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Why: Fatal Cirrus Crash - Brett James N218VB [Parachute System]

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0:00

We have an update to breaking news out

0:01

of Eastern North Carolina tonight where

0:03

we now know an award-winning songwriter

0:05

was on board that small plane that

0:07

crashed. The National Songwriters Hall

0:09

of Fame just put out this post sharing

0:12

condolences for Brett James. Brett James

0:15

wrote several songs including Carrie

0:17

Underwood's Jesus Take the Wheel and

0:18

Kenny Chesny's When the Sun Goes Down.

0:21

>> Jeez, man. Look at this. A Cirrus SR22

0:26

Turbo. the same exact paint scheme, mind

0:30

you, as what I got my pilot's license

0:33

in. And in this segment, we're going to

0:34

cover exactly what I think went wrong.

0:38

Keep in mind, there is a level of us

0:40

looking at the data and then having to

0:42

make assumptions at this point because

0:43

this is just within 24 hours of another

0:46

terrible loss of life in aviation. It's

0:48

a sad day for the aviation community

0:50

when anybody dies. Remember the odds of

0:54

dying in an aircraft uh on an annual

0:56

basis are a fraction of that of

0:58

vehicles. We have maybe 400 deaths per

1:00

year in aviation compared to over 40,000

1:03

in driving vehicles. By the way, look at

1:06

this same exact color aircraft. This is

1:10

a Cirrus SR22 in this photo. This was

1:12

the day that I passed my pilot license

1:14

test uh last year and uh you know since

1:18

then went on to get instrument rated,

1:20

get multi-engine rated and get uh pilot

1:23

in command single pilot operator

1:26

certified in a Phenom 300 jet aircraft,

1:28

multi-engine jet aircraft. This uh photo

1:32

right here though really hits home

1:34

because that crash scene we just saw is

1:36

is basically what I trained in. I

1:38

trained in the SR22 and the SR22 Turbo.

1:42

So, I did train in both versions. And

1:44

the photo here is the uh 22. Uh the

1:47

difference at lower altitude, not that

1:49

big of a deal. We're talking about a

1:50

difference of maybe 5 knots on on, you

1:52

know, my rotation speed. But beyond

1:54

that, very very common questions that

1:56

come up with these Cirrus related

1:58

accidents is Kevin, these Cirrus related

2:01

these Cirrus aircraft are known for

2:04

their CAPS parachute system. That's the

2:06

Cirrus airframe parachute system, CAPS.

2:09

And what's really important to know

2:10

about the Cirrus airframe parachute

2:12

system, where yes, these aircraft do

2:14

have a parachute, is that they do not

2:16

deploy automatically. Uh, a lot of

2:18

people think that they do, uh, but they

2:20

actually need to be uh pulled with a

2:23

substantial amount of force to get them

2:26

to to actually function. So, uh, you

2:29

could see, let's see here, uh, somewhat

2:32

what some of these systems looks like

2:34

look like. Here you go. Here's some

2:36

diagrams of what these parachutes look

2:38

like. And uh these aircraft are rated to

2:41

deploy the parachute at minimum at 600

2:45

ft above the ground. Uh and Cirrus

2:49

trains that you should use the parachute

2:52

at 2,000 ft above the ground, which

2:56

means in very critical phases of flight,

2:58

the parachute system is actually not

3:01

going to help you. So, not only is it

3:03

hard and heavy to pull down, but you're

3:05

generally only going to utilize this if

3:07

you had an issue above or outside of

3:10

your takeoff or landing uh sort of phase

3:13

of flight. Uh at 600 ft when we take

3:16

off, we usually say caps available. So,

3:19

technically at the the end of sort of

3:21

our takeoff, we could utilize this if we

3:24

needed to. But most of your fatal phases

3:27

of flight are going to occur in the

3:29

final moments of your approach to land

3:32

or right when you're taking off and

3:34

you're going to rotate and you have some

3:35

form of a sudden engine failure right at

3:38

the worst phase of flight. And again,

3:40

those are the phases where unfortunately

3:42

the parachute system is just not going

3:44

to help you. So when we take a look at

3:45

this aircraft, we have November 218

3:48

Victor Bravo. This aircraft took off at

3:51

12:41 central time and went to land uh

3:55

about uh a little over 1 hour later in

3:57

the Eastern time zone. So, it looks like

3:59

2 hours later, but that's because we

4:00

switched time zones here. And we uh

4:02

traveled from uh Nashville to North

4:05

Carolina.

