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Why: Midair Blackhawk & Philadelphia Crash Details

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FULL TRANSCRIPT

0:00

in this video I'm going to provide facts

0:02

and data around what we know regarding

0:05

the patomic crash now days after it has

0:07

occurred uh the crash between the

0:10

American Airlines slight 5342 and the

0:12

Blackhawk helicopter I'll provide you

0:14

the latest updates on this and we'll

0:16

also go through the Philadelphia crash

0:18

to provide updates that we now have on

0:21

the crash we will also give you my

0:24

opinion as well as facts and data on

0:27

where there are problems in aviation I

0:30

want to be really clear about this and I

0:31

think it gives me a unique perspective

0:34

I'm a new newer pilot I began my flight

0:36

training in November of 2024 I am a

0:39

licensed pilot and I'm going through my

0:40

instrument ratings and my multi-engine

0:43

ratings to soon get typed to fly uh a

0:46

small

0:47

jet now the reason I say I have a unique

0:50

perspective here is because I've gone

0:52

through training in 2024 and 2025 and I

0:57

see the holes in our training that I

1:00

think everybody involved in the aviation

1:02

Community should be aware of because as

1:05

a more experienced pilot you might not

1:07

be aware of the problems that are

1:09

happening at the training level which I

1:11

think are really likely to compound into

1:14

more Aviation accidents in the long term

1:17

and so therefore my goal in making this

1:18

video is to try to provide facts where

1:21

they're available but then also some

1:23

opinion on where I see problems that I

1:25

think could manifest into larger issues

1:28

so I'll be clear I've got a about 500

1:30

Landings under my belt so 500 takeoffs

1:32

and lands uh in about 150 hours of

1:35

flight time so relatively new pilot but

1:38

again I think that provides me an

1:39

interesting perspective so let's get

1:42

started first by talking about what

1:44

happened with this American Airlines

1:46

versus Blackhawk crash or Blackhawk

1:48

crashing into the American Airlines

1:50

flight uh and the first thing that I

1:52

want to say is most folks think that

1:56

takeoff is the most dangerous phase of

1:59

flight and I know that when I was uh not

2:01

a pilot I'd always freak out during

2:03

takeoff I'm like oh my gosh takeoff

2:05

takeoff this is scary like we're going

2:07

higher as a pilot I've actually found

2:09

that takeoff is generally relatively

2:11

easy and this becomes very important as

2:14

you'll see in just a moment regarding

2:15

the pic crash and DC see

2:19

statistically 53% of Aviation accidents

2:23

that occur occur during Landing only

2:27

88.5% of Aviation accidents

2:30

occur during takeoff which makes takeoff

2:34

six times less risky than Landing or put

2:37

another way Landing is six times more

2:39

risky now there are many factors for

2:41

this Landing is quite frankly let's

2:45

start with this way you're setting up

2:47

for a landing in the air whereas you're

2:49

setting up for a takeoff on the ground

2:52

if you need more time you just sit on

2:53

the ground a little bit more that

2:55

already changes the workload

2:57

substantially because you're getting

2:59

your weather briefing and your

3:00

clearances and your uh you know uh

3:03

flight plates for your approaches or

3:05

departures you're getting all of that on

3:07

the ground you're able to prepare and

3:09

stay ahead of the aircraft on the ground

3:12

The Landing phase of flight most of that

3:14

work is done in the air and if you

3:16

started a little late on that and you

3:18

got a little bit behind the aircraft

3:19

things compound very very quickly during

3:22

the landing phase it is probably the

3:24

most important phase to have a sterile

3:27

cockpit to not talk about anything else

3:29

or Focus about focus on anything other

3:31

than getting that Landing done and

3:34

that's usually because you're dealing

3:36

with a new environment new weather

3:38

briefing new air traffic controllers new

3:40

traffic uh it's you know one thing when

3:42

you're taking off and you're looking at

3:43

traffic on your iPad or or your glass

3:46

cockpit and you're like all right I see

3:47

where traffic is you take off and you

3:49

know what to pay attention to when

3:50

you're Landing everything is new and

3:53

fresh and that's probably why Landings

3:55

are indeed much more risky uh but take a

3:58

look at this this is a helicopter uh

4:02

route sheet uh or you know it's

4:05

basically the sectional four uh

4:07

sectional plate for helicopters a shout

4:10

out to Bronco Li for pointing out that

4:12

the helicopter appeared to be on Route

4:14

One uh to Route four likely route four

4:19

here and uh you'll see that this

4:21

intersects with Route Six right here at

4:25

the Ronald Reagan Washington

4:27

International Airport DCA

4:30

now something to know is you'll actually

4:31

see Route Six for the helicopter route

4:33

goes right over the center of the

4:35

airport now a lot of people I know me

4:38

before I was a pilot I'd looked it out

4:39

I'm like oh my gosh you want me to fly

4:41

over the airport what interestingly

4:44

flying over the airport is relatively

4:47

safe if you do it at the correct

4:49

altitude because if you think about it

4:51

at an airport uh aircraft are either

4:53

Landing or they're departing so they are

4:56

at their lowest elevation and I think

4:59

that's why over here you have a

5:00

helicopter route that's like look 1,500

5:04

that's where you have to be no lower no

5:06

higher Now understand when you look at

5:08

these these charts here these bars above

5:11

and below the numbers those are your

5:13

ceilings or your floors those become

5:15

very very important but they could be

