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The PERFECT Cold Hardware Wallet - Explained

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what's the best place to store the seed

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phrase to your crypto so that nobody

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including hackers nation states or even

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some artificial intelligence created

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malware would not be able to access it

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welcome to whiteboard crypto the number

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one YouTube channel for crypto education

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and here we explain topics of the

0:17

cryptocurrency world using analogies

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stories and examples so that anyone can

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easily understand them in this video

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we're going to be sharing with you the

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perfect cold wallet but first we need to

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explain how signing an actual crypto

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transaction Works in general a crypto

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transaction has many features but for

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this video we're going to say that

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signing a transaction requires two

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inputs and one output the first input is

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the private key now this is the key that

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is actually used to sign transactions to

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verify that you are the owner or the

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spender of your crypto number two is a

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partially signed transaction now this is

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kind of like a blank check but it

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already has the amount that you want to

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spend on it the date that you're

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spending it and who you're spending it

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to written onto that transaction

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generally this is computed by software

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that you use so you never actually see

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this thing to use an example let's say

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that Bob wants to spend 25 coins today

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there are only two things needed to

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create a verified crypto transaction and

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thus for Bob to spend his 25 coins when

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you use your private key to sign the

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partially signed transaction it then

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becomes a fully signed transaction that

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is now valid now this transaction isn't

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immediately processed it must first be

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broadcasted to a pool of other

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transactions for miners or validators to

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be able to add to the respective

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blockchain for example if it's an

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ethereum transaction it then goes to the

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ethereum memory pool which will then

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eventually get added to the ethereum

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blockchain now the cool thing about

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these fully signed transactions is that

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other people can check the signed

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transaction and see that Bob is actually

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the one signing the transaction based on

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the signature they can also check that

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he does have 50 coins to spend and in

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this particular transaction he's only

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spending 25 and because of that we know

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that transaction is valid if the

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transaction is valid and also if Bob's

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transaction is next in line it's

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successfully added to the blockchain and

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distributed all the way around the world

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now for the rest of this video I have to

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explain a Nuance you see when Bob signs

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his transaction he doesn't just sign it

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Bob because then anyone else could just

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copy his signature and spend his money

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instead what he does is

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cryptographically and mathematically use

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his private key to look at the

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transaction details to make a unique

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signature that only works on this

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transaction if Bob had spent 26 coins

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instead the signature would be totally

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different also if he wanted to spend the

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money to another account the signature

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would also be totally different and not

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just like a little different the entire

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signature would be different it's a

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little complex but we can use math to

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make sure that only Bob had the ability

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to sign this way and he signed it in a

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way where he used his private key but he

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never revealed his private key that way

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we're not able to sign like him until

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recently many of us believed that the

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device named Ledger Nano X worked like

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this where it stored your private key in

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an encrypted Hardware box that was

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accessible whenever you push the right

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buttons when you did we assumed that

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encrypted box would only accept

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partially signed transactions and upon

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approval and pushing a couple buttons

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could only sign them it's recently been

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brought to light that this Hardware can

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do much more than that it can use your

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private key to actually create

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instructions to recreate your private

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key outside of the box this has made a

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lot of Ledger customers upset because

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they didn't believe that the device they

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originally purchased could even do that

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and if they did know that they wouldn't

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have purchased it in reality The Ledger

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device could have always done this

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essentially extracting the private key

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out of the encrypted Hardware even if

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it's in a couple parts this video isn't

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about that but this video was prompted

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by the mass Exodus of U users leaving

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their Ledger device with this glaring

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vulnerability well it is sad to say that

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we should have actually never trusted

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Ledger with their closed Source software

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as a crypto user anytime we hear closed

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Source software we may as well think

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back a door that steals your money

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because if we can't check what the code

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actually does it may as well just be the

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worst case scenario open source software

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on the other hand means that we can look

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at the code and ensure that the device

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isn't doing anything malicious and if it

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is us or other developers reading the

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code could sound the alarms due to this

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many Ledger customers are wondering well

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what should I do with the millions of

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dollar I mean satoshi's on my ledger

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right now and that's brought us to the

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thought experiment of the perfect cold

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wallet I present to you security as a

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spectrum insecurity there is no black or

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white there's no yes and no there exists

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no Perfect Situation there is always a

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vulnerability and because of that we

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have to think of security as a spectrum

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with the best case and maybe a worst

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case with many possibilities in between

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so let's start at one end of this

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spectrum being the best case scenario so

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world-class security means never having

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to trust any hardware or trust any

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software at all in this perfect world

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you have a photographic memory and you

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can do some amazing math in your head

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using both of these skills you use your

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seed phrase which you've created in your

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head to create your private key and then

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you use that to sign a partially signed

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transaction all in your head that's a

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lot of math usually we have software do

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this but at least this way no sensitive

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information ever leaves your brain

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obviously this is near impossible for

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even world-class savants and it's

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definitely impossible to assume that

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even ten percent of the population can

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do this so even though we're saying this

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is the best outcome we know it's

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improbable we say that there's no

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perfect solution because even with

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enough time and knowledge of how our

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human brains work we may one day be able

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to extract these memorized words even if

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the participant is unwilling or if the

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brain has been frozen for decades so

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moving further down the Spectrum we have

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the second best situation this is when

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you memorize your seed phrase but you

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use a one-time use device where you

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basically input your seed phrase in and

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you input a partially signed transaction

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in and then this device will do the

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computation for you to come up with a

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signed transaction now of course you

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would want the device to be open source

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meaning that you could actually verify

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there's no malicious code and you would

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want it to be air gapped meaning that it

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had no Wi-Fi or Bluetooth capabilities

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even on the hardware level not just

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disabled with software it basically

