What Is Free Will Free From? | Kenneth Dorter | TEDxGuelphU

Okay, so we just had a talk about

science and the difference between

philosophy and science, the main

difference is that philosophy does not

deal in objectively measurable phenomena

the way science does. So science can

as it keeps improving its measurement

techniques,

it makes previous scientific theories

obsolete. That doesn't happen in

philosophy. Philosophy, the way we

measure things is subjectively and that

hasn't changed. So the 20th century

philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said

that

the entire western

philosophy.

The entire history of western philosophy

can be regarded as a series of footnotes

to Plato

who was the first philosopher whose

works we could we have in any detail.

Now if if you look at Plato, you find

that he deals with every issue

that modern philosophy deals with. Uh

and he seems to see all the points of

view except his the one that he chooses

is necessarily the one that other people

will choose

except with one exception.

He does not discuss freedom of will.

uh he does talk about

in a in the republic he talks says that

we're free to choose our next life in

all of its details. So in some sense

we're free but he never explains how

that's possible or what it involves. His

student Aristotle went a little further.

Aristotle is trying to decide what is a

a free act and he imagines an objector

saying

everything that we desire we desire

because it seems good to us

but we can't choose what's good what

looks good to us. We have no control

over what looks good to us. So we really

we really can't help what we choose. It

depends on our character and we can't

change our character at least not in the

moment. And Aristotle's reply to this is

well if this is the case

then there is no real freedom in our

actions. If there is freedom then in

some sense we must be responsible for

our character. And he just leaves it at

that.

um that view the view that he raises

via an objector

is what's called hard determinism. Hard

determinism is the view that everything

that we decide is determined and because

it's decided because it's determined

we have no responsibility for it.

Now a later philosopher Lucriccius an

Epicurion

who lived about uh who lived in the

first century BCE

was an atomist. He believed everything

was made up of atoms including our soul

and

the atoms bump into each other and

everything happens as a result of

collision of atoms. So

what does this have to say for freedom

of the will? It sounds sounds like a

determinist but he doesn't like the idea

of freedom of the will. So he says

there must be an ability of the atoms of

our soul to swerve spontaneously

out of their trajectories. And so we do

something that isn't simply caused by

what happened before.

And that's curiously

precient of the modern physics view, the

quantum indeterminacy view that things

at the at a certain level things happen

without any reason, without any cause,

purely spontaneously.

Now that view is the second of the three

major views on freedom of the will.

That's indeterminism. That things are in

fact not determined. The third we can

see in a philosopher who came about a

hundred years later the first century uh

CE

and that's Marcus Aurelius the emperor

of Rome and one of the great stoic

philosophers and Marcus Aurelius

uh it's sort of curious it seems as if

he's contradicting himself at first

because he says he keeps saying to

himself his book is called the

meditations but it's original title is

to self and he keeps saying to himself,

you're free. You you so why don't you

why don't you become a good man? Nothing

stopping you. You're free to become one.

So become one. And he keeps talking

about how he's free and not living up to

what he thinks you ought to be doing.

But when he talks about other people, he

says we should be forgiving of other

people because they really can't help

what they do.

because what they do,

what seems to them to be the right thing

to do, and this sounds like Aristotle's

objector, what seems to them to be the

right thing to do is what's in

accordance with their character, and

they can't help that.

So, how do you reconcile those two sides

of of Aurelius? The one that says,

"We're free. I'm free." And the one that

says, "You're not, and therefore I have

to forgive you." And that view is what's

come to be called compatibilism.

That is that there is a sense in which

the will is free that is also compatible

with causal determinism.

Now how that works is something that

I'll come to but I wanted to mention

these people because it gives us the

three basic postures on phil on the

question of free will. hard determinism,

indeterminism and compatibilism.

Now,

none of these people discuss free will

in any detail. The first person who

really does that is Platinus

um a neoplatonist philosopher who lived

in the 3rd century CE.

And I think the reason that he is the

first one who thinks this is worth

discussing in detail maybe because he

was acquainted with early Christian

theologians

and in fact freedom of the will first

becomes a really central issue in

philosophy with Christian theology.

Part of it is of course the question of

salvation and punishment and sin. Um, w

would a just god punish us if we're not

free? If our actions are somehow

determined, would reward or punishment

be justified then? But I think a

stronger reason for that

because you could say that about the

justice system in ancient Greece as

well.

A stronger reason I think is God's

omniscience.