5:17

very confusing look how many of them

5:18

there are here on this route you're

5:20

going to go from 700 as a ceiling so no

5:22

higher than 700 as a helicopter to 500

5:25

to 300 over here I see a 200 which looks

5:29

like it's part of one over here on Route

5:31

4 I see a 200 all the way down here but

5:34

I see A500 over here and a 300 there are

5:37

a lot of numbers going on here uh so to

5:40

keep up to date with this in Flight is

5:43

is very complicated uh and I'm not

5:45

trying to provide excuses I'm simply

5:47

trying to say it's it's overwhelming you

5:48

have to be very very familiar with these

5:50

routes look at the description for Route

5:53

One at the American Legion Bri Bridge

5:56

you need to be at or below 1300 mean sea

5:59

level at another Bridge you need to be

6:00

at 700 at another Bridge you need to be

6:02

below 300 at the Memorial Bridge you

6:04

need to be at or below 200 at James

6:06

Creek you have to be at or below 300

6:09

like holy smokes you need to know the

6:11

names of all these Bridges you need to

6:13

know exactly what altitude you need to

6:15

be at these various different points and

6:17

this is the point of training here's

6:18

that route four which basically says

6:20

you're going to start at 1,000 ft at

6:22

Ford Washington then you're going to

6:23

descend to 1,600 uh then once you're you

6:26

have you know off to your side they call

6:28

this a beam uh the Broad Creek Inlet

6:31

well good luck seeing this at night uh

6:33

you need to uh descend to 600 ft once

6:35

you're a beam this and then you're going

6:37

to descend from 600 ft to 300 ft over

6:40

the Wilson Bridge and then north of the

6:43

Wilson Bridge you need to be at or below

6:45

200 ft so you know and then you'll

6:47

intercept route one so basically route

6:50

four intercepts route one which is just

6:53

a way of saying as as you're traveling

6:55

up here you need to go from 1,000 to 600

6:59

so you can see this here like with more

7:01

familiar you see there's the fort you

7:03

can see the picture of it see there's

7:04

the creek the inlet okay from 1,000 to

7:07

600 okay got it we're going this way

7:09

going to go down to 300 and when you're

7:11

north of this you need to be under uh

7:13

200 okay well now remember they came

7:16

down this way on the one portion so

7:19

they're traveling south towards Route 4

7:22

this is where you see you got to be

7:24

under 300 here you got to be under 200

7:27

but what we now know from the data is

7:29

that it appears the accident occurred

7:32

around 300 ft now why do I say it

7:34

appears around 300t it's because radar

7:36

data shows the impact happening when

7:38

both the aircraft the airplane the

7:40

American Airlines flly 5342 and the

7:42

helicopter showed their radar at 300 ft

7:44

now that clearly indicates that the

7:47

helicopter was too hot now what we know

7:51

is radar rounds off to the 100 ft which

7:55

is really not a problem when you're an

7:56

aircraft flying you know over 600t uh

7:59

but when when you're trying to stay

8:02

below 300 or below 200 rounding to the

8:05

tune of 100 ft is massive that's like 50

8:09

to 30 you know 33 to 50% of your

8:11

altitude is a rounding error that's a

8:15

problem radar should be much more

8:17

sensitive at these lower altitudes

8:19

especially close to an airport but

8:22

unfortunately our airports are not in

8:24

the greatest shape in fact this is going

8:26

to be one of my complaints in my opinion

8:28

section is where I talk about you know

8:30

why is it that Landing equipment is so

8:32

variable at different airports a lot of

8:34

it is is either out of service or broken

8:36

or runways or in in poor condition the

8:39

funding for our airports hasn't been

8:41

great and this is where I I you know I

8:43

understand why people say oh my gosh

8:44

we're spending so much money in foreign

8:46

aid we need to fix our own freaking

8:47

airports well yeah we do need to fix our

8:49

own airports and this is not to make a

8:51

political opinion but there's a lot of

8:52

fixing to do at our own airports but

8:55

anyway this rounding of radar data is

8:58

very very bad

9:00

when the difference of 100 feet which is

9:02

a rounding error is literally the

9:05

difference between life or death because

9:08

if it is true that the helicopter indeed

9:10

busted the ceiling right here of 200 ft

9:13

which it appears it did then yes it

9:15

appears that the helicopter is likely

9:17

responsible uh for the crash yes we

9:20

already believe and and that's

9:22

speculation I want to be clear about

9:24

that uh you know I'm not trying to point

9:26

fingers here um we've got a lot to talk

9:28

about this here's I think

9:30

AI Telly did a nice um sort of uh 3D

9:33

animation of this I will say the first

9:35

part of their animation I disagree with

9:37

so because it it it doesn't line it up

9:39

like this I think this is a good

9:42

alignment uh of what likely happened

9:45

except it doesn't show you the vertical

9:47

as well uh because I really think this

9:49

plane essentially descended uh and the

9:53

helicopter was ascending right so you've

9:56

got I'll picture that as the descending

9:58

plane the ascending helicopter and and

10:01

that's how you get that sort of impact

10:03

it's a little hard but this is probably

10:04

one of the better 3D renderings I've

10:07

seen of it uh and busting that that 200

10:11

is what created this now these routes

10:14

have since been cancelled because

10:16

they're just too close too tight

10:18

probably because of the limitations of

10:20

uh what we have over here and there are

10:22

other factors at play as well the New

10:24

York Times had a piece on this and it

10:25

essentially overlays what it sort of

10:27

looked like to see the other uh plane uh

10:30