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means physically it's not even possible

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to transmit signals to the outside

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anyways when you're done performing your

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single transaction you would then want

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to take this device and shoot it with a

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gun or incinerate it with 4000 degree

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thermite or maybe both now you might be

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wondering why would I need a one-time

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use device well what if that device has

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been compromised to have a hardware

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component inside of it which stores any

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data that looks like a private Key Well

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if it does if you use that device once

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and then you save it for later a thief

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could break into your house steal that

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device and then use the hardware to

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extract those saved private keys from

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the malicious Hardware piece moving on

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our next best solution is very similar

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to the last one but if you're like me

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and can't fully remember the 24 words in

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your seed phrase the next best solution

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is to encrypt them and then inscribe

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that encrypted version onto a QR code

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now your transactions are protected with

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something that you have your QR code

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along with something that you know a

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passphrase to decrypt the QR code into a

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usable seed phrase let's say that you

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have a device that can take a picture of

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the encrypted QR code then you enter

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your passphrase into the device which

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then decrypts the QR code into a seed

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phrase enter your partially signed

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transaction and boom you now have a

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fully signed transaction that you can

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submit and broadcast to the network even

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still this Hardware may have a malicious

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piece that captures your unencrypted

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private key so you may as well shoot and

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burn it too right next up we have a

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device that's like the previous one

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except you simply don't burn it you

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still have to trust that the device

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doesn't have a back door which is

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looking at your inserted private keys

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and hopefully not storing them somewhere

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that an attacker could steal if they got

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a hold of your physical device but it's

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still better than storing your private

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keys on your computer that's connected

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to the internet in reality you could

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make one of these devices with an old

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laptop you simply take the laptop and

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remove the Wi-Fi module maybe you write

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some of your own code to sign a

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transaction and then you physically type

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in your seed phrase to compute the fully

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signed transaction then you take that

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fully assigned transaction and put it

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onto a USB thumb drive or maybe show a

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QR code to move that data or rather the

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data of the fully signed transaction

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from your signing device to your actual

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computer so that you can broadcast the

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transaction to the internet honestly

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someone could easily code this in Python

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and if you're interested in doing it

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without code check out the project named

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seed signer currently it can only send

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Bitcoin transactions but how it works is

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actually really cool you scan a QR code

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of your your encrypted private key and

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then you scan the QR code of the

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transaction that you want to sign you

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push some buttons on the device you

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enter your private Key password and then

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boom it presents you with a new QR code

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that you then scan with your computer's

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webcam to submit to the blockchain this

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device can be created for less than

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thirty dollars and when you turn it off

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all the data is wiped from the device so

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you could theoretically even share with

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your friends with no problem at least

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assuming you trust the Raspberry Pi or

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that device to not have any malicious

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Hardware like we mentioned earlier

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number five down this spectrum is what

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we all believed ledger to be a device

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that stores your encrypted private key

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in a secure Enclave or Hardware piece

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this way even if someone stole your

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actual device like your Ledger they

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couldn't actually get your seed phrase

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unless they also knew your password

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because even if they took the device

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apart and tried to break into the

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physical parts that hold the private key

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and extract them themselves they

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wouldn't be able to they would only be

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able to extract the encrypted part in

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theory a device at this level level

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would not even be able to give you the

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private key because it's only Built to

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sign things unfortunately this is not

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how a ledger works because with the

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right tinkering or with a malicious

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actor at Ledger the secure Enclave can

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then be tricked to give you the

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ingredients of the private key as we've

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recently seen or in other words The

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Ledger won't tell you the private key

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itself but you could trick it to say the

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first letter is a the second letter is B

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the third letter is C which is honestly

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just as bad okay but what if we had a

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device that didn't use a special piece

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of Hardware that we had to trust but

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instead just stored your private key

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already encrypted this way an attacker

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would have to know the password too like

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we described earlier well this is

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actually how many cold wallets work

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specifically the trezor it doesn't have

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any special Hardware piece and if you

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lent it to your technically inclined

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friend they could break it apart and

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steal your encrypted seed phrase but

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again because it's encrypted it wouldn't

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work they'd also have to have the

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passphrase to break the encryption to

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then have access to your funds the last

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device I'm going to talk about on this

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spectrum is a device that simply stores

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your private key unencrypted this means

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if someone stole the device they could

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also just completely look at and steal

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your crypto this is pretty hard to find

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because many companies doing this only

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sell to uneducated consumers and it's

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really bad at this point you might be

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wondering where the Ledger device

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actually lies well they're like number

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48 which is using a device that has the

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ability to send your seed phrase to

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three different companies if you wanted

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to they're right between entering your

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private key on a website that does it

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for you number 47 and using an advice

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that has the ability to send your seed

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phrase to three different companies even

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if you don't want it to number 49 if you

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thought this was a fun thought

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experiment don't even get us started on

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the security of generating a random seed

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phrase I mean for all we know Ledger

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already knows what your seed phrase is

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simply because when they shipped it to

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you they kept a list that you owned

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Ledger number 44087 and that one is the

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one where your first generated seed

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phrase is this and your second generated

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seed phrase is this and so on in other

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words saying that they know already the

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next seed phrase that your Ledger is

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going to create because they created the

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software that randomly generates those

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seed phrases I'd love to tell you that

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this is wrong but because we can't

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actually look at the software I can't

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and that's why I'm not using a ledger

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anymore I've recently bought a whole

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bunch of new wallets to test out and I'm

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gonna definitely share them with this

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channel so click the Subscribe button if

12:26

you're interested in seeing the

12:27

comparison of those wallets thanks for

12:29

watching I hope you enjoyed this video I

12:31

Really hoped you learned something and

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most of all I hope to see you in our

12:34

next video

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