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Air India 171 RETRACTION & UPDATE | Critical New Info!

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0:00

I owe you an update and a retractment of

0:03

what we talked about yesterday regarding

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the Air India 171 crash because we have

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new information that could add at least

0:12

to some of our understanding of what

0:14

happened but also opens up yet even more

0:17

questions. So as you already know just

0:20

to catch you up to speed and if you

0:21

don't want to be caught up to speed skip

0:22

ahead about a minute but this is Air

0:25

India 171. Almost 300 people died as

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this aircraft lost lift in what appears

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to be at least at this point believed to

0:33

be a dual engine failure which becomes

0:35

important. We don't see what appears to

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be a flame out from a bird strike. We

0:39

don't see a lot of adverse law. A little

0:41

bit of bank we see to the left that

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could potentially be indicative of uh

0:47

trying to guide away from buildings

0:49

ahead as essentially the pilots roll

0:52

away in this tragedy that occurs. But no

0:55

indications of a loss of a single

0:57

engine. Though even Boeing's mechanisms

1:00

can can minimize any kind of adverse yaw

1:03

if we just lost one engine. But if we

1:05

just lost one engine here, we left the

1:07

gear out, it's unlikely that this Boeing

1:09

787 Dreamliner would actually end up

1:12

crashing and losing all lift. So what

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does that leave us with? And what do we

1:18

have to retract from yesterday? Well, I

1:21

threw together a quick little note sheet

1:23

just to give you the idea. We don't see

1:25

the visible bird strike. We don't think

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pulling up the gear or the wrong flap

1:30

setting is a major issue here. We've

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talked about these items in different

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videos. And these aircraft can fly just

1:35

fine. Even if we're one setting off on

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the flap setting or we have the gear

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down, these aircraft are really designed

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to be able to maintain thrust and a

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climb rate even with just one engine.

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So that really leaves us with some form

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of dual engine failure leading to either

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the automatic or manual ram air turbine

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deployment. Now what could have caused

2:00

this dual engine failure could be a

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whole host of things. Some form of crazy

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fadec reset, fuel contamination, some

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form of fuel pump failure or lockup, a

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catastrophic electrical failure or an

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intentional issue. And so as a jet

2:18

pilot, I've familiarized myself with

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many different emergency procedures for

2:24

a dual engine failure. Uh and yesterday

2:27

we talked about this article from air

2:30

current where air current describes this

2:34

uh potential for the fuel switches

2:38

having been adjusted prior to the

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impact. And so a lot of people are now

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focused on these fuel control switches

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and what position they were in and why

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they were potentially manipulated before

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impact. Now, I've watched other videos

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and creators talk about this and not a

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lot of creators have begun to talk about

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the procedure for the specific 787

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Dreamliner. Uh, and it sort of shows

3:01

that this procedure is very different

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from what you typically see in uh a

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Boeing aircraft or potentially another

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aircraft. For example, I'm type rated in

3:11

the Phenom 300 EJET uh as a pilot in

3:14

command, also solo pilot, which is you

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know rare to fly a jet solo. Uh and you

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know, every aircraft has different

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emergency procedures, but there's often

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a lot of overlap. For example, one place

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there's overlap is in the concern

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regarding these switches that these

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switches can't be accidentally switched

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off. Why would both fuel valve switches

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be switched off? And for most normal

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emergency procedures, for us to

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potentially see these emergency switches

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turned off, even in the event of a dual

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engine failure would be quite odd. Take

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a look at some of these different

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emergency procedures for a dual engine

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failure or a loss of thrust on both

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engines. You might see engine start

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switches adjusted. You might see the

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thrust levers reset. For example, on our

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aircraft on the Phenom, you go to idle.

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You put your oxygen masks on. you

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establish communications and you land as

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soon as possible. Those are basically

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your memory items for dual engine

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failure. And then of course if you have

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the altitude you can go through

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potential relighting through either

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automated relighting or depending on if

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you have enough speed windmilling to

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restart these engines. You can go

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through windmilling restart procedures.

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This is very normal for an aircraft. Uh

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on the Boeing 737 for a loss of thrust

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on both engines, you would go through

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also manipulating the levers uh for

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thrust. You'd be watching the

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temperatures of the turbine engines. And

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based on what altitude you're at, you

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would go to different steps in the

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future. See, as you can see on the left

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here, above 20 flight level 270, you

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would do follow one set of instructions.

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Below flight level 270, which is 27,000

5:01

ft, you'd follow yet another uh set of

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instructions. Now, what's unique in the

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Dreamliner, which we didn't mention

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yesterday, and I apologize for that, uh,

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in the enthusiasm to share information

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about the latest information that we're

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getting regarding what caused this

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accident, we didn't specifically look

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for that models checklist, and it is a

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vastly different from that of other

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aircraft. And for that, I apologize.

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That's a failure. But the beautiful

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thing about making these videos is we

5:36

get to learn together and expand our

5:38

aviation knowledge and ultimately we try

5:40

to make aviation safer for everyone.