now I I don't 100% agree with this

10:33

because the plane would have had some

10:35

form of positioning and strobe lights on

10:38

in this angle likely the landing light

10:40

as well uh but that would have Blended

10:41

in with City Lights in the background so

10:44

this is not the best representation I

10:47

believe but it's still decent to show

10:49

you the windows and the positioning of

10:53

you know how small objects look

10:55

especially when they're moving towards

10:57

each other especially if you're wearing

10:58

night vision go

11:00

and you only have you know a 40% sort of

11:02

reduced field of view I believe that at

11:05

the point of impact the plane was

11:07

essentially off to the left here uh of

11:10

the cockpit view

11:13

and if they were wearing night vision

11:15

goggles uh it's not an excuse but it is

11:18

likely that they just didn't see the

11:21

plane that was Landing over them uh and

11:24

yes there was a likely misidentification

11:26

that appears to be the mainstream thesis

11:28

right now is that there was a

11:30

misidentification that they looked at

11:31

the wrong American Airlines flight a

11:33

flight that was taking off to verify

11:35

that they were going to maintain verbal

11:37

uh sep or visual separation uh as the

11:40

air traffic controller requested uh and

11:42

they requested from the air traffic

11:43

controller and the uh air traffic

11:44

controller confirmed they likely had the

11:46

wrong plane in sight and that's why this

11:48

accident

11:50

occurred now that part is speculation we

11:52

believe that is a possible or plausible

11:54

explanation but it's speculation just

11:56

like all of these diagrams are really

11:58

just speculation what all we know is

12:01

that radar data rounds to 100 and it

12:05

rounded to 100 in a place where

12:08

100 made a life or death impact and

12:11

that's what pisses me off is why do we

12:13

not have the technology to bring that

12:16

tighter now another thing I will say is

12:18

that a lot of military aircraft and this

12:21

is my opinion uh a lot of military

12:24

aircraft I see do not transpond on

12:26

adsb uh now they could still show up as

12:29

a data point on uh your uh you know your

12:34

map so to speak for example I'll show

12:36

you a my iPad right here this is a

12:38

screenshot I took just the other day

12:40

over the Camaro airport this is what air

12:42

traffic looks like for Pilots when they

12:45

use an app like foreflight I could

12:47

clearly see the November numbers for

12:50

each of the aircraft uh I could see

12:53

their trajectory extended via these

12:56

these trend lines I can click on them

12:58

and see their recent path that's sort of

13:01

the green path that you could see there

13:04

uh there's a lot of data you could get

13:06

and so if I'm coming in for a landing I

13:09

could see which aircraft are in front of

13:12

me now something that bugs me uh is if

13:16

you're not transponding on uh you know

13:18

your your adsb out then you don't

13:21

actually show up as an arrow or a

13:24

triangle which is ridiculous in fact

13:26

over the camio airspace we have a Point

13:29

meu Air Force Base uh a facility where

13:33

where we regularly have Flight Training

13:35

f16s we have radar planes c130s they're

13:37

all taking off over

13:39

there A lot of them are not actually

13:43

on this map because they're they're

13:46

flying dark I saw a radar plane probably

13:49

about 1,800 ft uh just south east of the

13:53

airport maybe 3 miles Southeast of the

13:56

airport under the grade and I I'm

13:59

watching it I see it right in front of

14:01

me as I'm in uh the the left downwind

14:04

for 26 over

14:06

here and they don't show up at all on my

14:09

map I think that's wrong I think if

14:12

military aircraft are going to fly in

14:15

America on training missions they should

14:17

absolutely be required to show up uh and

14:21

and transmit adsb out

14:23

data so that way other aircraft could

14:26

see their positioning now I do not know

14:28

if that was a fact here there is another

14:31

way you could show up as an arrow and

14:32

that's when an airport radar or radar

14:35

station picks up the

14:36

aircraft uh and then transmits that

14:39

radar signal to aircraft which then we

14:42

can receive and then it'll show up as an

14:45

unknown type aircraft and we'll still

14:47

get an arrow of it but often times I see

14:49

these military aircraft and they're just

14:51

invisible and I'm like this is

14:53

ridiculous how am I supposed to feel

14:54

safe flying when I'm looking at this for

14:57

my traffic

14:59

and then military aircraft are Flying

15:02

Blind I think as a newer pilot that is

15:06

very bad I don't know if that uh played

15:09

a role in this accident here but I think

15:12

there's a chance it could have if that

15:14

heli did not show up on this sort of

15:16

traffic map for the American Airlines

15:18

flight they were scammed they were

15:20

scammed out of the data that could have

15:23

saved 67 Liv now it's worth noting that

15:27

according to the flight data recorder

15:30

uh the NTSB indicated that there was uh

15:34

some form of uh audible indication 1

15:38

second before impact it was probably

15:41

something like holy

15:43

sh and they immediately pulled up so the

15:47

American Airlines flight saw the

15:49

helicopter last second literally the

15:51

last second and began he pull up but it

15:53

was too

15:55

late so clearly the American Airlines

15:57

flight had no idea the helicopter was

15:59

there now maybe they weren't looking at

16:02

the the the uh uh you know this

16:05

transponder data but my guess is that

16:08

military flight was invisible because I

16:10

have with my own eyes seen planes that

16:14

are invisible on my traffic map and I

16:16

