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SHOCKING UPDATE Midair Collision over Potomac!!

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0:00

we've

0:01

determined that the existing separation

0:04

distances between helicopter traffic

0:06

operating on Route 4 and aircraft

0:09

landing on Runway 33 are insufficient

0:13

and pose an intolerable risk to Aviation

0:18

safety by increasing the chances of a

0:20

midair collision at DCA it's official

0:23

the NTSB has just released their

0:25

preliminary accident investigation into

0:28

the midair Collision over the Atomic

0:30

river between American flight 5342 and

0:32

the Blackhawk army helicopter the

0:35

preliminary report calls for the Banning

0:39

of helicopters from flying under the

0:43

flight path that would allow planes to

0:45

land at Runway 15 or

0:47

33 and calls for helicopters to either

0:51

take alternate routes or hold outside of

0:55

that Runway path when the runway path is

0:58

in use they go as far as calling the

1:01

risks at DCA

1:04

intolerable we'll talk about the details

1:06

of this and we'll go through the report

1:08

itself we'll also talk about some of the

1:11

experience of the pilots in detail in

1:14

the report let's get into the report and

1:16

I'll add commentary as we go so first we

1:19

get an introduction 64 fatalities we've

1:23

obviously uh that's everyone on the

1:25

American flight that's 60 passengers two

1:27

pilots two flight attendants three

1:29

fatalities I ities on the helicopter

1:31

flight this is a reconstruction using

1:35

the publicly available data by the NTSB

1:38

on the flight paths and where the

1:40

Collision occurred overlaid onto a

1:42

satellite image uh to give us an idea of

1:46

what we're looking at and what we're up

1:48

against what you'll find uh is flight

1:53

5342 which you can't see in this was

1:55

actually circling from an approach to

1:58

another Runway around to 33 this was

2:02

something we've covered in the past

2:03

before so we won't rehash that much now

2:06

but what you really want to see is this

2:07

lining up of Runway 33 and that

2:10

helicopter having this intention of

2:14

passing below Landing traffic now in

2:17

this investigation we find out that

2:19

there was instruction from the flight

2:22

instructor to the newer helicopter pilot

2:25

that they were too high and that they

2:26

needed to descend but before I show you

2:29

that I want you to see the graphic the

2:32

NTSB used when they explained this issue

2:35

in their investigation video it's about

2:38

30 minutes long so I'll give you uh the

2:40

quick rundown on it take a look at this

2:42

board here what she says is that the

2:45

helicopter per the FAA flight charts is

2:48

supposed to take this route right here

2:51

between about 100 ft in elevation above

2:54

the ground uh and an altitude of 200 ft

2:57

no more than 200 ft that's what we've

2:59

seen on the f FAA charts previously

3:01

that's what's reiterated on this picture

3:03

here however the papy Glide path the

3:07

papy guided uh Glide path into Runway 33

3:12

would put at best case scenario an

3:15

airplane at a 75 ft vertical difference

3:20

away from an underneath passing

3:23

helicopter and we know the helicopter

3:26

was high but the helicopter was not only

3:29

High the helicopter was also to the West

3:32

closer to this area of just 200 ft a

3:37

helicopter operating over the Eastern

3:39

Shoreline of the pomac river would have

3:43

just 75 ft a vertical separation from an

3:47

airplane approaching Runway

3:50

33 75

3:53

ft that distance decreases if the

3:56

helicopter is operated farther from the

3:58

shoreline and again

4:00

this helicopter the Blackhawk was

4:02

operated farther to the west and in this

4:05

region you have even less than 75 ft of

4:09

potential distance if both are

4:12

performing perfectly in other words if

4:15

the helicopter is perfectly on its Glide

4:17

path rather than slightly below it which

4:19

is possible since autopilot was

4:21

disconnected by this point uh which is

4:23

normal or that helicopter slightly over

4:26

to the right and slightly high well this

4:28

is exactly how you end up get getting a

4:30

collision course and this is why uh the

4:33

NTSB uh calls this risk ridiculous

4:37

essentially that this was even able to

4:39

happen and they call it intolerable

4:41

that's the word that they use but they

4:42

do it with a passion of implying that it

4:44

was ridiculous that this was allowed to

4:46

happen in the first place and they kind

4:48

of cast a little bit of shade at the FAA

4:50

suggesting hey you know we should have

4:53

known that this was going to happen and

4:55

this should never happen again so

4:57

there'll be a lot of learning lessons

4:59

and experience out of this but based on

5:01

