. Uh these vessels are

12:34

ubiquitous for NASA. They are found on

12:37

launch vehicles and spacecraft. They are

12:39

critical containers

12:41

uh and suppliers of propellants and

12:44

elements required for life support. uh

12:47

we've invested a significant amount of

12:48

time and resources to better understand

12:50

how they work and more importantly how

12:52

they can fail because should they fail

12:54

the catastro the results could be

12:56

catastrophic. Well, we just saw that. We

12:58

saw that in Falcon 9 in 2016. We saw

13:00

that today and well I mean last night uh

13:03

as NASA's profile changes to more deep

13:06

space missions, in particular deep space

13:07

human missions, reliability is

13:09

paramount. Well, of course, COPV

13:12

behavior remains difficult to

13:14

understand. I I'm telling you it's the

13:16

composite f carbon fiber. Uh it's a

13:19

complex stress state that exists between

13:20

the liner and its overwrap and the

13:22

adhesive that holds it together. We need

13:24

to and adhesive by the way can fail when

13:27

you get temperature like rapid expansion

13:30

uh you know differentials and pressure.

13:32

Hot day, cold night, you know, adhesives

13:35

can wear away over time. We need to

13:36

understand not only the manufacturing

13:38

process but the material compatibility

13:40

fine. Today in many cases COPVS are

13:42

blown down systems. Their pressure is

13:44

reduced with use. Okay. COPVs used on

13:48

launch vehicles leave the ground at

13:50

their highest pressure. So that is your

13:52

most stressful point and as their

13:55

contents are depleted, the pressure

13:56

drops. This makes sense. Sort of just

13:58

like when you go diving, right? Uh their

14:01

use environment is often measured in

14:04

minutes. uh with going back to the moon

14:06

and Mars, we have situations where COPVS

14:09

might sit at a lunar base or in a Mars

14:11

ascent vehicle or orbital platform like

14:13

a gateway. They would be long used

14:15

measurements. Fine. Okay, we've got

14:18

tests and analysis for what challenges.

14:20

Okay, so they decide they're designed to

14:22

hold liquids and gases under pressures.

14:24

They have composite overwraps. They're

14:26

made from aluminum, steel, uh,

14:28

elasttores, plastics, uh, composite over

14:32

wraps, a mix of fibers, resins. It's

14:35

just a mix of like everything. Okay? And

14:37

they go through a process called

14:38

autofredage where the tank is subject to

14:40

high pressure to compress the inner

14:42

surfaces, making them less susceptible

14:44

to pressures later on, right? So, you

14:46

overpress the inside to push together

14:49

the adhesives on the outside. That makes

14:51

sense. Uh, okay. The autofred edge is

14:54

where many questions begin. Do auto

14:56

fredages affect the state of stress in

14:58

the liner? Was there a crack and will it

15:01

propagate? Right? Did somebody drop it?

15:02

And can you even see that? Right? Could

15:05

be something as simple as somebody

15:06

dropping it like the UPS delivery guy,

15:09

you know. Sorry, I'm not trying to poop

15:10

on UPS and just saying, "Here you go.

15:14

There's probably more safety around how

15:16

they package these. But anyway, the

15:17

complexity of these is deceptive and

15:19

bleeds into all failure modes associated

15:22

with these temp tanks. And there are

15:24

failure modes we still don't fully

15:26

understand. See, this sucks. See, like

15:29

cuz people are going to bag on SpaceX,

15:31

but here's NASA in 2021 telling you like

15:35

we use components that we still don't

15:38

fully understand.

15:40

That's kind of bad if you think about

15:43

it, right? Uh I mean it's it's kind of

15:47

like

15:48

not good.

15:50

Uh so let's see here. Uh

15:53

threedimensional state of stress

15:55

changes. COPV failures can be difficult

15:57

to predict or understand. See this this

15:59

makes me nervous. It's like, yeah, you

16:01

know, these suck and when they fail, it

16:05

will take your spacecraft down because

16:07

there's so much stored energy, but we

16:09

kind of need them, but we don't fully

16:11

understand them yet. Like, bro, don't

16:15

put me on one of these spacecraft, you

16:17

know? Jeez, man. Uh so to help advance

16:21

COPV technology and be better prepared

16:23

for long-term space travel uh they've

16:26

been actively engaged at NASA to develop

16:28

state-of-the-art non-destructive

16:30

evaluation techniques. They've got a

16:32

working group. They do stress test

16:34

rupture whatever these uh cracks in the

16:38

liners can lead them to rupture uh blah

16:41

blah blah. So basically

16:43

a core element of the propulsion systems

16:47

or gaseous storage systems

16:50

at most critical pressure loads at the

16:54

time of takeoff are a piece of

16:57

technology, a piece of equipment that

16:59

frankly we just don't fully understand

17:02

yet. Here they are. Here are pieces of

17:04

them in in prior rapid unscheduled

17:08

disassemblies.

17:09

not great because it's almost like not

17:11

fair to SpaceX, right? Because it's like

17:14

and people blame SpaceX and it's like,

17:16

well, not even NASA understands why

17:18

these suckers fail. So, it kind of

17:20

sucks. Uh, and worth sort of paying

17:23

attention to a little bit. Uh, the COPV

17:26

failures. I'm going to go back for a

17:28

moment to the Reddit here just to see if

17:32

they have anything extra that's

17:33

interesting on this. Uh, let's see here.