think that is a disgrace as a newer

16:18

pilot it makes me nervous to fly where

16:20

the military flies Okay and we're going

16:23

to leave that at that and we're going to

16:24

move on to more updates because there's

16:26

a lot to talk about here all right so

16:29

that's our Potomic crash now I want to

16:32

talk about the hours that uh these these

16:35

Pilots were flying because a lot of

16:36

folks were like oh you know was was this

16:39

I see these comments on social media

16:41

people were like oh was was the pilot

16:42

like uh uh uh you know flying part-time

16:46

or why do they only have 500 hours of

16:48

flight

16:49

time first of all it takes a long time

16:53

to get hours in

16:54

aviation you're lucky if you fly like 2

16:57

or 3 hours every day first of all there

17:00

there's weather uh second of all there's

17:03

ground that you have to learn so you

17:04

have to respect weather there's uh

17:06

ground schooling that you have to do uh

17:08

there is a lot that goes into prep and

17:11

charting and plating so you could

17:14

literally spend a 10-hour day of

17:16

studying Aviation ground plates your

17:19

pre-flight checklist fueling uh sumping

17:22

fuel you know verifying uh your your

17:25

systems are functioning on the aircraft

17:28

and you spent 10 hours and you only end

17:30

up logging 2 and 1 half hours of flight

17:32

time it's happened to me many times so

17:36

when I say have 150 hours you know

17:37

that's probably like 500 or more hours

17:40

of actual Aviation related work could be

17:42

even substantially more than that so the

17:45

hours are a little bit

17:46

misleading uh but it shows you when

17:48

somebody has thousands of hours they've

17:50

been doing it for a while because it

17:52

like there's probably a you're probably

17:55

putting in about 3 to four hours for

17:57

every actual hour of flight time you

17:58

have kind of

18:01

crazy according to

18:08

uh according to what we could see online

18:11

it appears that the female pilot had

18:14

here it says more than 450 hours of

18:16

flight time I've seen other sources that

18:18

have indicated uh that uh she had 450

18:22

hours here it says more than 500

18:25

hours either way it it is on the lower

18:28

side now realize I have fewer hours than

18:30

that I understand I've only been flying

18:31

since

18:32

November but I will say the most

18:34

experienced Pilots usually have in

18:38

excess of 5,000

18:41

hours certainly 2,000 hours in an

18:43

aircraft and usually what happens and

18:45

this is a big downside in aviation as

18:47

well is that as soon as you get to

18:49

around 1,500 hours you sort of graduate

18:52

from training and being a trainer and

18:54

you start going on to flying jets or you

18:58

know a fighter pilot you're getting out

19:01

of the training environment it's almost

19:03

like once you get to 250 hours you start

19:06

training other people you're still a

19:07

total newbie but you're training other

19:10

people and now instead of you paying as

19:14

like a Private Pilot instead of you

19:15

paying to fly to get those 250 hours

19:17

somebody else is paying you to train

19:19

them and you're getting hours because

19:22

you're sitting in the plane collecting

19:23

hours right training to go from 250 to

19:27

1,000 so it's possible that this

19:29

instructor with more than a th000 hours

19:31

of flight time it's possible maybe they

19:33

only had 500 hours themselves of

19:35

actually flying and 500 hours of sitting

19:37

in the chair next to the you know person

19:40

learning I think that is a critical

19:42

downside and and really it's it's

19:44

frankly a fatal flaw in the training

19:46

environment in aviation for example uh I

19:49

have been in situations where uh I'm

19:53

doing instrument training and like

19:56

imagine this we're flying in the

20:00

clouds you know you if you're wondering

20:03

about this you're like wait instrument

20:04

train you probably should be flying in

20:06

the clouds right oh yeah you should be

20:08

but most people who get their instrument

20:10

ratings they get their instrument rating

20:12

with almost no actual flight time in

20:17

clouds instead they wear these things

20:19

called a hood or foggles these are the

20:23

greatest scam ever these are a total

20:27

ripoff for the AV ation Community I

20:30

absolutely despise these see they're

20:32

just supposed to like block the upper

20:34

part of your vision so that way you

20:36

could only look at the console in front

20:38

of you it's total fugazi now why is it

20:41

total

20:42

fugazi because you could still see out

20:45

of the corners of the glasses with your

20:47

peripheral vision or you lift your head

20:48

a little bit and you could see

20:50

everything in front of you in visual

20:51

flight rolls I've worn fogles during the

20:54

day at night I've worn them probably for

20:57

somewhere around 40 hours they're a scam

21:00

I've been in actual clouds for maybe

21:03

about 90 minutes and I'll tell you when

21:05

you're in actual clouds like flying the

21:09

playe yourself in the actual clouds it

21:11

is a completely different ball game the

21:13

first time I went into the clouds you

21:15

know it's like oh okay I've done fogles

21:17

should be similar right no it's like oh

21:20

whoa okay I literally can't see anything

21:23

I can't like take off the glasses and go

21:25

oh I can see everything now it it is a

21:27

freaky feeling

21:29

now this will be important when we talk

21:30

about the Philadelphia crash because it

21:33

could be something that contributed to

21:35

the Philadelphia crash speculation we'll

21:38

talk about that in just a moment but I

21:40

find that the vast majority of

21:42

instrument training that is conducted is

21:44

conducted in these sort of hoods or

21:45