4:06

Uh and uh what we'll do is we going to

4:10

grab the weather yesterday for because

4:12

the takeoff weather in Nashville was

4:15

fine. The weather yesterday we had calm

4:18

winds. We had weather between 88 to 91

4:22

degrees. Nothing unusual and relatively

4:24

clear skies. That was yesterday. And if

4:28

we look at the weather yesterday for

4:31

North Carolina, it's actually a little

4:33

bit cooler. So, we have less of a

4:35

potential density altitude issue here.

4:38

East Franklin yesterday, we had winds of

4:40

about five knots. Nothing unusual. We

4:43

did have some scattered clouds, but it

4:46

seemed like it was uh mostly sunny here.

4:49

And uh we had a temperatures uh at a

4:52

high of about 81 in the afternoon

4:55

yesterday. Uh so it didn't look like we

4:57

were in any kind of IFR, IMC conditions,

5:01

any kind of major weather. It looked

5:02

like this was a relatively clear day. No

5:05

major winds, no major crosswind factors

5:07

here to consider, at least from what we

5:09

can tell. And so when we look at the

5:11

flight path here, what we find thanks to

5:14

flightaware uh is initially, you know,

5:16

we look at this and we wonder, okay, you

5:19

know, we have a pretty uneventful

5:20

flight. We have our departure, we have

5:22

our turn, and we fly what appears to be

5:25

a mostly autopilot flight. This aircraft

5:27

would have been equipped with autopilot.

5:29

And so pretty basic flight. Then what we

5:32

have here is what appears to be a uh

5:35

360. Now, a 360 before coming into land

5:39

would be very common when uh you need to

5:43

get lower because maybe you were a

5:45

little high. So, you wanted to get lower

5:48

a little bit more rapidly in your

5:49

descent. So, we could see this here. The

5:52

aircraft right here was at about 6,800

5:56

ft in the f in in the base turn to the

6:00

airfield. The airfield is about 2,000 ft

6:03

off the ground. I believe it was 275 is

6:05

the airfield elevation. So we are 4,800

6:11

ft above the airfield when we're turning

6:14

base. That's not possible to land. Uh I

6:18

mean like even in an emergency descent,

6:21

we're probably going to have to pull a

6:22

360 here. So that's what we find. We

6:24

find that the aircraft does a 360 here

6:27

while descending uh and slowing down.

6:30

During this descent, we're going about

6:32

130 140. This is pretty fast uh for for

6:36

an approach to land. So, we don't we

6:37

don't want to be going this fast. Uh so,

6:39

we do a 360 to slow down and get a lot

6:42

lower. By the time we finish our first

6:44

360, we're about 1,500 ft above the

6:48

ground. Still a good height above the

6:50

ground. And then we get to the airfield

6:54

at 3,000 ft.

6:56

We're at the airfield crossing the

6:59

threshold at 2900 ft. We are now 900 ft

7:04

above the ground and we're supposed to

7:07

be touching down.

7:10

So, not surprisingly, the aircraft goes

7:13

around. We're going to go mist on this

7:15

and we're going to take off again. This

7:17

is actually very safe in aviation. I

7:19

want you to know goarounds are safe in

7:23

aviation. There's nothing wrong with

7:25

goarounds. Uh, I'm a big fan uh of doing

7:29

go-arounds because we like to say in

7:31

aviation that goarounds are free. As a

7:34

licensed pilot, I would much rather any

7:37

day be in the back of a Boeing 737 or

7:40

whatever and the pilot go around because

7:43

I I would my first impression would be

7:45

they are doing something that is a safe

7:49

move to make. I much prefer a goound

7:52

than try to force a landing by by

7:54

pushing this down. So, I actually think

7:55

in this case, Brett probably made I

7:57

mean, he had to make this decision. I

7:58

believe I think he was way too high, but

8:00

this is a smart decision. Let's do the

8:02

right thing. Let's take Let's try it

8:04

again. We're way too high. We didn't get

8:06

down fast enough. No problem. Some of

8:09

this in a part 91 flight, really any

8:12

flight, is a little bit of a red flag,

8:14

though, because it does send us a signal

8:15

that maybe they just weren't ahead of

8:18

the aircraft here. Maybe they got

8:19

distracted while the plane was on

8:21

autopilot and they really didn't plan

8:23

out this descent properly to where they

8:25

didn't start descending early enough and

8:27

their bottom of the descent was just way

8:29

too high to align with being able to

8:31

land at this airfield. Unfortunately,

8:34

that is an early red flag of a lack of

8:37

planning by the pilot. It looks like

8:40

this was uh based on the FAA report a

8:42

one crew aircraft. Uh we know that these

8:45

Cirrus planes can be flown single pilot.

