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Air India 171 Update: What Captain Steeeve ISN'T saying

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FULL TRANSCRIPT

0:00

In this video, we're going to react to

0:01

Captain Steve reacting to the Wall

0:03

Street Journal dual engine failure

0:06

engine cut off switch quote unquote

0:10

exclusive. Now, quick catch up. This is

0:13

the checklist for a 787 Dreamliner,

0:17

which if you have a dual engine failure,

0:20

the checklist calls for fuel control

0:22

switches, both of them being set to cut

0:25

off, then run. Now, usually you set it

0:29

to cut off for about 1 second and then

0:32

back to run. It's more of like an off

0:34

and on again. Especially when you're at

0:36

600 ft off the ground, you want to move

0:38

these back to run fast. And these

0:40

switches are very unlikely to mistakenly

0:44

both be in the off position because a

0:46

you can't take off with them in the off

0:48

position and b they have gates that

0:52

require very specific manipulation of

0:54

the switch to actually get it to turn

0:56

off. Uh and then of course a second

0:59

memory item here is the ram air turbine

1:01

switch push and hold to basically

1:03

manually deploy the ram air turbine

1:05

which would also automatically deploy in

1:08

the event of a dual engine failure. But

1:09

this sort of verifies that. Now my name

1:11

is Kevin. I'm also a jet pilot except I

1:13

fly a Phenom 300. And Captain Steve is

1:17

referring to a Wall Street Journal

1:19

article which the Wall Street Journal is

1:21

calling an exclusive which I think is

1:23

really interesting. You can see his art

1:25

uh his piece here area India update fuel

1:27

cut off switches and cutoff position

1:29

according to Wall Street Journal. Now

1:31

this has been talked about for a while

1:33

uh over the past few days and this is

1:35

why I think it's odd that the Wall

1:36

Street Journal is saying this is an

1:38

exclusive because it was really uh I

1:40

mean there were a host of other

1:41

magazines and and uh you know uh air

1:45

news companies covering this already.

1:48

So, I find it odd that the Wall Street

1:49

Journal says this is exclusive, that

1:51

they're finding out about the plane's

1:53

fuel switches being at the focus of uh

1:56

this investigation. But what is

1:59

interesting about this Wall Street

2:01

Journal piece, and we'll see if Captain

2:02

Steve talks about it, but if you

2:04

actually scroll down to the bottom, take

2:06

a look at this. The US government and

2:08

industry officials have been frustrated

2:11

by what they perceive as the slow pace

2:14

of downloading, analyzing, and sharing

2:17

the context of the plane planes contents

2:19

of the plane's black boxes, the cockpit

2:22

voice recorder, and the data recorder to

2:24

indicate when switches were moved into

2:26

what positions and what was said inside

2:28

of the cockpit along with what kind of

2:29

warning messages or engine indicators

2:31

there could have been. Now, why is this

2:34

important? Well, because originally

2:37

india mentioned that they were going to

2:39

send these black boxes after finding

2:40

them which took two days and four days

2:42

to find which is quite a while but

2:45

originally they were going to send them

2:46

to the United States for investigation.

2:49

The United States got involved went to

2:52

India then the United States left. So

2:55

our FAA or NTSB uh inspectors came back

2:58

to the United States without the black

3:01

boxes because India decided that they

3:03

wanted instead to keep the black boxes

3:06

and do the data analysis themselves

3:09

where they recently opened a new lab for

3:12

analyzing such accident data. So

3:15

basically Indian investigators they want

3:18

to download the data themselves. And so

3:20

this is where we see the Wall Street

3:21

Journal says American investigators uh

3:23

remained but they have since returned

3:26

home basically empty hand empty-handed

3:28

without those black boxes which is

3:30

interesting because a lot of folks are

3:32

like hey we we kind of want to know

3:33

about this mostly because we also have

3:36

GE engines on these planes which is an

3:38

American company. This is a Boeing which

3:40

is an American company plane. So there's

3:43

a lot at stake for America and the

3:45

aviation community. Now, there's been a

3:47

lot of speculation around why would

3:49

these switches potentially have been in

3:51

the off position? Why would they stay in

3:53

the off position? Now, one theory is uh

3:57

that this was terrorism and basically

3:59

one of the pilots wanted to, you know,

4:01

check out which is very bad and

4:03

devastating and nobody wants to say

4:04

that. But look, the checklist is off uh

4:09

or cut off rather. It's technically not

4:10

off, it's technically called cut off uh

4:13

and then run. That's what the checklist

4:15

is, which is very different from a 737

4:18

or most other planes. Most other planes

4:20

when you look at their emergency

4:22

procedures for a dual engine failure,

4:23

you do not see touch fuel control valves

4:26

to cut off and run is very very unique.