just the FAA approved flight paths it

5:05

seems pretty ridiculous that it was

5:07

possible for helicopters to land or fly

5:09

under passing and Landing traffic now

5:12

let's talk about the pilot experience

5:14

which we now have documented in the NTSB

5:16

report now we can see that the captain

5:18

and first officer of the crj 65 both had

5:23

over 3,000 hours of experience you can

5:26

see that the captain flying the plane

5:27

had 3,950 hours and the first officer

5:31

had uh oh sorry uh over 2,000 hours both

5:35

of them had over 2,000 hours the first

5:36

officer was over

5:39

2,469 total hours 966 in type and the

5:43

captain flying had 3,950 hours 3,000 in

5:48

the plane so clarifying that both of

5:49

them have over 2,000 hours uh flying in

5:53

with flying experience so that that is

5:56

the American Airlines flight

5:58

5342 when we look here at the helicopter

6:01

we see a little bit of a lack of

6:04

experience now having been somebody

6:06

who's just gone through training myself

6:09

and I just became a licensed pilot in

6:11

command of a jet it's a Phenom 300E

6:15

Embraer 55s some people like to call

6:17

them uh I can tell you there is a lot to

6:21

learn and when they say that becoming

6:24

excuse me when they say that becoming a

6:26

pilot is a license to learn I could tell

6:28

you I probably had more hours in total

6:32

or I probably have more hours in total

6:34

than the pilot flying the helicopter in

6:37

that type

6:39

helicopter that's not a way of saying

6:42

that hey oh you know I have more

6:44

experience with them it's just a way of

6:46

saying I just started becoming a pilot

6:48

in December it's been about a 100 days

6:52

and the point of that is saying I have

6:54

very few hours they have very few hours

6:57

there is a lot to learn this this is why

6:59

I personally always fly with a second

7:01

professional pilot who has thousands of

7:03

more hours than me so I can learn and

7:06

appropriately fly this plane that said I

7:09

can tell you usually when you're in

7:11

training and this is a frustration I've

7:13

explained in the past usually when

7:14

you're in training what you're going to

7:16

find is the people who are training

7:18

you at least in your initial phases of

7:21

flight learning do not have a lot of

7:23

hours themselves so when you're first

7:25

learning how to fly a single uh engine

7:27

propeller plane you're usually learning

7:29

learning from people with less than

7:30

1,500 hours themselves often even less

7:33

than a th000 hours themselves then you

7:35

get to instrument ratings same thing

7:37

people with less than 1500 to 1,000

7:39

hours themselves when you get to

7:41

multi-engine training same thing people

7:43

with less than 1500 hours themselves

7:46

it's only when you get into the next

7:48

class of learning like uh for example

7:50

flying a jet that you start learning

7:52

from people with a lot of hours the

7:54

people that I flew with when I was

7:55

learning piston planes and getting my

7:56

initial licenses I would say the average

7:59

experience that somebody had was about 8

8:02

to 900 hours soon as I started learning

8:05

here the average experience that people

8:07

had that are training me in this about

8:09

10,000 hours you know you're talking

8:11

6,000 hours 8,000 hours 25,000 hours

8:14

30,000 hours 10,000 hours it's

8:16

incredible the differences in experience

8:20

but the point of saying this is when

8:22

you're learning how to get started

8:24

especially flying at night with night

8:26

vision and your vision is obscured

8:28

you're learning from people who don't

8:29

actually have that much more experience

8:31

than you when you're starting and I

8:33

personally think it's a problem now it

8:35

makes sense because once people have

8:36

experience they go on to bigger vehicles

8:38

but that's a downside because it means

8:40

newer people are teaching newer people

8:42

like I personally technically and

8:43

legally have the hours to be a flight

8:46

instructor but that doesn't mean I feel

8:49

qualified to teach somebody else when

8:50

I'm still in the middle of learning okay

8:53

so let's go back to this right here take

8:55

a look at this the pilot flying the

8:58

helicopter had 450 hours total 326 in

9:02

the accident helicopter the instructor

9:05

pilot had 968 hours 300 in the make and

9:11

model of a helicopter so you could

9:13

really see the experience difference

9:16

between the two here but beyond this I

9:18

want you to see the following here at

9:21

8:45 and 27 seconds autopilot was

9:24

disconnected on flight 5342 and began a

9:27

shallow right turn off runway one off

9:29

the runway one localizer to basically go

9:31

Circle over towards Runway

9:34

33 at roughly the same time so about 12

9:39

seconds uh 13 seconds before that you

9:41