17:38

uh they get tested before they get

17:39

shipped, right? But this is also like by

17:41

design that they overpressurize them on

17:43

the inside. But again, like how do you

17:46

identify if somebody dropped it? That's

17:48

my biggest concern. How do you identify

17:50

if the adhesives that are used are

17:52

properly fitted uh to where they won't

17:54

fail. Static fire means the ship wasn't

17:57

moving. Exactly. We already explained

17:58

that. Uh strut failure is therefore

18:01

unlikely, says somebody. Maybe there was

18:02

a valve failure. Maybe uh this is other

18:06

speculation. I mean, everything we're

18:07

doing is speculating, but I think these,

18:08

if you haven't learned about these COPVS

18:10

yet, it is a very interesting thing.

18:12

Good news, we found a whole new failure

18:14

point before it caused a flight issue.

18:16

Well, not necessarily. So, this is this

18:19

is the very optimistic take and and I

18:21

respect that because the optimistic take

18:23

is look, nobody was on the aircraft. We

18:26

have successfully destroyed another

18:28

aircraft that we can now learn from.

18:30

This is true. I give credence where

18:32

where credit is due. I I I respect that.

18:35

Yes, we have found another failure.

18:37

However, if the failure is COPVs suck

18:41

just like they did when the Falcon 9

18:42

exploded in 2016 and in 2021 NASA's

18:46

telling us, yeah, we still don't really

18:48

fully understand these and we kind of

18:49

just like cross our fingers that they

18:51

won't blow up. Then we're not actually

18:54

really learning anything. Then maybe

18:56

what we really need is a better

18:58

alternative. Let's just Google better

18:59

alternative to COPV in spaceflight. uh

19:03

because to me at least the limited

19:05

research that we've done on them and

19:08

talked about in this video because I you

19:09

know I I'm not trying to come across as

19:11

knowing everything here. Obviously

19:12

there'll be a full investigation here

19:14

and there's a lot that we could look at

19:15

here. It kind of makes you wonder is

19:19

there a better way to do this? Like take

19:21

a look at this. This looks like straight

19:23

up carbon fiber just like the Titan.

19:26

Dawn Aerospace

19:28

partner on smart coop.

19:31

Okay. So now we're going to have smart

19:34

COPVs because the old ones suck. So

19:36

maybe they have like AI in them or

19:38

something. Dawn continues to expand its

19:40

satellite propulsion system offering uh

19:43

offerings for uh smart COPVS with

19:48

development contracts blah blah blah.

19:49

The goal is to develop lightweight smart

19:51

composite overwrap pressure vessels for

19:53

nitrous based propulsion technology.

19:55

Fine. Uh COPVS are the next logical step

19:58

in expanding our product offering. Well,

20:00

it's their version basically of these C

20:01

COPVs. Propellants are traditionally

20:04

stored in metal tanks in orbit, but size

20:06

is constrained due to the weight of

20:07

metals. COPVs offer a lightweight

20:10

structure with high tensil strength,

20:12

making them withstand the harsh

20:14

conditions of space, including extreme

20:16

temperatures and radiation. So,

20:18

basically, we use these smaller tanks

20:20

because the big metal ones are just too

20:21

darn heavy. So, you use lightweight

20:23

ones, which oh wow, wrapped in carbon

20:26

fiber and epoxy. Fantastic. Exactly. the

20:29

tech like the problem with carbon fiber

20:31

is like if that thing falls I'm just

20:33

thinking it's hard to know that it was

20:36

actually damaged. You have to like

20:37

microscopically see that it's damaged

20:39

and now compromised and it doesn't get

20:41

better. Carbon fiber over time gets

20:43

worse and worse and worse. Take a look

20:45

at this. Using smart sensors in the

20:47

process accelerates the development and

20:48

gives much deeper insight into the

20:50

laminate status, hence the quality of

20:53

the vessel during testing and

20:54

production. So basically they're telling

20:55

me it's only smart during the

20:57

production. See, but what you need is

20:59

like a smart COPV that can tell you it's

21:02

compromised before takeoff.

21:06

Uh so some some work to do. It seems

21:08

like this is a very common issue here.

21:12

Uh developing ground test fiber optic

21:14

strain system. Understanding structural

21:16

stress and strain is important in

21:17

designing the COPVs. Alternatives to

21:20

this method include costly but powerful

21:22

co progressive failure analysis software

21:24

packages and digital imaging correlation

21:27

measurement systems. Basically scanning

21:30

all of your tanks all the time I imagine

21:33

is what it would take. Uh temperature

21:36

indicating paint will support monitoring

21:38

liner temperatures. Interesting. This

21:41

for testing purposes. Great. So it looks

21:43

like this is a pretty large issue that a

21:45

lot of folks are still working on. Uh,

21:47

and it doesn't actually seem like

21:49

there's a big solution here, which would

21:50

be the worst case scenario for SpaceX is

21:53

that there is not a solution yet for

21:55

these types of failures. I guess we'll

21:57

see. Why not advertise these things that

21:59

you told us here? I feel like nobody

22:01

else knows about this. We'll we'll try a

22:02

little advertising and see how it goes.

22:04

Congratulations, man. You have done so

22:05

much. People love you. People look up to

22:07

you. Kevin Praath there, financial

22:09

analyst and YouTuber, Meet Kevin. Always

22:11

great to get your take.

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