4:29

And so, uh, even myself, I I was

4:31

surprised when I saw this checklist on

4:34

the 787 Dreamliner, but then again, I

4:36

don't fly the Dreamliner. So, this is

4:38

surprising and it's nice to look at this

4:40

checklist, but again, it shouldn't be

4:42

left in the cutoff position. In fact,

4:45

before that ram air turbine switch is

4:47

manually deployed, you're supposed to

4:49

move the switches back to run. So, did

4:51

they make a mistake? Did they move these

4:53

switches to cutoff and then run? And is

4:56

that why during their troubleshooting at

4:58

600 ft, they just didn't have enough

5:00

time to complete their checklist or

5:02

what? Let's see what Captain Steve has

5:04

to say about this. We're expecting the

5:06

first official findings until last

5:08

month. Sudden loss cuts off the position

5:12

of the switches and how

5:13

>> those this is what the switches look

5:15

like. By the way, this is some nice like

5:17

music and dramatic or whatever cool

5:18

editing. But the point is these little

5:20

arrows right here. They point to these

5:22

little guards that show you you have to

5:25

lift these switches up to switch them

5:28

down.

5:30

>> 71 crash. And this is not the video that

5:33

we wanted to make. In fact, uh the

5:35

information that we're now gleaning from

5:37

the preliminary report that's been

5:39

handed over from AIB to the Indian

5:43

government is nothing short of stunning.

5:46

Uh and I don't

5:47

>> Well, the report is not out yet. Mind

5:49

you, this is what a lot of people are

5:51

getting frustrated about. There are only

5:53

leaks of the report out. In fact, just

5:55

minutes ago, we got a report in the

5:58

Hindu that says, "Don't worry, the AIB's

6:02

preliminary report will be released,

6:04

quote, very soon." So, it's not out yet,

6:07

Captain Steve, but leaks are out. So, a

6:10

lot of this is regarding to, you know,

6:13

or or or how should I put it? Like, you

6:15

know how news companies do this? They're

6:16

like, according to people familiar with

6:18

the matter, you know, these anonymous

6:20

leaks or whatever, that's what you get

6:23

here. You don't have the official report

6:24

yet.

6:25

>> Don't use that word uh loosely. It is a

6:28

stunning conclusion and it surrounds the

6:30

fuel control switches. More on that um

6:33

in a minute, but there are major news

6:35

agencies now around the planet that are

6:37

reporting on the findings of that

6:39

preliminary report to

6:41

>> Okay, let's go to a little bitly after

6:43

>> here. Preliminary findings indicate,

6:45

this is from the Wall Street Journal,

6:46

that the fuel control switches were

6:47

turned off leading to a loss of thrust.

6:50

Correct. But the question is, were they

6:53

put back in the run position? This is

6:57

what the Wall Street Journal doesn't

6:59

tell you. They don't tell you that they

7:00

were turned off and then off at the time

7:02

of the crash. This is why it's it's

7:04

frustrating that the preliminary report

7:05

is not out yet because we're just

7:07

getting speculation around this. But

7:09

let's let's see if Steve clarifies this

7:11

>> for takeoff. So, in this video, we're

7:15

going to talk about three things. We're

7:16

going to talk about what happened, how

7:18

it happened, and then we're going to

7:20

delve into a little bit of why. We're

7:22

not going to get too far into that, but

7:23

we're going to try.

7:24

>> All right, come on.

7:25

>> Turbine or the rat deployed.

7:27

>> Yes, we know the ram journal that it was

7:30

a dual.

7:30

>> These are things that could potentially

7:32

cause the ram air turbine to deploy.

