TRANSCRIPTEnglish

OMG: Air India 171 Investigation Leaked TERRORISM - Fuel Switches SHUT OFF

13m 22s2,241 words336 segmentsEnglish

FULL TRANSCRIPT

0:00

A critical clue has been found in the

0:02

Air India 171 accident that killed

0:05

nearly 300 people. It has been almost a

0:10

month since the accident and we're

0:13

finally getting a hint as to what could

0:15

have happened. Hey everyone, meet Kevin

0:18

here. I am a licensed jet pilot and

0:21

we've been covering the Air India story.

0:23

We just now have information out from

0:26

sources familiar with the investigation

0:28

that is about to be released with a

0:31

critical detail of what may have gone

0:34

wrong in the Air India 171 crash. Now,

0:37

keep in mind, everybody's been

0:38

captivated by this news because we're

0:40

worried. Oh my gosh, do we need to be

0:42

nervous about planes just falling out of

0:45

the sky on takeoff? This is really

0:47

weird. It's nerve-wracking. This is

0:49

scary. Is it safe to fly? And mind you,

0:52

while in America we have over 45,000

0:54

deaths a year from car travel, we have

0:57

fewer than 350 per year aviation deaths,

1:01

which means basically all US deaths

1:04

almost occurred for an entire year in

1:06

that one accident. Of course, in India,

1:09

it's scary. It shows the immensity, an

1:12

entire year's worth of a country's

1:14

deaths all compressed into one accident

1:17

essentially. It's scary. So, it's made a

1:19

lot of us nervous about what could have

1:21

gone wrong. We've speculated that, well,

1:23

we've seen the ram air turbine deployed.

1:25

Maybe this was because of some kind of

1:27

catastrophic electrical failure. But

1:30

planes don't lose thrust because of a

1:32

catastrophic electric failure. Did some

1:34

kind of catastrophic electric related

1:37

failure lead to a dual fedc reversion in

1:40

the engines leading to a loss of thrust?

1:42

Boy, that's a crazy lineup of the Swiss

1:45

cheese. That just seems like a very

1:48

weird alignment of events. Or is it

1:51

possible that something else went wrong

1:53

with the engines like fuel

1:54

contamination, vapor lock? Well, we

1:56

didn't he it's very rare for jets to

1:58

have a vapor lock issue. It's usually

2:00

something you consider in pistons can

2:01

happen in jets and fuel contamination.

2:03

No other aircraft had fuel issues that

2:05

day. Now, while regulators did go

2:08

investigate Air India after the accident

2:11

and issue citations for things that they

2:13

could do better along with other

2:14

airlines, this is the same routine thing

2:16

that happens in the United States. After

2:18

something goes wrong or there's a report

2:20

or something, investigators come in and

2:21

issue citations because that's how we

2:25

show that they're doing their job. Well,

2:27

it turns out that now there is a new

2:29

update. Air India 171787

2:33

Max 8 crash caused by quote fuel switch

2:37

mistake. H this is not something that is

2:41

usually a mistake. Let's read and then

2:45

I'll add. Investigators are looking into

2:47

the deadly June 12th crash of Air India

2:49

171 and have begun focusing on a

2:51

potentially crucial element. The

2:53

aircraft's engine control fuel switches.

2:57

According to multiple media reports

3:00

citing aviation sources, the switches,

3:02

which regulate flow to each engine, are

3:05

now at the center of the inquiry into

3:08

what caused the Boeing 787 Dreamliner to

3:10

plummet seconds after takeoff. The

3:13

report by Air Current, so this is re

3:16

reported from the original report from

3:19

Aircur, an aviation focused publication,

3:21

says multiple individuals familiar with

3:23

the ongoing investigation, so they could

3:25

be wrong. We don't actually have the

3:26

official release yet, right? But they

3:28

are suggesting that analysis of the

3:30

aircraft's blackbox data has pointed to

3:32

a possible movement of the switches.

3:35

What? Wait a second. If these fuel

3:39

control switches were in the off

3:41

position, the aircraft would have lost

3:44

engine power during taxi. You wouldn't

3:47

have even been able to complete the

3:49

runup process for turning your engines

3:51

on. Because on Boeings, you turn the

3:53

engines on. Once you get to about 25%,

3:56

you throw those fuel switches on. Every

3:58

aircraft obviously a little bit

3:59

different, but generally these switches

4:01

are going to be in the on position.

