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Getting Started in ICS/OT Cyber Security - 20+ Hours - Part 3 (Control Systems & Protocols)

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0:01

hello and welcome to unit three or part

0:04

three for getting started in industrial

0:08

cyber security so I appreciate you for

0:10

coming and we'll go and Jump Right In

0:12

This is actually going to be the monster

0:14

section of the course so if you can make

0:17

it through all of this content it should

0:19

be all downhill after after this this

0:22

section but this definitely is is the

0:24

the monster section of the entire course

0:27

so what we're going to cover

0:30

in this section one is we're going to

0:32

walk through a real world example of a

0:36

industrial control environment we're

0:38

going to use a power plant it was the

0:39

first project that I was involved with

0:42

on site and so that's the one that's

0:44

just always clicked with me and I think

0:46

it can be applicable to a lot of

0:48

different folks but just also keep in

0:50

mind that it doesn't matter really what

0:52

type of IC or OT environment you're in

0:57

the basics of cyber security are the

0:59

same

1:00

throughout so it doesn't matter if

1:02

you're in a power plant or a chemical

1:04

refinery or a Subway or a mine or a

1:09

hospital or Etc it's the the basic

1:13

concepts are are the same we just are

1:15

going to customize them slightly for

1:18

each unique environment

1:21

so we're going to talk about

1:24

some industrial

1:27

control aspects of those prod projects

1:30

from the engineering perspective so

1:32

we're going to talk about some terms

1:34

like isbl osbl or inside battery limits

1:38

outside battery limits and what that

1:39

means we're going to talk about

1:40

Greenfield and Brownfield projects again

1:43

some terms that I've I've heard and was

1:46

exposed to in whether it's you know in

1:49

my day job working for one of the

1:51

world's largest engineering companies or

1:53

just in other

1:54

conversations with folks in industrial

1:58

controls C cyber security so I wanted to

2:01

make sure we we put those in here as

2:04

well and then we're going to get really

2:06

into the the meat of the section where

2:08

it makes it look so simple here on the

2:10

agenda but looking at we're going to

2:12

talk about the different types of

2:13

control systems so if you're coming from

2:16

an it or it cyber security background or

2:18

you're not familiar with control systems

2:20

at all this is really hopefully the

2:22

section that's going to mean the most

2:24

right we're going to talk about the

2:26

different types of control systems and

2:28

what they are and what do they do when

2:29

we talk about what is a PLC or a

2:32

programmable logic controller or what is

2:35

an HMI or an rtu or ICS versus scada

2:39

versus you we're going to get into the

2:42

the majority of the control systems that

2:44

you're going to be exposed to and need

2:46

to understand to have a a basic

2:49

understanding of control system cyber

2:51

security then we're going to spend some

2:53

time talking about industrial control

2:56

protocols and there's lots of industrial

2:58

control protocols and we talked you know

3:01

in in previous history we had industrial

3:05

control protocols that stood on their

3:07

own and ran on their own networks in

3:10

dedicated environments and you can still

3:12

see those today and we'll talk about

3:13

some of those examples but most

3:17

industrial control protocols that we're

3:19

going to see in the real world have also

3:22

been adapted to run over tcpip since

3:24

that's the one common protocol the vast

3:27

majority of networks used today

3:30

and that's primarily because tcpip is

3:33

the protocol that we use to communicate

3:35

over the Internet so we use it because

3:38

it's everywhere but it also gives us

3:41

that inherent risk that there could be

3:43

some type of connection out to the

3:45

internet from the OT Network that we're

3:47

not aware

3:49

of so we're going to look at how tcpip

3:52

works and we're going to talk about some

3:53

of these different industrial control

3:55

protocols that run over tcpip or also a

3:58

standalone version

4:00

we're mostly going to talk about modbus

4:02

which is the most common version of

4:05

industrial control protocol in use and

4:08

used you know being transferred or

4:10

transmitted over over

4:13

tcpip and then real quick we'll wrap up

4:16

the section with talking about learning

4:19

to program Control Systems particularly

4:22

plc's the whole idea of that

4:24

programmable logic controller while

4:26

we're going to talk about the

4:28

programmable asset ECT and this is one

4:30

thing that's really for me it's really

4:34

critical to understand even just putting

4:37

a few hours into learning how to program

4:40

control systems and that closed or that

4:43

closed loop or control Loop we talked

4:46

about in the last section and

4:47

understanding how that's created right

4:50

it really helps bring into

4:53

focus at least some aspects of control

4:56

systems and then that builds into having

4:58

a better you know understanding that big

5:00

picture when it comes to how do we

5:01

secure these environments so that's what

5:03

we're going to talk about in this

5:06

section or in this

5:08

part so again as I mentioned really as

5:12

we go throughout this course you I

5:14

wanted to make sure we used a a real

5:16

world industrial control environment as

5:19

an

5:20

example that we could talk about and so

5:23

again as I mentioned my mind always goes

5:25

back to my first project that I ever

5:26

went on site for I used to start to talk

5:30

with

5:31

Engineers about projects that you were

5:34

in different parts of the world and but

5:36

I never got to go on

5:38

site and then finally when I did after I

5:42

don't probably about a year and a half

5:44

or so getting to go on site after

5:49

talking with with all again different

5:51

engineers and even clients and others

5:53

around the world it was just amazing how

5:56

it really brought everything into Focus

5:59

for me and I think we can probably

6:02

understand if we're just reading and

6:04

talking about something you know we

6:06

really don't truly understand when until

6:09

we we set foot like in that power plant

6:12

and that part of it was was actually

6:14

energized and it was in the process of

6:16

being commissioned so it part of it was

6:18

actually up and running in life which is

6:21

really really exciting and and also

6:23

realized it's a very dangerous

6:25

environment so it's very exciting but

6:28

it's also very dangerous at the same

6:30

time and it really if anything ever

6:33

before had talked about you know

6:34

understanding the importance of safety

6:36

and control system environments it it

6:39

was that site visit and realizing how

6:42

dangerous these environments can

6:46

be so that's the example that we're

6:48

going to use as we go throughout the

6:50

course we're going to talk about this

6:52

combined cycle natural gas power plant

6:55

and as you imagine so the the power

6:57

plant brings in natural gas and and uses

6:59

that to uh ultimately generate

7:02

electricity we'll actually walk through

7:03

that that process and what that actually

7:06

looks

7:07

like before we get to that I did want to

7:10

mention the idea of an overall life

7:12

cycle in this case of a power plant or

7:15

really again there the same concept for

7:17

any industrial environment or any really

7:21

OT environment even just a kind of a

7:23

standard manufacturing

7:26

facility so when we go to design and

7:30

build a new facility right if I'm want

7:33

say I'm a power company and I want to

7:34

build a new power plant so first we have

7:37

to figure out where we're going to build

7:39

the plant where can we build right where

7:41

we have to worry about local and and um

7:46

kind of the country or the County County

7:49

laws and that might you know prevent us

7:52

from building in a specific place the

7:55

site has to be uh physically compatible

7:58

to with with being able to build the the

8:02

project there we have to so we have to

8:04

find where we can actually literally

8:07

build this thing in the dirt we have to

8:09

make sure that like in the case of the

8:12

the power plant that we're using in this

8:14

example we have to be close enough to

8:16

where it makes sense where it's feasible

8:19

for us to bring in utilities like

8:22

natural gas and probably electricity

8:25

from another provider to get up and

8:27

running and so in other resources water

8:30

is going to also be an extremely

8:31

important resource that we need to bring

8:33

in to the site so we have to make sure

8:37

that we find a location that fits all

8:39

these needs right that we can legally

8:41

build in a power plant in that

8:44

environment right it's probably not

8:45

going to be too close to the general

8:48

public we're going to have to make sure

8:52

that the land the environment right we

8:54

can we can purchase it and that it's

8:56

going to be viable it's going to be

8:57

feasible to be be able to construct a

9:00

power plant there and that we also have

9:02

access to those resources that we're

9:04

going to need to run the power plant

9:06

itself so there's a lot of things and

9:08

that's just kind of scratching the

9:10

surface but those are some of the big

9:11

items that we have to take into

9:13

consideration when we're going to build

9:15

a new

9:18

facility so as we're going through that

9:21

and and some of these steps might happen

9:23

at the same time so in this case a

9:25

client like for ours for us will go out

9:28

and hire a company like floor to do

9:31

front-end engineering design or what we

9:33

call feed or feed work and so this is

9:36

where we have the engineers and others

9:38

on the teams will actually build out if

9:40

you want to think the design or the

9:43

schematics or the blueprints on what

9:47

that power plant is actually going to

9:50

look like and down to the you placement

9:54

of the very last bolt down to its exact

9:57

measurements it's really am amazing the

9:59

the work that engineering companies like

10:02

floor actually do um I'm just really I'm

10:05

still mind-boggled especially at the

10:07

size and scope of some of the projects

10:09

that that we have but that's the idea of

10:12

feet so an engineering

10:14

construction a lot or an an an

10:18

engineering company like floor will will

10:21

focus on feed work right being able to

10:24

do the engineering work and and for some

10:26

engineering companies that's all they do

10:29

they just designed the facility so floor

10:32

does more than that and we'll get into

10:35

that so floor is what we call an EPC or

10:38

engineering procurement and construction

10:40

company plus a whole lot of other things

10:42

we throw in there so but again I'm going

10:44

to Jumping ahead but we'll get to that

10:46

so so we go through feed so we have

10:48

engineers and others that work on

10:50

actually designing the

10:53

facility now as we're getting closer to

10:56

oh we have a site we know where we can

10:58

build it and that we're designing

11:03

the facility itself and that we need to

11:06

go ahead and get the permits right with

11:09

the appropriate governing bodies to make

11:11

sure we can indeed build in that

11:14

location that that we've

11:17

selected and then we get into this

11:21

process of procurement and construction

11:23

so that's the the PC of the EPC which I

11:26

mentioned so Flor is an engineering and

11:29

procur or construction and uh

11:31

procurement company right the idea is

11:33

that procurement we're going out through

11:35

our supply chain to bring in the raw

11:38

materials that we need or the materials

11:40

that we need to build that facility like

11:44

steel and concrete Control Systems right

11:47

wiring

11:49

Etc and then of course we have to build

11:52

it and some of these projects they can

11:54

take years to design and they can take

11:58

years to to

12:00

build the at least the large and

12:02

sometime we call Mega projects so

12:04

anything over you know a billion dollars

12:07

or usually like $500 million that's

12:09

considered a mega mega project and

12:12

that's really the the the floor World um

12:16

of construction and and

12:18

engineering and so we go through that

12:20

process though of right bringing in all

12:23

of the resources that we need to build

12:26

the facility not even just all the the

12:28

supplies and the resources as far as the

12:30

materials but also the staff right the

12:33

team members we have to bring in the

12:36

equipment as well so there's a lot that

12:39

has to come into play to be able to

12:41

build a facility even if we're just

12:43

building a let say a three story office

12:45

building right pretty standard pretty

12:47

cookie cutter if somebody was building

12:49

that today there's still a lot that goes

12:51

into building

12:54

that so once the site has been built

12:58

then it goes into do testing right we

12:59

want to make sure everything's up and

13:00

running so in that power plant right we

13:02

want to make sure that the power plant

13:05

can operate and operate safely so that

13:09

we're not putting anybody In Harm's Way

13:13

and so we want to make sure that it talk

13:14

about the different power plant or units

13:18

at the at the site so the first power

13:21

plant that I was on site for they

13:23

actually had essentially basically three

13:25

power plants in one and so you would

13:27

bring up one unit and test it make sure

13:29

everything's running and working

13:30

appropriately and then you would do the

13:32

same thing with the second one and the

13:34

third

13:36

one so once everything's tested then you

13:39

put the facility into production which

13:42

is what they call commissioning and so

13:45

that's usually where like a company like

13:47

floor once we have designed and in this

13:51

case built the the site that we turn

13:54

over the keys to the owner right to the

13:57

asset operator or asset owner is like

14:00

okay here's here's your site and then

14:03

sometimes we'll continue to work with

14:05

the owner or whether it's maybe as The

14:08

Operators of that facility or in some

14:10

other capacity at least initially for

14:13

probably the near future to be there to

14:15

be able to support the client in case

14:17

there were any

14:20

issues and then once the plant is up and

14:23

running and it is in production that's

14:24

where we go into you operations and

14:26

maintenance or talk about o andm work so

14:29

we talked earlier about we have

14:31

the operators of the site which again

14:34

could be the same company as the owners

14:36

could be somebody completely different

14:38

entity but they're the ones responsible

14:40

for running the site on a day-to-day

14:42

basis right they're the ones that are

14:44

Staffing the people in the power plant

14:47

that are ensuring that it stays up and

14:49

running and is generating

14:51

electricity we have team members like

14:54

different technicians and analysts that

14:56

do maintenance to make sure that we're

14:58

keeping up in the facility to prevent

15:01

things from breaking that would impact

15:03

the availability of the site which in

15:05

this case again would could impact our

15:07

ability to generate

15:11

electricity and then over time

15:15

eventually it might be 10 20 30 40 50

15:19

years down the road then that site is

15:22

going to be no longer

15:24

necessary or at least it's lived its

15:28

useful lifespan and it needs to go ahead

15:30

and be turned off and decommissioned

15:34

ultimately so that's this idea of the

15:36

overall life cycle of any really any

15:39

industrial site but in this case the

15:42

power plant that we're going to use for

15:44

example so is it absolutely necessary to

15:46

understand this to learn cyber

15:49

security in ic OT environments no of

15:52

course not but I thought it added a

15:55

little bit background which at least I

15:57

find fascinating and interesting maybe

16:01

that's just because of my background

16:02

working at floor but at the same time I

16:05

think again it just gives us a little

16:07

bit more of that big picture that helps

16:09

us understand especially if you're

16:11

coming from an it or it cyber security

16:14

background again just one more piece to

16:17

help understand the entire big

16:21

picture so when we look at how does this

16:25

plant work and I took this from there's

16:27

a a great video on YouTube that talks

16:30

about how these combined cycle natural

16:33

gas power plants work but the idea is

16:35

that the plant itself again the plant

16:38

that I was at actually was three

16:40

different power plants in in one but

16:43

what we had was where you can bring into

16:46

one of those units right if you want to

16:47

think of it as one one power plant

16:50

itself but you bring in natural gas into

16:55

the power plant right and we're going to

16:57

go ahead and and it gets heated en able

17:00

to turn a turbine and then that turbine

17:03

in turn will turn a generator which of

17:07

course the generator is designed as it

17:10

turns to create

17:13

electricity so bringing in natural gas

17:15

we heat it up it turns a turbine that

17:19

turbine is connected to a generator that

17:21

it spins and by spinning the generator

17:24

it creates

17:25

electricity and a lot of electricity

17:30

now many traditional power plants that

17:33

that could be your that's it you're done

17:37

but what we've seen is that we can go

17:40

ahead and create another if you want

17:42