7:34

Hydraulic failure, electrical failure,

7:35

dual engine failure. It is possible,

7:37

mind you, that there was some kind of

7:38

catastrophic electrical failure that

7:40

ended up leading to a dual fadec uh sort

7:44

of reset or uh reversionary mode. In

7:47

fact, that's what some people are

7:49

talking about more consistently now on

7:53

the mainstream media that something

7:55

potentially with those fadeex reset. Uh

7:59

in fact, take a look at this piece right

8:01

here. You can see uh Air India 171 crash

8:04

TCMA failure may have caused Boeing 787

8:08

crash. And then if you jump down a

8:10

little bit to get some more color on

8:11

this. However, uh according to the

8:13

person that they've interviewed here,

8:15

per previous incidents, the chief on the

8:17

list is the TCMA

8:20

and the Fedc. The TCMA is the thrust

8:22

control malfunction accommodation and

8:24

FADC is the full authority digital

8:27

engine control. The TCMA tells the fedc,

8:30

which controls the air speed on the

8:32

thrust uh on the engines whether or not

8:34

it's on the ground. If the TMCA senses

8:37

it's on the ground, it throttles back

8:39

the engines without pilot input. Adding

8:42

that the Air India flight uh could have

8:46

potentially

8:48

uh been suspect or or let's see on the

8:51

on the Air India flight. The fact that

8:53

there are known computer problems causes

8:56

me to suspect the thrust control

8:58

malfunction accommodation and FADC could

9:02

have led to this problem. So basically

9:05

some error whe it's whether it's a

9:07

catastrophic electrical failure or or as

9:09

this person is saying the TCMA

9:12

resetting sending the signal that maybe

9:14

this aircraft was actually on the ground

9:16

when it wasn't pulling that thrust back

9:18

to zero could have been a factor here

9:21

which is obviously not what you want in

9:24

a takeoff. Now look I one of the reasons

9:27

people always ask me like Kevin why do

9:29

you cover this? Why do you cover this?

9:30

Well, because as a jet pilot and a

9:33

passenger, you know, I don't always fly,

9:36

but as a jet pilot and a passenger, I

9:38

want to know because I think it's not

9:40

only good for the aviation community,

9:41

but it's also good for passengers. I

9:42

mean, here's a video clip just so you

9:44

know, like I not only do I fly jets, but

9:47

you know, I don't just operate them in

9:49

simulators. I'll also go stall them in

9:52

real life because it's important. Here's

9:54

just an example so you could see it.

9:56

just a few days ago. Fox.

10:02

>> There we go.

10:05

>> Stall. Stall.

10:08

Stall. Stall.

10:11

Stall. Stall.

10:13

>> There it is.

10:14

>> Stall. Stall.

10:15

>> All right. Power.

10:16

>> So, you can actually see the pusher

10:18

there. Uh, and it's it's really we have

10:19

a hydraulic pusher on this aircraft. And

10:22

so, this is the yolk. That's not me

10:24

pushing it forward. It's actually a uh

10:27

stall prevention mechanism that tries to

10:30

get you to nose down before stalling.

10:32

>> Stall.

10:34

>> There it is.

10:35

>> Stall. Stall.

10:36

>> You could see that. And the again, I'm

10:38

only showing this to say like the reason

10:41

I'm so passionate about understanding

10:43

what's going on here is because I'm in

10:45

aircraft flying these and it's important

10:48

to know what's going on and what why

10:49

these failures are happening to try to

10:51

prevent mistakes in the future. So,

10:53

okay, this is all just catching up so

10:54

far. Captain Steve, we've seen the

10:56

video. We know the ram air turbine was

10:58

deployed. Let's get to the

10:59

>> after takeoff. So, let's answer some

11:01

objections to that. Is it possible that

11:03

there's a procedure where that could

11:05

take place? Well, the answer to that is

11:08

yes and no. There are procedures where

11:10

the pilots would in flight turn one of

11:13

or in some cases both fuel control

11:16

switches to cut off. Let me explain the

11:18

first situation. If you were to lose a

11:20

single engine and the Boeing 787 flies

11:23

just fine on one engine, even with the

11:25

gear down or if the

11:27

>> This is true, by the way. The planes fly

11:28

just fine. Flaps for takeoff or land

11:31

configuration. Uh gear out, one engine

11:35

flight fine. You got an engine on fire.

11:37

You're going to turn your fuel control

11:39

valve off because you want to stop

11:40

feeding that fire, right?