4:05

If you turn them off during taxi, the

4:07

engines are going to shut down. If you

4:10

turn them off before takeoff, not only

4:12

are you going to get errors and cast

4:14

messages on your primary and and you

4:16

know multi-function displays, but you're

4:19

not going to take off. Anyone who's in a

4:22

pilot seat, either left or right, is

4:25

going to command an aborted takeoff. So,

4:28

it is unlikely these switches were in

4:31

the inappropriate position because a we

4:34

wouldn't have made it from the gate to

4:35

the runway. certainly wouldn't have been

4:37

able to take off with these in the off

4:39

position. So that means if these

4:42

switches did indeed get switched off, we

4:45

then wonder were these switches

4:48

accidentally switched off? Were they

4:50

bumped off? Well, in order to understand

4:53

a little bit about these switches, which

4:54

you can see graphically right here, fuel

4:57

control, you have two settings, run or

5:01

cut off. Well, they look like normal

5:04

little switches. You could just

5:06

accidentally brush your hand over and

5:08

switch off, right? Wrong. Because the

5:11

aircraft that I fly has exactly the same

5:13

style of switches. We actually use the

5:15

switches for our ignitions, not for our

5:18

uh for fuel cut off. We have fuel flow

5:21

switches in a different location. But

5:23

when we look at uh in the similar

5:25

location, we look at our ignition

5:28

switches, we have the same sort of

5:29

knobs. And the way these work is once

5:32

they're in the on or auto position, you

5:35

can't push them down. So if a child

5:37

walks up and tries to push them down or

5:39

somebody drops something on them or

5:41

tries to push them down, they won't go

5:42

down. In order for you to push them

5:45

down, you actually have to pull them out

5:48

and then they release past the little

5:50

metal barricade that prevents them from

5:52

going down. So you have to lift them up

5:55

and then you can click them down to the

5:57

down position which makes the accidental

5:59

shut off of these switches extremely

6:02

unlikely. They are also for example in

6:05

our aircraft nowhere near or even

6:08

similar in style to the flap handle.

6:11

This is not a switch that you would ever

6:13

in training go to during a flight. This

6:16

is not a a a switch that you

6:18

accidentally Oh, I meant to reach the

6:21

flaps and I happened to cut off both

6:23

fuel switches. No, no, no. Because even

6:26

if you accidentally cut off one of the

6:29

switches, you would have a single engine

6:31

failure and you should have still still

6:34

been able to fly. Now, we would have

6:36

likely seen some adverse yaw, although

6:39

Boeings have some pretty good adverse

6:41

yaw prevention in the event of a single

6:43

engine failure. likely you're still

6:45

going to see something, some evidence

6:47

that you have thrust in one engine. And

6:49

pilots all of the time are trained to

6:51

deal with this. You're going to pitch

6:52

for V2, some like to say, or your single

6:55

engine rate of climb. Some just level

6:57

off to the horizon, wait until they get

6:59

coordinated with their rudder to make

7:01

sure they don't play stall out the plane

7:03

and then get to their climb again. There

7:05

are many different strategies for what

7:07

to do in an engine failure, but this is

7:09

something that pilots train all of the

7:11

time. So even if one of them were

7:14

inadvertently shut off or intentionally

7:16

shut off

7:19

the second one or the second engine

7:21

since these control fuel flow to each

7:24

independent engine, left switch, left

7:26

engine, right switch, right engine, you

7:28

would not have this dual engine failure

7:31

and this aircraft accident. So this then

7:35

begs the question, why would somebody

7:38

turn both of these switches off? If

7:40

indeed it is true that both of these

7:42

switches were turned off, it means after

7:45

the aircraft rotated. So in other words,

7:48

after our takeoff, we're up in the air.

7:50

At that moment, somebody

7:54

made the decision to turn both of those

7:56

switches off, which you would never ever

7:58

do in flight unless an e emergency

8:01

procedure called for it. Certainly

8:03

unlikely during takeoff there would ever

8:06

be a reason for that.

8:08

And usually you only turn these off when

8:11

you actually get to engine shutdown and

8:12

you're parked at your gate and you're

8:15

ready to turn the plane off. So what

8:17

could have happened is that on takeoff,

8:20

the pilot in command, now this is my

8:23

speculation, okay?

8:26

Whoever we don't we don't necessarily

8:28

know who was flying the aircraft, left

8:31

seat or right seat. Usually what happens

8:34

is the left seat flies the plane as the

8:37

captain and the right seat ends up

8:39

operating flaps and radios. And

8:42

generally you'll see a rotation. So

8:44

you'll actually see them switch seats.

8:46

So it could have been the first officer

8:48

who was flying this time or it could

8:49

have been the primary pilot in command

8:51

who was flying. We don't exactly know.

8:53

Either way, somebody would have been in

8:56

control of rotating this aircraft. Now,

8:59

just so you could see what I'm referring

9:00

to, here's a video that I posted called

9:03

Dangerous Jet Landing, Phenom 300E,

9:05

worst turbulence yet. And this is

9:07

actually the takeoff portion of the

9:09

video, which I put towards the end

9:10

because it was less eventful. But what I

9:12

want you to do is I want you to see the

9:14

takeoff. And I want you to see that when

9:16

I when we call V1 and rotate, I will

9:20

actually move my hand from the thrust

9:23

lever from that center console where

9:25

those fuel switches are. And I will move

9:28

both my hands to the yolk, which Boeings

9:30

use yolks as well. And I will rotate by

9:33

pulling with both hands back on that

9:36

yolk, which means my hands are not at

9:38

the center console and I'm focused on

9:41

taking off, which does afford an

9:44

opportunity for when we call for flaps

9:46

to go up. the non-flying pilot to have

9:51

their hands in that center console,

9:53

manipulate the flap switches, but

9:55

potentially also shut off those fuel

9:57

valves in a malicious act, which is a

10:00

form of terrorism

10:02

that could be consistent with having

10:04

enough thrust to take off, then all of a

10:06

sudden almost simultaneously losing fuel

10:09

to both engines. Here again, a normal

10:11

takeoff.