Loop or another circuit where we go

17:45

ahead and we take that exhaust off that

17:48

first turbine and then we take that heat

17:51

and we use it to heat water to create

17:53

Steam and then that steam in turn can

17:55

turn a second turbine

17:59

and of course that turbine just like the

18:00

first is connected to its own generator

18:03

and as that generator turns it generates

18:06

its own electricity so we're actually

18:08

getting a huge boost in the output of

18:11

electricity that we're

18:14

generating for you know less resources

18:19

that we're bringing so if we're already

18:20

bringing in the resources to turn the

18:23

first turbine in the first generator

18:25

well let's create another circuit where

18:27

it's worthwhile I think it increases

18:30

depending on the plant you let's say we

18:33

we get 50% electric generation off of

18:36

that first turbine generator combination

18:39

you we might get 30% let's say off of

18:41

that second one but if it's not

18:44

consuming you know 30% or 50% or another

18:47

100% in resources like why wouldn't

18:51

we and so that was the type of power

18:54

plant that that was my first on-site

18:57

project and again when you look at and

18:59

some of these you know turbines and

19:01

generators are massive I remember

19:03

standing in the the room that you go

19:05

into the room that stores the the the

19:08

actual generator and you're standing at

19:11

it's like four or five stories up and

19:15

you can reach out and touch essentially

19:17

the top of the generator I mean the

19:19

generator is that large just

19:22

massive but that's the idea when um kind

19:26

of think of a gas power plant

19:29

and so there are some great videos on

19:32

YouTube here's some examples so here's

19:34

you know the one I think I mentioned um

19:36

that we were just looking at and there

19:37

there's some other ones um we're talk

19:39

about thermal power plants there's

19:41

nuclear power plants I think this is the

19:43

one that was really interesting because

19:45

you not a lot of us get to walk through

19:47

nuclear power plants or you we can kind

19:49

of imagine what they might look like but

19:52

if you've never seen one or if you've

19:54

never walked in or been inside a nuclear

19:57

facility AB like that I think it's

19:59

really impressive again it's just

20:01

another piece of the overall big picture

20:03

to help us just better understand that

20:06

background and how to secure these

20:08

environments and why it's important to

20:11

secure these

20:14

environments so I do like to talk about

20:17

isbl and Os this is one that these are

20:20

some of those terms that I used to hear

20:22

all the time where it was like huh what

20:24

part of it was we would hear them

20:26

because of my day job at floor these are

20:29

terms that that get tossed around on

20:30

projects all the

20:33

time but I also remember having you know

20:36

conversations outside of my day job and

20:39

whether it's you going to Sans

20:41

conferences or other classes with

20:44

different Engineers or just talking with

20:46

you different folks on the side right

20:49

isbl and osbl would come up all the time

20:53

so I like to think of you at a high

20:55

level the idea is that isbl means means

20:58

this is all of the components all the

21:00

systems that in our example the power

21:03

plant right that make up the power plant

21:05

itself so I mentioned the the turbines

21:08

the

21:09

generators right the ability to you the

21:12

the water itself you know running

21:14

through the pipes that we're heating to

21:16

generate steam right that's all within

21:19

the plant itself that's inside the

21:21

battery

21:23

limits outside the battery limits is

21:26

everything that's still on the on site

21:29

for the power

21:31

plant right but it's all of the

21:34

resources on site that are used to run

21:37

the power plant but that aren't the

21:41

plant itself so and this give me a

21:44

second this is what we'll pop over to

21:45

this picture that I took off of Google

21:47

maps of that the power plant that I had

21:50

uh been on site for and so you can

21:52

actually kind of see there are what

21:54

three different uh I always want to say

21:56

trins but it's three different units

21:59

when we talk about power plants uh when

22:02

you talk about natural gas environments

22:05

we talked about trains so but there's

22:08

three different plants in in one and so

22:12

you can see anything within that yellow

22:15

box roughly is that's the power plant

22:19

itself those again all the systems that

22:21

we use to generate

22:23

electricity now we have you can see

22:26

there's other aspects and other like

22:29

buildings and components that are at the

22:32

actual site itself from the parking lot

22:34

to the security guard as you come in to

22:36

the control room to the water storage

22:39

tank to water cooling stations to etc

22:43

etc so we need all of those other

22:45

resources like the control room and the

22:48

water tank to be able to run the power

22:52

plant but they're not part of the plant

22:56

itself right they're not wired as part

22:59

to run they're not as part of the system

23:02

that makes up the power

23:04

plant hopefully that makes sense right

23:08

the overall yes we need those resources

23:10

to allow the power plant to run but

23:14

they're brought

23:15

in right to the power plant

23:19

to allow the power plant to run right

23:22

their resources brought in to the plant

23:24

to then be consumed or transformed

23:28

into our ultimate output right so we're

23:31

bringing in things like

23:34

water right and

23:37

oxygen natural gas right we're bringing

23:40

those in from outside of the power plant

23:43

we're bringing in those resources to

23:45

then create an output to then right send

23:48

back

23:49

out so that's the idea of inside and

23:53

outside the battery limit right there's

23:56

also this idea that the

23:58

the kind of demarcation point between

24:01

the two acts as a little safety barrier

24:04

almost like a

24:05

DMZ so the idea is that we shouldn't

24:08

have any equipment within a certain area

24:11

you don't want to have equipment

24:13

especially on the power plant side that

24:15

could be dangerous that let's say it

24:18

exploded accidentally that it would

24:20

present a threat to anybody standing

24:23

outside of the battery limits and we can

24:27

also use it as a idea kind of again

24:29

going back to the DMZ of how we bring

24:31

resources into the plant and then let's

24:34

say there was an issue in the plant a

24:37

safety issue and so we can think of

24:40

things like well let's turn off the

24:42

water let's turn off the natural gas

24:44

let's turn off the resources that we're

24:46

feeding the plant that the plant then

24:49

uses to consume to then create some

24:52

other type of

24:54

output so again that's isbl versus

24:58

OS I did better in the last half than

25:00

the first half hopefully that makes

25:02

sense I should have started with the

25:03

picture I think hopefully that makes

25:05

more

25:06

sense now I also hear of Greenfield

25:09

versus Brownfield projects and I you

25:12

when I heard these terms I'm like I

25:13

think I know what they're talking about

25:14

and I I did I just didn't know you know

25:17

100% I was guessing but it it's probably

25:20

not that hard right Greenfield projects

25:22

just means it's it's a brand new

25:23

facility I get a work in I'm very

25:26

spoiled in my work at Florida I get to

25:28

work in most Green Field environments

25:30

right I get pulled into a project that

25:32

we're just starting to talk about the

25:35

feed work remember that front

25:36

engineering and and design

25:38

work so we're just talking about

25:42

designing the facility so that's the

25:44

best time to be able to talk about

25:45

things like how do we build cyber

25:47

security into a

25:50

facility it's much different when we

25:52

talk about trying to retrofit or build

25:55

cyber security into Brown field

25:57

environments Brownfield environments or

26:00

projects are those that have existed and

26:02

usually when they we talk about they've

26:04

exist they've existed for 10 20 30 40 50

26:08

years so it's not just as easy as coming

26:11

in and saying let's deploy a

26:14

firewall because we could literally

26:16

bring the site down very quickly with a

26:20

small

26:21

change because you feel maybe some of

26:24

those environments are really held

26:26

together with was it like gum and shoest

26:28

strings or whatever the expression is

26:31

it's like a house of cards you don't

26:34

want to touch it in case you pull the

26:36

wrong card and the whole thing comes

26:38

crashing down and when we talk about our

26:41

primary concern is physical safety and

26:43

then the safety of the environment and

26:45

the availability of the environment the

26:47

plant

26:49

itself then we start to really have

26:52

considerations of how careful we need to

26:55

be and how stage and approach needs to

26:57

to be when we Implement cyber security

26:59

in a Brownfield environment that already

27:04

exists but that's the difference between

27:07

greenfield and

27:13

Brownfield so now we start to get in the

27:16

real meat and potatoes of the section

27:20

another I don't know kind another weird

27:21

American expression sorry and so when we

27:24

talk about we're going to look at

27:28

the idea of the Purdue model now we're

27:31

going to come back and talk about this

27:32

the Purdue model in the next part so for

27:36

now we're really just trying to focus on

27:39

the different parts or physical systems

27:42

that we use to create a control system

27:46

environment so we're going to talk about

27:48

things like field devices and you can

27:50

see the list right and plc's and all the

27:53

the DCS and HMI and all the fun things

27:55

we're going to talk about so let's go

27:56

ahead and jump in

28:00

so field devices field devices operate

28:05

at the lowest layer of again what call

28:07

the Purdue model and so when we go back

28:10

and in some of these we started to touch

28:12

on when you think about the previous you

28:16

OT example of we used of you that

28:19

thermostat you might have at home or in

28:21

your

28:22

office where it has a field

28:25

device known as a a

28:29

sensor to sense or determine right how

28:33

warm or cold right what the temperature

28:34

is and in the

28:37

room so we can bring in that information

28:40

and there's different types of sensors

28:42

and we talk about there's analog versus

28:44

digital and there's all other

28:46

conversations that we have there but for

28:47

now right just understand we have things

28:50

like

28:51

sensors that we can use to bring in

28:53

information into a control system like

28:58

the temperature or you see humidity or

29:00

maybe I have a motion sensor right to

29:02

detect yeah if somebody's maybe

29:06

moving and we have things like actuators

29:10

you see valves pumps compressors things

29:12

that help us move

29:14

systems and things out in the real world

29:17

so we're going to come back and we're

29:18

going to talk about some examples of

29:21

those then things like Motors and the

29:23

list goes on and on but even just using

29:26

our thermostat at home example and the

29:30

idea is oh it gets too warm I want to be

29:32

able to go ahead and turn on the air

29:34

conditioning unit which has its own

29:36

essentially motor

29:38

right allows us to generate cooler air

29:41

push it through the the venting and the

29:43

duct system and the room becomes

29:46

cooler so we'll spend some more time as

29:49

we go throughout talking about field

29:50

devices but field devices is the

29:54

one aspect of any type of

29:59

asset or part in a control system

30:02

environment that is most overlooked from

30:06

a cyber security perspective think the

30:09

idea is somebody would physically have

30:11

to be on site and be able to touch that

30:14

sensor or an actuator to be able to make

30:19

changes that could affect or impact the

30:23

control system Network and not that's

30:25

not always 100% but I think that's the

30:28

vast majority of the time and so because

30:31

a lot of people think well an attacker

30:33

has to come into the environment and we

30:34

have you know our environment it sits

30:37

out in the middle of nowhere or we have

30:39

a chain link fence we have security

30:41

guard so nobody's going to come and

30:43

attack the you the sensor that we have

30:46

deployed out in the field Never Say

30:51

Never so we'll talk about again later on

30:54

some additional considerations for cyber

30:56

security around field devices because

30:59

it's one of those areas that not a lot

31:01

of people pay attention to partly

31:04

because it's I think in part it's

31:05

wrapped up with the whole physical

31:07

security discussion which I know we've

31:09

already touched a little bit on in

31:10

previous sections and we'll touch we'll

31:12

talk more about it as we go on as

31:17

well so the first type of control system

31:22

that we're really going to focus on is

31:24

the PLC or the programmable controller

31:27

the idea is the PLC is the most common

31:29

type of control system that is in use

31:34

today

31:35

and there's some there's different types

31:38

of controllers uh we're not not going to

31:42

get into those yet we'll talk about a

31:44

few as we go throughout later sections

31:47

of the course but for now keep in mind

31:50

the the

31:52

PLC is the thermostat example that we

31:55

were looking at earlier right so this

31:58

idea is that the thermostat right or now

32:02

a PLC is it's just like another

32:05

computer I think I've mentioned that I

32:08

know a lot of Engineers that that don't

32:10

like when I say that but for the most

32:13

part right it has its it its processor

32:16

it has memory u i point that out because

32:18

a lot of Engineers don't think that

32:21

plc's are Su susceptible to cyber

32:24

attacks things like buffer overflows

32:27

where they are very much so right they

32:28

have an operating system a processor

32:31

memory a code right so there's

32:33

vulnerabilities there's hardware and

32:35

software there that we as an attacker

32:38

could take advantage of now plc's other

32:41

Control Systems don't have a lot of

32:44

storage because remember the idea is

32:47

that that our OT assets or Control

32:51

Systems they're not processing 8

32:54

gigabyte Excel spreadsheets or large

32:57

engineering AutoCAD drawings right

32:59

that's that's in the it side of the

33:01

house in OT

33:04

we're running code right logic to bring

33:08

in data from our inputs like sensors to

33:13

then determine if we need to make

33:14

changes out in the real world and if we

33:17

do we we send signals to make those

33:20

changes happen we continue to collect

33:22

collect data and and make adjustments

33:24

over time as as need be and that's it's

33:28

like that's all that control systems do

33:30

but that's all that control systems do

33:32

yeah at a fundamental level so they

33:34

don't the point is they don't need to

33:36

store large amounts of data right so

33:40

we're not storing large amounts of data

33:41

we're not worried about storing large

33:44

securing large amounts of data now you

33:46

can find what they call ruggedized

33:49

versions of

33:50

plc's that are designed physically to

33:54

exist and reside in environments that

33:57

have harsh conditions so if you think if

33:59

they're out in the field where they're

34:01

exposed to extreme weather right extreme

34:04

cold extreme heat uh or maybe they're in

34:06

an environment like a some type of

34:08

desert type of

34:10

environment where you have a lot of sand

34:13

right how do it's like how do we protect

34:15

equipment against those types of

34:17

extremes right a a normal you know

34:20

computer or network switch or firewall

34:24

right you're not going to be able to put

34:25

in those types of environments and have

34:27

it live probably very long so plcs that

34:31

are going to be out in an environment

34:33

that are are exposed to extreme

34:36

environments then then you are going to

34:38

want to have those

34:39

ruggedized um

34:42

versions now we also talk about the

34:45

plc's we program them and so there are

34:49

automation professionals PLC programmers

34:52

and that's all they do usually between

34:55

programming plc's and also hmis which

34:58

we're going to talk about in in a little

35:00

bit so they always go go very well hand

35:02

in hand and hopefully you'll see that by

35:05

the end of this this

35:06

section so we do see that uh that log

35:11

that latter logic is the programming

35:13

language that we use most commonly still

35:16

today now I have seen like on LinkedIn

35:19

some different surveys and it looks like

35:21

latter logic is being phased out there's

35:24

you know I think five really Main

35:27

programming languages that we'll use for

35:29

plcs these days and latter logic does

35:32

seem like it

35:34

is being phased out potentially but I

35:37

know um like at floor in my day job

35:41

ladder logic is still going to be the

35:42

most popular uh language that we use for

35:45

programming plc's right so that's the

35:48

one that we're going to talk about in

35:51

this course as as we go

35:55

along now remember the idea of that

35:57

thermostat right we have that PLC we

35:59

have that system that computer that has

36:03

inputs and outputs remember the inputs

36:05

allow us to bring in

36:08

data from things like sensors to be able

36:11

to tell us yeah what the temperature in

36:13

the room is or you going see here what

