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The Disaster of Boeing & the Whistleblower Killing.

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well if you haven't heard yet Boeing is

0:02

a complete disaster it's a company that

0:04

has lost money now for 3 years in a row

0:07

they've been caught using dish soap for

0:09

lubricant and hotel key cards to test

0:11

fittings in planes and situations at

0:15

Boeing over the past few years

0:16

especially with the initial 737 Max

0:20

program led to the deaths of hundreds of

0:22

people partly due to poor training

0:25

manuals and iPad training videos that

0:28

weren't actually prop ly implemented by

0:31

Airlines whether it was Boeing's fault

0:33

or Airlines fault we have no idea but

0:36

what is going on at Boeing is a disaster

0:38

so much so that all of a sudden a

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whistleblower who retired from Boeing in

0:42

2017 has just been found dead with an

0:45

apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound to

0:47

the head and a gun in his hand with a

0:49

note in the other hand now obviously the

0:51

police department in Charleston uh North

0:53

Charleston in the area uh where this

0:56

death occurred in a holiday in parking

0:59

lot has uh suggested they're quite aware

1:02

of the suspicions around this case but

1:05

have still not provided any details as

1:07

to did he actually have any gunshot

1:09

residue on his hand if he shot himself

1:12

we should be able to see gunshot residue

1:15

on his hand around the area outside your

1:18

palm where you'd be holding a gun we

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should be able to tell these things if

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they had a proper crime scene we should

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be able to know from ballistics which

1:27

that might take a little longer uh if he

1:30

actually held the gun at an angle that

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he could have comfortably or would have

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comfortably held sometimes when uh

1:37

somebody else holds the gun for you the

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gun would be in such an angle that you'd

1:40

be shooting yourself in a weird angle

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like this or whatever very kind of

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gruesome and bad but that's extremely

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uncomfortable for years these are things

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that can be discovered so hopefully

1:50

Police Department is working on it

1:52

because this is really sus and it's

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probably sus because frankly when you

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look at a company like Boeing the

1:59

companies had a really long history of

2:02

well the stock basically going down this

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is a company that has uh basically hit a

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low in covid of about $89 it is up from

2:12

there but boy it has uh it's been

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suffering as you can see here on the

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week chart it's really had a hard time I

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mean outside of covid yes you got the

2:20

recovery to about 180 it's had a hard

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time staying in the 200s regularly

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bouncing back down uh into the 180ish

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range and so now the question is what is

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going on at this company well let's talk

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a little bit about John Barnett and

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potentially how Boeing compares to a

2:38

company like Toyota it's a good

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comparison to make here first John

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Barnett the guy who killed himself had

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quote unquote had some Choice things to

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say for Boeing we're going to go ahead

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and play that first after we play that

2:53

we're going to jump into what we think

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about how Boeing compares to Toyota one

2:59

this is not a 737 problem it's a bowling

3:02

problem um and I know the fa's gone in

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and they've done due diligence and

3:07

inspections to assure that the door

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plugs of the 737 are are installed

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properly and the Fasteners are tored

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properly but my concern is what's the

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rest of the airplane what's the rest of

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the condition of the airplane and the

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reason my concern for that is back in

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2012 boing started removing inspection

3:27

operations off their jobs so it left the

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mechanics to buy off their own work so

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what we're seeing with the door plug

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blowout

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is what I've seen with the rest of the

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airplane as far as Jobs not being

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completed properly inspection of steps

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being removed um issues being ignored my

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concerns are with the 737 and the 787

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because those

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programs have really embraced the theory

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that quality is overhead and nonv value

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added um so those two programs have

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really put a strong effort into removing

4:10

quality from the process when I first

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started working at Charleston I was in

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charge with pushing back defects to our

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suppliers and what that meant was I'd

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take a group of inspectors and actually

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go to the supplier and inspect their

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product before they sent it in well I'd

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taken a team of four inspectors to

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Spirit Aeros systems to inspect the 41

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section before they sent it to

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Charleston and we found 300 defects some

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of them were significant that needed

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engineering um

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intervention um when I returned to

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Charleston my senior manager told me we

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had found too many defects and he was

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going to take the next trip so the next

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trip he went on he took two of my

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inspectors and when they got back they

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were given accolades for only finding 50

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defects so I pulled that inspector aside

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and I said it's really clean up their

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act that quick that don't sound right

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and she was mad she said no said the two

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inspectors were given two hours to

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inspect the whole 41 section and they

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were kicked off the airplane one this is

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not a 73 that was a TMZ interview with

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John Barnett just days before he died

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what's worth noting is the 41 section is

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adjust the nose of the plane to just AF

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of the cockpit Windows that's wild so

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they were given 2 hours to inspect that