can see here the uh cockpit voice

9:45

recorder data revealed that the

9:47

instructor told the pilot the student

9:50

that they were at 300 ft which is very

9:53

quick to do mind you I flown helicopters

9:55

as well and it's really easy to go from

9:58

200 to 300 ft it doesn't take a lot of

10:01

pressure at all and you're there so you

10:04

got to be really careful here and this

10:06

is assuming you're paying attention to

10:07

your ultimeter and that it is accurate

10:10

it is possible that some of the

10:11

ultimeter settings were also false not

10:14

just the settings but the potential

10:15

readings in fact in the NTSB preliminary

10:19

report they talk about the potential uh

10:23

for the pressure altitude data being

10:26

invalid for the helicopter which that

10:28

obviously makes things even more

10:30

challenging uh keep this in mind

10:32

ultimeter mismatches can like even a

10:35

10-point mismatch on your ultimeter

10:38

could be the difference of 100 ft so you

10:40

could think you're at 200 and actually

10:42

be at 300 and remember the FAA chart

10:45

only gives you a 75 ft difference and

10:49

they are going as far as calling the uh

10:52

uh pressure altitude is invalid for what

10:56

was being recorded or reported by the

10:58

helicopter data which does mean there's

10:59

a potential the pilots had bad data but

11:02

in addition to having bad data their

11:04

preliminary investigation is also

11:06

revealing that the instructor did tell

11:09

the student they were too high and that

11:11

they needed to descend now what you'll

11:14

find when we Circle over here see the

11:17

pilot or the um the pilot said they

11:19

would need to descent to 200 ft because

11:20

the instructor told them to and when we

11:22

go to where the accident occurred you'll

11:25

actually find the various different

11:28

heights uh for each of them which is

11:31

right here the pat at the time of

11:35

collision had an altitude of about 278

11:39

ft so that means they only descended

11:42

about 22 ft from the time that they said

11:45

they needed to descend to approximately

11:47

impact time now it looks

11:51

like uh right here as they observed the

11:54

Collision which occurred at about 20

11:56

4759 so 475 59 was Collision point and

12:01

they acknowledged about 2 minutes before

12:05

that that they were too high so they had

12:07

about 2 and 1/2 minutes to descend and

12:10

they only descended 22 ft which is a

12:13

sign that well maybe they intended to

12:15

descend they just never completed their

12:18

their their descent in fact the

12:21

helicopter was in a pitch up attitude at

12:24

the time of the Collision I found that

12:26

very interesting both of the record both

12:28

of them had Co voice recorders with

12:30

excellent quality 2 hours of excellent

12:32

quality the lights were

12:34

on uh we know we already know some of

12:36

the data about how uh one of the pilots

12:39

potentially uh stepped on air traffic

12:41

control and that's why they missed pass

12:43

behind but we also think that the

12:45

helicopter misidentified pass behind

12:47

which plane or keep which plane inside

12:49

anyway the helicopter's pitch at the

12:51

time of the Collision was about a half a

12:52

degree nose up so slight I mean ever so

12:55

slight that's very very slightly nose up

12:58

but the point is is it's not nose down

13:01

it's not we're not descending here not

13:03

that you necessarily have to be nose

13:05

down with a helicopter anyway you could

13:06

descend without being nosed down but uh

13:09

it is interesting it it 2 minutes to

13:11

descent 22 ft doesn't imply a very

13:14

serious descent anyway uh a lot of talk

13:19

that we also hear in this not only in

13:21

this report but also at the press

13:23

conference had to do with resolution

13:26

advisories and traffic advisories here's

13:28

just some damage like the impact site uh

13:31

in the report here so two iPad minis

13:35

were recovered uh maintenance records

13:38

seemed excellent there a review of

13:40

commercial operations instrument flight

13:42

Rule instrument flight Rule departures

13:44

or arrivals at DCA between October 21

13:47

and December 24 indicated a total of 944

13:51

th000 operations during that time there

13:53

were

13:55

15,24 operations where commercial

13:57

airplanes and helicopters had a

13:59

separation of less than 1 mile and a

14:01

vertical separation of less than 400 ft

14:03

less than 400 ft is a little on the

14:05

tight side you're definitely going to be

14:06

getting the traffic traffic advisory

14:09

within this sort of separation and then

14:11

usually when you get even closer that's

14:13

when you'll move into a resolution

14:15

advisory uh and this could be where

14:17

tcast will actually command you to do

14:20

something now we do know that traffic