36:15

if it's a not only maybe a maybe we're

36:19

checking the temperature in a like a

36:20

data center but also maybe the

36:23

humidity so we can bring that

36:25

information in and then we also with the

36:30

logic right we can make decisions based

36:33

off of that information we bring in and

36:36

then if we have to make changes out in

36:37

the real world we'll send

36:40

signals out the outputs right so we'll

36:43

send those those signals remember those

36:46

changes are all based around when we

36:48

talk about those set point so we have

36:50

that variable that we can set in the

36:53

system or multiple variables right in

36:55

the example of the the thermostat right

36:57

we had that variable that we could set

36:59

to well how hot or how cold do I want it

37:02

what do I want the temperature to be in

37:04

the

37:06

room and then the logic handles

37:08

everything from there because once it

37:10

looks to once it measures well how what

37:13

is the temperature in the room oh it's

37:15

too hot well let's turn on the air

37:17

conditioner oh it's too cold let's turn

37:18

on the heater right so it sends those

37:20

signals down the

37:24

outputs so here's another way of looking

37:26

at it so I found this one diagram online

37:29

which I thought did a really really nice

37:31

job of showing yeah we have again the

37:34

PLC which very similar to another

37:37

another computer right processor memory

37:39

has its own operating system limited

37:41

amount of storage right not not like an

37:43

a traditional it asset and then what

37:46

does really make it stand apart is that

37:49

it the inputs and the outputs right

37:51

because we have those inputs that bring

37:52

in sensor data in this case like

37:55

temperature maybe humidity

37:57

and then we have that set point or those

37:59

variables right so how um you know what

38:03

how what range of humidity do we need in

38:05

the data center what um you know what

38:08

temperature does it need to be in the

38:10

data center right so we can go ahead and

38:12

the PLC can then remember if it needs to

38:15

make changes to the outside world it can

38:17

send signals out down those outputs now

38:21

in this case what if it's not a

38:22

thermostat but this is a PLC sitting in

38:27

a power

38:29

plant and so maybe I have this

38:31

combustion chamber that I need to be

38:32

able to send a signal to to ignite the

38:36

combustion chamber to turn on to create

38:40

heat right and then use that heat to

38:42

generate or turn a turbine to then turn

38:46

a generator to generate

38:49

electricity and then or and then maybe

38:51

here is yeah where we're unlocking or

38:54

allowing the turbine to spin

38:59

so that's the idea of a PLC and this is

39:01

where again attackers get caught up when

39:04

they get into an environment they might

39:08

access that

39:09

PLC and then see that it's connected to

39:13

something right but they don't know

39:15

exactly what so that's where they have

39:16

to start reverse engineering the

39:19

processed data that they can see that

39:21

try to understand what's connected on

39:23

the other end is it an air conditioning

39:26

is it a water pump is is it a combustion

39:28

chamber and a power plant that's where

39:31

we had that example that we talked about

39:33

earlier where those those activists had

39:35

accessed what they thought was a water

39:38

treatment

39:39

plant in I think in

39:42

Israel and instead of being this water

39:45

treatment plant that you know provided

39:48

clean drinking water to you maybe

39:51

hundreds of thousands or tens of

39:52

thousands of people like they thought it

39:55

was a water treatment facility which

39:57

really was just kind of the the the pool

40:00

cleaning apparatus at a at a hotel right

40:03

that cleaned and maintain their swimming

40:07

pool that's the main challenge for

40:10

attackers right it's not getting into

40:12

the OT Network it's not even gaining

40:14

access to the plc's or the hmis that

40:18

work in coordination with the plc's to

40:20

control these systems out in the real

40:23

world it's for them to understand well

40:26

what are they connected to what are they

40:28

controlling how do they control them so

40:31

we're going to walk through some

40:32

examples of that as we go throughout the

40:35

course but again for now just think of

40:39

that computer that PLC is again the

40:42

thermostat you could take that

40:43

thermostat off the wall and use it to

40:45

control something like part of a power

40:48

plant because it really is that simple

40:52

now are you going to do it no the

40:54

thermostat is not designed for that

40:55

purpose but hopefully you get the idea

41:01

right now here's an example of Latter

41:04

logic we're going to come back and we're

41:05

going to walk through a more real world

41:08

example to actually show you um you kind

41:12

of how ladder logic works but I just

41:14

want to get you this idea of of kind of

41:16

what it looks like and so it's a

41:17

structured approach to how we can

41:19

program that logic in plc's I think s i

41:23

remember the first Sans course I went to

41:24

they did a really good job of high

41:26

liting how ladder logic worked and they

41:29

actually had um the labs built around

41:34

right doing some programming which I

41:35

thought was great and that and that for

41:37

me that was my first exposure to PLC

41:39

programming back like 10 years ago so

41:43

we'll come back and we'll we'll talk

41:44

about real world example this this isn't

41:46

probably necessarily the greatest

41:48

example for for um kind of learning

41:51

latter logic but there are a couple

41:53

resources out there there's a lot of

41:55

resources you know I'm always focused on

41:57

free resources one is an online PLC you

42:00

can see simulator so you can play with

42:02

that um so you can see that one there's

42:06

a few out there that's the one I kind of

42:07

liked it seemed to have the most most

42:10

functionality for me so and then I think

42:13

I've mentioned before already the

42:15

automation direct line of plc's so the

42:18

click PLC uh line and that's the one of

42:22

the plcs that I have in my home lab and

42:25

so it's it's not only is it a fully

42:28

functional PLC that you can use in

42:32

control system environments so I know

42:35

engineers and PLC programmers and other

42:37

automation professionals that that use

42:40

those click plc's they're also the the

42:42

plc's that they use in the grid course

42:45

at s so the the course that Rob Lee

42:47

teaches uh but but also it's the nice

42:51

thing is you can get a fully loaded one

42:53

brand new for like 400 bucks you can't

42:57

go out and buy any brand new Schneider

42:59

or seamons or Rockwell Etc you PLC brand

43:03

new fully loaded for you probably

43:05

anything less than you know maybe $1,500

43:08

if you're lucky and that's just getting

43:10

getting started so to get something

43:12

fully loaded for like 400 bucks and very

43:16

functional very capable it's they're

43:19

they're a great great line of tools and

43:22

so they have a a Ser a learning series

43:24

that goes along with that so some of the

43:26

videos are a little little dated at this

43:28

point so they probably want to redo

43:31

those uh but otherwise um it's a great

43:35

resource it's and it's all again made

43:37

available for free so if you want to

43:40

especially if you're looking at getting

43:41

real hands on you can go and buy one of

43:44

their plcs and even the the low one

43:47

right fully loaded 400 bucks low end you

43:49

can you can get in for you probably

43:51

about a hundred or so US Dollars we're

43:55

talking about here so still really

43:57

incredible deal because if you really

43:59

want to get start getting hands-on

44:01

experience in OT the place to start is

44:03

to get a PLC and start start learning

44:06

the how to program PLC you don't have to

44:09

become an expert in PLC programming but

44:12

at least getting some hands-on

44:14

experience really helps you start to

44:17

think along along the lines of kind of

44:20

again thinking like an engineer right

44:22

thinking like an automation team member

44:25

right how somebody from the OT side of

44:27

the house thinks

44:30

so another thing I wanted to mention

44:33

before we move on from plc's is that

44:35

plc's have a key switch now sometimes on

44:39

more expensive models it's literally a

44:41

physical key that you would insert into

44:44

a key switch and Inter turn a lot of

44:47

times like on the click plc's and and I

44:50

have some expensive uh Schneider and

44:54

seen equipment and it's it's just a dip

44:57

a little dip switch right a little

44:59

little switch that you flip the idea is

45:01

that plc's us have at least two modes

45:05

one called program mode and one run mode

45:07

generally or the idea is one is readon

45:10

mode and one is read write

45:12

mode so

45:14

that we can control when somebody can

45:18

remotely update or even locally update

45:21

the firmware and the programming of a

45:25

PLC

45:26

right so from a cyber security

45:29

perspective if we have a PLC running in

45:34

run mode that's the readon mode it means

45:37

the PLC is running it's doing its job

45:39

and nobody can actually change make

45:43

changes to the PLC the only way you can

45:46

make changes to the PLC if it's in run

45:48

mode is to change the key switch back to

45:51

program mode so if it's in program mode

45:53

the PLC will still do its job it will

45:55

still function function but you also

45:57

have the ability to upload firmware make

46:01

changes to the code

46:05

Etc so that's the nice thing it's a very

46:09

simple concept on how we can secure

46:12

plc's from being hacked right because if

46:16

they're in run mode and if your

46:17

attacker's remote if they're not

46:20

physically there at the

46:22

PLC as long as that PLC is in run mode

46:25

they can't remotely make changes to it

46:28

it's secure from that perspective now if

46:31

you have somebody make changes to a PLC

46:33

maybe they're doing an update in a

46:35

maintenance window and updating firmware

46:37

or maybe they made an adjustment to the

46:40

programming code on the PLC and they

46:43

forget to put the key switch back into

46:46

run mode that's where we get into

46:48

trouble because if an attacker is in the

46:49

environment they find the PLC and then

46:52

they find that it's in run mode then

46:54

they could potentially make make changes

46:56

either you know to the firmware or to

46:58

the the code running running on the the

47:02

system but it's really that easy that we

47:05

can protect PC plc's if the key switch

47:08

is over in readonly

47:12

mode if you have a physical key switch

47:15

then that's where you probably have to

47:17

check it out maybe you have to go to a

47:18

supervisor they have the keys in a safe

47:21

and then they would actually check it

47:22

out and then they have a process to make

47:24

sure did somebody return the key and

47:27

ideally when they returned the key they

47:29

made sure the PLC got turned back into

47:32

run mode right before they were able to

47:34

take out the

47:36

key or then if you have the little dip

47:40

switches so it's

47:41

not as secure right to determine whether

47:45

somebody has locked a key like locked a

47:48

PLC or not so what you have to do is you

47:50

have to have somebody walk and

47:53

physically check plc's from time to time

47:55

to see if that switch is in run mode or

47:59

there are some platforms like the dros

48:01

platform has ability to check certain

48:04

plc's remotely to see just a query to

48:07

see hey are you in run mode or are you

48:09

in program

48:10

mode that's actually what my thesis my

48:13

Master's thesis is is on actually

48:16

basically creating an open- Source tool

48:18

that allow people to remotely check

48:20

plc's to see if they're in red mode or

48:22

not I know it's nothing fancy but it was

48:25

what I could them on so I was like okay

48:27

I'll I'll take it I wanted to do a much

48:30

much bigger paper on kind of the whole

48:33

kind of risk kind of threat landscape

48:36

and the risk associated with plc's and

48:38

how all the different ways they could be

48:39

attacked

48:41

but um we'll go with the uh PLC key

48:44

switch security so so more on that to

48:47

come uh and here's a quick mixure I

48:49

found oh I don't have that I think this

48:51

actually came from the the dros research

48:53

on the the blog posting that they did

48:56

with um plc's and talking about the the

49:00

key switch so I talk about run mode

49:02

versus program mode some plcs I think

49:04

mentioned on the other slide have

49:06

additional modes I'm not a fan like one

49:10

allows you to remotely configure the PLC

49:14

to whether you can remotely make changes

49:16

to it or not you know so the idea is I

49:20

don't want to have to send people out

49:22

into the field right with keys or to

49:24

flip dip switches because if it's a

49:25

dangerous environment I'm putting

49:27

somebody physically In Harm's Way I

49:30

completely understand but if we have a

49:32

system that can remotely configure a PLC

49:35

to whether it can be programmed or not

49:38

an attacker is going to find that system

49:40

and they're going to use it against you

49:43

so it's one of those where the benefits

49:46

are especially if it's a very hostile

49:49

dangerous environment then we're

49:51

probably we want to air on the side of

49:53

caution not put People In Harm's Way so

49:56

we would have some type of program that

49:58

would allow us to do that we were just

50:00

talking about this actually for a

50:01

project at the office this morning um so

50:05

in one where the environment is very

50:07

very very very cold so you would not

50:10

survive you know out in the the winter

50:13

months for for very long at all so we

50:15

don't want people you know outside in

50:18

that type of weather

50:20

so so in control systems you'll hear

50:24

mostly about

50:26

plc's or and sometimes more generically

50:29

controllers well and again we'll we'll

50:32

talk about some different types of

50:33

controllers and plc's as as we go a

50:36

little bit later on through the course

50:38

and then you'll also hear the term

50:41

DCs so for myself you coming from an it

50:47

an IT security background I look at this

50:51

probably a little bit differently and

50:54

the idea is

50:55

in a Windows environment you know with

50:58

Windows systems if you only have if you

51:00

have a very small business and you have

51:02

a couple of computers it's really easy

51:04

just to manage those let's say three

51:07

computers very individually right you

51:09

can go and create user accounts and

51:10

passwords on each one maybe you do some

51:12

system hardening and you create some

51:14

policies so it's it's not too hard to

51:16

set those up on each machine right you

51:18

do it three times but what if you're

51:21

like floor and you have 35,000

51:23

workstations right that's not something

51:25

that you want to set up and

51:27

control on a machine by Machine basis so

51:31

we set up or use tools like active

51:33

directory to manage all those systems

51:37

centrally so that's how I think of the

51:40

DCS world now there's different types

51:43

of systems when we talk about DCS that

51:47

we'll get into some variations as we go

51:50

throughout the course as as well but I

51:54

think of you know if I have

51:58

a in this case you that going back to

52:02

the power plant

52:04

environment and let's say just looking

52:06

at part of that power plant some of the

52:08

the major components or physical systems

52:12

that we have in the real world are

52:14

remember the combustion chamber that we

52:15

can use to generate heat right the heat

52:17

that turns the turbine and in turn the

52:20

turbine turns the generator to generate

52:23

electricity so in this example let's

52:25

just say we have a PLC that is

52:28

responsible for controlling each of of

52:31

those physical systems that we have in

52:34

the real

52:37

world so PLC number one again we're

52:40

going to use it to control the

52:41

combustion chamber so we're mixing

52:43

oxygen and natural gas to a specific

52:47

mixture so that way we can then ignite

52:50

it right we take that heat we use it to

52:52

turn the turbine right we can have that

52:54

turbine control controlled by a second

52:56

PLC and then that turbine turns that

52:59

generator which is controlled by a third

53:02

PLC right and ultimately we get

53:04

electricity so again very simple example

53:09

but let's say we have a PLC for each of

53:11

these types of systems out in the real

53:15

world so I can manage each of those

53:18

individually but what if and if we go

53:21

back to the power plan example that we

53:23

were using earlier and we actually have

53:25

three different power plants at that

53:28

location or three different power units

53:31

if you

53:32

want so in this case so each of those

53:36

units or if you want each of the power

53:39

plants within the power plant right we

53:41

can take those three plc's and we can

53:43

tie them into their own controller so we

53:45

can use that controller to manage each

53:48

of those individual

53:51

plc's and then ultimately we could tie

53:54

those controllers back back in this

53:55

hierarchy back to kind of this the idea

53:58

of the the main DCs so we have overall

54:03

this DCS system this distributed system

54:07

to be able to control all of these

54:10

different physical systems these

54:12

processes that we have in the real

54:15

world so again for now I again this is

54:18