8:47

They're not two pilot aircraft. Uh but

8:49

it says here total crew one and two

8:51

passengers and we believe that Brett was

8:54

flying though we're not certain. Uh this

8:56

does indicate aircraft crashed under

8:58

unknown circumstances in wooded area in

9:01

Franklin, North Carolina. Part 91

9:03

operation on the approach phase of

9:06

flight. Okay. So what do we know about

9:11

uh these how should I phrase phrase it?

9:13

Uh, what else do we know about this

9:17

flight and we we saw this goaround

9:20

happen? What happened after the

9:22

goaround? Well, let me show you first

9:24

what a go-around typically looks like

9:26

and why it's important to practice them.

9:29

So, here's an example of a goaround. And

9:32

this is in uh in a jet aircraft. And you

9:35

can see we're in IMC here. There's a

9:37

this there's a lot going on. We are

9:39

doing this for training purposes. And

9:42

when you're in these conditions, you

9:43

really want to plan ahead. Now, we know

9:45

we're going to go around, but it's a

9:47

practice thing. You regularly have to

9:49

practice this. Otherwise, it's very

9:51

common for you to forget your go-around

9:53

procedures. You potentially leave your

9:55

flaps in. Potentially, you forget to go

9:57

full power on your goound. Uh sometimes

9:59

people will push the throttle forward

10:02

halfheartedly. You don't get enough

10:04

power to that engine and on your

10:06

goaround you end up stalling the

10:07

aircraft out. that becomes really really

10:10

important in what you're about to see of

10:12

the flight path of this Cirrus aircraft.

10:15

Now, this is an example here of going

10:17

through uh IMC into the Santa Barbara

10:21

airport. Uh and we're just listening for

10:23

the go

10:23

>> approach. Unstable approach.

10:26

>> Yeah,

10:29

just a little fast. Fine. All right. Go

10:32

miss. Yep.

10:34

>> Full power to set up.

10:37

>> All right. And then we get our takeoff

10:39

and we go take off again. We go flying

10:41

again. All right. So then there are a

10:42

lot of procedures that we're going to go

10:44

through. Obviously, we got to get the

10:45

flaps up. In our case, we got to get the

10:46

gear up. Uh you know, so full power

10:49

flaps up, gear up. Like there's

10:50

obviously a lot that we have to do.

10:51

Fine. In the Cirrus, you're not going to

10:54

put a gear up. Uh not in this Cirrus. So

10:57

why does this matter? Well, it matters

10:59

because it's very common to be licensed

11:02

but not actually current or how should I

11:05

say it? Like you could be legally

11:06

current but not proficient in doing

11:08

goarounds. Not a lot of people are going

11:10

to go out and purposefully go practice

11:12

their go-arounds. Here is actually a

11:15

Cirrus aircraft. This is the SR22. I

11:18

don't think this is the Turbo. And this

11:20

is me landing that same aircraft almost

11:23

that you see in the uh uh the crash

11:25

footage or uh crash photo. This is me

11:28

landing the Cirrus in Santa Paula, which

11:30

is a very very small airport. And what I

11:33

want you to think of is on their first

11:34

approach here, they went into this

11:36

airport 900 ft high.

11:46

As you can see, we're there's the there

11:48

are the numbers. You could tell in this

11:50

Cirrus I'm like 50 ft above the ground.

11:53

I'm not high at all. I'm not 900 ft

11:55

high. Right.

12:01

There it is. There's our land into uh

12:05

Santa Paula.

12:07

>> The sound of those tires hitting reminds

12:08

me so much of Microsoft Flight

12:10

Simulator. But u that's a Cirrus. So

12:13

you've now seen a few different angles

12:15

of of what these aircraft look like when

12:17

it comes to land. So why do I show this

12:19

and why do I bring this up? I bring this

12:22

up because when we go back to what

12:25

happened here, look what happens next.