fogles and they do not give a realistic

21:48

impression of what it is like to be an

21:49

instrument rated pilot I think that

21:52

could be a contributor to why

21:54

Pilots aren't really good when it comes

21:57

to clouds unless they have a lot of

21:59

experience flying in the clouds and I

22:02

I'm also of the opinion and mindset that

22:04

people shouldn't become a pilot at all

22:07

unless they're instrument rated now that

22:09

adds extra barriers and that's probably

22:11

why we're not in this case but it's very

22:13

easy to take off in visual conditions

22:17

and then before you know it you're in M

22:19

or a cloud and that Panic sets in of oh

22:21

my gosh I can't see anything anymore now

22:23

as an instrument rated pilot you know no

22:25

problem I got my instruments I'm going

22:27

to trust my instruments but that

22:29

adjustment does not actually get trained

22:32

in most people's training and I think

22:35

that is bad I don't know if that

22:38

contributed at all to the Philadelphia

22:39

crash we'll talk about that in just a

22:41

moment uh but this idea that she had 500

22:43

hours and the instructor had 1,000 hours

22:45

yeah they're both newer uh there are

22:48

some people like this website arguing

22:51

that this was a very experienced

22:53

group I don't think a th000 hours of

22:55

flight time is very experienced I've

22:58

been in instrument conditions with

23:00

pilots who have a th hours and they've

23:03

never been in an icing

23:05

condition and then I I I think to myself

23:08

I'm like how am I supposed to learn from

23:11

somebody and I don't blame them I blame

23:13

sort of like the schooling process the

23:16

way the aviation processes how am I

23:17

supposed to learn how to deal with icing

23:20

if almost none of the instructors you

23:22

fly with have ever been in icing

23:25

themselves because they do their

23:27

instrument training with fogles and

23:28

they're not actually in clouds where

23:29

they're dealing with icing you know so

23:32

like that way if I'm in a situation

23:34

where I'm like okay I know I need to

23:35

turn on our anti- I uh 15 minutes before

23:40

entering icing and we enter icing and

23:43

the system's not on yet

23:46

because the instructors haven't been

23:48

taught and they say no no no no we're

23:51

going to preserve our icing fluid until

23:52

we're actually in the clouds I'm like

23:53

it's not going to work and then that's

23:55

what happens that is unsafe

23:59

and that's not any one person's fault I

24:02

think it's just the nature of Aviation

24:05

is that you're training people in a way

24:07

that does not line up with

24:10

reality and that's probably and again

24:13

this is speculation that could be a

24:15

contributor to what you have over here

24:17

when you go through and you read these

24:19

these FAA

24:21

plates and the FAA plates are okay you

24:24

know we're going to we're going to be at

24:26

this altitude at this level this how are

24:28

often have the pilots trained at night

24:31

to be at those various different

24:33

altitudes my guess is not too often

24:36

because most training is also done

24:38

during the day I go out of my way to

24:41

find training at night because I think

24:43

it's so important to train at night

24:45

everything is different Illusions are

24:47

different especially if you're wearing

24:49

night vision everything is different at

24:51

night I've never worn night vision I'll

24:53

say that but that's another potential

24:55

contributor here again it all comes back

24:58

back to training and I just want to be

25:00

clear with where my opinion is and where

25:01

the factual updates

25:03

are

25:06

so we know as a fact ceilings are 200 in

25:10

the ptoi crash we know that radar data

25:12

rounds to 100 the ceiling was 200 let me

25:15

make sure I said that right and radar

25:17

rounds to 100 we know there are cases as

25:19

a fact that the military does not

25:23

broadcast their location and we know as

25:25

a fact that often times the people

25:26

training

25:28

don't have a lot of Real World

25:30

Experience themselves those are

25:33

facts all of those facts are problems we

25:37

also know as a fact that Landing is six

25:39

times more dangerous than takeoff I have

25:41

flown a helicopter as well and I'll tell

25:43

you it's really easy without even

25:46

realizing it to add a tiny little bit of

25:49

pressure to that lever that's on the

25:51

floor they call it the collective it

25:53

should be uh using my left hand uh just

25:57

the camera's on the right I think but

25:59

it's really easy to pull up on

26:01

that without even noticing it and start

26:05

climbing very easy to bust ceilings in a

26:12

helicopter now at this point uh here you

26:15

could see some indications of the 450

26:19

hours of

26:20

experience we see uh Captain

26:23

Rebecca as uh clearly an Enthusiast

26:27

Outdoors she worked in the Biden

26:29

Administration there were rumors

26:31

circulating that oh she was

26:33

lgbtq these these sort of comments are

26:36

just

26:37

disgusting

26:39

uh I I feel terrible that this happened

26:42

and again I'm making this video because

26:43

I feel so bad for these folks they're

26:46

literally my age you know I just turned

26:49

33 and uh it's so

26:52

sad uh anyway so so this is why I want

26:55

to add uh this insight to this now going

26:57

out to Philadelphia

26:59

the black box was

27:00

recovered uh the daughter was 11 who

27:05

died which is absolutely terrible it's

27:07

honestly it's so unfair it's almost

27:10

Final Destination esque where it's like

27:12

you literally got life saving

27:15

surgery uh and uh you know to survive to

27:20

have a chance at

27:22

life and then the plane that's going to

27:24

take you home after your life-saving

27:26