just how I think of it is we can manage

54:20

in plcs individually or we can do it in

54:23

this Collective or this centralized

54:26

process using a distributed hierarchy or

54:29

the

54:30

DCs so again we'll talk about some more

54:32

examples as we go throughout the course

54:34

so this is just a again kind of

54:37

highlevel example of how Mike looks at

54:39

it so again we'll we'll uh we'll see

54:42

some more examples we'll talk about some

54:44

real world examples as we go

54:46

on so we also talk about scada so we

54:50

talked or we touched on scada a little

54:52

bit earlier when we talked about how we

54:55

Define I versus scada that was one of

54:58

the things I remember Rob Lee mentioning

55:00

that you know IC is land and SK is when

55:04

and was just like oh yeah that makes

55:06

complete sense where just so many people

55:09

myself included or at least maybe I

55:11

shouldn't speak for others but I know

55:13

myself it just I IC and skada it was you

55:16

know 101 15 years ago the terms were

55:20

used in a way that could be very

55:22

confusing and and you couldn't determine

55:24

the difference

55:26

and so when he said that it was like oh

55:28

my gosh I wish somebody had told me that

55:31

before but when we talk about scada and

55:35

this is where we'll come back and talk

55:37

about you we have the ability to

55:42

remotely monitor a control system or

55:45

asset at a remote site so the most

55:48

common example we use is in power

55:51

transmission so if I am gender or not

55:54

only generating electricity but what if

55:56

we're transmitting the power over long

56:02

distances we'll have substations that

56:04

are responsible for monitoring the power

56:07

over over distances right as we're

56:09

transmitting it

56:11

and

56:15

when sorry I just thought something

56:17

we'll we'll get back to that so we have

56:20

these substations right and the

56:21

substations could be miles away

56:26

and so we're going to connect to those

56:27

over some type of wide area connection

56:30

so you might have a cellular device or

56:33

maybe satellite A lot of times

56:35

especially in the United States you'll

56:36

see Cellular Connections and that

56:38

Cellular Connection is connected to what

56:40

they call an

56:42

rtu and then that rtu gives us kind of

56:45

that interface into other control assets

56:48

at that location as well so we'll go

56:50

over the wire to connect to that rtu

56:53

which then also allows us to connect to

56:55

other devices like plcs and controllers

56:57

that are at that

56:59

substation and there's other special

57:01

types of devices like IEDs that we'll

57:04

see there not the bad type of IEDs but

57:07

we'll talk about those in a minute so

57:10

the idea was supervisory control we have

57:12

the visibility that we've talked about

57:14

right where we can reach out and we can

57:17

pull data back the Telemetry on how that

57:20

system and the systems that it's

57:23

connected to how they're

57:25

operating so we can bring that

57:27

information back we can display it to an

57:29

operator like in something like an

57:32

HMI and then remember that

57:35

HMI also gives us the ability to control

57:39

that process remotely so if there's an

57:42

issue maybe we have an alert or an alarm

57:43

that we need to respond to we can do

57:46

that through our

57:47

tools but remember scada is doing that

57:50

over the wide area link if we're sitting

57:52

in the Operation Center and we're

57:54

monitoring and controlling assets and

57:56

the process at that same location let's

57:59

say we're in the the Operation Center or

58:01

the control room for the power plant

58:03

we're on site then that's

58:06

IC if we're remotely monitoring let's

58:09

say that remote

58:11

substation we're going out over let's

58:13

say that Cellular

58:15

Connection to remotely Monitor and

58:18

control systems and the process at that

58:20

substation that's

58:23

G

58:26

now the HMI which we just had mentioned

58:28

and we hadn't really got to yet is with

58:31

the HMI the idea is it's a graphical

58:35

interface now a lot of people joke a lot

58:37

of times they have a very like

58:40

8090s look and feel to them they look

58:43

like you know some of the original

58:45

websites that we had when the internet

58:48

or when the worldwide web first

58:50

started uh and this mostly because

58:52

they're very stripped down they don't

58:54

have a lot lot of additional features or

58:56

components they're not running things

58:58

like JavaScript which is good because we

59:00

don't want all of those additional

59:03

components that are going to introduce

59:06

vulnerabilities there already are

59:08

actually quite a significant number of

59:11

vulnerabilities associated with hmis

59:13

which we're going to talk

59:14

about so the idea though is we have this

59:17

graphical interface right that again

59:20

very simple very straight down

59:23

straight slimmed down and that it gives

59:27

the operator right gives the human the

59:30

visibility into the process to see

59:34

what's going on so we can look at in a

59:36

simple picture oh here's some type of

59:38

air conditioning uh system right we can

59:41

see some of the data that's collected by

59:43

different sensors and have it

59:47

displayed we can see oh in this case all

59:49

the lights are green which could be good

59:52

it depends on the environment sometimes

59:54

good green is is good sometimes red is

59:55

good believe it or not so it just

59:57

depends on the

59:59

environment and that the HMI also gives

60:02

the operator or the control aspect so we

60:06

have buttons we can push so we can push

60:09

stop or start or turn them off or we can

60:14

push 1 2 3 4 5 now looking at the screen

60:17

we don't know what 1 2 345 does so that

60:21

would be something that the operators

60:22

would know or if I'm a attacker well I'm

60:24

need to figure out what one two 3 4 five

60:27

does and those are the I know when the

60:29

attackers get onto these systems it's

60:31

where they they slow down because they

60:33

have to figure out what are all these

60:37

things but the HMI is going to be a

60:40

really popular Target for attackers

60:42

because the HMI right not only gives us

60:45

visibility into the process of the PLC

60:48

or other systems that are connected to

60:50

it but almost always a

60:52

PLC but then also so it gives the person

60:57

using the HMI the ability to control the

61:01

PLC which in turn right allows us to

61:04

control the process right the physical

61:06

systems that it's connected

61:10

to so it gives us the visibility it

61:13

gives us the control and when I look at

61:16

from an attacker perspective or if I'm a

61:18

penetration

61:20

tester and I'm getting paid to play the

61:23

role of a hacker in the

61:26

environment the idea with hmis is a lot

61:29

of hmis these days it runs

61:32

windows but it's not a traditional like

61:34

workstation laptop or server so a lot of

61:37

people don't think about patching it

61:39

it's like printers in the IT world

61:43

printers are just other windows or Linux

61:45

machines typically but how often do

61:47

printers get patched not not too often

61:50

unless you have an automated uh cloud

61:53

service usually that does it for you

61:55

which is like what we have at

61:58

floor so are we patching our hmis cuz if

62:01

I'm in attacker and I get in the

62:03

environment and I scan for host and I

62:05

find oh there's a a Windows machine and

62:08

then oh it's running probably a web

62:10

service because that interface can be

62:13

drawn as a web page so not only do I see

62:17

a Windows machine that's probably not

62:21

that up to date on its patches so it

62:23

could be vulnerable could be extremely

62:26

vulnerable to attack it also is running

62:28

a web service like built-in I and

62:31

windows the internet information server

62:34

or maybe it has another web service

62:37

that's been added to it whether it's

62:38

Apache or it might say something like

62:41

light httpd or any of these other oneoff

62:44

types of browsers so those probably

62:46

haven't been

62:47

updated and then remember this is

62:49

actually drawn as a web page so the web

62:51

page itself can have vulnerabilities so

62:54

you have the the operating system you

62:56

have the web server itself and then you

62:58

have the web page that's actually

62:59

running on the web service all three of

63:01

those can have vulnerabilities that

63:03

could allow an attacker to gain control

63:06

over that

63:09

asset the other interesting thing is

63:11

let's say I do take control over that

63:13

HMI and then I use it to attack other

63:16

systems like the PLC that is connected

63:20

to if I did set off some type of alarm

63:23

that if environment is watching for

63:26

suspicious activity and there is an

63:28

analyst that sees that event or that

63:31

alarm and then they look to see oh it's

63:34

an HMI sending traffic to a PLC it's

63:39

going to say oh that's that's just

63:40

regular traffic it's it's an HMI nobody

63:43

you know it's it's not an attack it

63:44

can't be it's an HMI just like going

63:46

back to our it example is a

63:49

printer because if I'm an attacker I

63:51

want on the printer because if I'm using

63:52

it to attack the rest of the network if

63:54

an analyst sees that alert they say oh

63:56

it's just a printer nobody can use it to

63:58

attack the rest of the network but they

64:00

can right because it's just another

64:02

Windows machine just like a laptop or a

64:06

server or a

64:07

workstation so that's why hmis are one

64:10

of the top targets for attackers because

64:13

it's kind of easy to to hide it's

64:16

probably easy to take control over the

64:19

HMI and then once you have access think

64:22

of what it gives you right you have that

64:24

visibility into the process right you

64:27

can use that to reverse engineer what's

64:30

going on you can use it to see what's

64:32

going on right we have the visibility

64:34

and it gives us the control it had gives

64:37

us the ability to manipulate that PLC

64:39

and the systems the process that it's

64:42

connected to that it

64:43

controls so the HMI is

64:48

extremely important asset that we need

64:50

to protect because it is going to be a

64:54

top Target for

64:56

attackers so that's the the idea of an

64:58

HMI now here's another example now this

65:01

is one I found on the internet took

65:02

about 10 seconds through Showdown and

65:05

we're going to come back in in I think

65:07

unit six or seven part seven we're going

65:10

to come back and talk about using showan

65:12

to find

65:14

exposed OT assets on the internet right

65:17

finding control systems like plc's and

65:20

hmis that are exposed to the internet

65:22

because there's still still some out

65:23

there not as bad as as we were but but

65:27

there are still some out

65:29

there so again um you know they're very

65:33

you talk of primary targets for

65:35

attackers especially anything connected

65:37

to the internet in this example you can

65:40

see oh here's an HMI for it looks like a

65:42

a pump in somebody's well whether it's

65:45

for a house maybe it's for an office

65:47

building I have one of these for my

65:48

house in in South Carolina so the idea

65:52

is I'm not on City water it's not piped

65:55

in I just have a pump that's dropped

65:58

into the ground right under the water

66:00

table and it brings up water and and

66:02

pumps it into the

66:04

house now when you see these exposed to

66:08

the internet sometimes they actually

66:10

could be exposed to where you could

66:13

interact with the interface and you

66:15

would be able to push the buttons If you

66:17

want to make changes a lot of times

66:20

though they're exposed to the internet

66:22

in a readon fashion so at least the

66:25

owners and operators in those cases were

66:28

thinking a little bit when they were

66:31

exposing those assets or those you the

66:34

the control systems to the

66:38

internet we still don't want it exposed

66:41

regardless well in any way shape or form

66:45

but at

66:47

least if it's exposed in read only you

66:50

know at least they're not giving the

66:52

attackers the ability to remotely

66:55

control it you're still giving them

66:56

visibility but you're not giving them

66:59

the ability for control unless they're

67:02

able to hack the interface and then

67:06

bypass the readon access we'll come back

67:10

and talk about that because a lot of

67:11

times too they're exposed to basically a

67:13

second device which then enforces the

67:16

read only so again we'll come back and

67:18

and talk about that especially when we

67:20

get into the the showan section which is

67:23

going to be in unit

67:25

7 but that's

67:27

hmis now the sis the safety instrumented

67:31

system in a OT environment this is the

67:36

fail safe backup this is the most

67:38

important system that we have in the

67:41

environment period the end because not

67:45

only is it designed to keep the facility

67:47

safe but we're keeping the facility safe

67:50

not just for availability reasons but

67:52

ultimately to protect human Liv

67:54

life right we want to keep our on-site

67:57

Personnel safe we want to keep if

67:59

there's general public in the area of

68:01

that facility we want to make sure that

68:04

they are

68:06

safe but the idea is with the sis is

68:09

that it

68:12

monitors the entire plant and if there's

68:15

ever a fault condition detected that

68:19

could result in yes something bad

68:22

happening to the plant where maybe it

68:24

just we're just worried about the plant

68:26

essentially breaking down to where we

68:29

have to take it offline to fix

68:31

it but again most importantly if there's

68:34

ever any condition that could lead to

68:37

let's say a type of explosion that would

68:40

would kill somebody or maybe a gas leak

68:42

that could kill

68:45

somebody so idea is that the sis if it

68:48

ever detects that there's some type of

68:52

fault that could lead to some type of

68:54

dangerous situation it can shut down

68:56

part or the entire plant to keep it safe

69:00

or we talked about in the second part

69:03

about the crcis

69:04

incident where the Russian nation state

69:08

had come in over the wire had control

69:11

over the Sao ramco petrochemical

69:13

facility and they're in there for 3

69:15

years and in that time they reverse

69:17

engineered the OT Network and the

69:20

processes and were able to remotely

69:23

access the sis and take

69:26

99.99% control over

69:29

it and then once you if you had 100%

69:32

control over tcis right and you can I

69:35

remember I think there's there's quite a

69:36

few of course articles about tcis out

69:39

there and all of them feature Rob Lee

69:42

and in most of them you can see he'll

69:44

rattle off 10 different ways an attacker

69:46

could create an explosion in that

69:48

environment very

69:51

quickly and he always again stresses

69:53

that the this idea and why an attacker

69:56

would want to take over the sis is so

69:59

that they're going to kill

70:02

people or again I always think well

70:04

they're going to create some type of

70:06

explosion or other some type of other

70:08

dangerous condition that's going to you

70:10

know potentially destroy the facility

70:12

which of course if somebody is on site

70:16

they're going to be

70:19

killed so you can understand how

70:21

important it is to protect

70:24

the sis so we take additional steps to

70:27

protect it like putting it on its own

70:30

network segment completely air gap or if

70:33

you want islanded so that it's not

70:35

connected to anything else so if an

70:38

attacker was going to take control over

70:40

the sis they would physically have to be

70:43

on

70:46

site that's the only way you can really

70:49

even start to protect the sis to where

70:53

you can trust it to do its

70:58

job looks like this slide's out of order

71:01

so but we talked about this in the HMI

71:04

section right so so we'll move on now

71:08

there's the engineering workstation

71:10

right the engineering workstation

71:11

whether it's a like a physical

71:13

workstation or a laptop that we can use

71:17

to be in the environment to do things

71:21

like program plcs

71:24

now if it's a workstation right the

71:26

workstation is usually sitting in

71:28

sometime like a room or area designated

71:31

for engineers to work a lot of times

71:33

it's off of the control room or the the

71:36

Operation Center could be in the data

71:38

center but the idea is that you have a

71:41

workstation and you'll sit there and of

71:43

course it's not mobile right but you'll

71:46

be connecting to the PLC that you're

71:49

going to make changes to over the wire

71:51

right over typically tcpip

71:55

if you have a laptop you could

71:56

physically go to the PLC which I think

71:58

is actually what's happening in this

72:00

case right you have somebody sitting

72:01

there with a laptop and I think this

72:03

looks like the maybe a Serial cable

72:06

could be an ethernet cable that's being

72:08

used to connect the laptop to a PLC up

72:11

here this is another picture you can see

72:14

by the way that I found on the the

72:15

subreddit for the PLC subreddit so lots

72:19

of lots of interesting

72:22

pictures so you can use again the

72:25

workstation or

72:27

laptop to connect to a PLC to do things

72:29

like upgrade firmware and make changes

72:31

to

72:33

code of course if it's a laptop there

72:36

are a lot more security considerations

72:38

to take in to well into consideration

72:41

because that laptop could be taken off

72:45

site it could

72:47

[Music]