11:42

>> Flaps were retracted prematurely. In

11:44

fact, the Air India pilots went into the

11:46

simulator and tried all of those

11:48

scenarios. We did a video I think about

11:51

10 days ago where we talked here on this

11:53

channel about several of the theories of

11:56

how this airplane could have lost both

11:58

engines. The Air India pilots went into

12:00

the simulator after that and tested all

12:03

of those scenarios and with a total

12:05

>> different pilots mind you

12:07

>> electrical failure a total hydraulic

12:09

failure they could not induce a dual

12:12

engine failure from those two things

12:14

>> right that's what's so weird is like a

12:17

catastrophic electrical failure even

12:19

losing all of your power doesn't turn

12:21

your engines off we think it was

12:23

something having to do with like the

12:25

FedEx reverting to a reversionary mode

12:27

but that means both of them failed

12:29

which is weird. And I think that's why

12:30

the person's talking about the TCMA

12:32

because it's one thing that could cause

12:34

both those fadeex to tell the engines to

12:37

go to idle. Even with the flaps brought

12:39

up prematurely and the gear down on one

12:42

engine, the airplane still flew out.

12:45

>> Correct. That doesn't matter. But if one

12:47

engine had failed right at rotate, is it

12:50

conceivable that one of the pilots

12:53

mistakenly grabbed the other fuel

12:55

control lever and

12:58

this? Absolutely not. There was no rush

13:04

to turn the engine off. I've heard this

13:06

theory before. I think it's crazy to

13:09

think that there was a single engine

13:11

failure and they accidentally turned the

13:13

wrong engine off. Could it happen? Yes.

13:15

I just think it's crazy because in a jet

13:18

there's no rush to turn it off unless

13:19

it's on fire. The the Now, is it

13:23

possible that there were warnings that

13:26

the engines a certain engine was on fire

13:28

and then they've proceeded to the wrong

13:31

uh uh you know checklist maybe. But we

13:34

certainly didn't see the engines on fire

13:36

and that seems like a low chance. But

13:38

let's just say maybe there's a

13:40

possibility. But it seems crazy to me

13:42

because when people fly a jet, it

13:45

doesn't matter if the darn thing is off

13:47

or on, like you know, the fuel valve is

13:50

off or on if you have just a flame out

13:53

because the drag isn't going to change.

13:55

It's not like a propeller plane where

13:57

you're like, "Oh crap, pitch for a blue

14:00

line. Oh no, I need to feather the

14:02

prop." You know, you don't have to do

14:03

that. There's no feathering a jet

14:04

engine. So I I don't I don't like this

14:07

argument.

14:07

>> Put it to cutoff. Well, it's not very

14:10

probable. And here's why. Our training,

14:12

everybody's training follows this

14:14

pattern. If you have an engine failure

14:16

on rotate, which we test all of the

14:18

time, right? When we're in training in

14:19

the simulator, we practice this all the

14:21

time. You don't touch,

14:23

>> not just in the simulator. I do it in

14:24

real life.

14:25

>> Anything until a minimum of 400 ft. And

14:27

you normally don't touch anything until

14:28

about 1,000 ft. There's something called

14:30

an engine out altitude.

14:32

>> Okay? So some people usually you get

14:34

positive rate of climb gear up 400 ft

14:37

you go flap up autopilot yaw dampener on

14:41

uh and some people do that at a th00and

14:43

but these are like everybody's got their

14:45

different systems and procedures here

14:46

but yes there is usually a minimum

14:48

altitude where you're just not dinking

14:49

with stuffitude and that's set for every

14:52

takeoff for just that scenario where

14:54

you'd lose a single engine. The pilot

14:56

flying will say my aircraft. The other

14:58

pilot will then begin to bring up the

14:59

checklist. The pilot flying will say

15:01

quick reference checklist. They'll pull

15:03

out a laminated checklist. They'll then

15:06

begin to coordinate their lucky you got

15:09

a laminated checklist, bro. That's for

15:11

training.