God knows what you're going to do before

you do it. So, you're sitting there

stressing out

saying yes, no,

you're an idiot and going back and

forth.

And God, meanwhile, is is looking at the

next moment and already knows what

you're going to do while you're you're

going through all this terrible turmoil.

Uh, and so if God knows what you're

going to do before you do it,

how are you free? There's only one

choice you can make, namely the one that

God already sees. So that's why I think

it becomes an issue, starts to become a

big issue with Christianity.

So I'd like to begin with that question.

Um, how are we free if God knows what

we're going to do before we do it? What

we're going to choose before we choose

it.

And you don't have to believe in God.

You can believe in physics.

According to physics,

there were four dimensions.

Height, width, breadth, and time. Now,

but we're three-dimensional creatures.

So, I can look around and I can see

every point in the height of the

building. I can see every point in the

width. I can see every point in the

depth. But I can only experience one

moment of time. I can't see the other

moments of time.

But we're also told by physics that all

of time exists.

We as three-dimensional beings can't

know this, but all of time exists at

once. That there are wormholes in the

fabric of spaceime that connect the

future with the present with the past.

It's all there.

And a fourthdimensional being would be

able to see every moment of time the way

we three-dimensional beings can see

every moment of height, width, and

depth.

So

even if you don't believe in God,

if you believe in physics, it's

theoretically possible that a

fourthdimensional being sees what you're

going to choose before you choose it.

So are you free in that case?

Well, here Christian theology comes to

the rescue. Uh St. Augustine, a 4th

century founder of of uh Christian

theology really more than anyone else.

And he raises that question, not of

course with regard to the fourth

dimension, but with regard to God's

omniscience.

And his answer is a very simple and I

think very persuasive one. The fact that

somebody knows what you're going to do

doesn't force you to do it. God may know

what you're going to choose, but that's

only because God can see you making that

choice in the future. God's knowledge

does not determine your action.

So,

you're not limited by God's emissions.

So, the answer to our first question,

how can we be free if God already knows

what we're going to do? Is

that there's no problem that God's

knowledge doesn't interfere with our

freedom.

The second question I want to ask,

how can we be free if every event has a

cause? Which means that my choices have

causes, which means that everything is

determined.

So suppose I ask you, why do you why did

you come here today? And you're going to

say, because there was nothing good on

television.

Now I know why you're laughing because

there's always something good on

television.

But you know we can if we can believe in

Santa Claus we can believe in this

example at least for the sake of

argument.

So why do you think there's nothing good

on television?

Because you have certain tastes and

because the programmers made certain

decisions and the decisions the program

programmers made don't coincide with

your tastes.

So why do you have those tastes?

Well, you have those tastes

because of your experiences in life. You

have those tastes because of your

heredity. You have those tastes because

of your environment,

peer pressure and so on.

Um

and those in turn are caused by other

things

and those causes are caused by other

things

and so on back and back and eventually

the chain of causality starts at the

beginning of time.

The programmers who are making their

decisions about what to choose for your

programming today,

they too are determined by their tastes,

by their beliefs about what people want,

by their environment, by pure pressure,

by their heredity. And each of these has

causes. And each of those causes has

causes. And so there too everything

eventually goes back to the beginning of

time.

So ultimately all of our choices on this

view

begin with the with the f initial state

of the universe. Given the initial state

of the universe, everything follows

including every decision that anybody

ever makes.

So let's look let's look at this more

closely. There are three factors

involved

when we make decisions. One is the

available options.

Two is our tastes.

Three is the reasoning process by which

we arrive at our decision.

So let's take the first one, our

options.

There's a book by William Falner called

as I lay dying. And in this book, a

family is trying to get across a river,

but the bridge is washed out.

And so the brothers are

debating, should we do this, should we

do that? And they keep asking the

father, "What do you think, dad?" And

the father keeps saying, "If only the

bridge was still there, we could just

ride right across it." And that's all he

ever contributes to the debate.

Uh, but that's not his work. We don't

have that option.

The options we have are the options we

have.

We can't say if only. That doesn't

really help anything.

So the options are already

set. We have no there's no free will, no

freedom to change our options. Well,

what about our tastes?

If

suppose you go to get ice cream and you

love chocolate ice cream and you say,

"I'll have chocolate ice cream." And the

server says, "Sorry, we only have

vanilla." And you say,

"But that's terrible. I love chocolate

ice cream, but I hate vanilla ice

cream." And she says, "That's no

problem. Why don't you just decide to

love vanilla ice cream and hate

chocolate ice cream? Then then

everything will be fine."