72:48

be then at that point you know you you

72:51

don't know what could happen with that

72:53

laptop you have additional security

72:56

controls on it sure like things like EDR

72:58

to help protect it but we have to have a

73:01

hideen sense of you know security around

73:05

our laptops especially those laptops

73:07

that we're using to do things like

73:09

operations and maintenance

73:12

task so just something to think about

73:15

but also think about you from an

73:17

attacker perspective what do we

73:19

get if we gained access to an

73:22

engineering Workstation

73:25

well then we would have you access to

73:29

programming data right the code that

73:31

we're running so if I'm worried about as

73:34

an attacker trying to reverse engineer a

73:37

process or what's going on in the

73:41

environment then there's nothing better

73:43

than have access to that engineering

73:45

workstation or laptop right that has

73:49

that programming data which we're going

73:51

to come back and talk about later on

73:54

on it so we can access that information

73:57

and use it to reverse engineer the

73:59

environment to understand what's going

74:02

on that's the idea of engineering

74:04

workstations or laptop you see ews all

74:07

the time I remember seeing ews and it

74:09

was like what the heck and it's was like

74:11

oh engineering workstation I'm like okay

74:12

that makes sense and then it was like oh

74:14

it's just another Windows

74:16

machine like okay I get

74:21

that and then data historian for me the

74:23

data historian is going to be the most

74:25

popular Target for an attacker and we'll

74:28

talk about why but the idea is data

74:30

historian it

74:32

stores the what call the process data

74:35

from the OT environment so remember we

74:37

have the process in the OT environment

74:40

of you what that environment produces so

74:44

if I'm the power plant and I'm producing

74:46

electricity or if I'm the insulin

74:48

manufacturing plant and I'm

74:52

creating insulin

74:54

injections so we have processed data

74:57

that explains different aspects of that

75:02

process like how many injections of

75:04

insulin did we generate today how much

75:07

power did we generate

75:09

today what resources were consumed to

75:13

generate those

75:14

things right those are just some

75:16

examples of processed data that we can

75:20

store and we'll come back and we'll talk

75:22

about some detail examples later on but

75:26

for now think we have this data that

75:27

talks about or describes what's going on

75:29

in the plant or in the site we're going

75:32

to put it in a regular old database like

75:35

something sitting there in Microsoft SQL

75:37

Server sitting on a Windows server and

75:39

that's what we call a data historian

75:41

right it's storing that processed data

75:43

for historical

75:45

purposes think the the big use for that

75:49

is we take that data we take that

75:51

process data from the OT Network and we

75:54

push it out to the OT the sorry the it

75:57

Network where the business is where they

75:58

can use that to do things like Bill

76:01

customers or coordinate shipping

76:09

Logistics when I mentioned earlier that

76:11

it's going to be the number one attack

76:13

Target for either attackers or

76:16

penetration testers and part of that is

76:19

if imagine remember most of our attacks

76:21

in OT come from the it Network so if I'm

76:25

an attacker and I get into your it

76:27

Network which we know is going to happen

76:29

right it's only a matter of

76:31

time if you allow the it Network to talk

76:34

with the OT Network more than likely

76:37

there's a DMZ between it and

76:40

OT and that the one host if there's any

76:44

host that's exposed between it and OT

76:46

that's sitting in that DMZ it's a data

76:51

historian and that data storian remember

76:53

it's just another Windows Server running

76:56

Microsoft SQL Server which SQL server

77:00

has its own vulnerabilities on top of

77:02

the operating system which has its own

77:06

vulnerabilities so it's going to be one

77:08

of those easier to attack

77:11

targets and it's going to be exposed so

77:16

it makes it an easy target for

77:19

attackers so hopefully we'll come back

77:21

well we will come back in the next part

77:23

and talk about secure network

77:24

architecture and how we can prevent it

77:28

from being

77:29

exposed but that's the idea of the data

77:32

historian and we'll come back and talk

77:34

more about process data and and tags and

77:38

so on in a little

77:41

bit and here we're just talking about

77:43

the process data right so we're going to

77:45

record all this information about what's

77:47

going on in the

77:49

environment and we can we can use that

77:52

for security purposes

77:55

potentially but mostly it's getting that

77:57

data into the hands of the business so

77:59

they can make certain decisions or they

78:01

can take certain

78:04

actions and then you can also use or

78:06

examine that data to identify issues

78:10

with operations or maybe I can watch the

78:13

process over time to determine things

78:16

like Predictive Analytics to determine

78:18

when certain parts in my assets are

78:21

going to break down over time so I want

78:23

know ooh this part's going to break in

78:24

in 3 months so we need to make sure that

78:28

on our maintenance schedule sometime

78:30

between now and the next three months we

78:32

replace that

78:34

part that's another example of how we

78:36

can use process data and again you could

78:38

use it to find

78:40

potentially uh security issues in the

78:43

environment but that's typically not its

78:45

use it's for making business decisions

78:47

on the it side of the house and then

78:49

also potentially using it to identify

78:52

operation issues that we need to be

78:54

aware

78:59

of so here's an example of a operation

79:04

Monitoring Center this is one for you

79:06

see an now is a green green power Energy

79:09

company in play South

79:11

America and so they had put place you

79:14

put this out on the internet so I

79:15

thought it was great to be able to to

79:17

share with everybody cuz yeah this looks

79:19

like a kind of you know typical Maybe

79:23

mediumsized

79:24

Operation Center or control

79:27

room and basically right we have the

79:30

ability for for control operators to sit

79:35

right and watch screens filled with

79:38

hmis and it looks like maybe an Excel

79:40

spreadsheet in that lower left hand

79:43

corner you see some other screens that

79:45

they're using to monitor different

79:46

aspects of the environment and be aware

79:49

of different different aspects that they

79:51

need to be but mostly it's a collection

79:54

of hmis right that give us visibility

79:57

and control allows us to see what's

79:59

going on with the process allows us to

80:01

see what's going on in the plant we can

80:03

monitor for aler alerts and alarms and

80:08

then it gives us the ability to control

80:10

remember we can go ahead and we can

80:13

interact we can make changes to that

80:16

process in the the physical world if we

80:19

need to

80:21

react so I that that was just a nice

80:24

simple example of a control room I could

80:28

share now there are a lot of other

80:30

different types of control systems and

80:32

we'll we'll talk about some of these

80:34

right we already started mentioning rtus

80:37

in incada we mentioned those IEDs which

80:40

are responsible for monitoring what's

80:42

going on on in power transmission right

80:45

making sure that the power is being um

80:47

carried across the wire

80:51

appropriately uh we'll talk about some

80:53

of the other ones like vfds and Feats

80:56

and um talk about mzes a lot mzes are

80:59

kind of the Bane in my

81:01

existence from a secure network

81:03

architecture perspective but we'll talk

81:05

about that in in the next part so again

81:08

there are a lot of different types of

81:10

control systems again we're not going to

81:12

get into all the technical details of

81:15

all of these but but we'll talk about

81:18

you know few of these as we go

81:20

throughout the rest of the course and

81:22

then as you get into different types of

81:24

environments you'll find that um you'll

81:28

definitely want to learn about those

81:31

control systems that are specific to

81:33

your your unique type of OT environment

81:36

right if you're in manufacturing you

81:38

want to know everything you can about

81:40

manufacturing execution systems you

81:42

probably do not care about intelligence

81:44

electronic devices which are essentially

81:48

just for power

81:50

transmission and vice versa if you're in

81:52

power transmission you want to know

81:54

everything about IEDs and you don't

81:57

really care about the mzes of the

82:00

world so again we'll we'll talk about

82:03

some of the more common ones and and

82:04

some of the examples especially in power

82:07

because we're we're focused on using

82:08

power as our example but but we again

82:11

we'll talk about some of these and the

82:12

other ones definitely encourage you to

82:14

to look them up as you come across them

82:16

and you know only takes a couple minutes

82:19

right of reading to then understand it's

82:21

like oh okay like that's what vsad is

82:24

like okay that you know that makes

82:25

complete

82:27

sense so we're moving into the last half

82:30

of this section I I did warn everybody

82:32

this was this was going to be the

82:34

biggest part or section in in the course

82:37

but so the first half we talk about the

82:40

different types of control systems

82:42

that's what we primarily focused on

82:44

there and then in this last half we're

82:45

going to talk about networking so we are

82:48

going to talk about different industrial

82:49

control protocols but before we get

82:52

there we're going to cover some

82:53

networking Basics so if you're from the

82:56

it side of the house and and have a good

82:59

grasp on networking Essentials then this

83:04

next part of the section is is going to

83:06

be um boring for you uh if you're coming

83:11

from an OT background or or from it and

83:15

and don't have a a strong background in

83:17

in networking then then hopefully this

83:19

will be a great uh introduction or may

83:22

be a refresher for some people so let's

83:26

go and jump in so the idea is when we

83:30

Network computers together especially

83:32

now we have whether it's computers

83:34

talking over the Internet or thinking an

83:37

OT Network where we have different types

83:39

of systems so we have control systems

83:42

like plc's and hmis and rtus and sis and

83:47

DCS and and the list goes on and we also

83:50

have Windows machines you know laptops

83:52

and workstations and

83:55

servers and the idea is that we can

83:59

allow different systems with different

84:02

Hardware with different software like

84:05

different operating systems so Windows

84:07

versus Linux and all the different

84:08

versions of those right we can allow

84:11

these different operating systems and

84:15

different pieces of Hardware to

84:16

communicate and share information and

84:18

and also think of all the different

84:20

applications that we run and not only on

84:24

you think of like servers and

84:26

workstations and laptops but our phones

84:29

and our Smart TVs and our iot devices

84:32

and the list goes on and on so any

84:34

device that is networked especially if

84:37

there's internet connectivity right idea

84:40

is

84:41

that originally when computers like

84:43

Xerox Intel digital or or deck had

84:48

started to network their computers

84:50

together they wanted to be able to

84:51

network

84:53

the different companies together right

84:55

that would be really excited

84:58

exciting but they realized there was no

85:00

basis for communication between their

85:02

own individual networks that they had

85:04

created kind of in a in a

85:08

um in in kind of their own own little

85:11

world and

85:13

so there was this need for a common

85:16

framework and as long as you wrote or

85:19

created hardware and wrote software and

85:21

operating systems to play by these seven

85:25

rules then those systems could

85:27

communicate with each other even again

85:29

if they're completely different

85:31

platforms so these are the seven rules

85:34

of networking that if again if you play

85:36

by these your your system can talk with

85:39

other

85:41

systems so we talk about the seven

85:43

layers and they're they're numbered one

85:45

through seven you with starting at the

85:47

the lowest level the physical layer so

85:50

level one is the physical layer this we

85:53

talk about this is where the zeros and

85:55

ones right the the bits of data that are

85:59

transmitted over some some type of

86:02

pathway right whether it's you have an

86:03

ethernet cable or maybe it's Wi-Fi like

86:07

80211 but the idea is that you have that

86:10

physical path that you're sending your

86:13

data on right zeros and ones there's

86:15

either the presence of electricity or

86:17

not at a specific point in time zeros

86:19

and ones that's that's all we're sending

86:21

over

86:23

the network when we're sending

86:26

data now when you think that if I'm

86:29

sending information over that network

86:32

over that wire or that Wi-Fi connection

86:35

right to allow my computer to do that I

86:37

have to have a network card and so the

86:40

network card operates at the data link

86:42

layer so the data link layer itself is

86:44

actually broken into sub two sub layers

86:47

so there's The Logical link control

86:49

layer and then there's the media access

86:52

control sublayer so the

86:55

Mac sub layer is where the network card

86:58

is so if you're familiar with the MAC

87:00

address that's assigned to every network

87:02

card remember every network interface

87:04

card has a 48 bit unique address to

87:08

identify it uniquely from every other

87:11

host on that that that subnet or that

87:15

Network so the Mac sublayer is where the

87:20

network card lives the network

87:23

interface the LLC The Logical link

87:26

control that's where we have the

87:28

software driver that allows the rest of

87:31

the operating system to talk with and

87:33

access and use the network art right so

87:36

the physical layer lay level one and

87:38

then the first part of the data link

87:40

layer that's all physical Hardware right

87:44

we have again the network card that

87:46

allows us to then Connect into either

87:48

Wi-Fi or uh ethernet connection right to

87:52

have a cable

87:53

connected the LLC is the software driver

87:56

that allows us to work with or interface

87:59

with the network C from the operating

88:02

system

88:04

perspective so everything else from the

88:06

network layer up right if we're looking

88:09

at it from a like a workstation or

88:12

server perspective this is all operating

88:17

system so at the network layer this is

88:20

where the IP of TCP IP comes

88:25

in so when we talk about the Internet

88:27

Protocol this is where especially in

88:29

particularly addressing and routing come

88:31

into place so every host on a IP network

88:36

has to have a unique IP address if you

88:40

don't you're going to have drop package

88:42

or mis deliveries and you're not going

88:43

to have you're going to have failed

88:45

communication just like if the delivery

88:49

person for the Post Office comes to your

88:51

street and let's say you live at 574 but

88:54

there's another house across the street

88:56

with the same number

88:58

574 they won't know who to deliver to so

89:01

they might just guess and go to one

89:03

rather the the other and it it makes it

89:06

for a

89:07

mess so we have to make sure that every

89:10

system on the local network has a unique

89:13

IP address from all other host otherwise

89:16

we have communication

89:18

issues and then you can see there yes

89:21

there's different versions of IP version

89:22

4 we typically see IP or IP there's

89:25

different versions so there's IP version

89:27

4 which is 32bit addresses and there's

89:29

version 6 which is 128 bits out on the

89:33

public internet essentially we ran out

89:34

of IP version 4 addresses a long time

89:38

ago so we want to use IP version six

89:41

where we have billions and billions of

89:44

cab billions of of of IP addresses that

89:47

will never run out of so so they say

89:50

right Never Say Never

89:53

but it's it's really you ugly to work

89:56

with IP version 4 is not necessarily the

89:59

prettiest thing but it's a lot simpler

90:02

than working with IP version 6 for a lot

90:04

of people so it's very slow to very very

90:07

slow to be adopted so when especially

90:09

you're in an environment like a OT

90:11

Network you'll see IP version 6

90:14

addresses the only time you usually see

90:16

IP version 6 at least for me when I see

90:18

IP version 6 in an OT network is because

90:21

there's Windows machines that

90:22

automatically start with IP version 6

90:25

addresses now and so usually most of

90:27

your windows machines have both IP

90:29

version 6 and IP version for IP

90:32

addresses so which is which is not a

90:35

good thing because attackers know and

90:38

work with IP version six much

90:40

better than than most cyber security

90:44

Defenders and and network admin

90:48

administrators so so a lot of attackers

90:51

when they get in environments they can

90:53

use IP version six to move about the

90:56

environment and they might not ever be

90:58

detected because a lot of Defenders

91:00

aren't looking for the IP version 6

91:02

traffic they might not even know IP

91:04

version 6 traffic is there but it's

91:06

there by default in newer Windows

91:08

operating systems

91:10

so but so IP addressing takes place in

91:13

network at the network level at level

91:16

three we also talk about routing so if

91:19

you're going to move from one subnet or

91:21

one network to another you're going to

91:24

pass through a router right that happens

91:26

because of the addressing scheme so

91:28

especially think of if I'm going out to

91:30

the internet I'm passing through a

91:32

router or a default gateway to get to uh

91:36

different resources out on the internet

91:37

and the the Internet is just collection

91:40

of all these different IP networks that

91:41

are connected with with

91:44

routers so the network layer gives us

91:47

the internet and all this internet or

91:49

interconnectivity between

91:53

networks now when two computers want to

91:56

talk to each other they also not only

91:58

need an IP address to reach that

92:00

destination like the delivery person

92:02

coming to your home but let's say they

92:05

want to actually come inside and drop

92:08

off the

92:10

package so the idea is to make a

92:12

connection to a remote computer we also

92:15

use a transport protocol so transport

92:18

protocol are we're going to have two

92:20

choices so there's