15:13

In training, you use a laminated

15:14

checklist. Usually, you have a booklet

15:16

that you have to go page through. The

15:18

quick reference handbook is actually

15:20

pretty thick. Uh but but you know, you

15:23

get pretty comfortable at opening it

15:24

quickly. efforts back and forth to get

15:27

through the first three or four steps on

15:29

that checklist after they get above 400

15:31

feet and the airplane is climbing

15:33

safely. And mind you,

15:36

Steve's not talking about memory items

15:38

here. The first few items on each of the

15:41

most critical checklist items are memory

15:44

items. That's critical. And so I'm a

15:47

little surprised Steve's not talking

15:48

about this. This is the quick reference

15:51

handbook from the Boeing 787. These are

15:55

memory items. Above the dotted lines are

15:57

memory items. So, you must remember

15:59

these. And the whole point is that you

16:01

do this before ever needing to reference

16:04

the stupid manual because it's critical

16:06

you do it right away. You know, it's um

16:10

something that you just don't have time

16:12

for. You need to react right away. Which

16:14

is why it's entirely possible these

16:16

pilots did everything as intended. that

16:18

they did their memory items and they

16:20

were just too low because of some other

16:22

failure such as that T uh MCA

16:26

and the landing gear has been brought

16:28

up. At that point, the pilot flying will

16:31

say let's start the checklist. The pilot

16:33

monitoring will do the first item which

16:35

would be uh auto throttle and they'll

16:37

point to the auto throttle the switch

16:39

and they'll say left side or right side

16:40

depending on which engine has failed and

16:42

then they both concur with that and they

16:44

turn it off. Next is the thrust levers

16:48

and then the one pilot flying.

16:50

>> That was a diagram of both of the

16:51

switches turning off, which was a bad

16:54

example because the editor didn't

16:55

realize that you were only supposed to

16:57

show one of these switches going off.

16:58

But this part doesn't matter. We're

16:59

going to fast forward a little bit. He's

17:01

just going through some of the procedure

17:02

for a single engine shutdown. And I've

17:05

kind of already ranted about that

17:06

enough. Let's look at this. I like this

17:07

diagram.

17:08

>> Failure that's also on that quick

17:11

reference checklist. The dual engine

17:13

failure requires the pilot monitoring to

17:16

take both fuel control levers and place

17:18

them to cut off and then back to run.

17:20

That's the entire procedure. They don't

17:22

sit and cut off for a while. It's not

17:24

like you count to 1 2 3 and then put

17:26

them back.

17:27

>> It's not the entire procedure because

17:28

you also need to deploy the Ramire

17:30

turbine, but that's okay.

17:30

>> You go right to cut off, right back to

17:32

run. Now, uh that procedure obviously

17:36

was not done. There is never

17:39

>> Well, we don't know that it wasn't done.

17:42

That's the problem. We don't know

17:43

because we don't actually have the full

17:45

preliminary report. We don't know that

17:47

the procedure wasn't done. Yes, we have

17:50

heard rumors that people that

17:51

investigators are focusing on the fuel

17:53

control switches, but we do not know

17:55

that they did not complete this

17:56

procedure. We know the ram air turbine

17:57

was deployed which does mean that we

18:00

could have reset the fuel control valves

18:02

and deployed the ram air turbine

18:05

but it was too late to gain altitude

18:07

anyway because the you know the fedex

18:09

had reverted to zero thrust.

18:11

>> Ever in the history of commercial flight

18:13

ever been a procedure where you take

18:16

both fuel cutff switches and put them to

18:18

cut off and leave them there

18:20

>> especially not seconds after rotate.

18:23

Now, one of the things that's bothered

18:25

me in this whole scenario from the

18:27

beginning was how quickly the ram air

18:29

turbine or the rat deployed uh shortly

18:32

after takeoff, and I'm talking four or

18:33

five seconds after takeoff, that rat

18:35

comes out, the rat is there as a last

18:39

resort.

18:40

>> It's in the checklist, bro. It's in the

18:42

check. I don't think Steve looked at

18:44

this checklist.

18:44

>> In case there is a dual engine failure,

18:47

and a dual engine failure normally takes

18:49

some time to progress. Those big old

18:51

engines need to spool down. It might

18:53

take 30 to 60 seconds for them to

18:55

completely fail to send the message to

18:58

the rat to deploy. It's designed to be

19:00

something that happens at altitude,

19:02

maybe 35,000 ft. Both engines flame out.

19:05

They they spool down. The rat then

19:07

deploys to give you electric hydraulic.

19:10

It doesn't give you any thrust, but it

19:11

gives you enough to fly the airplane and

19:12

shoot an approach when you get down and

19:14

talk on a radio. Now, that rat came out

19:17

almost immediately. Why would that rat

19:19

come out so quickly? Because the whole

19:21

flight didn't last more than Did you

19:22

push the button?

19:24

>> 60 seconds. The only explanation is that

19:28

both of those fuel control levers were

19:30

placed to cut off. That would

19:32

>> No, it's in the checklist. It's not the

19:35

only explanation. A Steve

19:39

immediately deploy the RAT. The RAT now

19:43

the airplane is in what's called

19:44

airborne logic as opposed to ground

19:46

logic. What's the difference between

19:48

those two? When the airplane is on the

19:50

ground and there's weight

19:50

>> weight on wheel switches. It's okay. We

19:52

get it. I'm not going to watch all of

19:53

this.