14:23

traffic was announced and heard in the

14:26

cockpits uh of this

14:30

situation however it's possible that the

14:33

plane descended below the tcast

14:37

functioning level because tcast inhibits

14:40

once you get closer to the ground

14:41

automatically for a lot of these planes

14:44

and it's possible that that traffic

14:46

advisory would have turned into a

14:47

resolution advisory telling you what to

14:49

do had they had more altitude but it's

14:52

likely they descended below the inhibit

14:55

altitude and they never got a resolution

14:57

advisory which could have been a Savor

14:58

here here now personally I've had plenty

15:01

of traffic alerts especially coming in

15:03

for landing these as a pilot are almost

15:07

a nuisance when you're coming into land

15:09

because you're clear to land you're

15:11

configured you're looking you're

15:12

watching you're seeing you're avoiding

15:13

it's a little harder to do at night but

15:15

you're doing your

15:16

best and usually the I would I

15:19

personally would argue nine out of 10

15:21

times the traffic advisories that I get

15:24

as I'm coming into land are planes

15:27

holding short the runway like another

15:29

plane waiting to take off and it's just

15:32

flashing on my uh you know the Garmin

15:34

3000 the flight deck okay we know yes

15:38

there are other planes around so there

15:40

could be some complacency in the

15:42

sensitivity of these traffic

15:45

advisories I personally have also gotten

15:48

into conflicts where my my um dashboard

15:51

or my flight deck will be ready uh to

15:54

tell me to climb or descend and I'm

15:56

watching traffic pass by at 500 ft with

15:59

Air Traffic Control you know we're we're

16:01

communicating we're talking we're seeing

16:02

and we're avoiding we're 500 ft away I'm

16:05

flying in a jet and I'm looking I go my

16:08

gosh that plane is close and you're

16:10

you're just holding the Yoke with your

16:12

finger over the autopilot disconnect

16:14

ready to descend or do whatever the

16:17

resolution advisory advises but again

16:19

not when you're coming into land so

16:23

there could potentially be a little bit

16:25

of complacency around traffic advisories

16:28

but then losing the resolution

16:30

advisory probably unideal in this

16:33

situation it could have potentially led

16:36

the plane to climb sooner had they

16:39

gotten the advisory versus the high

16:41

level inhibit which I believe the

16:42

inhibits at about 400 ft it might be

16:44

around 500t depends on the model and uh

16:47

we saw in this report that the accident

16:49

occurred with a plane at about 378 ft in

16:52

height uh and uh we'll go ahe and pull

16:55

that height up again just to verify

16:56

because now I might be misquoting that

16:57

and I want to get the correct out of

16:59

here uh I'm sorry 313 ft and the

17:02

helicopter was indicating 278 ft which

17:05

again they doubt some of the altitude

17:07

readings that they're getting of the

17:09

helicopter now uh what what can be

17:12

learned from this well uh in in my

17:14

opinion I totally agree with the NTSB

17:17

that planes should not be just 75 ft

17:21

apart from helicopters on FAA database

17:24

charts this it's it's almost I first of

17:28

all I completely agree it's intolerable

17:29

but it's almost shocking to me that that

17:31

was even approved and not thought of in

17:33

the first place it just makes you wonder

17:35

how could the FAA

17:37

approve something with such a little

17:40

margin of safety in fact most of the uh

17:44

documents that you you know the the

17:45

charts or sectionals or you know uh low

17:48

IFR flight routes that you get provide

17:51

you minimum distances on purpose to give

17:54

you a buffer for example your minimum

17:57

buffer above terrain on most most of the

17:59

FAA charting is 2,000 ft in mountainous

18:01

terrain so you have a 2,000t buffer if

18:04

you're in Florida and non-mountainous

18:05

terrain you'd have 1,000 foot buffer

18:07

over

18:08

terrain advised on charts that the FAA

18:11

would approve something that would bring

18:13

vehicles within 75 ft of each other is

18:15

is mind-blowing to me now that's not to

18:18

say that there aren't other challenging

18:19

airports in fact there probably are uh I

18:22

just took the plane to uh Aspen which is

18:25

a challenging airport to fly into mostly

18:27

because your decent is about 2 and 1/2

18:29

times what you're used to so you know if

18:31

a normal descent profile looks like this

18:34

you know you're you're probably coming

18:35

in more like this it's a little weird

18:37

but it's okay uh buttered my Landing

18:39

into Aspen and coming back home so we

18:42

went there on Sunday and we were holding

18:44

short uh the runway to take off there's

18:47