92:22

TCP and there's UDP I don't have them

92:25

listed here so TCP is the one that I

92:29

think most people are familiar with and

92:31

it's a connection oriented protocol and

92:33

we'll come back and talk about the

92:34

differences between them a little bit

92:36

later

92:38

on whereas UDP is a connection list

92:43

protocol but the idea is the transport

92:45

layer is responsible for taking large

92:47

chunks of data and breaking it down into

92:49

these equally sized chunks that we put

92:51

put out on the wire which eventually

92:53

really get remember chunked down into

92:57

zeros and ones right but overall we're

93:00

logically taking these larger chunks of

93:02

data and breaking them down into these

93:03

equally sized chunks to send out on the

93:07

wire and we do that because it's much

93:08

more efficient to send that data so it

93:11

makes it

93:13

faster but that's where TCP and UDP live

93:18

so when we talk about making a

93:19

connection to a remote port on a

93:22

destination system like I'm going to

93:25

tcp8 or TCP 443 to browse a website

93:30

right that's happening at the transport

93:33

layer with

93:35

TCP now the session layer is where we

93:39

establish the session logically between

93:41

two systems so it's very important but

93:44

not ton to talk about there the

93:47

presentation layer is where we would see

93:49

things like encryption and and

93:52

compression we talk data manipulation

93:54

right happening with the zeros and ones

93:57

or the chunks of data that we're sending

93:59

over the

94:00

network though realistically a lot of

94:02

that functionality is now moved up into

94:04

upper layers or it's even handled in

94:08

applications that are running on the

94:11

system not the application layer

94:13

itself so the application layer or layer

94:17

seven it's not again the applications

94:20

running on top of the operating system

94:22

even though I have pictures of word and

94:24

different browsers here but the idea

94:27

it's the apis or or the

94:30

layer that allows applications running

94:33

on the operating system to

94:35

talk with the networking

94:39

layers that allows an application like a

94:42

web browser to send a request out over

94:46

the network out over the internet to a

94:48

web server somewhere on the other side

94:49

of the planet to then get a response

94:52

back and then display a web page for us

94:56

sitting in front of our

95:00

computer we also talk about application

95:03

layer protocols like we're just talking

95:05

about HTTP and https which are used for

95:09

web browsing or FTP for file transfers

95:12

or SMTP which we use for

95:15

email again the idea is we have these

95:17

seven different layers or these seven

95:19

different rules so as long as you create

95:22

your Hardware or you write your software

95:24

and operating systems to play by these

95:27

seven

95:28

rules then it it doesn't matter what

95:30

Hardware or software you're using

95:32

doesn't or vendor agnostic as long as we

95:34

play by the rules we can connect and we

95:36

can exchange and share

95:40

information and we won't spend a lot of

95:43

time on it but what it looks like in

95:45

this idea of data encapsulation is let's

95:48

say I do want to go out to even just

95:51

going out to google.com to load the the

95:53

main search page you our browser is

95:56

going to go ahead and take that request

95:58

and pass it off onto the application

96:00

layer right the data of the the request

96:03

itself so get this web page

96:07

www.google.com and it goes through each

96:09

of the

96:10

layers and as it goes through each ler

96:14

layer there's a

96:16

header there's header data that's added

96:19

that represents that layer and as we go

96:22

through each of those layers of the OSI

96:26

model that Header information is added

96:30

until we get all the way down to the

96:33

data link layer right where we're

96:34

actually remember the the sub the Mac

96:37

layer where our network card is where

96:40

we're taking the packet we're also

96:42

adding what they call the CRC or the

96:44

cyclic redundancy check which is

96:46

essentially a hash or fingerprint of the

96:48

data to make sure especially when the

96:50

data is transmitted over the

96:53

network that the receiving computer can

96:55

check the CRC to make sure that the data

96:58

did not become corrupted during

97:00

transmission so much more important in

97:02

the older days when we didn't have such

97:04

reliable

97:08

networks but we take the data right we

97:10

create all the Header information by

97:12

adding a piece from each layer we add

97:16

that cyclic redundancy check put the

97:18

packet out on The Wire so that way it

97:21

gets sent over to our destination right

97:24

there's our zeros and

97:26

ones and then the Destin the destination

97:29

receives the packet and then it passes

97:32

it back up the its own OSI

97:36

layer which then remember we check the

97:39

CRC make sure oh okay we got the packet

97:43

intact if it showed up as corrupted we

97:46

could request that it be resent but it's

97:48

going to be let's say we got the packet

97:50

intact

97:52

and so then we pass the packet up the

97:53

OSI layer stripping off that Header

97:56

information for each appropriate layer

97:58

because it tells the system how to

98:00

process that

98:02

data so as we go up the data link layer

98:05

right we strip off the data link Header

98:06

information we go up to the network

98:08

layer we strip off the network Header

98:09

information and so on and so forth till

98:12

we eventually get the data in this case

98:14

to the web server to say hey we want to

98:16

see

98:19

www.google.com and so then the web

98:21

server says oh okay well get you

98:25

www.google.com here you go and then we

98:27

go through the exact reverse order so

98:29

back down the OSI model put those zeros

98:32

and ones out on the network come back to

98:34

our computer come back up with OSI model

98:37

Right strip off all the Header

98:38

information till we get the web

98:45

page so when we want to

98:48

troubleshoot network connectivity issues

98:50

we can use a a packet sniffer to capture

98:53

that Network traffic the zeros and ones

98:55

but then it translates those zeros and

98:57

ones into information that we can

98:59

understand and use for troubleshooting

99:01

purposes on the on the

99:07

screen so we're going to talk about wies

99:10

shark which is the most

99:11

popular packet sniffer out there because

99:13

its open source is so powerful and it's

99:16

free so why wouldn't you use it right

99:21

but you can use packet sniffers like wi

99:23

shark and there are a few others out

99:25

there but but wire shark is the most

99:28

popular one to be able to do packet

99:30

analysis so there's different types of

99:32

activities we can use packet Stiers for

99:34

so he mentioned one of those would be

99:36

troubleshooting network connectivity

99:38

issues I remember the the first day I

99:40

was on the power plant uh on site they

99:42

were using wire shark to troubleshoot

99:45

Wi-Fi connectivity issues so I was able

99:47

to to to help out a little bit there we

99:50

can also use it to understand or

99:53

establish a network Baseline which means

99:57

we want to watch especially in OT

99:59

environment we want to see which assets

100:01

exist in the environment and which a

100:03

assets are talking to each other and

100:05

when they talk to each other well what

100:06

are they

100:08

saying and that allows us if we create

100:11

that Network Baseline to then over time

100:14

understand when something out of the

100:16

ordinary happens and when something out

100:18

of the ordinary happens it could

100:21

potentially be a security issue Maybe

100:23

not maybe

100:25

not but it could be that's why we want

100:28

to create these Network baselines to

100:32

understand what

100:35

common functionality and communication

100:38

in an OT Network looks

100:40

like we can also use it and we're going

100:43

to come back and in later sections talk

100:45

about how do we create an asset register

100:47

if we don't have one so one of those

100:49

options is to take packet cap captures

100:51

in the environment and start with well

100:54

what IP addresses do we see

100:59

talking and go from there and then again

101:02

we can use it for troubleshooting

101:04

network

101:05

issues so we'll actually look through

101:08

some different examples of all of these

101:10

as we go throughout the

101:11

course but again we mentioned that um oh

101:15

and sorry before I jump ahead that you

101:17

know we can use tools like wire shark

101:21

and

101:22

for asset Discovery right finding

101:24

systems oh there's an IP address we

101:26

didn't know about or maybe there's a MAC

101:28

address maybe it's not running tcpip

101:30

maybe it's you're running some other

101:31

protocol but oh we can see a MAC address

101:33

for a network interface

101:35

C we can also use that to potentially

101:38

map out things like operating systems or

101:41

applications that are running on systems

101:43

which we could also then potentially

101:45

used to map out

101:49

vulnerabilities and again ultimately

101:51

from a network security monitoring

101:53

perspective we can look for anything out

101:56

of the ordinary right that suspicious

101:58

activity you see the picture I was

102:00

trying to get somebody with a magnifying

102:02

glass looking over right finding finding

102:05

the the malicious Network traffic mid

102:07

Journey came up with two magnifying

102:09

glasses so I I just went with

102:12

it that's where that came from

102:14

though all right so wire shark I

102:16

mentioned again it's the it's the most

102:18

popular packet uh sniffer out there

102:23

because not only is it open source and

102:24

it's

102:25

free but that it's extremely powerful so

102:29

you can see we have over 3,000 what they

102:31

call dissectors or parsers right it

102:33

allows wire shark to interpret over

102:37

3,000 different network protocols which

102:39

is a

102:40

ton which includes our most common

102:43

protocols like sure

102:46

tcpip and then also industrial protocols

102:49

like modbus which we're going to spend

102:50

most of our time in this course when we

102:53

talk about protocols we're going to be

102:54

focused on

102:55

modbus but also S7 dmp3 backnet OPC

103:01

opcua so on and wireless versions as

103:04

well so not only 80211 but we can talk

103:07

about things like zigby which I always

103:09

love to say and wireless heart and um

103:13

you the the list goes on and and

103:17

on so we're going to be able to we'll

103:20

look at some examples of of some of

103:22

those so you can download it at wi.org

103:25

but Wireshark was created by Gerald

103:27

comes you see he actually worked at an

103:29

ISP and he wanted a packet sniffer to

103:32

troubleshoot some network connectivity

103:34

issue but he went to look at them and

103:36

there were tens of thousands of of

103:38

dollars and they didn't have the money

103:41

to to purchase a a packet sniffer or a

103:43

packet analyzer so he decided he was

103:45

going to build one himself I mean just

103:47

amazing and then it created this tool

103:49

that I if you work in it and if you've

103:51

ever troubleshoot troubleshot network

103:55

connectivity issues you've used wi shark

103:58

wire shark's also a great security tool

104:01

for Defenders and for

104:04

attackers and it's a great tool even if

104:06

you're learning how different types of

104:08

attack tools work the best way to

104:11

understand how the tool works is to

104:13

watch it what's going on behind the

104:15

scenes so if you're running a tool let's

104:17

say like nmap what's really happening

104:20

when you're running an end map

104:22

scan that's how you can really truly

104:24

understand what those tools are doing Ed

104:26

scus hands I remember that was one of

104:28

the things he always preached I mean

104:30

he's preached that for 20 plus years run

104:33

a packet sniffer in the background like

104:34

wire shark while you're running those

104:36

tools to understand what's happening

104:39

what's really going on behind the scenes

104:42

and I actually had pointed that out to

104:44

one of the the IC SS instructors because

104:47

the book was not correct because it's

104:51

like oh no if you watched it through

104:53

wies shark when you run map with the

104:55

switches that they were recommending it

104:57

did not do what they

104:59

said I don't know if they actually ever

105:01

updated that the book or not I never

105:02

went back and

105:05

checked but that was actually because of

105:08

of

105:09

Ed that's wi shark all right so we talk

105:13

about you know capturing or sometimes

105:15

you use the term sniffing or sometimes

105:17

you hear like passive sniffing of pack

105:21

right the idea is that we have those

105:22

zeros and ones going over the network

105:25

and so I'll have a workstation now a

105:28

workstation or any device especially in

105:30

tcpip it's designed only to pay

105:34

attention to those packets that are

105:36

specifically sent to it and there's

105:39

different types of traffic that we're

105:41

not covering here but whether it's

105:42

unicast so it's going directly to your

105:44

system we have other types of traffic

105:46

like multicast and broadcast that go

105:49

like broadcast go to all systems so your

105:51

system would also listen to those those

105:54

uh

105:56

broadcasts but the idea is by default

105:58

your system is not going to listen to

106:01

All packets on The Wire that it can see

106:04

it's only looking for the things that

106:06

are addressed to it so you can if you

106:09

have administrative access you can put

106:10

your network card into what they call

106:12

promiscuous

106:13

mode and so if I'm running a tool like

106:16

wi shark I put the network card into

106:17

promiscuous mode it does allow me to see

106:20

all all of the network packets the zeros

106:23

and ones on the wire whether they're

106:25

addressed to my computer or

106:27

not so we're able to see those zeros and

106:30

ones and then remember the beauty of wi

106:33

shark is it takes those zeros and ones

106:34

and put it puts it into an interface

106:37

that we can see and that we can

106:39

essentially read and understand what's

106:41

going on now it might still look really

106:44

really really strange at first but if

106:46

you've been doing it for a while or even

106:48

for a little while you can start to get

106:50

pretty familiar I think fairly quickly

106:52

with it to do some basic troubleshooting

106:55

and understand what's going on so we'll

106:57

we'll look at some

107:02

examples oh and here's so this is this

107:05

is more of a it example but I thought it

107:09

was it was one where we're capturing

107:12

zeros and ones off the network and we're

107:14

allowing wi shark to do that translation

107:17

and it's telling us hey what we captured

107:19

here in these zeros ones this is ntp

107:22

traffic or the network time protocol so

107:25

the network time protocol is used to

107:28

synchronize

107:29

clocks particularly especially in it

107:32

environments now clock synchronization

107:34

is very very important in OT networks

107:36

undoubtedly but we might not leave it up

107:39

to just regular old ordinary ntp right

107:43

so but so in it environments we'll have

107:46

ntp and we can see things like IP

107:49

addresses we can see clock times we can

107:52

see you know time stamps so we could use

107:55

this to understand what's going on with

107:57

the ntp protocol between these two

108:00

computers that are talking we would also

108:02

see things like IP addresses talking to

108:04

each other um we're just not seeing it

108:06

in the screen but we can use that again

108:08

for troubleshooting to understand what's

108:11

going on again so that's just an example

108:13

of how it takes these zeros and ones and

108:15

translates into something that we can

108:17

see and use better for troubleshooting

108:20

purposes so again we'll come back and

108:23

we'll see some great examples as we go

108:25

through the rest of the

108:29

section so now we talked about in every

108:33

Network environment pretty much these

108:35

days the main protocol is tcpip and

108:37

that's mostly because in some way shape

108:39

or form almost all networks are

108:41

connected to the internet and the

108:43

protocol that we use for communication

108:45

over the Internet is

108:48

dcpip if the internet had been BAS based

108:50

off of I don't know the mic protocol

108:52

then the mic protocol would be the most

108:53

popular protocol in use today right

108:56

everybody wants to be connected to the

108:57

internet we even even have a lot of OT

109:00

environments that want to be connected

109:02

to the internet for things like the

109:04

industrial internet of things which are

109:06

going to come back and talk about

109:08

later so there are industrial control

109:11

protocols now there were versions of

109:13

these that ran on their

109:15

own and they didn't you know you didn't

109:18

have TCP right you just had modbus was

109:21

the protocol that used to communicate

109:23

and share information between

109:26

systems or S7 which is a seens

109:29

proprietary protocol or OPC which is

109:32

still a scary protocol which we'll talk

109:34

about but or you know the idea with OPC

109:37

it it literally is built off of the same

109:40

system that Microsoft uses called Olay

109:44

or object linking embedding which allows

109:46

you to take data from one Microsoft op

109:50

application like word or Excel and then

109:54

post it into like a PowerPoint

109:56

presentation that's the same system that

109:57

they

109:58

use for industrial control I was like

110:02

what mindboggling and I've never met an

110:06

engineer that actually likes working

110:07

with OPC now OPC UA is a new standard or

110:11

new protocol which which is which is

110:13

much cleaner which might which is much

110:15

nicer and we'll see an example when we

110:17

get into the vulnerability management

110:19

part where 's actually a new uh

110:22

vulnerability scanner looking for

110:23

vulnerabilities just specific to opcua

110:26

servers so I wanted to include that into

110:29

the vulnerability management section

110:30

which I thought was very cool so and

110:32

there's also Wireless uh different

110:34

industrial control protocols as well and

110:37

we have you know we still use things

110:38

like 80211 right just regular old Wi-Fi

110:41

but there are Wireless you know specific

110:44

Wireless industrial control protocols

110:46

like Sig and and wireless heart and any

110:50

you still use things like Bluetooth as

110:52

well so we'll talk a little bit more of

110:56

those in some examples as we go

110:58

throughout the

110:59

course so again we're going to focus on