10:14

Power brakes off. Right.

10:18

Your speed allowed three ways.

10:22

70. Sure.

10:25

See that helicopter coming over? That's

10:26

what I was worried about.

10:30

Hey, B1, rotate. The helicopter is no

10:32

factor. B2.

10:34

Positive. Both hands. You're up.

10:40

I got that helicopter in sight. No

10:41

factor. I'm going to start turning left

10:43

though. helicopter 6 05 north back with

10:44

the option report on negotiation flap

10:47

the option.

10:47

So there's obviously a lot to do here

10:49

and I'm flying in this example here in a

10:52

single pilot configuration where you

10:53

actually see that I'm operating the

10:55

gear. I'm operating the flaps. Typically

11:00

uh in a dual pilot Boeing setting you

11:03

would have one person who's not on the

11:05

yolk operating the flaps and the gear.

11:07

They would be operating those after the

11:09

pilot in command calls for it. So, uh,

11:11

this is scary because it suggests

11:14

terrorism is a potential option here. I

11:17

don't see how this could be a quote

11:19

unquote mistake because you can't take

11:22

off in this configuration. You just

11:24

wouldn't you wouldn't have the fuel.

11:26

Your engines would just shut down. You'd

11:28

shut down on the runway. So, it had to

11:29

have happened after takeoff. It remains

11:32

unclear whether the controls were

11:33

shifted intentionally, mistakenly, or as

11:35

a result of a malfunction. It seems

11:37

unlikely that the switches could be

11:39

moved as a malfunction or as a mistake.

11:42

And then both of them, it's not like

11:44

these switches just break. And even if

11:46

they did break, both of them, very odd.

11:49

Each of the two engines has a switch

11:51

with two positions. Running cut off.

11:52

Shifting the switch to cut off while

11:54

airborne would immediately shut down

11:56

fuel to that engine. It still run for a

11:58

few seconds. you know, it takes a little

11:59

bit of time, but once that line is

12:02

clear, yes, you would lose thrust uh and

12:04

disable the generators that supply

12:06

electricity and much of the plane

12:07

systems. That's why that ram air turbine

12:09

would deploy.

12:11

You just can't bump them and expect them

12:13

to move. The switches are used during

12:15

ground operations during starting or

12:17

shut off. Exactly. Uh adding to the

12:21

intrigue is any lack of any formal

12:23

safety communication from Boeing or GE.

12:26

Uh since the initial blackbox data was

12:28

examined by Indian authorities June

12:30

25th, aviation experts say this silence

12:32

may indicate that a mechanical fault is

12:34

not the leading theory behind the crash.

12:36

Right? They're basically saying, "Hey,

12:38

Boeing or GD GE didn't publish any kind

12:40

of like urgent recalls, right?

12:43

This is scary because it does mean that

12:47

it is possible that this was terrorism,

12:52

which is again comforting for all other

12:55

planes, but also gives me a lack of

12:58

faith in just humanity in general that

13:00

somebody would choose to do this if

13:02

indeed that's what it turns out happened

13:04

here.

13:04

Why not advertise these things that you

13:06

told us here? I feel like nobody else

13:07

knows about this.

13:08

We'll we'll try a little advertising and

13:10

see how it goes.

13:10

Congratulations, man. You have done so

13:12

much. People love you. People look up to

13:14

you.

13:14

Kevin Praath there, financial analyst

13:16

and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great

13:18

to get your take.

UNLOCK MORE

Sign up free to access premium features

INTERACTIVE VIEWER

Watch the video with synced subtitles, adjustable overlay, and full playback control.

SIGN UP FREE TO UNLOCK

AI SUMMARY

Get an instant AI-generated summary of the video content, key points, and takeaways.

SIGN UP FREE TO UNLOCK

TRANSLATE

Translate the transcript to 100+ languages with one click. Download in any format.

SIGN UP FREE TO UNLOCK

MIND MAP

Visualize the transcript as an interactive mind map. Understand structure at a glance.

SIGN UP FREE TO UNLOCK

CHAT WITH TRANSCRIPT

Ask questions about the video content. Get answers powered by AI directly from the transcript.

SIGN UP FREE TO UNLOCK

GET MORE FROM YOUR TRANSCRIPTS

Sign up for free and unlock interactive viewer, AI summaries, translations, mind maps, and more. No credit card required.