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section found 300 issues and then they

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were kicked off later when his team was

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invited back to Boeing for a follow-up

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inspection he specifically wasn't

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invited but somebody else from his team

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was forced to go rather than him and

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then they magically only found 50 issues

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somehow the other 250 were resolved and

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I guess if you're given a checklist they

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could be cleared off but then it also

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makes you wonder were they if they're

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being inspected by a different person

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who didn't see what it was like before

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and so this really begs the question of

6:06

what's going on at Boeing is this a

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culture of manufacturing problems and

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again how does it compare to Toyota so

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first my understanding of the Boeing

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bolt disaster which was sort of

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foreshadowed by Mr Barnett's complaints

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and whistleblowing about Boeing remember

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when we had a midair door blowout door

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plug blowout because bolts were missing

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well my understanding based on some of

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the latest evidence that's come out

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around these missing bolts basically

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conclude uh that someone let's call it

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at stage C of the production process

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noticed missing bolts but the bolts were

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the remaining piece of getting that

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plane moved from let's say production

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stage C to D and so the entire assembly

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line has to pause and wait for those

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bolts to show up which means all the

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other planes in the line behind slow

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down slowing down production slowing

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down potential profit at boing which is

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already a money losing

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company that's a problem so what do they

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do well what they generally do is

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they'll say all right we're going to

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move the plane to the next phase anyway

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and then we'll come back and fix the

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problem this is called traveled work

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this is a phenomenon where basically

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okay we need to go back and put the

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bolts in work travels to the next stage

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of production the issue is if somebody

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doesn't document the issue and actually

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cohesively connect the different stages

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of production the people at stage D

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might put panels on and go cool we're

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doing our part never know that there was

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an issue from stage C and if the ca

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folks don't properly communicate it what

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happens well you end up with a plane

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that's got big old defects to the point

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where door plugs just go flying out

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midair now that's a really big problem

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and it's a sign that maybe Boeing is

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much more interested in getting planes

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off the line than actually getting

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quality out the door this is what we

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just heard John Barnett allude to he

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actually made it pretty clear that

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Boeing believes that quality is just a

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form of overhead in other words another

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way of saying there's more cost so what

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can we do to just get more planes out

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the door rather than worrying about

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quality but that's a problem when it

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comes to air travel because you're

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playing with people's lives for dollars

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and that's wrong now Boeing has been

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trying to address this and they've since

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announced that 60% of worker bonuses

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will be based on reducing traveled work

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and this is where I think Toyota has a

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very interesting example of how they

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kind of solve and prevent these sort of

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quality issues and when people think

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about Toyota they usually think high

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quality Vehicles so how can Toyota

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manufacture so well when American

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manufacturing L Boeing can fail so

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miserably well Toyota had this principle

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called the andon cord and it was

9:00

basically something that was popularized

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in Japanese uh popularized in Japanese

9:04

manufacturing where somebody could

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essentially pull on a cord shut down the

9:07

entire production line a supervisor

9:09

would come and go hey what's wrong we're

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going to make sure your issue gets

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solved and somebody else like a

9:14

supervisor is actually able to take

9:16

responsibility for the issue and the

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entire team sort of works to try to

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solve that problem as soon as possible

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to get the rest of the line moving again

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and rather than making somebody feel bad

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for stalling production they actually

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encourage it and everybody works

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together to solve the issue whereas in

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sort of the more American Manufacturing

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Systems you have much more oh come on

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why are you stalling the production line

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move it along let's go we'll fix it

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later and this fix it later mentality

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has actually left a lot of boings

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sitting out on Torx in What's called the

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flight line This is essentially a

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parking lot where planes go waiting to

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get delivered they take off and they go

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deliver them somewhere they make their

9:55

delivery flight but how are you supposed

9:58

to fix a plane outside in the flight

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line when all the ladders and the tools

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and the ergonomic workstations are

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located inside the facilities well this

10:07

is where often times things either get

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missed or they get done poorly and

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that's a big problem all of my citations

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by the way for this are all over at

10:27

eac.edu in Boeing's manufacture

10:29

facturing process controls Parts

10:30

handling and storage and some of the

10:33

examples they found were Hotel key cards

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being used to check door seals no

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manufacturer specifications or

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installation specifications suggesting

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you're supposed to use door key cards to

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check seal fits and Dawn dish soap

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apparently being used to lubricate a

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dual a door seal during installation

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weird and then when Boeing was

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testifying before Congress people were

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asked hey or Boeing was asked do you

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have camera footage of who was working

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on these door plugs who was there oh no

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sorry those cameras were set to Auto

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delete this is like a a culture of a

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disaster here where it's like H move it

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along we're a money losing company we