111:02

mod modbus in this course and we're

111:05

going to look at the version of one of

111:07

the versions of modbus that runs over

111:11

tcpip

111:13

so there are some great GI GitHub

111:16

repositories out on the internet for uh

111:19

Industrial control and in learning cyber

111:21

security in in OT one of them is this

111:25

the

111:27

it repository or you can see from Tim

111:31

Yardley and I mean there's a ton that he

111:35

has in this GitHub repository but why I

111:40

really love it is that he has this

111:43

peaps uh folder or repository where he

111:47

has all of not only these different

111:50

packet captures

111:53

for industrial control protocols but

111:56

they're very small captures with just

112:01

exactly very specific types of traffic

112:06

so you can really narrow in on the

112:09

different types of traffic that you want

112:11

to load into wi shark and examine

112:14

further as I you know love the love the

112:17

collection so we're going to use one of

112:21

those packet

112:23

captures for

112:28

theor so I mention we're going to focus

112:30

on modbus since it's the most commonly

112:33

used control system protocol that we see

112:36

again it's a version that runs over

112:39

tcpip uh and you can see so mbus was

112:42

created by modon which eventually got

112:44

bought by Schneider Electric uh but it

112:47

was used and you can see over serial

112:49

communication like

112:51

rs232 cables kind of like the the cables

112:53

that you you might have seen connecting

112:56

like a UPS to a uh like a

113:00

server um and or we use them to connect

113:04

from maybe an engineering workstation to

113:08

a PLC right for

113:11

programming but uh so we run it over TCP

113:15

IP now you see the default Port is TCP

113:17

502 so when we're looking at a packet

113:19

capture if we see traffic to or from TCP

113:22

502 or if we do a packet

113:25

scan of a remote system and we see TCP

113:31

502 open more than likely it's modbus

113:35

that we're looking at a version of

113:36

modbus there's again there's many

113:38

different versions of modbus um but uh

113:42

again we're going to focus on one of the

113:44

versions that runs over

113:46

tcpip for me it works just like SNMP

113:49

which we mostly see in the IT world so

113:51

if you're familiar with SNMP or the

113:54

simple Network management protocol the

113:56

idea is it's this client server

113:58

relationship that allows you to remotely

114:01

connect to an asset and pull information

114:04

about it that it stores essentially in a

114:07

little database called a MIB so we see

114:10

these especially the most common example

114:13

is for Network switches so I can connect

114:15

to a network switch remotely and so say

114:18

I'm a network administrator I can

114:20

connect to that network switch and then

114:23

I can go into this database into a

114:25

specific field or entry that I am

114:28

looking for to say oh okay let's say

114:30

this is a 24 Port switch and it can I

114:33

can look in the values for those 24

114:36

ports to see which ports are active I

114:38

can see you know how much data is being

114:42

transmitted uh at that point in time in

114:44

that Port how much is being received on

114:46

that Port uh we can look for are there

114:49

any errors over the last 5 minutes on

114:51

that Port right so on and and so forth

114:54

so SNMP again allows us to store

114:57

information about that asset about that

115:00

system and how it's performing so it's

115:03

very similar in control systems where if

115:07

I connect to a PLC with modbus I can see

115:10

all these different aspects of the

115:13

system

115:14

itself so you might even have a value to

115:17

say let's say that PLC controls ass that

115:20

maybe it's that thermostat we have in in

115:22

at home or in the office and that if I

115:25

look up let's just say the value in the

115:28

first slot just for now we'll use some

115:31

generic terminology if I look at the

115:33

first value and I see a one it means the

115:36

air conditioner is on if I see a zero it

115:38

means the air conditioner is

115:41

off so start thinking about well if I

115:43

can see a zero or one to then know if

115:47

the air conditioning is on or off well

115:50

do I have the ability to manipulate the

115:52

zero and one to be able to churn the air

115:55

conditioner on or off even if I'm not a

116:00

authorized party into being able to

116:04

control that process right and that's

116:07

where the security questions come into

116:09

mind so and we'll talk about some other

116:12

networking tools but this is much more

116:14

for especially when we get into

116:16

penetration testing course you know much

116:18

more dedicated hours into you know how

116:21

do we test security how do we break into

116:23

control system networks but you know

116:25

tools like mmap but we'll see we'll see

116:27

inmap before the the course is over so

116:30

looking at doing some basic Port scans a

116:33

modb CLI is a client utility that you

116:38

can use to bake connections to mod bus

116:41

servers to request pieces of

116:44

information uh scapy is a tool that

116:47

allows you to kind basically create your

116:49

own Network packets and anything you can

116:51

imagine you can put out on the network

116:54

whether it's going to work or not so um

116:57

Metasploit is a automated well more of a

117:01

automated attack framework mostly in the

117:04

IT world but it has some OT

117:07

functionality built into it so but it's

117:10

mostly used to it makes exploiting

117:13

vulnerabilities in it let's just say

117:15

known ex vulnerabilities in the IT world

117:19

very very

117:21

easy or as easy as it can be how about

117:24

that we'll go we'll go with that so and

117:26

we'll talk a little bit more about MPL

117:27

maybe we'll see some examples before the

117:30

the course is over again the main main

117:32

idea is we're going to focus on modbus

117:34

that the version that runs over tcpip

117:37

and that the default port for modbuz is

117:39

TCP 502 so if we ever see activity on

117:42

TCP 52 it's almost always going to be

117:45

modbus not always so don't we're not

117:48

going to always assume it is

117:50

but more than likely we'll we'll think

117:53

it is how about that so um now this is

117:58

where we're starting to talk about how

117:59

modbus is like SNMP where it stores

118:02

information about the asset locally and

118:05

so modbus stores information or data in

118:09

slots or little placeholders called

118:12

coils and registers so if you're

118:14

familiar with how databases are

118:17

structured so we create different fields

118:19

in the database and we have different

118:21

sizes or different amounts of data that

118:23

we can store in these different

118:25

fields and that we can read and write to

118:28

these these fields depending on the

118:30

permissions we have but if you think if

118:32

I'm an engineer that I'm making updates

118:35

to PL PLC programming right I need to to

118:38

have the ability to write if I'm

118:42

upgrading the firmware as a as a tech I

118:45

need the ability to write to the

118:48

system potentially an attacker has the

118:50

abil ability to remotely manipulate

118:53

those values remember we talked about

118:55

just going to the the first value and

118:57

changing a zero to one it turns on the

118:59

air

119:00

conditioner or changing the one to a

119:02

zero which turns off the air

119:05

conditioner you see they are zero based

119:08

so the first one is zero and then the

119:10

second one is one and the third one is

119:12

two and so on and so forth but they talk

119:15

about so when we store information in

119:17

coils and registers So Co oils store

119:20

it's a single a bit right it's 01 right

119:25

so true false on off right you when you

119:28

load that value you either see a z or A1

119:31

so we'll see those in in y

119:34

shark now you can also if you want to

119:36

store larger values like if we go back

119:39

to our thermostat example if I'm storing

119:41

the

119:43

temperature then the temperature let's

119:46

say it's going to be 80 degrees inside

119:48

the room well a little warm for my taste

119:51

but say if it's 80 degrees Fahrenheit

119:54

then I can't store that as a zero or one

119:57

right I need to store store a larger

119:59

value so we need to have a register to

120:02

be able to do

120:08

that and we'll look at some examples now

120:11

there's different modbus function codes

120:13

so there's different commands so you can

120:15

see the first one well read coils

120:17

remember we can have coils and registers

120:20

coil stores just zeros and ones and you

120:24

see all these different variation we're

120:25

not going to get into all of them you

120:27

can see yeah I can read coils I can

120:28

write coils I can read and I can write

120:30

to

120:32

registers we'll again we'll see some of

120:34

these examples and how they look through

120:36

wi shark now bobus and you can see here

120:40

there some troubleshooting or diagnostic

120:42

commands you also see report slave ID

120:45

which shows a a relationship between

120:48

devices you know with with modbus so

120:50

it's based off of a Master Slave

120:53

communication scheme but we're moving

120:55

away from that into uh using the you

120:59

know client server aing convention so

121:02

trying to get away from all the the

121:05

racist connotations so you're just still

121:07

unfortunately still going to see kind of

121:09

Master and slave pop up from from time

121:12

to time because it's you it's going to

121:15

take time to to get rid of

121:17

it um now here's an example um and where

121:22

we look at and these are some great free

121:24

tools and I I love love showing and and

121:28

using free tools so I I don't want

121:30

anybody to ever have to purchase

121:33

anything when going through a class but

121:35

these are examples of different tools

121:38

that you can use to

121:40

simulate

121:42

modbus and so here you know we have the

121:46

the modbus the server simulator right or

121:49

you can see it's really simulating a PLC

121:51

running mod bus and so it's where it's

121:53

storing all this information now you can

121:55

see it's not varying the the data it'll

121:58

change the data it'll rotate it but it's

122:00

still the same value in all these memory

122:03

spaces so it's it's nothing special from

122:07

from that I think you can also play with

122:08

it a little bit more if you really want

122:11

um but even just spinning it up and then

122:14

using the the pulling the client it's

122:16

just a graphical interface the we

122:19

mentioned earlier um it's just command

122:22

line and it's built into like Cali Linux

122:25

if you're familiar with that especially

122:27

from a security testing or penetration

122:30

testing uh perspective right but you can

122:33

see in this case we have the client you

122:35

can see in the lower right hand corner

122:36

of the client it's connected to the

122:38

Local Host in TCP Port

122:41

502 and that it's pulling the data from

122:45

those memory spaces inside the host

122:48

which is what you're seeing right you

122:50

can see the the values in the memory or

122:52

in the database let's say on the on the

122:55

P the the simulated PLC and then we can

122:57

see those values in the the client on

123:00

the right hand side so you can

123:02

definitely check those and play check

123:03

out those and and play with those and

123:06

again there are also other free client

123:08

servers out there there's there's others

123:11

that you can pay uh and they're not too

123:13

expensive to simulate things like plc's

123:16

and and uh mod bus Communications so

123:19

it's just something to to play a little

123:20

bit with and it's also one of those if

123:23

you're especially doing it over the wire

123:25

or at least locally where you can

123:27

capture it with wire shark again it

123:29

allows you to go in those wire shark

123:32

captures and understand a little bit

123:34

better what you're looking at in in W

123:37

shark but again and we'll look at an

123:40

example here right so if we have this

123:43

idea remember that the PLC acts as the

123:47

the server

123:50

right the the modbus server and then we

123:52

have the the modbus client which could

123:54

be like in this case our engineering

123:56

workstation that goes and sends out a

123:58

request to the server to the PLC like oh

124:02

okay what is the value in the first coil

124:06

in your

124:08

database and then yeah it'll it'll give

124:11

us a response as long as we have that

124:12

connection and that permission and it's

124:15

you usually pretty pretty wide

124:17

open

124:19

at least in

124:20

readon uh format maybe not read right

124:24

hopefully not and that's where we get

124:25

into remember our key

124:27

switch so we want to make sure that we

124:30

have all of our PCS in run mode which

124:33

this one is not we can see in the

124:34

picture right because in run mode it's

124:36

in read only so people can't just

124:40

manipulate those values remotely and

124:42

turn a zero to one or a one to a

124:44

zero or maybe we turn the 80° set point

124:48

to to 100° or

124:51

40° so crank the heat up all the way or

124:53

crank the air conditioner up all the

124:56

way so again it access this client

124:59

server where we can issue yeah different

125:02

requests right read write or any of

125:05

those Diagnostics that that we have

125:07

access

125:09

to so

125:11

when we look at this in wire

125:15

shark here's a bit of a sample

125:21

and there's a definitely a lot more to

125:23

it and and we'll come back and we'll

125:25

actually open up bu shark in a second

125:28

but what we're seeing is part of the

125:30

wire shark window where you can see the

125:33

packets we've captured so you can see

125:34

the number of packets right 1 2 3 four 5

125:36

six and this is one of the the ITI Tim

125:39

Yardley packet captures and very short

125:43

Suite to the point very concise gives us

125:46

exactly what we're looking for I can can

125:48

see the in the packet capture I can see

125:51

the source IP address I can see the

125:53

destination IP address so I can see

125:55

there's two hosts talking to each other

125:57

10.0.0 57 and 10.0.0 3 we can see the

126:02

protocol so some of these packets are

126:05

for tcpip this is where we

126:08

have uh this kind of interesting those

126:10

first three packets are actually a

126:14

previous Network session between those

126:16

hosts being torn down right so those

126:19

hosts were talking with each other and

126:21

then they wrapped up and they said okay

126:23

we're done talking that's what you're

126:24

actually seeing in those those those

126:26

first three packets those those should

126:28

have been chopped

126:29

out the next three so packets four five

126:32

and six that's where we're establishing

126:35

a new oh actually sorry no so packets

126:40

one through four that's where those two

126:42

hosts were talking and then they they

126:44

said hey we're okay we're done so

126:47

packets 5 six and seven that's where we

126:49

see the three-way handshake to establish

126:52

communication between two computers or

126:54

assets running

126:55

tcpip so that's where you can see where

126:58

there's the sin syac and a so we don't

127:00

get into it here but that's the

127:02

three-way handshake that we use to

127:04

establish a connection between two

127:06

computers running tcpip and not only are

127:08

we establishing the connection but we

127:11

can see the ports in which they're

127:13

establishing the connection now the

127:16

source port is not necessarily important

127:21

this port of

127:22

2578 it's somewhat randomly chosen what

127:28

is important is the destination Port

127:31

which we can see is 502 remember Port

127:34

502 and tcpa and we see this is TCP

127:38

traffic for TCP 502 is used for mod bus

127:42

so more than likely this is going to be

127:44

mod bus traffic and we see exactly that

127:47

so once that TCP connect connection is

127:49

established then all the other traffic

127:51

going over it is that mod bus over TCP

127:56

traffic and then you can start to see

127:58

well what are they sending oh well we're

128:01

sending queries and then we're getting

128:05

responses so if we're looking at this so

128:08

the source of

128:09

10.0.0 57 is sending a query to

128:15

10.0.0.0 which is means

128:20

10.0.0 3 in this case is our

128:23

PLC and then

128:25

10.0.0 57 it could be an engineering

128:28

workstation it could be another host on

128:29

the network it could be an

128:33

attacker or it could be a technician

128:36

that has

128:38

authorization we don't know that looking

128:40

at the packet right that's additional

128:41

context we would need in the case of an

128:45

investigation but from the packet

128:47

capture itself again we see the first

128:48

four packets really are inconsequential

128:51

these two hosts were talking with each

128:53

other they finished they wrapped it up

128:55

they closed those sessions that's what

128:56

we're actually seeing there packets 567

128:59

that's where we established the TCP

129:01

connection between those two hosts using

129:04

that three-way handshake and then

129:05

everything else is the mod bus traffic

129:08

and then wi shark remember using that

129:10

dissector or the parser it translates

129:12

that information into something that oh

129:15

hey oh well what is it asking for

129:19

right well what type of response did we

129:21

get so we're going to come back and and

129:23

look at

129:26

that now you can also do a filter in

129:29

wire shark to say hey I don't even care

129:31

about the TCP IP traffic like I get I

129:34

get it right the computers you know will

129:36

set up the connection and hey these

129:38

these four packets where the computers

129:40

were talking to each other and they

129:41

closed the connect I don't care I just

129:44

want to see the mod bus traffic I want

129:47

to see what's going on which hosts are

129:49

talking with modbus what types of

129:51

commands are they

129:53

issuing right are they trying to make

129:55

updates right are they just reading

129:57

what's going on that's all I want to

130:00

see so you can do a filter like in this

130:04

case where we just say show mbuzz and

130:07

here's the name of the packet so if

130:08

you're looking in that ITI repository

130:10

you can get the modbuz test dataor part

130:14

one so let's go ahead and open that up

130:17

now

130:21

so let

130:22

me find our friend wi

130:29

shark and we'll install the update later

130:34

like a good cyber security

130:37

professional and then let's find I think

130:41

this is the packet capture right here I

130:43

hope let's let's open it up so you can

130:46

see this is a little bit different where

130:47

we're seeing the entire wire shark

130:50