only one runway in Aspen and uh the

18:49

plane in front of us uh takes off and

18:53

it's cleared for takeoff at the same

18:55

time another plane is cleared to land

18:58

facing each other so one plane's coming

19:00

in to land like this and another plane

19:03

is cleared in the opposite direction to

19:05

take off that's what they do Inn Aspen

19:07

because Jets Land one way and take off

19:10

the other way that's the way it is if

19:12

you have a smaller plane you could go

19:13

the other direction if you wanted to but

19:15

Jets take off one way land the other way

19:20

and usually the rule is the the the way

19:23

you fly out of Aspen in this direction

19:25

is as soon as you rotate positive rate

19:27

Gear Up you start your Bank to the right

19:29

to get out of Landing traffic's way

19:32

climb as quickly as possible then turn

19:35

left and get out of the Final Approach

19:38

path uh for for other traffic now again

19:42

clear day and this is generally only

19:44

going to happen in a clear day as you

19:45

know the field is yours if you're in in

19:48

the

19:48

clouds or you just don't go there and

19:50

they shut the airport down but what's

19:54

remarkable to me is even with both of

19:56

the aircraft seeing each other in a

19:59

clear as day environment with no clouds

20:03

you ended up having and we're watching

20:05

on our flight deck you have this plane

20:07

taking off and the other coming into

20:08

Land This One turns right this one's

20:10

coming into land

20:12

400t distance apart to me that's tight I

20:16

don't like that I guarantee you they

20:18

were getting traffic

20:19

advisories but here's an example where

20:22

you actually have on a daily basis a

20:25

normal takeoff where planes are pointing

20:27

at each other and like trying to dodge

20:29

each other as a normal departure

20:32

procedure that's odd to me so uh there

20:35

are few problems here I think number one

20:38

these uh sort of Standards should

20:42

certainly be reviewed for more spacing

20:44

and safety there are probably some

20:47

adjustments that can be made to the way

20:49

tcast provides resolution advisories in

20:51

terms of when it inhibits especially

20:53

around sensitive

20:55

areas but I think you know we could

20:58

start with having greater Separation on

20:59

some of the FAA charts and obviously in

21:03

other videos we've talked about calm

21:05

issues potentially using uh different

21:08

ways of identifying which traffic you're

21:10

following in this is a big deal as well

21:13

worth rehashing quickly on my

21:15

multi-engine check ride I was asked to

21:18

follow traffic in as number three to

21:20

land and I look they say off my left

21:23

wing 9:00 great I look okay traffic

21:28

inside

21:29

and then I look at my iPad and go hey

21:30

just verifying do you want me to follow

21:32

Charlie Alpha and they're like no I want

21:34

you to follow Alpha Charlie it was a

21:37

tail number with the same letters at the

21:38

end and I'm like that's confusing and

21:40

I'm looking I'm clicking around go oh my

21:42

gosh there was a Plane off my

21:44

left so I'll show you a little bit my

21:48

example here so I'm flying like this on

21:51

the downwind there's a Plane off my left

21:54

that's on final but then there was

21:56

another plane on base here and they

22:00

wanted me to follow the one on base that

22:02

was being blocked by the other and they

22:04

had similar tail numbers so uh you know

22:07

I'll tell you triple cheing who you're

22:10

following in just the limited experience

22:12

that I have major deal so a lot of

22:16

things to learn here in addition to just

22:18

oh my gosh you know what like there's

22:22

there's so much to learn and the better

22:24

the more you can learn from somebody

22:26

with thousand thousands of hours of

22:28

experience

22:29

the better because there's there's a lot

22:30

here and I do think a newer pilot

22:33

training a newer pilot in the Blackhawk

22:36

while that's the way training is done in

22:39

aviation also poses significant risks my

22:43

take thanks for watching and here's an

22:45

update for you stay tuned for more and

22:47

if you have any questions about Aviation

22:49

or what it was like to become a Jet

22:50

Pilot or some differences between piston

22:52

and Jet happy to make a video on that if

22:55

that's something you're interested in

22:56

thanks so much goodbye not advertise

22:58

these that you told us here I feel like

22:59

nobody else knows about this we'll we'll

23:01

try a little advertising and see how it

23:03

goes congratulations man you have done

23:04

so much people love you people look up

23:06

to you Kevin paffrath there financial

23:08

analyst and YouTuber meet Kevin always

23:10

great to get your take

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