surgery crashes this is the black box

27:30

it's terrible it's absolutely terrible

27:33

now uh I froze I I didn't like a lot of

27:37

the animations on the from AI here

27:39

either uh so I I I froze at an image

27:42

that I did

27:43

like which is and I've sort of been

27:46

leading up to this I believe that the

27:48

pilots and this is my speculation okay

27:51

fact I want to be clear the fact is the

27:52

girl was 11 the fact is one person died

27:56

on the ground uh I think they were in a

27:59

car let's see here blackbox was

28:02

recovered the photo was released some of

28:05

the cops are dealing with breathing

28:08

problems uh and here we go one

28:11

37-year-old was found dead inside a

28:13

vehicle after the plane

28:15

crashed six people inside of the plane

28:17

including her mother and four crew

28:18

members were all killed all from Mexico

28:21

they had a fuel stop uh

28:23

scheduled uh but they were heading to it

28:26

looked like Tijana Mexico

28:29

now the reason I froze on this image is

28:32

because when we looked at the trajectory

28:34

of this flight which I didn't love the

28:37

drawing of the trajectory here mostly

28:40

because uh how how they're depicting

28:43

this plane taking off from this plane I

28:44

think is a little or taking off from the

28:46

airport is a little funny like at least

28:48

put the flight path of the line on where

28:50

the airport is but anyway uh the the

28:53

point is they show a little bit of a

28:56

right turn starting which some of the

28:59

adsb data did indicate a little bit of a

29:01

right turn starting but they were

29:03

supposed to turn substantially to the

29:04

right 290 degrees was their supposed

29:07

heading which would have been about

29:08

halfway through the screen over here

29:10

where this mouth Mouse is so for some

29:12

reason they never completed this turn

29:15

now we know that uh in the takeoff data

29:18

we hear them acknowledge their switch to

29:21

the partner frequency and then the pilot

29:23

says good day which implies that there's

29:26

no real stress at the point of of that

29:29

ATC transition which is probably around

29:32

the time that they entered the

29:34

clouds now again that is speculation it

29:38

is speculation that they were not

29:39

distressed because the pilot said good

29:41

day or the co-pilot said good day uh but

29:45

what we know is they never fully

29:47

completed their right

29:48

turn now pilot debrief suggests that uh

29:52

and Bronco ly both suggest that this was

29:55

unlikely a stall but that this was

29:57

potentially

29:58

uh a result of spatial

30:00

disorientation I agree uh that there

30:04

were there were two speculations I

30:06

originally had one was that this was

30:08

either a stall uh or that this was

30:11

spatial

30:11

disorientation spatial

30:14

disorientation uh it appears more likely

30:16

after looking at more of the data that

30:18

uh because of the way the plane crashed

30:21

spatial disorientation is what happened

30:24

which what I mentioned in my first video

30:27

uh is that when you are taking

30:30

off if you're not fully prepped there's

30:33

a lot that's going on you in my opinion

30:37

should have the autopilot set before

30:39

your takeoff because when you get into

30:41

the clouds like this things change very

30:43

very rapidly and this is where as a

30:46

newer pilot I'd like to also mention

30:49

that pilot first of all every plane

30:51

should have an autopilot the a lot of

30:53

trainer planes do not have autopilot

30:55

which is insanely stupid in my opinion

30:58

and again I'm giving that to you as

30:59

perspective fact many trainer planes

31:02

don't have

31:03

autopilot now if you drive a Tesla you

31:06

think how hard is it to use autopilot

31:07

well I'll tell you in a plane very hard

31:10

because if you get into a

31:12

plane and you just turn on the autopilot

31:15

uh on your takeoff the first mode it

31:17

goes into is called roll

31:19

mode roll mode is like what it sounds

31:22

the plan's just going to start rolling

31:24

into a constant bank that's not what you

31:27

want not that's like terrible uh what

31:31

you generally want on takeoff is your

31:33

plane to follow a flight plan which

31:34

means the flight plan has to be

31:36

programmed or a

31:37

heading so what I like to do when I take

31:40

off on a plane when I take off assume

31:43

this little radio here as a plane when I

31:45

take off on a plane uh I like to have my

31:48

autopilot set before I ever enter the

31:50

runway so I set my autopilot and I'll

31:53

program in do the same thing every time

31:56

what is my initial heading going to be

31:58

okay I'm taking off runway 2 six I want

32:00

my initial heading to be 300 so I want

32:02

to turn right 30 or

32:04

40° I rotate my heading knob to 300 set

32:08

that heading what altitude do I want to

32:10

climb to set my altitude knob move the

32:13

altitude to 4,000 or whatever my initial

32:15

climb altitude is and then I got to set

32:18

my flight level change okay so I go to

32:21

flight level change and then I scroll

32:23

the Little Wheel and I program in at

32:25

what speed do I want to climb all right

32:27

want to climb at 110 knots or 120 knots

32:31

whatever now if you programmed that all

32:35

and then you went to test your flight

32:36

controls as Pilots usually do you could

32:39

have actually overridden the autopilot

32:41

and cleared all of those settings so now

32:44

all of a sudden you get up in the air

32:45

you hit the autopilot and oh no it's

32:46

back on Roll mode it never actually

32:49

saved all of the autopilot settings you

32:51

input so now you have to reprogram all

32:53

of that and if you're doing that as

32:55

you're entering the clouds

32:58

good luck

33:02

man I I say this because as a as a newer