12:29

We get them going around again. Okay, so

12:32

well this is the first go around. Uh

12:33

they did their 360, they do their first

12:35

go around. Uh this is our uh we are on

12:39

the upwind phase of flight here. You can

12:42

see them actually turn a little bit like

12:44

this could just be the way the map is

12:46

set, but it looks like they're veering

12:48

to the right a little bit, which

12:50

somebody in the chat in the live stream

12:51

chat mentioned, did they put enough

12:53

right rudder in? And honestly, I didn't

12:55

notice this the first time, but you're

12:56

right. Look at this. They veer to the

12:58

right here, which is very weird before

13:00

turning left. That could be a data

13:01

anomal anomaly. But anyway, this is also

13:04

a very funky turnout. like there's

13:08

there's really no good crosswind here.

13:11

This is sort of a Uturn out to the left

13:14

which somewhat suggests that maybe the

13:15

pattern work wasn't exactly the best

13:17

over here. So not not the best if the

13:21

data is correct. Uh and then what we

13:24

find is they come in for a much closer

13:27

approach this time. Now the reason the

13:30

closeness of an approach matters is

13:32

because the mo one one of your I would

13:36

say probably the most dangerous portion

13:38

of flying is your approach to land.

13:42

>> Now my favorite way to land an aircraft

13:45

is straight. You want to fly straight

13:50

into the airport. It is the easiest all

13:53

of them. You're good. You're good.

13:54

>> It is the easiest way to land. And this

13:57

is going into Hebrew, for example, and

13:59

you want the straight in. But what's

14:02

dangerous is when you're making these

14:04

turns,

14:06

uh, to actually make that turn to final,

14:08

which you'll see here.

14:09

>> Out all the way.

14:10

>> Oh, yeah. It's so out.

14:11

>> This is

14:12

>> so a little fast, but um, glide path is

14:14

starting to come in here.

14:15

>> Sink rate.

14:17

>> Pull up.

14:20

Go around. Wind shear ahead. Unstable

14:22

approach.

14:23

>> So, the lady's really pissed. you know,

14:26

the automated voice of the computer.

14:27

It's fine. Smooth landing and

14:29

everything, right? But this is this is

14:31

tight. In Utah, you're dodging mountains

14:35

to turn into this Hebrew airport. It's a

14:37

very dangerous airport to fly into. It's

14:40

a very hard uh and unforgiving airport.

14:42

And it's a tiny, very narrow runway to

14:44

come into that turn into that final

14:48

approach segment, the straight portion.

14:50

Very dangerous. Very common to people

14:53

for people to stall out over there.

14:54

extremely common, but it doesn't look

14:58

like that was the issue that happened

15:00

here. And the reason I say that is we

15:03

end up looking at the data and we could

15:06

see this aircraft

15:08

uh doesn't actually crash until much

15:11

later uh off off I mean the data ends

15:13

here, but it looks to me like they were

15:16

right back over the threshold again and

15:19

they were able to get above the runway

15:21

again. And the reason I find this

15:24

interesting is because when we look at

15:25

the track logs, we can see right here

15:27

they got to within about 25 ft of the

15:30

airport elevation, which we can't see

15:32

very well on the map. And then their

15:34

vertical speed goes positive. So they're

15:36

coming in to land at about 103, which is

15:39

a little fast. Little fast for the

15:41

Cirrus. You know, I would have liked to

15:42

have been a little bit slower. Uh but

15:44

that's okay. Like I can land fast. Slow

15:48

is not my friend, but I can land fast.

15:50

you know, we have to land fast if we

15:52

have a hydraulic issue or, you know,

15:53

we're doing a no- flap landing or

15:55

whatever. But look what happened here.

15:58

The aircraft then went for another go

16:00

around about 25 ft above the ground. And

16:03

you could see the vertical speed go

16:05

positive to 265 ft uh per minute and

16:09

then 600 ft per minute. And you could

16:12

see the aircraft's speed drop from 79,

16:17

which is already mega slow, to 72. And

16:21

then the data ends.

16:23

Now, here's my opinion of what happened.

16:28

I don't think this was a base to final

16:30

stall. I think this was another goound.

16:35

A little fast, didn't feel comfortable.

16:38

The second time you're already a little

16:40

pissed, right? Like you were late to

16:43

come down, so you're pissed. You have to

16:45

do the 360. You had to go around for the

16:48

first time. You're like, "Uh, I don't

16:50

want to go around again." Like, you're

16:51

already like frazzled, right? You've got

16:54

two passengers in the back who might not

16:55

be uh uh pilots, so they don't know.

16:59

They're like, "Come on, man. Like, get

17:00

us on the ground." So, you have all

17:02

these external pressures.