screen but this is exactly the packet

130:53

capture that we were looking at earlier

130:54

right remember first Flo is the the

130:57

computers that were talking with each

130:58

other but are no longer and then five

131:01

six and seven those are the packets

131:02

where they're establishing a new

131:05

connection to talk and then we start

131:08

issuing essentially

131:10

commands right but the idea is remember

131:12

that wire shark looks at the zeros and

131:15

ones going over the wire captures all of

131:17

them and then displays it in information

131:20

that we can understand remember when we

131:21

talked about the OSI models and we had

131:23

that Header information that's actually

131:25

what's being displayed in the lower

131:27

leftand corner now the right hand corner

131:29

is ideally where they're showing the

131:31

zeros and ones except if we just showed

131:33

zeros and ones a it's meaningless and

131:35

just we don't have enough real estate on

131:38

the screen to be able to display all

131:40

that it means

131:43

nothing but so we convert it to hex so

131:45

it's a little bit more

131:48

manageable but most people don't talk in

131:53

binary or speak or read in binary and

131:55

most don't even speak or talk or read in

131:58

in

132:02

HEX

132:03

but so in that lower leftand corner

132:06

though and this is interesting because

132:08

when you look at that first section this

132:11

is actually all the information related

132:14

to the physical layer level one and then

132:18

as you move up the OSI models well the

132:20

next layer right is level

132:24

two so that's where we see ethernet

132:28

remember that's also where we see the

132:29

media access control so we can see the

132:32

MAC address right the media Access

132:34

Control address of the network cards or

132:37

interfaces that are talking to each

132:40

other we can oh and I should note that

132:45

the first half of that 48 bit address

132:48

right so these are 48 bits addresses in

132:51

HEX the first

132:54

half is actually mapped to the vendor so

132:58

the i e maintains the database so

133:00

anybody that manufactures a network card

133:04

they actually register or they'll

133:07

get a range of addresses assigned to

133:10

them so that's why you can see wire

133:12

shark is saying hey if your Mac address

133:14

starts with 00002 B3 that means the

133:18

manufacturer of that interface card is

133:22

Intel or if your Mac address starts with

133:26

00278 then oh that network interface was

133:30

created by this company called run

133:32

toop so it can help us identify

133:36

different Assets in the environment also

133:38

if I'm an attacker it can help us

133:40

identify different Assets in the

133:43

environment but just keep that in mind

133:45

we'll see some better examples on where

133:46

that can come in handy a little bit

133:48

later but remember each of these maps to

133:51

the different layers of the OSI model so

133:53

remember layer one the physical layer

133:55

Layer Two the physical or the sorry the

133:57

the data link layer where we have the

133:59

Mac sub layer where we see the the the

134:02

Mac addresses which is exactly what we

134:04

see

134:04

here now the network layer remember

134:07

that's where IP works so that's where we

134:08

see things like IP addresses so this is

134:11

where we can see yeah 10.0.0 57 is

134:15

talking with

134:16

10.0.0 do3 you can click into each of

134:19

these and there's even more information

134:21

but I think the highlights are kind of

134:23

what we're seeing here and then remember

134:25

layer four that's the transport layer so

134:27

that's where TCP and UD UDP take place

134:31

and where are the the ports that we

134:33

connect to operate with or or take

134:38

place and then again we can see sure the

134:41

source Port of two 2387 can not as

134:43

meaningful what we're really looking for

134:45

is the destination port and we see TCP

134:48

502 so then we can more than likely

134:51

especially in this scenario it's going

134:52

to be mod Buzz so we know there's a mod

134:55

bu server or mod bu endpoint there right

134:59

so that's what we're seeing in wire

135:01

shark and then again if we want to just

135:03

limit it to mod bus traffic we can put a

135:05

filter in say yeah just show me mod bus

135:08

get rid of all the generic

135:12

tcpip information I I just don't care I

135:15

don't need it's not going to help me

135:18

and that's that's kind of looking at

135:20

wire shark you know just to get it up

135:22

and running now there's some other

135:25

things that we can look at so what

135:26

happens when we start digging into these

135:29

requests and the responses that we're

135:31

we're seeing so we'll look at one of

135:33

these real quickly so we can jump down

135:35

like to packet 51 here now it's

135:38

interesting also because now there's a

135:40

third host in the packet capture because

135:42

now we're also seeing 10.0.0

135:46

n and 10.

135:50

0.0.3 and so we can look to see if we

135:54

expand down here under modbus and modbus

135:59

tcpip right we can actually see that

136:02

okay we know that 10.0.0 n is issuing a

136:06

query for

136:10

recoil so it wants to say okay give us a

136:14

coil I'm going to read the first coil

136:17

which is number

136:21

zero and I'm only going to get a single

136:24

coil so I'm going to

136:26

get then when I do the

136:32

response right we're going to go ahead

136:34

and okay the PLC in this case is going

136:37

to look up to see what is the value in

136:40

that first slot and it's going to send

136:44

that value back and say yeah the value

136:46

it's zero remember a coil can only store

136:48

a zero or a one so we're expecting a Zer

136:51

or a one so we issue the query to say

136:54

okay what's the value in the first coil

136:56

essentially I'm kind

136:58

of shortcutting it but yeah we're just

137:01

saying what's the value in the first

137:03

coil and then the PLC is coming back and

137:05

saying okay the value is zero so okay

137:08

maybe in that case that means the air

137:10

conditioner is

137:12

off so if I can read the coil again this

137:15

is where the attackers get stuck right

137:17

cuz I'm able to see zeros and ones I

137:20

don't know what that what does a zero

137:22

mean for that first slot that first slot

137:25

it might actually be completely

137:27

meaningless we don't know that's where

137:31

oh if I'm an attacker if I have things

137:33

to access like your program files or

137:36

program data or process data or I'm on

137:39

your engineering workstation and I can

137:41

use that information to reverse engineer

137:45

right what's happening in the

137:46

environment right that's that's a

137:52

possibility and then as we go through

137:54

the capture this is where oh we see all

137:56

these recomends but oh now we see

138:00

right again this could be a completely

138:02

legitimate user that's issuing these

138:05

right

138:07

commands but what if it is an attacker

138:10

right how would we know right that's a

138:12

really big question we'll come back and

138:13

talk about in the last part of the

138:16

course right when we get into to network

138:18

security monitoring and when we detect

138:20

anomalies going through the

138:22

investigation process to determine is

138:25

this something bad happening in the

138:30

environment and so in this case we can

138:33

see that they want to go ahead and

138:36

update a value in one of those coils and

138:40

then you can see well what are you going

138:42

to update it to right so I want to

138:45

change that zero to a one or a one to a

138:47

is

138:48

zero that's where we're really kind of

138:50

going through in in this example so we

138:53

kind of walk through these so we'll just

138:54

go and Skip through these oh and you can

138:56

and this is referencing where you don't

138:58

have to pull one register or one coil at

139:00

a time you can actually say hey give me

139:02

the next 10 coils or the next 10

139:05

registers right you don't have to just

139:07

do one at a time which makes it nice

139:09

right

139:11

but um so we go through

139:16

there um oh I'm sorry I thought I

139:18

actually had a different I thought I had

139:20

a different example in here so I'll have

139:22

to come back and and add that into uh uh

139:25

the later part of the the section but so

139:29

that's a real quick highlevel uh look at

139:32

modbus we'll come back in and look at

139:34

some other examples as well if you want

139:36

to really look into some modbus Labs um

139:41

David oh his the last name is escaping

139:44

me but he has a company called fortified

139:47

with a

139:48

pH yd I remember if I remember right and

139:52

he actually has some amazing amazing

139:54

Labs uh where it sets up like um it's

139:57

kind of like where you're watching like

139:58

a power plant and a chemical refinery

140:01

and different environments like through

140:02

a webcam and then you're able to

140:04

manipulate different values on the

140:07

control system as like the plc's to see

140:10

if you can create some type of dangerous

140:12

condition where you can actually watch

140:14

like of like the power plant catch on

140:16

fire right

140:18

or or a chemical refinery start to

140:22

smoke um so it's it simulates right the

140:26

the real world type of uh attacks in a

140:30

in a really cool fashion he mentioned he

140:32

got some money from the Air Force think

140:34

to build them out so really uh really

140:36

awesome work um and you can somebody had

140:39

pointed out when I did this course uh

140:41

live that he made them available at

140:44

least the original versions uh on

140:47

uh GitHub which is very very cool um so

140:51

you can actually just download and and

140:53

Implement in fact actually let's just

140:55

find it uh real quick you can see my

140:58

LinkedIn

140:59

feed but um we'll do

141:02

GitHub I think it's fo4 to five like

141:07

that yeah I think this um I think this

141:11

fortified

141:13

logic yes I think this is so OT security

141:16

with OT logic yeah I think he also has a

141:19

new project for associated with secure

141:22

PLC coding I think he was down at the

141:24

the recent conference in Atlanta talking

141:26

about that um here's uh graphical

141:29

realism framework for industrial control

141:32

I

141:33

don't okay yeah so it looks like and

141:36

these are the the simulations yeah so

141:38

you can see where you can set up like a

141:40

a software based version of a PLC and

141:42

HMI there firewall and so on you can

141:45

also purchase

141:48

access to his online labs and they're

141:50

updated um um and I think you get access

141:53

for like 6 months I took his class that

141:55

he taught at besides Augusta and so you

141:58

get like six months of of access so it's

142:00

very cool stuff um I said I was really

142:03

impressed um with the the labs David

142:06

forby that's that's that's his name Kim

142:10

um so yeah really nice guy um I think he

142:13

had got into this and when he was doing

142:14

his PhD work um and has really just you

142:18

know taken off and run with it um since

142:21

so so definitely check those out if you

142:23

have the time and and the want and I'll

142:26

probably be doing some demos of that um

142:28

down the road uh sometime but but not

142:31

probably as part of this this course but

142:34

definitely check check that

142:38

out so I'm going to pull myself back a

142:41

little bit before I go too far off the

142:44

rails and we we can talk about some of

142:48

the other industrial control protocols

142:50

we'll we'll we'll be definitely

142:52

referencing some of these additional

142:53

ones as we go throughout the course uh

142:56

even some that that aren't aren't

142:58

actually listed in this section like

142:59

back Nets not here back Nets used in

143:01

building automation systems so that's

143:04

one probably that it's going to be more

143:07

common for people especially even it to

143:09

come across but so S7 is a proprietary

143:14

protocol from semens so if you have

143:16

semens in your environment it can be

143:18

talking S7 just like with modbus it can

143:22

run on its own but more than likely

143:24

you're going to see it running over

143:25

tcpip these

143:28

days uh very similar to modbus it you

143:31

know allows you to read values write

143:32

values issue commands for things like

143:35

troubleshooting so this is what it looks

143:37

like from The Wire shark perspective now

143:40

the one kicker with this example when I

143:42

started looking at them the first thing

143:45

that jumped out is the IP address

143:47

addresses because if you look at the IP

143:48

addresses these are public IP addresses

143:51

these are host on the

143:53

internet right these are not internal IP

143:57

addresses they're not private IP

143:59

addresses so this would as you imagine

144:02

would indicate this is traffic over the

144:05

Internet which

144:07

that's more than likely right now you

144:09

can actually use public IP addresses

144:11

internally and still have it private but

144:14

on the surface this would look like two

144:16

host communicator over the Internet

144:17

which we never want our OT assets

144:20

exposed to the internet not directly

144:22

because that's going to leave them open

144:25

and vulnerable to attack right uh but

144:28

this is what it looks like through wire

144:29

shark so it's very similar in this case

144:31

you can see um it's not reading writing

144:33

functions it's it's oh okay I want tell

144:35

me what the the time is on that PLC and

144:40

then you can see the next set if we kind

144:42

of go back get rid of the arrows right

144:44

it's not only read the clock but oh set

144:47

the clock so what if maybe an attacker

144:49

could change the value of the clock or

144:52

the time or the date right that's that's

144:55

that can literally be potentially

144:57

dangerous in an OT network if not if

145:00

anything it's just going to potentially

145:02

break your process

145:05

so and then there you can see um wire

145:08

shark right deciphering with the diss

145:11

sector the the information for S7 I

145:14

mentioned OPC this is the one that's

145:16

based off of the object linking in but I

145:18

I still can't say this without laughing

145:20

because it's like oh my gosh you did

145:21

what um I I still can't believe this to

145:25

today it's still kind of funny now the

145:27

newer version of opcua is a modern

145:31

open-source

145:33

protocol um uses kind client client

145:35

server model there's also a publish

145:37

subscribe um there's other protocols

145:40

that support so you can see TCP UDP

145:43

we're also going to come back and talk

145:44

about

145:45

mqtt um not really the gathers and not

145:47

in this course but we will talk about

145:49

mqtt as a messaging protocol as well you

145:53

can see it actually has security

145:54

features where with the original version

145:57

of OPC there were no security features I

146:00

think the one key between OPC and OPC

146:02

UPA they're completely different

146:04

protocols though there's no connection

146:07

other than they come from oh I don't

146:10

have the picture anymore the OPC uh

146:12

Foundation folks so um and then again

146:15

there's there's a lot other's that we're

146:17

going to talk about so I mentioned

146:18

backnet uh we'll we again we'll talk

146:20

about backnet a little bit we'll talk

146:22

about dmp3 a little bit um we'll talk a

146:25

little bit about PC Works Omron Cod

146:28

CODIS will definitely be talking about

146:31

um

146:32

and um there's a lot more to the the

146:36

CODIS conversation there where it's more

146:39

than just this idea of a protocol but so

146:42

those are definitely some we'll talk

146:43

about the list goes on and on we'll even

146:45

talk about more when we get into The

146:47

Showdown section so it should be unit 7

146:50

or part seven when we get down there um

146:52

so we'll see some more there but and

146:55

then there's also again the wireless

146:57

protocols so we'll come back and and see

147:00

some examples later on in the course

147:02

about different wireless communication

147:04

remember Wireless can be anything in the

147:06

IT world when we say Wireless we're just

147:08

usually talking about 80211 maybe

147:11

Bluetooth maybe like NE nearfield

147:14

communication for like badge readers uh

147:17

to open up doors but in the OT world we

147:22

can have lots of different types of

147:23

wireless communication RF like radio

147:26

radio frequency zigg be and wireless

147:28

heart those are some of the ones that

147:30

I'm more familiar with CU I see those

147:33

more in environments but you Al you also

147:35

see 80211 everywhere in in control

147:39

system environments which because it's

147:41

very dangerous because WiFi inherently

147:44

is not not safe it's not secure and it's

147:48

it's hard to secure especially in OT

147:51

environments and so we're leaving these

147:54

environments open to to attack but we'll

147:56

come back and and we'll talk about that

147:59

uh hardening especially when we get into

148:01

things like secure network

148:03

architecture and a little bit later on

148:05

and yeah how what what are we doing with

148:08

with wireless protocols and and how

148:10

we're going to secure

148:12

those so we kind of ran through a lot

148:15

there I know that's a lot of of

148:16

information but we talked about

148:18

different types of control systems and

148:20

then we got into different control

148:21

protocols and the main one we're focused

148:23

on is mod bus over tcpip because that's

148:27

the one we're going to see everywhere I

148:28

think it's it's also makes some for some

148:31

fairly straightforward examples but

148:34

again we'll come back and and we'll talk

148:36

through some more of those examples we

148:38

didn't get too far in the weeds I think

148:40

we just wanted to kind of hit it at a

148:42

high level and then we'll come back and

148:44

start digging it a little little a

148:46

little bit deeper so and that's that's

148:49

the end of this part so and we'll uh

148:52

come back in the next section is where

148:54

we really start to talk about okay how

148:56

do we secure our networks and this is

148:59

where I also like because we're also

149:00

talking about well how do we secure them

149:02

well well what are we securing them from

149:06

right so what are the different types of

149:07

attacks so that's that's what we're

149:10

going to going to be able to

149:14

see so I think yeah with that that's

149:17

that's the part so thanks again for

149:19

watching if you liked it if you can like

149:21

it on YouTube and if you haven't already

149:22

subscribed I appreciate it if you do uh

149:25

otherwise then I will see you in part

149:27

four thanks again for checking it

149:29

out

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