33:07

pilot I see a lot of training

33:13

failures nobody has trained me how to

33:17

set the autopilot before takeoff that is

33:20

something that I studied and started

33:22

doing myself and then when I do it

33:25

people that I fly with trainers are like

33:27

oh that's a good idea

33:28

like

33:29

bro this should always be done uh you

33:32

know if you are fortunate enough to

33:34

actually have a plane that has autopilot

33:36

that you're training in you know I'm

33:38

fortunate I've done most of my training

33:39

hours in a Cirrus SR22 G7 but it's very

33:43

expensive to do that uh some of my

33:46

training hours have been in Cessnas in

33:48

Pipers uh or diamonds like a

33:52

da42 and there's no

33:55

autopilot but when you go out into the

33:57

real world and you start flying a plane

33:59

with autopilot and you never had

34:00

training on it well then you don't have

34:02

the habits built to actually have your

34:03

autopilot preset see in my opinion and

34:06

this is speculation okay so I want to

34:08

give you the fact autopilot training

34:10

sucks in

34:11

aviation and like nobody actually does

34:14

preset this stuff or they don't realize

34:16

that their autopilot settings get

34:17

cleared when they go through their

34:19

checklist so you have to set it at the

34:21

correct time but in addition to

34:24

that uh when you transition from Train

34:28

into the real world and now you're

34:30

expected to use autopilot you're going

34:32

in with sort of empty bags of training

34:34

and so when you go into the clouds in my

34:36

opinion you want to be at a point where

34:38

you're at 400 ft boom autopilot on like

34:41

as soon as you've cleared your obstacles

34:42

and you're off the end of that Runway

34:43

the departure end of the runway

34:45

autopilot I want that sucker on ASAP

34:47

because there's enough going on now you

34:49

have to dial in your departure frequency

34:51

if you didn't preset that up you got to

34:54

put in your heading if you didn't preset

34:55

that up all of that could be on

34:57

autopilot

34:58

in my opinion and this is based on the

35:00

data autopilot was not used unless there

35:03

was some kind of catastrophic failure

35:05

which I don't think there necessarily

35:06

was there was a lot of comments around

35:08

this this plane potentially being on

35:10

fire prior to Landing I didn't see that

35:12

in any of the images uh what it looked

35:15

like was a very bright Landing light

35:17

that would show up in some of the

35:19

imagery or just the reflection of the

35:21

side of the plane is very very common

35:23

when you fly a plane at night you start

35:24

seeing the reflections that pop up of of

35:26

other planes it becomes that makes more

35:28

sense or the landing lights of planes

35:30

they're very bright uh in my opinion

35:33

autopilot was not used otherwise that

35:34

heading would have been used unless

35:35

there was some other inflight

35:37

catastrophic failure so again I want to

35:38

be clear there is a form of speculation

35:42

here but I want to use this as a

35:44

learning opportunity to say here is how

35:46

that speculation could potentially if

35:49

it's not the cause of this crash it

35:51

could potentially be the cause of other

35:52

crashes and I'm bringing it up as a

35:53

learning lesson because I see this as a

35:55

big problem

35:58

so if autopilot was used they would have

35:59

had their heading and they probably

36:01

wouldn't have gotten spatially

36:01

disoriented because the autopilot would

36:03

have flown them to their heading and to

36:05

their altitude and they could have taken

36:06

their time to get their bearings now

36:08

here's the other thing when you end up

36:10

without autopilot on and you're stick

36:12

flying in the clouds yes Pilots are

36:16

supposedly trained to be comfortable

36:18

with this but most of them are trained

36:20

wearing

36:22

fogles when you actually hit the clouds

36:25

it's

36:26

like I can't see anything I have been in

36:29

that situation where I hit the clouds I

36:32

look down and I'm go switch to

36:34

instruments you look down and you feel

36:36

your adrenaline be because you're like

36:38

okay I only have the instruments now and

36:40

you look down got to hold that heading

36:42

hold that altitude how's my angle how's

36:44

my pitch you you know everything attack

36:48

for climbs and this is also important

36:51

because I also mentioned that I think a

36:52

contributor to this crash my opinion is

36:55

a weight issue very easy if you're full

36:56

fueled to overweight here I don't know

36:58

if they were full fuel given that they

37:00

had a fuel stop not too terribly far

37:02

away it is possible that they actually

37:03

didn't have full fuel but you know based

37:06

on the explosion at the end it seemed

37:07

like there's a chance they could have

37:08

been Fu full fuel we'll see the

37:10

investigation will reveal but it's very

37:12

very easy if you are aft heavy and then

37:16

you get into the clouds and you get

37:17

disoriented you're accidentally pitching

37:18

too high uh you become disoriented you

37:21

lose directional control of the aircraft

37:23

and you start rolling to the left which

37:25

as we saw in the data is what happened

37:27

the role to the left we don't know why

37:29

that role to the left happened but it

37:30

could be a

37:32

contributor

37:33

so to me the these are all issues but in

37:37

addition to this there are issues of uh

37:40

ATC or air traffic control just being

37:44

overwhelmed uh this is another issue

37:46

that I see a lot uh in aviation uh and I

37:49

hate to say it but I think a lot of air

37:52

traffic controllers are

37:54

overwhelmed they are they're probably

37:57

too few of them but I've seen air

37:59

traffic controllers uh be unable to