17:04

And then what happens is

17:08

you start losing

17:10

sight of all of the elements and your

17:13

training of what goes into actually

17:15

performing a proper go around. Are you

17:18

putting the flaps up? Are you going full

17:20

throttle? Do you have the rudder in

17:22

correctly? Are you doing everything you

17:24

should be doing on that go around while

17:26

at the same time communicating to

17:28

traffic like, "Hey, uh, I'm going around

17:31

again, whatever." Right? These things

17:34

are important. Uh so uh what happens uh

17:41

when

17:44

you go around and you don't put enough

17:48

power in or you pull back too much and

17:51

you're potentially heavy. We know that

17:54

this aircraft had two passengers in the

17:56

back which makes you back heavy. I have

17:58

had a Cirrus that I've manually had to

18:01

drain fuel from because these suckers

18:03

don't have a lot of payload. So, I had

18:06

two passengers in the back, myself and a

18:08

co-pilot, and we had to drain fuel

18:12

because the computer said we wouldn't

18:13

even be allowed to take off because we

18:14

were too heavy. These planes are very,

18:17

very quick to fill up. That's with no

18:18

baggage, mind you, which is crazy. Now,

18:20

this aircraft had been flying for about

18:22

an hour, so we don't think that we were

18:24

full fuel, but we definitely had

18:25

passengers in the back, which is going

18:27

to make us tail heavy, which makes it

18:28

more likely for us to pull up too much

18:31

on that goound again. So, I think what

18:34

happened here, and this is my

18:35

speculation, so I want to be clear about

18:36

that, but I believe that what happened

18:38

in this accident is this aircraft came

18:40

into land. We're coming into land, we're

18:44

coming to do our flare, and we don't

18:47

feel good. We're going too fast. Okay,

18:50

we're gonna go around. We go full power.

18:53

It's, you know, a modestly warm day.

18:56

It's not a cold day, so our performance

18:57

is a little lower, maybe humid. We've

19:00

got passengers in the back, so it makes

19:02

us a little tail heavy. We're going to

19:04

be a little less performative, but not

19:06

dramatically. I don't think weather was

19:07

a huge factor here. and we go to pull up

19:10

and we get that 200 ft of climb and for

19:14

whatever reason we get maybe impatience

19:17

or what we won't know until the

19:18

investigation is done. we we don't want,

19:20

you know, maybe stress, maybe anxiety,

19:22

maybe he's on the radio, you know,

19:24

going, "Hey, I'm going around again."

19:26

And just doesn't realize he's pulling

19:28

back on that stick a little too much.

19:30

And that aircraft goes nose up a little

19:33

too much.

19:36

Once you hit stall speed,

19:39

there's really no recovering

19:42

when you get into a full stall. It's

19:45

entirely possible that very rapidly he's

19:48

on the radio queuing up. Hey, I'm going

19:50

around again. He's pulling that stick

19:52

back. Before he knows it, he's getting

19:54

the pings, the stick shakers activating.

19:57

Oh, we're stalling. Oh my gosh, what's

19:59

happening? Aircraft goes to stall. It's

20:02

done. There's no recovering that low. If

20:05

you stall at 200 feet above the ground,

20:08

there's no parachute system that's going

20:09

to save you. There's no amount of

20:12

training that can save you. it's over.

20:14

You stalled it. You crash.

20:17

And my guess is this was a go-around

20:20

gone wrong. And it's terrible. Uh but it

20:23

shows us how important it is to

20:26

constantly train uh in aviation uh all

20:30

of our emergency procedures, especially

20:32

gorounds, which should be a very normal

20:35

thing to practice, but very, very few

20:37

people say, "Hey, this weekend I'm not

20:39

doing anything. What am I going to do?"

20:40

"Oh, I'm going to go brush up on my

20:41

go-arounds." like I showed you with that

20:43

Santa Barbara approach. Why? Most people

20:46

aren't going to do it once they're

20:47

licensed. I'm not saying that's for sure

20:49

what happened here. We got to be

20:50

respectful obviously of all the

20:51

circumstances around it. So yes, this is

20:53

there's some speculation in this, but in

20:55

case you're wondering what my take is on

20:57

what potentially happened here based on

20:59

the data we see, I think this was a

21:02

stall on a failed goaround on a tail

21:05

heavy aircraft that is not really good

21:07

at handling uh a lot of weight.

21:09

>> Knows about this. We'll we'll try a

21:10

little advertising and see how it goes.

21:12

>> Congratulations, man. You have done so

21:14

much. People love you. People look up to

21:15

you.

21:16

>> Kevin Praath there, financial analyst

21:18

and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great

21:19

to get your take.

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