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got to appease the shareholders we got

11:13

to go make money we got to get our

11:15

bonuses got to get our BuyBacks going

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for the stock and what do you end up

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with junky stuff like soap and hotel

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cards being used in installation

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processes a lot of traveled work nobody

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going back to fix the traveled work in

11:30

fact it's so bad that when this Boeing

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737 Max 9 had its door plug blown off

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Alaska Airlines went back and looked at

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their logs and they were actually

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getting warnings on these on this

11:45

particular plane they actually

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specifically grounded the plane to uh

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essentially one part of the United

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States where it would just conduct

11:54

shorter flights rather than Long Hall

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flights and would stay above land

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because they were already getting

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warnings that something was wrong with

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the plane and they needed to go in for

12:04

detailed inspections I guess some

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passengers complaining about whistling

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noises which could have been an

12:08

indication about the pressure issue from

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the first from the GetGo weren't enough

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you know Arc clearly people like were

12:16

designed not to sit by that door plug

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which is the sad thing that kind of

12:20

suggests Alaska knew about this Boeing

12:23

problem but somehow either via Boeing or

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because of Alaska's failure decided to

12:27

fly anyway Brett I remember interviewing

12:30

him and Brett from Arkin vest he's like

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you know there's like a one in 400

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chance that no one would be sitting next

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to that door plug that blew off somebody

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knew that there was a problem with this

12:40

plane and sure enough there was but

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apparently we have this Aviation culture

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in America at least thanks to Boeing and

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and apparently that might extend over to

12:50

uh spirit Aeros systems which has had

12:51

some issues and maybe even Alaska

12:53

Airlines apparently it's okay to just

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keep floating around with some of these

12:57

known issues going around in fact just

13:00

weeks before the 737 Max incident the uh

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specific plane that had its door plug

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blow off spent nearly 3 weeks quote

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shuffling down an assembly line with

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faulty rivets in need of repair oops and

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so now you've got this John Barnett guy

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who's testifying in a federal

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whistleblower lawsuit uh there are

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specific whistleblower procedures with

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the FAA if you're an employee and you

13:27

have insight into Aviation safety sa and

13:30

so he's testifying in a deposition he's

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in the midst of his deposition staying

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at this holiday and hotel and he's

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citing that he while working at Boeing

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had uncovered serious problems with

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oxygen systems where maybe only one in

13:44

four uh or rather I should say where

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only three and four breathing masks

13:48

would actually work in other words one

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in four so 25% of people might end up

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holding down breathing masks that

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wouldn't actually work in an emergency

13:57

that's disgusting uh and uh Barnett

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suggests that said it's not the 737 that

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was the only problem but it's also the

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787 Dreamliner which is a long haul

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flight uh Base plane or styled plane and

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he called both of these ticking time

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bombs scary really bad so obviously you

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heard it from him himself and then this

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idea that he could just end up dead

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doesn't actually prevent more suspicion

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here if anything it just creates more

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suspicion over boeings I remember back

14:34

uh flying with uh flying on a 737 Max

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and I asked one of the stewardesses

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about it this was probably this was

14:39

preco I asked hey you know don't you

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ever get people who are nervous about

14:43

flying on the Max And she said Oh all

14:46

the time we actually take the little

14:48

safety briefing card and we turn it

14:50

around so it doesn't really clearly at

14:52

the top left say 737 Max so they turn

14:55

The Branding around because the

14:56

reputation is so bad that was all back

14:58

when they had the Ethiopian air uh

15:01

crashes for the uh uh stabilizer

15:04

controls where uh Pilots were M trained

15:07

as we talked about at the beginning of

15:08

the video for a new system that they

15:10

added in the 737 Max you had to kind of

15:12

like rotate some some wheel or whatever

15:15

to overtake the system in the event of a

15:16

failure and two substantially deadly

15:19

accidents a lot of nasty problems

15:22

related to Boeing yet despite all of

15:24

these nasty problems related to Boeing

15:26

what's remarkable is this t has still

15:29

managed to outperform Boeing year-to dat

15:32

in its

15:34

underperformance rip uh in Boeing's

15:37

earnings call they basically Express

15:39

that they're confident in their recovery

15:41

and then when you look at their actual

15:42

income they have narrowed their

15:44

operating loss loss from operations here

15:47

at$

15:48

773 million in 2023 but we uh we expect

15:52

now with these early 2024 issues we

15:56

might end up having even more losses at

15:58

this particular company so quite scary

16:00

to see what's going on in the world of

16:02

Aviation and I'm really sussed out that

16:05

you could whistleblow a company in

16:08

America and just like the Spy movies

16:10

just end up dead I thought that was for

16:13

the

16:14

movies yikes

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