19:54

>> Goes to the run position and then it

19:56

stays there for the duration of the

19:58

flight unless of course there's an

19:59

engine failure and you need to bring it

20:01

back to the cut off position. But taking

20:03

it from run to cut off is also that same

20:06

three-step procedure. You have to grasp

20:08

it, pull it up over the detent, pull it

20:11

down, and release it cuz it's

20:13

spring-loaded to the cup.

20:14

>> He's just talking about how the little

20:16

switches work. We've already talked

20:17

about that many times.

20:18

>> You may never have an answer to that. be

20:21

quite honest with you, never have an

20:22

answer to that. Uh but we do need to

20:25

delve into that because I think it's

20:26

hugely important and it's a big question

20:28

that's sitting out there that at least

20:30

we need to try to attempt to answer. Uh

20:33

and that's where my other area of

20:35

expertise comes in. I'm not just Captain

20:38

Steve who flies an airliner for a major

20:41

airline and I'm also Dr. Steve. And I've

20:44

been a doctor now for I think I had my

20:46

doctorate about 15 years ago. Uh, but

20:49

I've been a trained, experienced

20:51

counselor for well over 30 years and

20:54

I've counseledled thousands of people,

20:56

families, individ. We're going into

20:59

mental health. This is where we go

21:01

mental health and the terrorism side.

21:02

>> Most extensive training uh any pilot

21:05

gets on through that program eight years

21:08

earlier as a student and I earned my

21:10

wings.

21:12

>> Oh yeah. What is it?

21:12

>> Next evaluate there. It's student in the

21:15

just is I just said that I said look my

21:17

aircraft. I I said, "Let's What's going

21:19

on, man?" And he explained to me that he

21:22

had been up until about 3:00 in the

21:24

morning on the phone with his father who

21:27

lived in the Midwest, and his father was

21:29

attempting to commit suicide. His dad

21:31

had a loaded gun in his lap.

21:34

>> Okay. All right. So, this is the last

21:36

part of this video is about mental

21:38

health, which is very sad. Uh, and yeah,

21:41

pilot fatigue, very real issue. You know

21:43

what's actually incredible? When I I was

21:45

just looking at this data. Uh I looked

21:47

at my

21:49

uh health data in my app and I looked at

21:53

my uh what was it? My uh what did what

21:56

what did I look at? Was it the VO V2s or

22:00

something? Oh, an easy Yeah, I mean

22:04

that's an option, too. But an easy one

22:05

that shows it nicely is I want you to

22:07

see this. And I'll tell you, there's

22:09

something crappy about becoming a pilot

22:12

and going through all the training. Uh,

22:14

and it's this. Can you see where in this

22:18

last year I had a substantial amount of

22:20

pilot training?

22:22

This is a step counter.

22:25

It's the whole

22:28

December, January, February, March,

22:30

April.

22:31

Like actually staying fit as a pilot is

22:34

hard because it's so much classroom work

22:36

and studying and and actually sitting in

22:39

a plane flying and you're not walking

22:41

obviously. So um fatigue, depression,

22:47

lack of physical fitness, these are all

22:49

things that could be components of well

22:52

sadness that yeah could also lead to the

22:55

unfortunate possibility that there was

22:56

an oopsy dupy that shouldn't have

22:58

happened. Now, do we think that's

23:02

likely? It depends. We still don't have

23:05

that preliminary report, and that's what

23:07

everybody is looking for right now is

23:09

why is that preliminary report getting

23:10

delayed? There are a lot of suspicions

23:12

now circulating around that. But I will

23:14

say the good news on this channel is if

23:17

anything or anything that we talked

23:19

about here makes you nervous at all, you

23:22

can go to met kevvin.com/life.

23:24

That's one e because we've met each

23:26

other now. at kevin.com/life. Hit enter

23:28

and you can get life insurance in as

23:30

little as 5 minutes. Can Apple pay and

23:33

Android pay for it? It's the same

23:35

insurance that Lauren and I use. Check

23:36

it out at metk.com/life.

23:38

Paid sponsor of the channel.

23:40

>> Why not advertise these things that you

23:41

told us here? I feel like nobody else

23:43

knows about this.

23:44

>> We'll we'll try a little advertising and

23:45

see how it goes.

23:46

>> Congratulations, man. You have done so

23:47

much. People love you. People look up to

23:49

you.

23:49

>> Kevin Praath there, financial analyst

23:51

and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great

23:53

to get your take.

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