Well, we can't that we can't change our

preferences.

What what seems good to us, what seems

desirable to us, we can't help that.

It's based on our character.

So that leaves the third possibility and

that is the reasoning process.

So somebody can say to you, I think you

should think about this some more.

And that's something that can change.

The options don't change. Your tastes

don't change. At least not in the

immediate moment.

But you can change your reasoning

process.

So what do you do when you think about

it some more?

It means that you stop

reacting to immediate gratification.

That's what the person means when they

say, "Think about it some more." that

you're just

you're too focused on your immediate

gratification. You have to think more

about the long-term consequences of what

you're choosing.

And so when you think about the

long-term consequences, things look

different. Um

you can realize that the things that

stir you up right now

are things which

will not

keep you happy for long and will have

consequences, unpleasant consequences

later on.

So in your decision

to resist the temptation of reacting

to the things that stir you up

in your decision

to instead

focus on what will bring you long range

happiness.

What you're doing is asking yourself,

what do I really want?

And you're doing then, if you do take

the time to think about it, think it

through, you're doing what you really

want. And this doing what you really

want is is doing something freely. It's

free will because it's what you really

want.

And this is the compatibilistic view.

You're saying, "Okay, I agree

that everything happens

by causal determination,

but at the same time,

I can be free from the pull of what

stirs me up. I can be free from

irrational behavior." And this is a

sense of freedom which is compatible

with determinism. So that's what

compatibilism is.

Now let's take a third question.

How can we be free?

Or let me put it let me put that

differently.

Can we be free

if there is no causal determination?

Is it possible to make a case for saying

we're free

because like the atoms that swerve

according to Lucriccius

or the indeterminate

events according to quantum theory?

Can these provide us a basis provide us

with a basis for freedom? because they

prove that things can happen

spontaneously

or if not prove at least they illustrate

that things could happen spontaneously.

So let let's consider some examples of

that.

So you're back to your ice cream place

and you say

and and as as you already know you love

chocolate ice cream.

Um,

and the other ice creams there look

pretty disgusting. U, they have things

like spinach ice cream and you hate

spinach.

And you say to the you go up there and

the guy says, "Oh, I remember you.

You're the guy that really loves

chocolate ice cream." Well, you're in

luck. Today, we have the finest

chocolate ice cream in the history of

the world. It's just been voted on by a

a panel of a million experts and they

all agree that this is the best

chocolate ice cream anybody has ever

made. Not only that, today it's half

price.

And not only that, but since you would

be the 100th person person to buy it

today, you would get a free Cadillac

automobile.

And you say, "I'll have the spinach ice

cream and lots of it.

Why do you say that?

No reason. Because it's an uncaused

event.

There's no explanation. It's a

spontaneous event. If there were a

reason, then there would be a cause. And

then our model that this is something

that happens without a cause

wouldn't work.

So,

so if you have uncaused events,

there's no explanation to why they

happen.

You can't give a reason for them.

You can't even say, well, he did it just

to show he was free and didn't have to

do what people expected of him. But that

would be a reason, too. Therefore, that

would be a cause of the decision. And

so, this model rules that out also.

There's no reason at all. The person

just says, "I'll have the spinach ice

cream." Which they hate,

but there's no reason that there's

nothing improbable about that because

it's happened for no reason. Let me give

you another example.

You're with your sweetheart.

It's a perfect day. The sweetheart your

sweetheart is the perfect person. It's

what it's the person that you've always

been looking for. And it's perfect in

every way.

and your sweetheart looks you deeply in

the eyes and says, "I love you." And you

look your sweetheart deeply in the eyes

and you say, "You smell like a wthog

and you look like one, too."

Well, why did you do that?

No reason.

It's an uncaused event.

So what these examples

are meant to illustrate is that if there

is such a thing as an undetermined world

where things happen spontaneously for no

cause at all.

That's not really what we would think of

as a meaningful sense of freedom. That

would be random chance. That wouldn't be

a good thing. Maybe, you know, maybe

it's freedom, but it's freedom from

yourself in a way. It's freedom from

your own preferences. It's just

a free floating event and there's

nothing that would be very desirable

about that.

So that's

the third question

that is the question of

can there be a meaningful sense of

freedom through indeterminacy events

that are not at all determined.