38:01

handle traffic call outs to where planes

38:04

are taking off into other planes and

38:06

they're not even noticing each other and

38:09

air traffic control says

38:11

nothing not trying to make excuses but

38:13

I've been in situations where where I

38:15

just see air traffic control where you

38:17

expect them to give a traffic advisory

38:18

and they don't or uh and it's probably

38:22

because they're overwhelmed with other

38:23

other work I've also seen very

38:25

inconsistent airport AIDS Landing AIDS

38:27

out of service uh you know Precision

38:30

approach Landing lights uh out of

38:32

service a pathway indicators like a papy

38:35

uh inconsistent weather briefings you

38:37

know we we still rely on these like Adis

38:39

reports that only update every hour but

38:41

weather changes way faster than

38:44

that manual wind checks the fact that we

38:46

have to like sometimes get on the radio

38:47

and manually request a wind update is

38:49

crazy since the wind data is generally

38:51

collected in an automated manner anyway

38:53

they should be just broadcast via an

38:55

automated AIS every minute as some

38:57

airports have but not all airports

38:59

military should never have adsb disabled

39:01

in America uh you know especially around

39:05

active civilian flight areas we've

39:07

talked about some of the training area

39:08

issues or autopilot issues I do think

39:11

that air traffic control should verify

39:13

that you're actually on your departure

39:15

heading before transitioning you to the

39:17

next controller I mean maybe that's just

39:19

a responsibility division

39:21

but this aircraft the Philadelphia

39:24

aircraft was clearly not on it's 290

39:28

heading and they just handed him off to

39:30

the next controller oh let the next guy

39:32

deal with it sort of the K the can down

39:34

the road

39:35

mentality maybe that's what the

39:37

procedure is for ATC I don't think it's

39:42

great so these are thoughts that I have

39:45

uh in addition to you know i' I also had

39:48

a comment about how if an aircraft says

39:51

hey I have another aircraft in sight

39:53

they should be reading back the tail

39:54

number now then I got when I said that I

39:56

got comments from people like but Kevin

39:59

how are you supposed to see the tiny

40:01

number on the T

40:03

plan sorry

40:06

bro it's right here it's right there

40:11

okay it's not that hard so so so let's

40:15

just say as an example I am November 53

40:19

Lima

40:20

Eko and air traffic control tells me uh

40:26

you are not number three to land which

40:28

means that's number one that's number

40:31

two and that's number three it's not

40:33

that hard for me to

40:36

say a affirmative number three to land

40:40

following November 66

40:45

215 three to land November 53 Lima Eko

40:49

something like that obviously you could

40:51

probably clean that up a little bit

40:52

people like it's too much congestion on

40:55

the radio bro I have been in situations

40:58

mapped just like this where I am in the

41:00

Lima Echo position and air traffic

41:02

control says you're number three to land

41:05

and I go got it you want me to follow

41:08

215 and they say no there's actually

41:11

another aircraft you know off the map

41:13

over here to the right I want you to

41:14

follow that one I'm like ah well good

41:17

thing I checked it's right there it's

41:21

not that hard so uh sorry I'm frustrated

41:26

because

41:27

again as a newer pilot I see this stuff

41:30

and it drives me nuts I I'll give you

41:32

another example just to show you this is

41:34

sort of like a bonus here that parachute

41:36

jump area you could seen at the top

41:38

there literally

41:40

seen uh this kind of stuff I'll leave

41:44

you with the little clip of the audio of

41:46

it and some silly janky uh you know

41:50

video editing around it that I did but

41:52

anyway if you found this Insight helpful

41:54

consider subscribing to the channel good

41:56

luck out there I really appreciate you

41:58

all watching and subscribing to the

41:59

channel and we'll see you in the next

42:00

one goodbye and good luck approach Al my

42:05

uh 10:00 there's a parachute guy getting

42:08

close to me 291 Alp are you up frequency

42:11

where are you right now he's on my 9:00

42:14

I I am over T Valley uh well this guy is

42:18

uh having fun I just want to let you

42:21

know there's a parachute going on area

42:22

this guy is just jumping from somewhere

42:24

I don't know from where but it's he's

42:26

very close to probably few miles how

42:29

long have you been on our frequency I've

42:31

called you about 5 minutes ago for fly

42:34

following to Van oh excellent you

42:36

probably heard our jum call we said

42:37

there are parachute activities 5 mil

42:39

Northeast next 5 minutes 8,000 ft below

42:43

so you probably heard that call and that

42:45

jump zone is deped on all VFR Maps yes

42:48

sir I've been flying for six years and

42:49

never witnessed something like this I

42:51

just wanted to let you know thank you

42:53

for six years you should know that that

42:54

jump zone is in C just Northeast of C

42:58

sure thank you one apple thanks for the

43:00

heads up I'm sure they had a nice

43:01

[Applause]

43:02

view can I get slot following to Van by

43:05

any chance help you right now keep you

43:07

Northeast and we'll help you in a moment

43:08

why not advertise these things that you

43:10

told us here I feel like nobody else

43:11

knows about this we'll we'll try a

43:13

little advertising and see how go

43:14

congratulations man you have done so

43:16

much people love you people look up to

43:18

you Kevin PA there financial analyst and

43:20

YouTuber meet Kevin always great to get

43:22

your take

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