5:42

It's actually what got me into aviation

5:44

was watching people's videos like pilot

5:47

debrief or Captain Steve or mentor pilot

5:49

or whatever whom I respect greatly and I

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think they're all wonderful creators and

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everyone contributes to making the

5:55

industry safer. And so even though not a

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lot of people have talked about it yet,

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what I have is a screenshot of the

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emergency procedures for the 787

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Dreamliner which was the Air India 171

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flight. And remember the question is why

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were those fuel control switches moved

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to cut off? they don't accidentally go

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to cut off which is what was mentioned

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in the uh air current article or other

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articles that it's potential that

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there's a potential that some of these

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fuel control switches were potentially

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improperly inadvertently or

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intentionally switched off. An

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intentional switch off of these fuel

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control switches would be very bad. Uh,

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if you intentionally switch these

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switches off by lifting them and pushing

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them down past their gate, you will very

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rapidly lose engine thrust. Some of the

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pilots and comments yesterday suggested

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you would almost instantaneously lose

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engine thrust, especially during a high

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power phase of flight like takeoff.

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However, the 787 Dreamliner has very

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unique procedures which you don't see in

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a lot of other aircraft when it comes to

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these fuel control switches and it

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changes everything. Take a look at this.

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In the event of a dual engine failure,

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despite the fact that these pilots had

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very, very little time to do anything,

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the very first memory item is to cut off

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the fuel control switches.

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The general procedure is you move them

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to cut off for about 1 second. See how

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it says cut off then run. So you move it

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down 1 1000 and you move it back up. The

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second step is manually deploying the

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ram air turbine.

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And the causes for a dual engine failure

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in this example at high altitude could

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be fuel leak, fuel starvation, or

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volcanic ash, which generally you deal

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with volcanic ash in areas like Hawaii,

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but I I mean I suppose you can have

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volcanic ash floating around somewhere,

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but this seems relatively unlikely.

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a fuel leak is a possibility

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that uh you know hasn't been talked much

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about. Usually people talk about uh the

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fuel valves being cut off which

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ironically is one of the procedure items

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here. The reason is you're trying to

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almost hot start these engines where you

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you cut the fuel flow off hopefully cool

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down the turbines a bit but they're

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still hot enough and spinning enough to

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where when you hit them back in

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hopefully you can quickly relight. Uh

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although you may relight into a stall,

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the hope is that at any altitude on the

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787 Dreamlininer, you're able to restart

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these engines rapidly regain thrust and

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pull out of whatever crisis you're in.

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Now, it's highly unlikely that any of

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these procedures would have functioned

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at 600 ft of altitude, which makes that

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takeoff altitude such a unfortunate and

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critical phase of flight. However, if

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these switches were moved in

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as as a memory item to resolve the

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problem, then it actually suggests that

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the pilots did exactly what they were

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supposed to do, which is the opposite of

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the potential that somebody decided, I'm

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checking out and I'm taking the plane

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down with me. I'm going to reach over

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and I'm going to turn these switches

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off, which would also accomplish

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crashing the plane. Now, whoever went

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for these control switches possibly also

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manually deployed this rammer turbine.

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Now, we won't know until obviously we

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get more official reports out, but what

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we recognize here is another potential

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cause is bird strike on both engines,

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but we don't see that. We don't see that

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flame out coming out of the end of the

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engines, which is typical after the

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ingestion of birds. You don't see the

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typical uh sort of like momentary loss

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of thrust on the left engine and the

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right engine. You don't see the typical

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stalling of the engines that you would

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ordinarily see in a larger bird strike.

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These aircraft are after all designed to

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withstand bird strikes. Not just the

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windows, but the engines. They're

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designed to withstand bird strikes.

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Larger birds cause problems for larger

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flocks of birds. Obviously, of course,

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some of the threats here would be

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startle factor, confusion arising from

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multiple subsystem failures and a very

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high workload, especially when you're

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600 feet above the ground. mitigation,

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prompt recognition of the situation and

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initiation of the correct memory items.

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And that may be exactly what they did.

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Switching the fuel control switches to

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shut off or cut off rather uh and then

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run and then deploying the ram air

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turbine. Of course, that didn't light

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the engines, at least from what we could

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tell, because we never got thrust

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restored, which then goes back to our

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list here. Okay, if we remove

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intentional, while that is still a

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possibility, let's for a moment remove

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intentional,

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we recognize the dual engine failure

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procedure will call for an automatic or

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manual deployment of the rammer turbine.

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So, we already know that we didn't see a

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bird strike. We're not so worried about

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gear flap because we know we could fly

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with those. Even slightly misconfigured,

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that's not going to take a plane down.

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We know we had the dual engine failure.

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So, it really leaves us with some of

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these issues here. fuel contamination,

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some form of fuel pump failure, uh a

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very rare case of vapor lock, uh some

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form of uh leak, we could write in here

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some kind of catastrophic electric

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failure which could maybe reset both

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fadeex but seems very unlikely. And this

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is why I started this segment off by

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saying, you know, this really raises

11:37

more questions than answers at this

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point. But it is possible and it's worth

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noting that the pilots did exactly what

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they were supposed to do. Which then

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just brings us back to how did one of

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these things fail? And we still have

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this remaining question of why have GE

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and Boeing not put out some kind of

11:54

emergency update? Maybe they don't have

11:56

the answer yet or maybe there was

11:59

another cause we're not looking at yet

12:01

or aware of yet. We'll see as more data

12:04

comes out, but I wanted to make this

12:05

update as soon as possible. Uh, and if

12:07

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to get your take.

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