I have one last question that I want to

put and that is

can we be responsible for our actions

if we don't have

free will. So this goes back to one of

the questions I asked in connection with

theology earlier. Uh can you be held

responsible for your actions if all of

your actions are the products of causes

that go back to the beginning of the

universe? and you have no way of

changing them. Well, you can change them

but only in accordance with your

preferences. So, that's another causal

factor.

Um,

if you can't help doing what you do in

the way, for example, that Marcus

Aurelius said,

if everything that you do is determined

by

causes,

then how are you responsible for it? In

a way that's the question that

Aristotle's objector raised as well.

And the answer we've seen it to some

extent already. It's put most

effectively I think by David Hume.

And what David Humes

points out is is this.

Um, people say that you shouldn't be

held responsible for events

if they follow from

causes that you can't control.

And he says, well, this means they will

follow follow from your character.

But that's in fact what makes you

responsible for them. The fact that they

do follow from your character.

Imagine if events didn't follow from

your character. This would be like the

kinds of examples I gave before.

If events didn't follow from your

character,

then you do one thing one minute,

something completely unrelated and

incompatible with that the next minute.

Your behavior would be all over the

place. you would simply be irresponsible

because all of your choices would be

entirely free floating. They would have

nothing to do with who you are.

So that wouldn't be a good thing

and that wouldn't be respons

responsibility.

And if you get to the other question

then how can we punish people for doing

what they can't help doing?

Hume's point, and again this ties in

with things we've already talked about,

is that why else would you punish them?

You punish somebody

for what happens from their character.

If it doesn't come from their character,

there's no point in punishing them

because the next time they act may be

completely inconsistent.

You punish them because you think that

there's a consistent character behind

these actions which needs to be

reformed.

Otherwise, it makes no sense.

And furthermore, when you punish someone

or when you reward someone, what's the

purpose? The purpose is to change their

behavior.

Uh if you reward someone, it's to change

their behavior to be more consistently

like what they've already just done. If

you punish somebody, it's to get them to

be different in the next time.

Now,

the only way reward and punishment make

any sense is if they have an influence

on your behavior. And the only way they

can have an influence on your behavior

is if they have a causal effect on your

character or at least the choices you

make.

So, as Hume points out,

the only thing that really makes sense

is to punish people if there is

determinism

and reward people if there is

determinism. Determinism gives us a

reason to punish and reward, not a

reason not to punish and reward.

So, Hume

is not a hard determinist. He believes

in determinism, but he doesn't believe

that determinism is incompatible with

that determinism makes the question of

responsibility impossible.

Now, I'd like to conclude

with a reference to the title, what is

free will free from?

There are three basic answers to that

question.

One is that free will

is free from compulsion.

That is, you're free when you're not

forced to do something. So, you know,

The Godfather Movie, I'll make you an

offer that you can't refuse. What's the

offer? Well, in 30 seconds, either your

signature will be on that paper or your

brains will be on that paper.

That's not a free choice. Then that's an

act you're being compelled.

But we have lots of most of our choices

are free in that sense. That is free

from compulsion. All of us who are here

today came here from our of our own free

will. Uh well I don't know some people

might have dragged their their friends

along but um at least most of us are

here of our own free will meaning that

nobody compels us to do this.

A second thing that free will can be

free from

in theory is causality.

We when we speak about free will we

might mean free from causality.

We've already rejected that though. That

is there is causality.

If we were free from it, it would mean

these acts of spontaneity

that don't really seem to be something

that that that are desirable.

So free will in that sense is something

that I've rejected.

It if it if it does exist, it's at least

not a good thing. And as far as we know,

it doesn't exist because as far as we

can tell, every event does have a cause.

Third,

we can be free from irresponsible

behavior or irrational behavior.

And that's something that we can

certainly be free from. That is in the

example I gave before when someone said,

I think you need to think about this

some more. What they were saying was you

need to be more rational. You need to

free yourself from a kind of

uh re reflexive response to the stimuli

of emotions.

And so we can be the more rational we

are in the sense of the more we think

about what we're doing, why we're doing

it, and whether it's what we really

want, and whether it'll get us what we

really want.

The more we do that, the more free we

are because the more we are choosing

what we really want.

And yet that is at the same time

something that's compatible with the

belief that every event has a cause. And

so that is compatibilism

that we're free in the sense of free to

be of being reasonable, free from being

irrational.

um but we're not free from cause from

causality. So ultimately the view that

I'm recommending to you is

compatibilism. Thank you.